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Washington Sanctioned the ICC Itself: What France’s Rebuke Means for Suspects, Witnesses and Companies in Paris

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Washington Sanctioned the ICC Itself: What France’s Rebuke Means for Suspects, Witnesses and Companies in Paris

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On 9 October 2026, the United States imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court itself. Secretary of State Marco Rubio vowed to dismantle the Court piece by piece unless it ends what Washington regards as a threat to its citizens, according to the United Nations account of the announcement (UN News, 9 October 2026). Three days later, on 12 October 2026, France replied in the blunt language of diplomacy, condemning the American institutional sanctions targeting the International Criminal Court (France Diplomacy, Statement of 12 October 2026). The timing added symbolism. The escalation came just hours after former ICC judge Navi Pillay was awarded the 2026 Nobel Peace Prize, in what the International Federation for Human Rights called a striking contrast between recognition of the fight against impunity and efforts to undermine international justice. For anyone in France, the question is concrete rather than ceremonial. A suspect wanted by The Hague who lands at Roissy, a witness living in Paris, a non-governmental organisation that documents atrocities, a bank asked to freeze an account, a lawyer instructed to advise on American designations: each now stands between two colliding orders, an American prohibition and a French obligation. This article explains, with the official texts, what Washington decided, whom it hits, what France still owes the Court under its own Code of Criminal Procedure, and why applying American sanctions from French soil can itself be a criminal offence.

I. Washington sanctioned the ICC itself: what the October 2026 escalation changes

A. From ICC judges to the institution: the decree of 6 February 2025 and the October 2026 blacklisting

The starting point is an American presidential decree dated 6 February 2025. France describes the sequence precisely in its official statement of 12 October 2026: several sanctions had already been adopted on the basis of the presidential decree of 6 February 2025, hitting judges and staff including French judge Nicolas Guillou, and now the institution itself was targeted (France Diplomacy, Statement of 12 October 2026). The progression matters. First Washington designated individuals, judges, prosecutors and staff of the Court, among them a French national sitting as a judge in The Hague. Those earlier waves of individual designations, from the February 2025 order through the summer 2026 listings, are retraced in the companion analysis of American ICC sanctions, French cooperation and the blocking statute. Then, on 9 October 2026, it moved from persons to the institution, sanctioning the Court as such. The International Federation for Human Rights, headquartered in Paris, denounced the move the same day, after successive sanctions against ICC judges, prosecutors and partner organisations, calling the institutional designation an unprecedented escalation that threatens the Court’s ability to fulfil its mandate and a direct attack on the rule of law (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026).

The mechanism created by the February 2025 order is worth reading in full, because everything since has been built on it. Section 1 provides that all property and interests in property located in the United States, or in the possession or control of any American person, belonging to the persons concerned are blocked and may no longer be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court, Sec. 1(a)). The circle of persons concerned is drawn wide. It covers the person listed in the annex and any foreign person whom the Secretary of State, consulting the Treasury Secretary and the Attorney General, finds to have directly taken part in an ICC effort to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute a protected person without the consent of that person’s country of nationality (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Sec. 1(a)(ii)(A)). It extends further to anyone who has materially assisted or sponsored such an effort or such a person, or provided financial, material or technological support, or goods or services, for them (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Sec. 1(a)(ii)(B)). In plain terms, the order reaches not only the judges who sign warrants but potentially anyone who helps the Court do its work, including organisations and service providers outside the United States whose property touches American jurisdiction or American persons.

The prohibitions are not limited to freezing what exists. Section 3 states that the prohibitions cover both making any contribution or provision of funds, goods or services to a blocked person and receiving any such contribution or provision from a blocked person (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Sec. 3). Giving money to a designated person is prohibited; receiving money from one is prohibited too. The order adds that these prohibitions apply regardless of any contract concluded or any licence or permit granted before the date of the order (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Sec. 1(b)). Earlier agreements do not survive: a retainer signed before the designation, a grant agreement already running, a lease already concluded, none of these prevails over the blocking once the designation takes effect. Alongside the money comes movement. Section 4 suspends unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States for persons meeting the designation criteria, their immediate family members, and persons employed by or acting as agents of the ICC (Executive Order of 6 February 2025, Sec. 4). Designated persons, their close relatives, and even staff employed by the Court can be barred from American soil.

France answered each layer of this construction. Its statement calls on the United States to withdraw the sanctions and reaffirms France’s unfailing support for the Court and its staff (France Diplomacy, Statement of 12 October 2026). That pledge of support is not decorative: France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, it hosts no ICC organ but it cooperates with the Court under a dedicated title of its Code of Criminal Procedure, and one of its own judges was among the first designated. Paris adds that it is acting collectively, working with its European partners and the other States Parties to the Rome Statute to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially, delivering justice to the victims of the most serious crimes (France Diplomacy, Statement of 12 October 2026). The reference to the 125 States Parties echoes the Federation’s warning that States which built a court to hold the powerful accountable cannot stand by while it is dismantled, calling the moment the ultimate test for those 125 States Parties (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026) The reasoning behind the French position is the same one that governs every surrender case examined in Paris: international criminal justice only works if States execute what the Court orders, a logic explained in detail in the analysis of what France must do when an ICC arrest warrant reaches its territory.

B. What American sanctions concretely freeze: assets, visas, services, and the narrow carve-outs

Sanctioning an institution rather than individuals changes the practical picture. When judges were designated, the Court could reassign tasks and States could voice support; when the Court itself is designated, every transaction that touches the American financial system and involves the institution is potentially caught. Salaries paid through dollar clearing, cloud hosting billed by an American provider, travel booked on American platforms, grants received from American foundations, all sit in the danger zone. The Federation describes measures so broad that Washington had to create special exceptions for basic activities such as paying salaries, maintaining essential services and caring for detainees (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026). That sentence deserves attention: a sanctions regime that needs explicit licences to let a court pay its own staff and feed its own detainees is a regime whose default setting is paralysis. The words attributed to the Secretary of State leave no doubt about the intent: either the Court ends what Washington calls its threats, or Washington ends the Court (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026).

The consequences radiate well beyond The Hague, and this is where readers in France are directly concerned. Civil society organisations that document atrocities, preserve evidence, support witnesses and help victims seek justice operate largely on grants, bank accounts and cross-border transfers that pass through dollar infrastructure. The Federation reports that such organisations have already faced sanctions, financial restrictions and intimidation, and notes that three of its Palestinian member organisations, Al-Haq, Al Mezan and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, have themselves been sanctioned (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026). In September 2026, the Federation, Amnesty International and 36 other organisations filed a joint amicus curiae brief in support of a lawsuit challenging the American sanctions regime, documenting how the sanctions disrupt civil society’s work and threaten victims’ access to justice worldwide (FIDH, Press release of 9 October 2026). A Paris-based association that receives American funding, banks with a group active in the United States, or partners with designated organisations can find its accounts frozen or its transfers rejected, not by any French decision but by the compliance department of a bank applying American rules extraterritorially. The same exposure reaches law firms, experts, translators and investigators who bill the Court or defence teams: any contribution or provision of funds, goods or services to a designated person is prohibited, and receipt is prohibited symmetrically.

Individual travel is the second pressure point. The suspension of entry covers designated persons, their immediate family members, and persons employed by or acting as agents of the Court. A French lawyer who assists the ICC, a witness who testifies in The Hague, an expert who files a report for the Prosecutor, each must consider that American territory may close to them, and must weigh that risk before accepting instructions. None of this is theoretical for France: French nationals work at the Court, French organisations cooperate with it, and French banks clear dollars daily. The practical question therefore reverses. It is no longer only whether Washington can punish The Hague; it is whether Paris must still help The Hague, and whether Paris forbids obeying Washington. That is the second half of this article, and it is governed entirely by French law, which continues to apply on French soil regardless of the American designations. The surrender mechanics themselves, chamber of the instruction, time limits and appeal, are examined in the companion analysis of how a surrender to the ICC unfolds before the Paris judge, while the general French extradition procedure before the same chamber is set out in the guide to extradition under French law and the guarantees of the requested person.

II. Paris refuses to follow: what France still owes the Court and what it forbids on its soil

A. Can France still arrest and surrender suspects to the ICC: the duty to cooperate under the Code of Criminal Procedure

Nothing in the American sanctions repeals French law, and French law orders cooperation. The dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens with a principle stated without ambiguity: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre” (art. 627 du code de procédure pénale). France participates in punishing the offences and cooperates with the Court. The same article defines the personal scope: “Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre” (art. 627 du code de procédure pénale). Genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes: these are the three categories for which France has bound itself to act as the enforcement arm of The Hague on its territory.

French domestic definitions mirror the Rome Statute and carry the heaviest penalty in the French scale. Genocide is defined as follows: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité” (art. 211-1 du code pénal). Crimes against humanity follow: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique” (art. 212-1 du code pénal), followed by the statutory list of underlying acts from wilful killing to enforced disappearance. War crimes are defined by reference to the conduct of hostilities: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31” (art. 461-1 du code pénal). These definitions matter for surrender practice because the Paris chamber of the instruction verifies that the acts described in the ICC warrant correspond to crimes this severe; the vocabulary of the warrant and the vocabulary of the French code must meet.

The procedure itself runs through the Paris judiciary. When the Court requests the surrender of a person found in France, the chamber of the instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal examines the request, and the test at that stage is deliberately narrow: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin” (art. 627-8 du code de procédure pénale). No manifest error, then surrender, with detention if the person is free. Any other question raised before the chamber is not decided by it: “Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles” (art. 627-8 du code de procédure pénale). Defences that belong to The Hague, challenges to the evidence, disputes about the context of the conflict, immunity arguments, go to The Hague; Paris checks identity, manifest error and procedural regularity. Speed is built into the statute: “La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée” (art. 627-8 du code de procédure pénale), and on further appeal “la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation” (art. 627-8 du code de procédure pénale). Fifteen days at the investigation chamber, two months at the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation: a person arrested in France on an ICC warrant must organise the defence within weeks, not months.

Cooperation is not only about handing people over. The Court regularly asks France to freeze assets, seize documents or preserve evidence pending trial. French law assigns these conservatory measures to a specialised magistrate: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste” (art. 627-3 du code de procédure pénale). The Treasury advances the costs, the anti-terrorist prosecutor of Paris orders execution, and the statute caps the duration: “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans” (art. 627-3 du code de procédure pénale), renewable before expiry at the Court’s request. This is precisely where American sanctions collide with French procedure: a Paris bank served with a French conservatory order for the ICC and, simultaneously, an American instruction to block the same funds for the opposite reason, must choose, and French law tells it which order prevails on French territory. Beyond ICC requests, France can prosecute these crimes itself when the suspect lives here. The universal jurisdiction provision states that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code” (art. 689-11 du code de procédure pénale). Two cumulative conditions frame this jurisdiction: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français” (art. 689-11 du code de procédure pénale), and “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne” (art. 689-11 du code de procédure pénale). Habitual residence in France plus a monopoly of the anti-terrorist prosecutor plus priority to any surrender or extradition request: that is the French safety net that keeps operating even while Washington tries to switch the Court off.

B. Can a French bank or company obey American sanctions: the blocking statute that makes it a criminal offence

France does not merely decline to apply foreign sanctions; it punishes those who apply them. The instrument is the law of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information to foreign persons, known as the French blocking statute, reinforced at European level by the EU blocking regulation against third-country sanctions. Its first article draws a prohibition that covers exactly the reflex American sanctions demand from compliance departments: “il est interdit à toute personne physique de nationalité française ou résidant habituellement sur le territoire français et à tout dirigeant, représentant, agent ou préposé d’une personne morale y ayant son siège ou un établissement de communiquer par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, à des autorités publiques étrangères, les documents ou les renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité, aux intérêts économiques essentiels de la France ou à l’ordre public, précisés par l’autorité administrative en tant que de besoin” (art. 1er de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968). A French bank that transmits a client’s file to an American authority to demonstrate compliance with the ICC designations, an executive who reports the account movements of an ICC-related association to satisfy an American regulator, each falls squarely within this prohibition when the communication threatens French sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order.

The second article of the same law closes the most dangerous door, the one marked evidence for foreign proceedings: “il est interdit à toute personne de demander, de rechercher ou de communiquer, par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents ou renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères ou dans le cadre de celles-ci” (art. 1er bis de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968). Gathering or transmitting documents to build evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings is forbidden as such. An American designation procedure, an enforcement action by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, a discovery request in American litigation over ICC dealings: all are foreign administrative or judicial proceedings within the meaning of this article, subject only to treaties and international agreements, which is why cooperation with the ICC itself, ordered by a French judge under the Rome Statute system, stands on the opposite, lawful side of the line. The law then imposes an active reflex instead of silent compliance: the persons concerned “sont tenues d’informer sans délai le ministre compétent lorsqu’elles se trouvent saisies de toute demande concernant de telles communications” (art. 2 de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968), meaning anyone served with such a request must inform the competent minister without delay rather than execute it. And the sanction is criminal, not administrative: “toute infraction aux dispositions des articles 1er et 1er bis de la présente loi sera punie d’un emprisonnement de six mois et d’une amende de 18000 euros ou de l’une de ces deux peines seulement” (art. 3 de la loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968). Six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 18,000 euros: that is the price, under French law, of obeying the foreign prohibition.

The practical consequence for companies, banks, associations and their counsel in Paris is a compliance conflict with no comfortable middle. Executing an American instruction to freeze the funds of the Court, of a designated judge, of counsel, or of a partner organisation exposes the French actor to the blocking statute and to the European regulation that mirrors it; refusing to execute it exposes a group with American operations to secondary American penalties. French law resolves the conflict in principle: on French territory, the French prohibition and the French cooperation order win, and the proper response to the American request is notification of the minister, not transmission of the documents. In practice, groups manage the collision by segregating flows, seeking licences on each side, documenting every request received, and never transmitting anything to the foreign authority before the minister has been informed and French counsel has qualified the request against treaties in force. For individuals the asymmetry is simpler to state: a French national designated by Washington for assisting the Court commits no offence under French law by that assistance, while a French actor that denounces or starves the Court to please Washington risks French criminal prosecution. The design is deliberate. France built the blocking statute precisely for moments when a foreign power orders, from abroad, what French law forbids at home.

Conclusion

The sequence of October 2026 is now fixed in the official record. On 9 October, Washington sanctioned the International Criminal Court as an institution, after designating its judges and staff under the decree of 6 February 2025. On 12 October, Paris condemned the institutional sanctions, called for their withdrawal, and pledged with its European partners and fellow States Parties to keep the Court able to work independently and impartially for the victims of the gravest crimes. Between those two dates, the legal position of anyone in France did not move: the Code of Criminal Procedure still orders French judges and prosecutors to arrest, detain, freeze and surrender for the Court, with fifteen days before the investigation chamber and two months before the criminal chamber of the Court of Cassation, and the law of 26 July 1968 still punishes with imprisonment and a fine anyone who hands economic or financial information to foreign authorities or builds evidence for foreign proceedings. Suspects should prepare surrender defences within days of arrest and reserve Hague-level arguments for The Hague. Witnesses, experts and counsel should assess American travel exposure before accepting ICC work. Banks, companies and associations should treat every American sanctions instruction touching the Court as a notifiable event for the minister and a file for French counsel, never as an order to execute. The Court that Washington wants to dismantle brick by brick is the same Court that French law requires Paris to supply with suspects, evidence and frozen assets. That contradiction will be tested case by case, account by account, warrant by warrant, and each test will be decided, on French soil, by French judges applying French statutes.

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