KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Netanyahu ICC Arrest Warrant: Can France Arrest Him in Paris, or Does Immunity Shield Him?

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Netanyahu ICC Arrest Warrant: Can France Arrest Him in Paris, or Does Immunity Shield Him?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

Benjamin Netanyahu is back at the top of American search trends this week, with more than 20,000 searches in the United States and interest doubling within days, as US outlets report new Israeli planning around Iran and as the International Criminal Court file refuses to go away. On 21 November 2024, the Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants of arrest for the Israeli prime minister and his then defence minister Yoav Gallant, for crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Gaza. Almost two years later, those warrants remain unexecuted, Washington has escalated from sanctioning ICC officials to sanctioning the Court itself on 9 October 2026, and a Canadian government memo revealed this month that Ottawa was advised it would be expected to carry out ICC arrest warrants, including for Netanyahu, if he entered Canada. The question therefore travels well beyond North America: if Netanyahu’s aircraft touched down at Roissy or Le Bourget tomorrow, would France arrest him, or would immunity stop the police at the foot of the plane? Paris answered in advance, on 27 November 2024, that the immunities of a sitting leader of a State not party to the Rome Statute apply and would have to be taken into consideration if the Court requested his arrest and surrender. Yet eight months ago, France’s own Court of Cassation, sitting in its most solemn formation, redrew the exact boundary of that immunity in a way every foreign ministry lawyer is now rereading. This article explains what the judges in The Hague actually decided, what French statute law commands once an ICC arrest request reaches Paris, where the immunity argument genuinely bites, and the precise court path a case like this would follow through the French capital.

I. The ICC Wants Netanyahu Arrested, and French Law Organises Full Cooperation With the Court

A. What the Judges in The Hague Actually Decided About Netanyahu and Gallant

On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges brought by Israel under articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute, and on the same day it issued warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, as the Court announced in its official press release on the Situation in the State of Palestine. Israel had asked the Chamber to rule that the Court had no jurisdiction over the Situation in general and over Israeli nationals in particular, and to order the Prosecutor to issue a fresh notification of the investigation; the judges rejected both requests. On jurisdiction, the Chamber took the view that Israel’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction was not required, because the Court could exercise jurisdiction on the territorial basis of Palestine, as an earlier composition of the Chamber had determined. The Chamber added that States are not entitled to challenge jurisdiction before a warrant of arrest has been issued, which made Israel’s challenge premature, while leaving the door open to future challenges on jurisdiction or admissibility.

The warrants concern alleged criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators for the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare and for the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution and other inhumane acts, committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, the day the Prosecutor filed the applications. The Chamber also found reasonable grounds to believe that both men bear responsibility as civilian superiors for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population of Gaza, on the basis of two documented incidents. The factual findings describe the deprivation of objects indispensable to survival, including food, water, medicine, fuel and electricity, the obstruction of humanitarian relief, and the severe impact on water availability and hospitals, with the judges noting that no clear military necessity or other justification under international humanitarian law could be identified for the restrictions. The arrest warrants themselves were classified as secret to protect witnesses and the investigations, but the Chamber chose to make their existence public because similar conduct appeared to be continuing and because victims and their families had an interest in knowing.

The jurisdictional foundation deserves attention because it is the point most often misunderstood in public debate. On 1 January 2015, the State of Palestine lodged a declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes committed since 13 June 2014, Palestine acceded to the Statute shortly afterwards, the Prosecutor opened the investigation on 3 March 2021, and the Chamber had already ruled on 5 February 2021 that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction extends to Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. Israel is not a party to the Rome Statute, and neither is the United States, but the Prosecutor’s case does not rest on their membership: it rests on territory. That territorial anchor is exactly what makes the warrants relevant far beyond the Middle East, because every State Party on whose soil a wanted person sets foot faces the same cooperation question, and France wrote its answer into its own Code of criminal procedure more than twenty years ago.

B. How France Turns an ICC Arrest Request Into a Case Before the Paris Courts

France signed the Rome Statute on 18 July 1998 and built a dedicated cooperation regime into its Code of criminal procedure, whose opening article states the principle without ambiguity: for the application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court signed on 18 July 1998, France takes part in repressing the offences and cooperates with that court under the conditions set by the present title. The following passage states the rule in the authentic French wording: « Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. » The machinery that follows is centralised in Paris by design. Requests for arrest for the purpose of surrender issued by the Court travel in original with supporting documents to the French authorities competent under article 87 of the Statute, which check their formal regularity and then transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris court of appeal while simultaneously executing them across the entire territory of the Republic. The authentic wording is: « les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République. » In an emergency, the request may even be sent directly and by any means to the territorially competent public prosecutor, which means an arrest at Roissy or Le Bourget can begin before the paperwork completes its formal circuit.

The same design runs through the enforcement of protective measures: the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor orders the execution in France of the conservatory measures requested by the Court, for a maximum of two years renewable, and transmits any enforcement difficulty to the competent authorities so that the consultations provided for by the Statute can take place. That consultation channel matters more than it looks, because it is the procedural outlet through which a delicate question such as immunity would be raised with the Court rather than settled unilaterally in Paris. Readers who want the full sequence of a Paris ICC surrender, from the airport police station to the investigating chamber and the Cassation appeal, will find it narrated step by step in the account of what happens when an ICC fugitive is arrested in France and brought before the Paris judge, which follows the same articles applied here.

II. The Immunity Wall: Why Paris Says a Sitting Prime Minister Cannot Simply Be Handed Over

A. What France Declared in November 2024, and the Article 98 Problem Behind It

Six days after the warrants were issued, the French foreign ministry published a statement that remains the official French position to this day and that anyone advising a government, an airline, or a travelling official must read first; the full text is available on the ministry’s page devoted to the ICC warrants concerning Israel. In substance, France said it would respect its international obligations, recalled that the Rome Statute demands full cooperation with the Court, but added that the Statute also provides that a State cannot be required to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law concerning the immunities of the officials of States not party to the Court. Paris then drew the consequence explicitly: those immunities apply to Prime Minister Netanyahu and the ministers concerned, and they would have to be taken into consideration if the Court asked France for their arrest and surrender. The statement therefore does not deny the warrants and does not deny the duty to cooperate; it interposes the immunity of a sitting leader of a non-party State between the two.

The legal knot behind that sentence is the clash between two provisions of the Rome Statute. One removes official capacity as a shield before the Court itself: a head of State or government cannot plead his position to escape the Court’s jurisdiction. The other, the provision on cooperation and third States, provides that the Court may not pursue a request for surrender that would require the requested State to breach its international-law obligations on the immunities of a third State or its officials, without first obtaining the cooperation or waiver of that State. France reads the second provision as covering a prime minister in office of a State that never joined the Statute, and as obliging Paris to pause, consult, and weigh that immunity before any handover. The reading has distinguished company and fierce critics: the International Court of Justice held in 2002, in the case concerning the arrest warrant against the Congolese foreign minister Yerodia, that an incumbent foreign minister enjoys immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of another State, while listing the situations where prosecution remains possible, including before his own country’s courts, after a waiver, after leaving office, or before certain international criminal courts, and the full case file is kept by the International Court of Justice under the name Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000. Conversely, the ICC Appeals Chamber held in May 2019, on the referral of Jordan over its failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir, that there is no head-of-State immunity before the ICC itself and that a State Party in that position should have arrested and surrendered him, a ruling whose reasoning is preserved in the Court’s record of the Jordan referral appeal judgment. Both rulings can be correct at once, because one governs national courts and the other governs the international court, and the French position sits precisely on that fault line.

The geopolitical weather around the file has only thickened since. Washington, furious at the warrants against the Israeli leaders and at the Afghanistan investigation, moved from targeting Court officials to targeting the institution itself with sanctions announced on 9 October 2026, as reported by Al Jazeera’s coverage of the United States sanctioning the International Criminal Court itself on 9 October 2026, while Ottawa was advised it would be expected to execute ICC warrants on its soil, according to the Canadian public broadcaster’s account of the government’s legal memo. For France, an EU member bound by the regulation that neutralises foreign sanctions in Europe, the collision between American pressure and the duty to cooperate is a live operational problem, analysed in detail in the explanation of how Washington’s sanctions on the Court interact with France’s duty to cooperate and the European blocking statute. But sanctions do not dissolve warrants, and they do not rewrite immunity: they only raise the stakes of the Paris decision.

B. What France’s Highest Court Ruled in July 2025, and the Exact Paris Procedure That Would Follow

The decisive French clarification came not from the executive but from the judiciary, and it came very recently. On 25 July 2025, the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly, its most solemn formation, ruled on the validity of a French arrest warrant issued against a sitting Arab head of State for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, in its published plenary judgment on the personal immunity of an incumbent head of State. The chamber of investigation of the Paris court of appeal had refused to annul the warrant, reasoning that international crimes fall outside any legitimate official function; the plenary assembly quashed that ruling and annulled the warrant. Its reasoning is now the reference point for every immunity argument raised in Paris, and it cuts in both directions.

First, the Court confirmed that personal immunity belongs only to a narrow circle and covers everything: « L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. » A sitting prime minister therefore holds it as fully as a sitting president, as stated in the plenary ruling itself. Second, the Court held that this immunity, which proceeds from the sovereign equality of States, applies before national courts even when the charges are crimes against humanity or war crimes: « en l’état du droit international, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre ne font pas exception au principe de l’immunité de juridiction des chefs d’État étrangers en exercice. » Neither the peremptory character of the prohibitions nor the gravity of the crimes creates an exception before a domestic judge today, as the plenary assembly held. Third, and crucially for an ICC case, the Court drew the line exactly where the two courts divide: « Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale. » Immunity blocks the national judge; it cannot block the international court whose statute expressly excludes it, in the Court’s own words. The judgment adds the sentence every practitioner quotes back to clients who confuse the two, in the judgment’s words: « L’immunité n’équivaut pas à l’impunité. Elle n’exonère pas la personne qui en bénéficie de sa responsabilité pénale. » The crimes may still be tried before the courts of the leader’s own country or before a competent international court, and personal immunity lasts only as long as the office, with the Court recalling that functional immunity after leaving office can no longer be opposed to prosecutions for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.

Procedurally, the same judgment makes immunity a question the French judge must raise on his own motion, because it constitutes a manifest procedural obstacle to his jurisdiction: « Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge. » Applied to our hypothesis, this means the Paris chambre de l’instruction could not simply look away; it would have to confront the immunity question head-on, in public hearing, with counsel heard, since the plenary assembly requires it. And the chamber’s room for manoeuvre on an ICC surrender is narrowly fenced by statute. Anyone arrested on an ICC request must be brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent public prosecutor, with the rights of custody applying in the meantime: the Code states that any person apprehended under an ICC arrest request must be presented within a day to the local prosecutor, informed in a language he understands, and granted immediate access to counsel of his choice or appointed ex officio. The authentic wording is: « Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent. » Transfer to Paris must follow within five days, failing which the president of the investigating chamber orders immediate release: the transfer to the Paris detention facility is capped at five days from presentation to the prosecutor, on pain of release. The authentic wording is: « Le transfèrement doit avoir lieu dans un délai maximum de cinq jours à compter de sa présentation au procureur de la République, faute de quoi la personne réclamée est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, à moins que le transfèrement ait été retardé par des circonstances insurmontables. »

The Paris phase then runs on short, binding timetables. The investigating chamber is seized immediately and the wanted person appears within eight days, with a possible eight-day extension, questioned on the record in public hearing unless publicity would harm the proceedings, a third party, or dignity. Then comes the decision that would make world headlines: where the chamber finds no manifest error, it orders surrender and, if the person is free, his incarceration for that purpose, ruling within fifteen days of appearance, with the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation deciding any further appeal within two months of receiving the file. The authentic wording is: « Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. » And the same article confines the chamber strictly: « Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. » The chamber does not retry the Hague case; it checks identity, papers, and the absence of manifest error, then hands over. That limited standard of review is exactly what the Court of Cassation confirmed when it upheld the surrender of Félicien Kabuga to the international residual Mechanism, holding that the investigating chamber’s review consists only of verifying identity, the production of the instruments behind the request, that the facts fit, and the absence of manifest error. The authentic wording is: « le contrôle de la chambre de l’instruction consiste seulement, en cette matière, à vérifier si les conditions de remise sont remplies quant à l’identité de la personne, la production des titres en vertu desquels la demande est formée, l’existence de faits entrant dans la définition posée à l’article 1er de cette loi, et l’absence d’une erreur évidente. » The same ruling adds the safety valve: « Ce contrôle inclut par ailleurs, si sa violation est invoquée, le respect des garanties fondamentales accordées à la personne réclamée. » Release pending surrender can be sought at any time under the Statute’s own detention regime, and once the surrender decision is final, handover must occur within one month, failing which the president of the investigating chamber orders immediate release. The authentic wording is: « La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction, à moins que sa remise ait été retardée par des circonstances insurmontables. »

Conclusion

The Paris answer to the Netanyahu question is therefore neither a simple yes nor a simple no, and the distinction matters for anyone who travels, advises, or reports on this file. The warrants are real judicial acts resting on territorial jurisdiction that does not require Israel’s consent; French statute law organises full cooperation with the Court through a Paris-centred procedure of arrest, presentation within a day, transfer within five days, hearing within eight, surrender ordered within fifteen days of appearance, and handover within a month of a final decision. Against that machinery stands the immunity France recognised in November 2024: before French courts, a sitting prime minister of a non-party State enjoys personal immunity that even charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes do not pierce, as the plenary assembly confirmed in July 2025. But that same judgment states that immunity cannot be opposed before the international court whose statute expressly excludes it, and it obliges the Paris judge to examine the obstacle openly rather than presume it away. In practice, then, a landing in Paris would trigger arrest and the full surrender procedure, inside which the immunity claim would be litigated in public, with the Article 98 consultation channel to the Court as the likely theatre of the decisive exchange, and with release valves at every missed deadline. Immunity here is not impunity; it is a procedural wall before one set of judges that disappears before another, and the wall itself lasts only as long as the office.

📄 Official circular