In late September 2026, Moscow took its retaliation against European sanctions one step further. According to Reuters reporting relayed on 29 September 2026, Russia placed the Russian assets of several European groups under temporary management, presenting the move as an answer to European sanctions and to the freezing of Russian state assets in the European Union. French retail groups operating in Russia are among the targets, alongside a Swiss food group and a German wholesale group. A specialist sanctions briefing dated 30 September 2026 adds that a presidential decree transferred the Russian assets of French retail operations and the former Russian operations of a French home-improvement chain, together with logistics companies, to a Moscow-registered management company created in October 2024.
Two reserves open this analysis, and they matter more than anything that follows. First, no official source available at the date of writing establishes an expropriation, a fault or a liability: the facts below are written in the indicative only insofar as they reproduce what the cited press and professional sources report, and everything the sources do not say is written in the conditional or not written at all. Second, only a court or an arbitral tribunal ruling on the actual contracts and measures can decide what these operations are in law; signed contracts take precedence over any general analysis. With those reserves stated, the September 2026 sequence deserves a full legal reading, because it tests three bodies of law at once: Russian emergency-management decrees, European sanctions law, and the investment-protection treaties France signed before the war.
I. What Moscow Decided in September 2026, and What It Means in Law
A. How will French groups know whether their Russian assets are under temporary management?
The starting point is factual, and it comes from the wires. Modern Diplomacy, relaying Reuters on 29 September 2026, reports that Moscow was moving to strip European companies of ownership rights over their Russian assets, presenting the European Union’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict as the justification. The same report states that Russia placed the assets of a Swiss company, a German wholesaler and a French retailer under temporary management in the course of September 2026. A senior Russian official described these actions as “asymmetric measures” in response to sanctions from European nations, and warned that more companies could face similar treatment. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, still according to the same reporting, suggested that the measures could be reversed, while blaming the absence of dialogue from the European Union.
The sanctions briefing published on 30 September 2026 by an international law firm gives the operation a sharper outline: a presidential decree is said to transfer the Russian assets of French retail operations, a Swiss food group’s Russian assets and the former Russian operations of a French home-improvement chain “under the control of the Russian entity” designated by Moscow, alongside the assets of two logistics companies. The briefing adds two details that litigators will keep: the designated management company was established in Moscow in October 2024, and it has no disclosed ultimate beneficiaries or significant commercial activity of its own. None of this is confirmed by an official Russian publication available to this author at the date of writing, so it is reported here strictly as press information, in the conditional where the source itself is conditional.
The mechanism itself, however, is documented in official sources. Since 25 April 2023, Russian Presidential Decree No. 302 has provided the legal framework for placing assets owned by investors associated with so-called unfriendly states under temporary administration, a measure recorded in UNCTAD’s investment policy monitor as the framework for temporary administration of assets held by certain investors linked to unfriendly states (UNCTAD measure page). The Kremlin has since published amendments extending that regime (amendments to the temporary-administration order). The September 2026 operations therefore do not invent a new tool; they extend an existing one to new, bigger and more visibly French targets. The same wire reporting counts 135 firms tied to foreign companies now under temporary administration, against only 22 Western firms reported affected before, while the number of European businesses still operating in Russia has fallen sharply. No major American company is reported as similarly targeted, a contrast the reporting links to ongoing United States-Russia discussions about business opportunities conditional on future peace in Ukraine.
For a French group, the practical question comes first and it is binary: has title passed, or has management passed? Temporary administration, as designed in the 2023 framework, formally leaves ownership with the foreign investor while handing voting rights, management appointments and cash-flow control to an administrator. A transfer decree worded as the September 2026 press reports describe would go further toward a change of economic ownership. The distinction decides everything that follows — the applicable treaty standard, the competent forum, the valuation date and the very vocabulary, since only a tribunal could say whether the operation “could be regarded as” an expropriation. French in-house counsel should therefore secure, before any public comment, the full chain of documents: the published decree if any, the administrator’s appointment acts, board minutes, bank instructions and any notice served on local directors. Without that paper trail, no arbitration and no delisting-style challenge can be built.
B. Is temporary management an expropriation, and who decides?
International investment law answers with a test, not a label. A measure that leaves formal title untouched can still be an expropriation if it permanently deprives the investor of the use, enjoyment and economic value of the asset — the classic “creeping” or indirect expropriation. Conversely, a temporary, reversible, non-discriminatory administration ordered for a declared public purpose, with compensation, can be a lawful regulation of property. Between the two, tribunals weigh duration, reversibility, intensity of interference, discrimination and compensation. Nothing in press reporting alone allows a lawyer to place the September 2026 operations on one side or the other of that line, which is why every qualification in this article stays conditional: the operations as reported could be consistent with prolonged administration, or they could present features — transfer to an opaque vehicle, absence of compensation, targeting by nationality — that a tribunal would be asked to examine as a possible creeping expropriation.
The treaty that would frame a French claim is old, and that is precisely its strength. The agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments, signed on 4 July 1989, continues to apply between France and the Russian Federation as successor state, and it is catalogued as the France-Russian Federation BIT (1989) (treaty record). Like most French bilateral treaties of that generation, it protects French investors against expropriation and nationalisation except for a public purpose, without discrimination and against prompt and adequate compensation, and it offers access to international arbitration. Three consequences follow for a French group targeted in September 2026. First, the nationality of the investor at the relevant dates must be documented, because restructuring after the measures will not help. Second, the local remedies and negotiation periods written into the treaty must be calendared immediately, since limitation and fork-in-the-road clauses punish late or parallel moves. Third, valuation must be frozen in method from day one: comparable transactions from before the interference, audited accounts, and contemporaneous board valuations will weigh more than any expert report commissioned two years later.
European sanctions law forms the other half of the legal picture, and it cuts both ways. On the European side, the asset freezes rest on Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Regulation 269/2014) and on Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine (Regulation 833/2014), renewed and extended many times since 2022. Their validity in principle was confirmed early by the Court of Justice in the Rosneft case, C-72/15, in which the Court upheld the Council’s broad discretion in foreign-policy sanctions (C-72/15 judgment record). But validity in principle is not validity in each listing: the General Court annuls individual listings whenever the Council’s evidence is stale or insufficient, and September 2026 gave a fresh example with the annulment of a former Russian senator’s 2024 and 2025 relistings in Tkach v Council, Case T-584/24, decided under Regulation 269/2014. The same month, the Council itself removed two prominent businessmen from the individual sanctions list when renewing the regime, lifting their freezes — proof, if any were needed, that a listing lives or dies on evidence, not on reputation.
That evidence-based logic is Moscow’s stated grievance and Brussels’ standard answer at once. Russia presents the September 2026 operations as “asymmetric measures” responding to sanctions and to the freezing of about 210 billion euros of Russian state assets in the EU, a figure recalled both in the wire reporting and in recent policy analysis on using those assets to fund Ukraine in 2027 (EPC analysis). The European answer, developed in earlier coverage of the frozen-assets debate, is that immobilisation under sanctions is not confiscation, and that any use of the assets’ proceeds must pass through a judicial or legislative act engaging the responsibility of its author — a question examined in detail in our analysis of frozen Russian assets, ECHR compensation claims and enforcement in France. A French group caught between the two blocs should therefore litigate on two tracks without mixing them: contest the Russian measure as an investor under the treaty, and manage the European position as a regulated operator under the sanctions regulations. Each track has its own forum, its own clock and its own standard of proof.
II. How Can a French Group Targeted in Russia React From Paris?
A. Can a French investor sue Russia in arbitration over seized assets?
The investor-state track is the natural forum, and the 1989 treaty is its door. A French group whose Russian subsidiary has been placed under temporary administration or transferred to a designated manager can, once the treaty’s negotiation period has been observed, file for arbitration and ask a tribunal to characterise the measure and value the loss. The claim would typically plead unlawful expropriation — discrimination by nationality, absence of a genuine public purpose, absence of compensation — alongside breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, for example where assurances of reversibility were followed by an irreversible transfer, and breach of full protection and security. None of these pleas is self-proving: the tribunal will want the decree, the administrator’s acts, the correspondence with ministries, and proof that the investor exhausted or properly bypassed local remedies as the treaty requires. Groups that kept clean corporate records in Russia start this race several lengths ahead; groups that managed their subsidiary by informal instructions will spend the first year reconstructing evidence.
Two practical obstacles must be priced in from the start. The first is enforcement of a future award. Russia has a record of resisting payment of investment awards, so counsel must map, before filing, where Russian commercial assets outside Russia could one day be attached — and that mapping runs into the second obstacle, the immunities of foreign states before French courts. French law is strict: “Des mesures conservatoires ou des mesures d’exécution forcée ne peuvent être mises en œuvre sur un bien appartenant à un Etat étranger que sur autorisation préalable du juge par ordonnance rendue sur requête” (Article L.111-1-1 of the Code of Civil Enforcement Procedures, Légifrance). In plain English: no conservatory or enforcement measure against property belonging to a foreign state without prior judicial authorisation by order on petition. The text’s symmetry matters — the protection France grants foreign states is the mirror of what French groups would invoke abroad — and it means award enforcement in France is a second full litigation, not an administrative formality. The judge may authorise such a measure only on narrow statutory grounds — express consent of the state, property specifically earmarked for the claim, or commercial-use property — as Article L.111-1-2 provides (Légifrance). Diplomatic-use property, central-bank assets and military property enjoy near-absolute protection, and Article L.111-1-3 specifically shields property, including bank accounts, used or intended for the diplomatic mission (Légifrance); only commercial-use property offers a realistic path, and the creditor must prove that use.
The third obstacle is political and it sits in Washington as much as in Moscow. The wire reporting notes that no major American company has been targeted, in a context of United States-Russia discussions about future business. A French group cannot free-ride on that bilateral channel, but it can coordinate with the French and European authorities so that its individual file feeds the collective response — the 19th sanctions package discussions, the listing of the individuals and entities that implement the takeovers, and the European measures of 28 September 2026 adding ten individuals and seventeen entities over the deportation of Ukrainian children (Council press release). Retaliation decrees have authors, signatories and beneficiaries; European sanctions practice increasingly names them. Filing an arbitration and feeding a listing file are complementary, not alternative, strategies.
Finally, the European blocking statute must be read before any American angle is touched. Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of third-country legislation (the Blocking Statute) prohibits EU operators from complying with certain foreign measures and nullifies foreign judgments given under them. Its current scope covers listed United States measures, not Russian decrees, so it does not directly shield a French group against a Moscow administrator. But its logic governs the group’s conduct elsewhere: where American secondary sanctions and Russian countersanctions pull in opposite directions, the statute tells the Paris headquarters which compliance choices are lawful in Europe. Any wind-down, sale or asset swap in Russia must therefore be screened twice — once against the EU Russia regulations, once against applicable United States measures — before it is negotiated with an administrator whose own designation status must itself be checked.
B. What should a French group do in France while its assets are blocked in Russia?
While the arbitration clock runs, Paris offers three defensive lines. The first is the French asset-freeze administration itself. France implements European freezes through the Monetary and Financial Code: the Minister for the Economy and the Minister of the Interior may jointly order, for six months renewable, the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, possessed, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance terrorism, incite it or take part in it — “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” held by such persons (Article L.562-2, Légifrance) — and the Minister for the Economy may order equivalent freezes to implement United Nations Chapter VII resolutions and European acts (Article L.562-3, Légifrance). The chapter opens with Article L.562-1, which defines the key terms — terrorist act, funds, freezing — by reference to the European regulations (Légifrance), and the question of who “controls” a listed entity is assessed in French company law by the control test of Article L.233-3 of the Commercial Code (Légifrance). A French group targeted in Moscow will often discover that its own compliance department must simultaneously apply these texts in France: payments to the Russian administrator, dividends rerouted through designated persons, or services to a newly listed manager can each constitute making funds available in breach of the EU regulations, punishable in France. The first instruction to the Paris headquarters is therefore counterintuitive but firm — freeze first, characterise later: suspend all flows touching the Russian entity, file the required notifications, and seek authorisations before moving a single euro.
The second line is evidentiary and it must be built in France, not in Russia. The September 2026 delistings carry a lesson many general counsels miss: the Council removed two major businessmen from the individual sanctions list upon renewal, after negotiation, because listings must rest on current, specific evidence — and the General Court had just annulled another party’s 2024 and 2025 relistings for want of it. Evidence decays on both sides of this conflict. A French group should therefore constitute, under the control of its French counsel and protected by legal privilege, a complete “Russia file”: pre-measure valuations, shareholder resolutions, financing agreements, insurance policies including political-risk cover, correspondence with the Russian authorities, and a day-by-day log of the administrator’s acts. That file serves the arbitration, any civil claim for reparation — since “Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer” (Article 1240 of the Civil Code, Légifrance) — the dialogue with the French Treasury’s sanctions-implementation services, and any future claim against insurers. Political-risk insurance deserves a dedicated audit: notification deadlines in such policies are short, and a late declaration can void cover worth more than the arbitration itself.
The third line is strategic communication held to a lawyer’s standard. Press coverage of the September 2026 decrees names names; the group’s own statements must not. Confirming or denying operational details in public can waive privilege, contradict a future pleading, or breach sanctions-reporting duties. The disciplined posture is a short holding statement — operations continue to serve customers and employees, the group is assessing measures reported in the press, it complies with all applicable sanctions, it reserves all its rights — and nothing more until counsel clears the next step. Inside the company, the message is the reverse: maximum circulation of the litigation hold, suspension of routine document-destruction policies for the Russian perimeter, and briefing of directors on the risk of personal designation. Administrators appointed by decree sometimes seek the cooperation of incumbent directors; those directors need written instructions from Paris before signing anything, because a signature given under pressure in Moscow can be read as consent in The Hague or in Paris.
Conclusion
The September 2026 decrees mark a change of scale, not a change of nature: Moscow is using its 2023 temporary-administration framework against household names of French and European business, openly as retaliation for European sanctions and the immobilisation of Russian state assets. For the groups concerned, the law offers a structured path — document the measure, qualify the investor’s nationality, observe the 1989 treaty’s steps toward arbitration, enforce with eyes open about state immunity, comply strictly with the European freeze regime in France, and learn from the September 2026 delistings that evidence, not outrage, moves both courts and councils. Each of these steps is conditional on facts only the group’s own documents can establish, and each forum will apply its own test.
The closing reserves mirror the opening ones. At the date of writing, no official source establishes that the reported operations constitute an expropriation, a fault or a liability on anyone’s part; what press and professional sources do not say remains unwritten or conditional. Signed contracts — investment agreements, shareholder pacts, financing and insurance policies — take precedence over any general analysis, including this one. And only the courts and tribunals competent over each dispute — the arbitral tribunal for the investor’s claim, the EU courts for any sanctions listing, the French enforcement judge for any attachment — can decide what the September 2026 measures were and what they are worth. Groups that prepare all three tracks now will be ready whichever characterisation prevails; groups that wait for clarity will find that the law’s clocks did not wait for them.