On 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice closed four days of public hearings in the case brought by Nicaragua against Germany over German arms exports to Israel and other support allegedly facilitating grave violations in Gaza. The Court is now deliberating on Germany’s preliminary objections, and its ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility, expected later this year, will decide whether the case proceeds to the merits — a phase that could run until 2030. Nicaragua told the judges that Germany breached the Genocide Convention by selling Israel weapons used in Gaza. Germany answered that the case was improperly filed and should be thrown out. For an international audience, the decisive question is wider than Berlin: the same legal file could be opened against any European arms supplier, including France. A Paris lawyer’s view is therefore essential reading — because France licenses military exports under its own code, answers to European criteria, and has already seen its highest administrative court refuse to suspend arms authorizations bound for the Middle East. This analysis explains what The Hague just heard, what a Nicaraguan victory would change, and exactly what would happen if the same case were filed in Paris.
I. Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: what the 7 to 10 September 2026 hearings were really about
The case is officially titled Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany). Nicaragua filed its application on 1 March 2024, asking the Court at the same time to indicate provisional measures, the urgent orders meant to protect the rights at stake while a case is pending. Oral hearings on those measures took place on 8 and 9 April 2024. On 30 April 2024 the Court found that the circumstances, as they then presented themselves, did not require provisional measures — but it kept the case on its General List and the proceedings continued. That distinction matters enormously: the refusal of urgent measures decided nothing on the substance of Nicaragua’s claims. The Court neither cleared Germany nor rejected Nicaragua’s substantive claims. Nicaragua then filed its Memorial on the merits in July 2025. In October 2025 Germany responded not on substance but with preliminary objections to jurisdiction and admissibility, which under the Court’s Rules suspended the merits phase. Nicaragua answered those objections in writing in February 2026. The September 2026 hearings were the oral argument on that procedural battle alone: two rounds of pleadings, Germany’s delegation led by Legal Adviser Julia Monar and Nicaragua’s by Ambassador Carlos Jose Arguello Gomez, with President Iwasawa presiding. As the Registry announced, the Court would now begin its deliberation and deliver its decision at a future public sitting whose date will be announced in due course. For the full official record, readers can consult the ICJ press release of 10 September 2026 and the ICJ case page with all verbatim records.
A. Can Nicaragua sue Germany over Gaza when Israel is not in the courtroom
Germany’s first objection is the simplest to understand and the hardest to defeat: Nicaragua never had a genuine legal dispute with Berlin, because Managua simply wanted to drag Germany before the Court. Countries bringing a case to The Hague are normally expected to show that a real dispute existed and that they attempted to resolve it before filing. Monar told the judges on the opening day that Nicaragua had shown no interest in hearing Berlin’s view on the allegations and had simply wanted to bring Germany before the Court. Nicaragua’s lawyers denied this, pointing to documents sent to the German foreign ministry and to press releases describing the dispute. The Court will have to decide whether that paper trail amounts to a genuine pre-existing dispute within the meaning of its Statute, or whether Managua manufactured jurisdiction after the fact. This is a classic admissibility filter, and States challenging jurisdiction raise it in nearly every case — but here it carries unusual weight, because the underlying facts concern a third State’s military campaign rather than any bilateral quarrel between the two parties.
Germany’s second line of defence is temporal. Berlin accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction only for disputes arising from situations or facts occurring after 2008, and it argues that Nicaragua’s claims are rooted in a far older background — the occupation, the settlements, decades of conflict — that predates that cut-off. Nicaragua rejects the argument and says Germany confuses the background of the case with the claims themselves, which concern German conduct in 2023 and 2024: export licences issued after 7 October 2023, financial decisions taken in 2024, and the political support expressed during the Gaza campaign. The distinction between background facts and facts giving rise to the dispute is a familiar one in the Court’s case law, and much of the September argument reportedly turned on where that line falls. If the Court sides with Germany, part of Nicaragua’s case could be trimmed before the merits are ever reached.
The third objection is the most dramatic, and the one international lawyers watched most closely: the Monetary Gold principle. Germany argues that Nicaragua’s claims cannot be decided without first determining whether Israel itself committed genocide or serious violations of humanitarian law — yet Israel is not a party to these proceedings. Under the rule derived from the Monetary Gold case, the Court must decline to rule where deciding the dispute would necessarily require it to pronounce on the legal responsibility of an absent third State. Nicaragua answers that the case is about Germany’s own obligations and Germany’s own conduct: the duty to prevent genocide, the duty to ensure respect for humanitarian law, and the decision to license arms and fund or defund agencies. On this view, whatever Israel did, Germany had independent duties of its own, and judging Berlin requires no prior verdict on Jerusalem. The Court’s answer will shape not only this case but every future attempt to sue an arms supplier rather than the user of the weapons — which is precisely why Paris, London and Rome followed these hearings with close attention.
A fourth question concerns the discrimination claims. Nicaragua also alleges that Germany failed to prevent and condemn racial discrimination, segregation and apartheid in the occupied Palestinian territory, and Germany disputes that the Court has any jurisdictional basis for that part of the case. The Genocide Convention gives the Court jurisdiction over genocide-related disputes between its parties, which both Nicaragua and Germany are — but stretching that jurisdictional title to cover apartheid and discrimination claims is legally ambitious. How the Court treats this limb will signal how far third-State litigation can reach beyond the Genocide Convention into the broader architecture of international human rights law.
The factual backdrop against which all of this was argued is striking. Nicaragua says German export licences for military equipment bound for Israel were worth 378 million dollars in the last three months of 2023, against 45 million in the first three months of the year — an eightfold surge after the war began. Germany, the world’s second-largest supplier of arms to Israel after the United States with 31 percent of Israel’s major-arms imports over 2021 to 2025 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, replied in April 2024 that 98 percent of what it had authorized since October 2023 was general equipment such as vests, helmets and binoculars rather than weapons of war. Berlin then suspended all military exports for use in the Gaza offensive in August 2025, before lifting the restrictions a few months later by pointing to the stability of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Nicaragua’s lead counsel put the knowledge argument bluntly: given the depth of Germany’s political, commercial and military relationship with Israel, Berlin could not have been unaware, and should in any event have been aware, of the serious risk of acts amounting to genocide. Whether that serious-risk standard triggers Germany’s duty to prevent is ultimately a merits question — but the jurisdiction ruling expected later in 2026 will show which way the wind is blowing, and a full judgment would not arrive before 2030.
B. If Nicaragua survives the objections: complicity, prevention and the precedent for every arms supplier
Should the Court reject Germany’s objections in whole or in part, the merits phase would force it to answer questions that no international court has ever settled definitively. The first is what complicity in genocide actually means for a State that supplies weapons. The Genocide Convention punishes complicity, and it obliges every party to prevent genocide — but at what moment does the duty to prevent crystallize, and what must a supplier State concretely do once it sees a serious risk? Must it suspend all licences, review them case by case, demand end-use guarantees, or simply stop new authorizations? Nicaragua’s case builds directly on the South Africa proceedings against Israel, in which the Court already found it plausible that some rights under the Genocide Convention were at stake. Extending that logic from the alleged perpetrator to its suppliers would be a major step: it would convert the duty to prevent from a general appeal into an operational checklist for every defence ministry and export-licensing office in Europe.
The second merits question concerns Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, under which States undertake not only to respect humanitarian law themselves but to ensure respect by others. Nicaragua invokes this provision alongside the Genocide Convention and peremptory norms, arguing that Germany’s military, political, financial, academic and technical cooperation with Israel breached its own obligations regardless of what Israel itself did. A ruling on this point could clarify when arms transfers made in full knowledge of a foreseeable risk of serious violations of humanitarian law engage the responsibility of the supplying State — guidance that would immediately constrain export policy in Paris, Madrid, London and beyond. The case also raises the obligations of third States toward the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, including the duty to cooperate in bringing unlawful situations to an end rather than sustaining them through trade, funding and institutional partnerships.
The third dimension is institutional and financial. Nicaragua’s original application also challenged Germany’s decision to suspend funding to the United Nations relief agency for Palestinian refugees at a critical moment — a reminder that third-State responsibility is not only about weapons but about the money and structures that keep a civilian population alive. Combined with the questions about academic, scientific and corporate cooperation with institutions involved in the occupation, a merits judgment could provide the first comprehensive judicial map of what States may and may not do when another State stands accused of the gravest international crimes. For accountability, cessation, reparations and deterrence, the stakes extend far beyond Germany and Palestine: any State whose weapons, funds or partnerships sustain an allegedly unlawful situation would have to read the judgment as addressed to itself.
That is why the September hearings matter even though nothing was decided on substance. If the Court throws the case out on jurisdiction, third-State litigation over Gaza largely ends with South Africa’s direct case against Israel. If even part of Nicaragua’s claims survives, every European capital with a defence industry must audit its licences, its funding decisions and its cooperation agreements — starting with France.
II. The same file in Paris: who authorizes arms exports and which judge can stop them
France is one of the world’s leading arms exporters, and its licensing system is both highly centralized and largely shielded from judicial review. Understanding how Paris decides, who can challenge those decisions, and where the criminal courts fit in is the practical core of this analysis — because any lawyer asked whether France could face its own Nicaragua-style case must answer with procedure, not slogans. The French regime combines a strict prior-authorization rule, a European overlay of denial criteria, an administrative judge who often declines jurisdiction over defence diplomacy, and a criminal arsenal that includes genocide, complicity and universal jurisdiction. Each layer must be examined in turn.
A. How Paris licenses weapons and why the administrative judge usually refuses to intervene
The starting point is a prohibition. Under Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code, “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” In plain English: no war material leaves France for a non-EU State without prior authorization, and the administration defines both the controlled list and the exemptions. The licence itself, as Article L2335-3 of the Defence Code provides, is granted by the administrative authority in the form of general licences or individual licences, and the system is completed by Article L2335-4 of the Defence Code, which allows the authority to suspend, modify, repeal or withdraw licences at any time for reasons including respect for France’s international commitments, protection of essential security interests, public order, or non-compliance with licence conditions. Companies that breach the regime face detection and prosecution: Article L2339-1 of the Defence Code empowers customs officers, judicial police and authorized defence ministry agents to record violations, while licence holders must open their premises and hand over information to State inspectors. The executive therefore holds the full toolkit — authorization, suspension, and punishment — and exercises it through an interministerial commission whose deliberations are covered by defence secrecy.
Above the national code sits the European filter. Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which governs every EU Member State’s arms-export policy, lays down eight assessment criteria, and its Criterion Two is the one that mirrors Nicaragua’s arguments against Germany. Having assessed the recipient country’s attitude toward human rights and humanitarian law instruments, Member States must, in the official English text, must refuse a licence where a clear risk exists that the equipment might be used for internal repression, must exercise special caution where serious human rights violations have been established by competent UN, EU or Council of Europe bodies, and must refuse a licence where a clear risk exists that the equipment might be used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law. The full text is available on EUR-Lex as Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. In theory, this European standard does exactly what Nicaragua asks the ICJ to impose on Germany: no licence where a clear risk of serious humanitarian-law violations exists. In practice, each Member State applies the test itself, behind closed doors, and no European court systematically second-guesses individual licensing decisions.
Could a French court do what the ICJ is being asked to do — suspend the licences? The normal emergency route against an administrative decision is the refere-suspension: under Article L521-1 of the Administrative Justice Code, when a decision is challenged on the merits, the interim judge “peut ordonner la suspension de l’exécution de cette décision, ou de certains de ses effets, lorsque l’urgence le justifie et qu’il est fait état d’un moyen propre à créer, en l’état de l’instruction, un doute sérieux quant à la légalité de la décision.” Urgency plus serious doubt about legality — that is the test every association challenging an export licence to a belligerent must meet. And the fastest filter is Article L522-3 of the Administrative Justice Code: where urgency is lacking or where it is manifest that the claim falls outside the administrative courts’ jurisdiction, is inadmissible or is ill-founded, the interim judge may reject it by reasoned order without investigation or hearing.
That filter proved fatal to the most direct French attempt to obtain exactly what Nicaragua seeks internationally. On 6 January 2026, the Conseil d’Etat’s interim judge ruled on case number 510900, in which the company EvidenceBank asked the court, among other things, to order the French State to suspend, as a conservatory measure, every authorization for the export, transit or material support of arms and military technology bound for Israel. The order rejected everything, holding that such claims “ont une portée générale excédant les pouvoirs du juge des référés et ne sont pas détachables de la conduite des relations internationales de la France.” In English: the requests were general in scope, exceeded the interim judge’s powers, and could not be detached from the conduct of France’s international relations. The operative part is brutally short: “Article 1er : La requête de la société EvidenceBank est rejetée.” The full text is published at Conseil d’Etat, interim judge, 6 January 2026, No. 510900. This is the modern expression of the acte de gouvernement doctrine: where a measure is inseparable from France’s diplomatic conduct, the administrative judge declares itself incompetent rather than review the merits — even when genocide and humanitarian catastrophe are invoked.
Transparency litigation has fared no better. On 1 December 2025, the Conseil d’Etat rejected the appeal of the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Amnesty International France and Disclose, which sought disclosure of administrative documents on war-material exports to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt after the Montreuil administrative court had dismissed their claim in July 2024. The operative part reads: “Article 1er : Le pourvoi des associations Centre européen pour les droits constitutionnels et les droits humains, Amnesty International France et Disclose est rejeté.” See Conseil d’Etat, 1 December 2025, No. 498014. Taken together, the two rulings draw the French map with unusual clarity: the executive licenses and may suspend at will, the interim judge will not order suspension where diplomacy is involved, and even access to the underlying documents is refused. A Nicaragua-style case filed in Paris against French licences would therefore almost certainly hit the same wall — which is precisely why litigants take the supplier cases to The Hague instead.
B. The criminal path in France: genocide, complicity and the universal-jurisdiction door
Where the administrative judge steps back, the criminal judge may step forward — under strict conditions. French criminal law defines genocide in Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code as committing, pursuant to a concerted plan aimed at the total or partial destruction of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, or of a group defined by any other arbitrary criterion, one of a listed set of acts against members of that group: voluntary attacks on life, grave attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to living conditions likely to destroy the group in whole or in part, measures to prevent births, and forced transfer of children — punishable by life imprisonment. Complicity is defined by Article 121-7 of the Criminal Code: an accomplice is a person who knowingly, by aid or assistance, facilitated the preparation or commission of a crime or offence, as well as a person who by gift, promise, threat, order or abuse of authority provoked the offence or gave instructions for committing it. Applied to arms transfers, the legal question would be whether licensing, financing or logistically supporting deliveries — knowing of a serious risk that the weapons will be used to commit genocidal acts — constitutes knowing facilitation. French complicity requires knowledge, not merely negligence, and proving that an official or executive knew, at the moment of authorization, that the specific equipment would serve the crime is a formidable evidentiary hurdle. But it is a hurdle a prosecutor or an investigating judge can examine, unlike the administrative judge bound by the foreign-affairs shield.
The jurisdictional key is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows French courts to try any person suspected of having committed abroad the crime of genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes, provided the suspect has habitual residence in France — defined as a sufficient connecting link with French territory. In other words, France claims universal jurisdiction with a residence condition: a foreign official or arms broker living in France could theoretically be prosecuted here for complicity in atrocities committed abroad, and French nationals involved in licensing or exporting can in any event be pursued under ordinary territorial and personality jurisdiction. This is the provision that makes Paris a potential forum for the criminal side of a Nicaragua-type file — not against the licensing State as such, which enjoys immunity, but against the individuals who decided, profited or executed.
Three practical consequences follow for anyone concerned by a French arms file today. First, evidence must be preserved now: export licence numbers, customs data, ministerial statements, corporate disclosures, end-use certificates, and the chronology of authorizations against the chronology of reported violations. The Nicaragua case shows that figures win arguments — the 378-million surge, the 98-percent equipment breakdown, the suspension and resumption dates. Second, associations and victims should understand the forum map: the administrative emergency judge will almost certainly declare itself incompetent on suspension claims touching diplomacy, as the 6 January 2026 order demonstrates, while criminal complaints with civil-party constitution before an investigating judge, or reports to the national anti-terrorism and war-crimes prosecutorial structures, follow a different logic with different timelines. Third, companies in the defence supply chain need compliance audits against Criterion Two of the Common Position today, not after a subpoena: documenting the human-rights and humanitarian-law assessment behind each licence application is the only shield if a prosecutor, a foreign court or the ICJ’s reasoning ever turns toward the supplier.
None of this means France will be hauled before the ICJ tomorrow. Contentious cases require the respondent State’s consent to jurisdiction, and Paris calibrates its declarations carefully. It does mean that the legal reasoning Nicaragua is testing — prevention duties, clear-risk denial of licences, supplier responsibility — is already half-written into French and European law. The gap is not in the texts but in the judge willing to apply them.
Conclusion
The hearings that closed on 10 September 2026 decided nothing on substance, and that is exactly why they matter. Germany asked the Court to throw out Nicaragua’s case without ever discussing arms, genocide or prevention; Nicaragua asked the Court to look at what Berlin licensed, funded and defended while Gaza burned. The ruling on jurisdiction and admissibility expected later this year will determine whether international law gets its first full trial of a weapons supplier’s responsibility — with a final judgment possibly as late as 2030. For France, the mirror is already in place: a Defence Code that requires prior authorization and allows suspension at any moment, a European criterion that forbids licences where a clear risk of serious humanitarian-law violations exists, an administrative judge that refuses to touch diplomacy, and a criminal code that punishes genocide, complicity and war crimes wherever the suspect resides. This analysis complements our earlier examination of the same hearings, Nicaragua v. Germany After the 7-10 September 2026 ICJ Hearings, by focusing on the French licensing and judicial machinery. Whether the next supplier case is filed in The Hague, in Paris or before a prosecutor, the files are being built now — with licence figures, dates and official statements. Readers holding documents, export data or testimony concerning French military transfers should have them assessed by counsel without delay, before the limitation periods, the archives and the headlines move on.