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America Prepares Sanctions Against the Entire ICC: What Happens to the Trials, the Victims’ Fund and French Banks If the Court Itself Is Listed

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America Prepares Sanctions Against the Entire ICC: What Happens to the Trials, the Victims’ Fund and French Banks If the Court Itself Is Listed

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On Sunday 20 September 2026, as delegations flew into New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, Reuters reported that the administration of President Donald Trump has prepared sanctions against the entire International Criminal Court and plans to announce them soon. The timing under discussion, according to officials cited by the Wall Street Journal, is this very week, during the General Assembly meeting. If the announcement comes, it would mark a rupture with everything Washington has done so far: until now the United States has sanctioned individual ICC judges and prosecutors, including the Court’s president on 18 August 2026. Listing the institution itself — the Court as an entity, plus those who cooperate with it — would switch the file from targeted pressure on people to a system-wide prohibition on dealing with the tribunal that tries genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. For readers in France the question is concrete and immediate. French banks clear dollars, French insurers underwrite risk, French technology vendors sell software, French investigators and counsel work for ICC organs, and French courts cooperate with The Hague every week under a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This analysis reconstructs what an entity-wide American listing would technically do, identifies which live trials and which victims’ funds would feel it first, and sets out the two French answers that matter: what Paris must keep doing for the Court, and what French law forbids French actors to do for Washington.

I. What would listing the whole Court actually switch off?

A. How does an American entity-wide designation freeze a court that sits in The Hague?

Start with the mechanism, because most commentary describes sanctions as a political signal when they operate as a payments and contracts machine. The Reuters exclusive of 20 September, reported by Humeyra Pamuk, Anthony Deutsch and Stephanie van den Berg, states the core fact without ambiguity: sanctions against the entire Court have been prepared, even though the exact timing of an announcement remains unclear. The same reporting recalls the context. Washington has imposed sanctions on a number of ICC judges and prosecutors but has so far held off from imposing sanctions on the court itself, although the move has long been considered as one of the options. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in July a campaign calling on other countries to withdraw from the tribunal. American officials want the Court to drop its arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as well as a past probe into Afghanistan. The State Department did not respond to the request for comment.

The legal instrument behind any such move is the Executive Order of 6 February 2025 on the International Criminal Court, published by the White House, in which the President found that the Court’s actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat and ordered: all property and interests in property located in the United States or held by American persons is blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in. Designating the Court itself would extend that blocking language from named individuals to the institution, its organs, its staff payroll, its vendors and potentially its cooperating entities. Any entity-wide sanctions imposed by the United States Treasury would prohibit American citizens and companies from providing funds, goods, or services to the court without a license from the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, known as OFAC. That license regime is the whole ball game for practitioners: a general or specific OFAC license can authorize otherwise prohibited transactions, such as winding down contracts, paying salaries or maintaining software, but each license has a scope, a validity period and reporting conditions, and operating outside them exposes the American person to civil and criminal penalties.

The second mechanical point is over-compliance, and it is where a The Hague institution feels a Washington listing most brutally. Banks often over-comply with such American sanctions because they depend on access to the American financial system. A bank that clears dollars through a correspondent account in New York will typically refuse any transaction touching a listed entity rather than risk losing its correspondent relationship, even when the transaction might theoretically be licensed or fall outside American jurisdiction. Among the court’s operations that could be affected by sanctions against the entire organization are the purchasing of IT services and insurance, the hiring of investigators and conducting everyday financial transactions, such as paying dozens of American employees, as the ICC’s registrar and president have warned. Read that list again slowly, because each item is a separate choke point. Cloud hosting and case-management software are often supplied by American vendors. Professional indemnity and premises insurance run through brokers who clear in dollars. Investigators are recruited on individual contracts paid by bank transfer. Dozens of staff members hold American passports, which means paying their salaries could itself become a prohibited service absent a license. The ICC’s registrar and president have said so publicly, and their warning is not rhetoric: it describes procurement, payroll and treasury as they function on any given Monday in The Hague.

The third point is extraterritorial reach through cooperation language. Targeting the entire organization directly, as well as entities that cooperate with it, could severely undermine the court’s work. If cooperating persons and entities face secondary exposure — loss of dollar clearing, placement on correspondent blacklists, exclusion from American technology stacks — then law firms, expert institutes, forensic laboratories, translation providers, travel agencies and even State registries that transmit evidence may each run their own risk committee before answering a judicial assistance request. The Court was established in 2002 by the international community to prosecute war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and it asserts jurisdiction only if a member state is unable or unwilling to prosecute atrocities itself. The United States has never been a member. Non-membership never stopped Washington from engaging the Court when convenient, and it does not limit the blast radius of an entity listing now: the dollar, the cloud and the insurance market are American-centered whether the target is a member of the Statute or not.

For the international audience this desk serves, the practical conclusion of this first section is a calendar, not a slogan. A designation lands on a Friday evening Washington time; over the weekend, compliance departments worldwide screen the name; on Monday morning, payments bounce, insurers suspend cover notes, software vendors freeze admin consoles, and American staff cannot be paid. Licenses follow, but licenses take weeks, and trials do not pause for the Treasury. That is the machine the Reuters sources describe as prepared. The next question is what it would interrupt in the courtrooms.

B. Which trials and which victims’ money would feel it first?

The Court’s docket this autumn is unusually full, which is exactly why an entity-wide listing during General Assembly week would bite immediately rather than theoretically. Tomorrow, 23 September 2026, Trial Chamber VI delivers its trial judgment in the case of Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, the former Seleka commander tried for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in the Central African Republic. A trial judgment requires judges, a courtroom, interpreters, a detention unit, a victims’ participation section and a press operation — every one of them a payee, a vendor or a system. Further down the calendar, the Duterte case moves through its pre-trial and victims’ participation phases after the third status conference of 16 September 2026, the El Hishri case — the first Libya case committed to trial, with all seventeen charges confirmed on 16 July 2026 — points toward a trial opening in May 2027, and the Yekatom and Ngaissona reparations hearing is set for 1 October 2026. Each of these steps consumes the exact services an entity listing disrupts: interpretation contracts, expert appointments, witness travel, detention logistics and reparations disbursements.

The governing law that Washington would be pressing against is the Rome Statute itself, and three of its provisions explain why States Parties cannot simply shrug. First, the general duty: every State Party must cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction That is Article 86 of the Rome Statute, and the word fully leaves no room for a cooperation slowdown ordered from abroad. Second, the non-compliance procedure: where a State Party withholds cooperation in breach of the Statute and thereby prevents the Court from exercising its functions, the judges may record that finding and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, or to the Security Council for Council-referred situations That is Article 87, paragraph 7, of the Rome Statute. A State Party that stops executing ICC requests because its banks fear OFAC would not be complying with the Statute; it would be a candidate for a judicial finding of non-compliance and a referral to the Assembly. Third, the financial-investigation duty: the Statute lists among the forms of assistance identifying, tracing and freezing or seizing crime proceeds, property, assets and instrumentalities for eventual forfeiture, subject to the rights of bona fide third parties — Article 93, paragraph 1(k), of the Rome Statute. Freezing and seizing criminal assets requires banks that answer freezing orders; banks that de-risk the Court as a client stop answering anyone.

Then there is the victims’ money, the least visible and most exposed part of the institution. The Statute provides: the Court sets the principles governing reparations to victims, covering restitution, compensation and rehabilitation That is Article 75, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute. And it creates the vehicle: a Trust Fund for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of their families, is established by decision of the Assembly of States Parties That is Article 79, paragraph 1, of the Rome Statute, completed by paragraph 2: money and property collected through fines or forfeiture may be transferred to the Trust Fund by order of the Court The Trust Fund for Victims holds voluntary contributions, implements reparations awards and runs assistance programmes in situation countries. Its money sits in bank accounts, its programmes pay implementing partners by transfer, and its awards in cases such as Yekatom and Ngaissona — with the reparations hearing days away — convert judicial orders into disbursements through the banking system. An entity-wide listing that captures the Court’s funds, or that scares the Fund’s own banks into closing its accounts, would not only delay trials; it would interrupt compensation to victims whom the Court has already recognized. That prospect is what makes the registrar’s warning about everyday financial transactions more than administrative detail.

None of this means the Court would close. International courts are stubborn institutions, and the Assembly of States Parties can route around damage: assessed contributions can be restructured, non-American vendors can be substituted, staff can be reassigned, hearings can be sequenced around cash flow. But routing around takes months, and the autumn docket does not have months. A judgment delivery, a reparations hearing and a trial-preparation calendar are fixed judicial acts with detained accused, protected witnesses and participating victims. Delay in such proceedings is itself a rights issue — for the accused, for the victims and for the States that fund the system. The entity-wide sanction, if announced this week, would therefore arrive as a procedural weapon aimed at the calendar: not a legal argument filed in any courtroom, but a payments freeze imposed outside all of them. Which brings the file to Paris, because France is one of the States whose statutes answer both halves of the problem: keep cooperating, and refuse to enforce the foreign prohibition.

II. What must France still do, and what does French law forbid French actors to do?

A. How does France keep cooperating with the ICC when Washington says stop?

France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, and its domestic law says so in terms a bank compliance officer can verify in one click. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Participation in punishment and cooperation with the Court are therefore not foreign-policy options of the day; they are a standing legislative command, implemented by a full procedural title that runs from arrest for surrender through sentence enforcement. An American listing of the Court changes nothing in that title. A Paris prosecutor who receives an ICC surrender request next Monday applies French procedure, not OFAC guidance, and a French judge who authorizes a transfer, a freeze or a sentence-enforcement measure draws authority from the Code, not from any Treasury license.

The surrender track shows how operational that command is. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” The same article continues, and I quote: “Après avoir vérifié l’identité de cette personne, ce magistrat l’informe, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris.” Twenty-four hours to the prosecutor, five days to Paris, rights notification in a language the person understands, counsel from the first hour: that is the French surrender pipeline, and it runs on deadlines no foreign sanctions list can extend. Defence work in such files consists of policing exactly those guarantees — identity verification, language, counsel access, detention review — and of testing the request against the Statute, not of relitigating geopolitics.

The money track is equally written down, and it matters more than ever when the Court’s own treasury is under threat. Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides, and I quote: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” The same article binds the Paris court, and I quote: “Le tribunal est lié par la décision de la Cour pénale internationale, y compris en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux droits des tiers.” In plain terms, ICC fines, forfeitures and reparations orders convert in Paris into enforceable domestic measures through the tribunal correctionnel, which may even order substitute recovery steps when a confiscation order cannot be executed as written. If ICC funds in The Hague were frozen by dollar-clearing banks, the Paris enforcement route would remain open for every euro-denominated asset on French soil — real estate, bank balances, securities — because the judge applies the Statute and the Code, and neither contains an OFAC exception.

French courts also police the boundaries of foreign freezes executed in France, a discipline directly relevant when two sanctions regimes collide. Article 695-9-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines the instrument, and I quote: “Une décision de gel de biens est une décision prise par une autorité judiciaire d’un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat d’émission, afin d’empêcher la destruction, la transformation, le déplacement, le transfert ou l’aliénation d’un bien susceptible de faire l’objet d’une confiscation et se trouvant sur le territoire d’un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat d’exécution.” The same article equates effects, and I quote: “La décision de gel de biens est soumise aux mêmes règles et entraîne les mêmes effets juridiques que la saisie.” And the Court of Cassation enforces the mandate strictly. On 1 April 2020, the Criminal Chamber, appeal 19-81.760, reviewing a Romanian freezing request executed in France, held, and I quote: “En effet, le juge français qui a pour mission d’exécuter une mesure de gel décidée par une juridiction étrangère en vertu des dispositions des articles 695-9-1 et suivants du code de procédure pénale, ne dispose pas des pouvoirs à lui dévolus par les articles 706-144 et 706-146 du même code lorsqu’il ordonne lui-même une mesure de saisie.” Read the full ruling on the Court of Cassation website. The lesson for the sanctions clash is structural: a French judge executes the freeze the law assigns, within the powers the law grants, and no further. An American instruction to freeze the ICC has no French legal vehicle; a French instruction to freeze for the ICC does. Counsel who understand that asymmetry win the urgent hearings.

There is a final French procedural lock that American readers consistently underestimate: evading a freeze in France is itself a criminal offence, investigated with customs powers. The Criminal Chamber recalled on 29 November 2023, appeal 22-85.867, published in the Bulletin, and I quote: “l’arrêt attaqué énonce que l’article L. 574-3 du code monétaire et financier punit le fait, pour les personnes mentionnées à l’article L. 562-4 du même code, leurs dirigeants ou leurs préposés et pour les personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel ou d’interdiction prise en application du chapitre II du titre VI du livre V de ce code, de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre.” The Court added the jurisdictional holding, and I quote: “dès lors que les modalités de constatation, de poursuite et de répression du délit de soustraction aux mesures de gel des avoirs dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme sont prévues par le code des douanes, cette infraction constitue une infraction prévue par le code des douanes au sens du 1° du I de l’article 28-1 du code de procédure pénale.” Read the full ruling on the Court of Cassation website. The underlying statute, Article L. 574-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code, provides, and I quote: “Est puni des peines prévues au 1 de l’ article L. 542-1 du code des douanes le fait, pour les personnes mentionnés à l’ article L. 562-4 , leurs dirigeants ou leurs préposés et, pour les personnes faisant l’objet d’une mesure de gel ou d’interdiction prise en application du chapitre II du titre VI du présent livre, de se soustraire aux obligations en résultant ou de faire obstacle à sa mise en oeuvre.” Mirror that logic onto the ICC file: anyone in France who sabotages an ICC-ordered freeze executed through French courts faces French criminal liability, while anyone who sabotages cooperation with the Court at Washington’s request answers to the cooperation title. The incentives point one way because the statutes point one way.

B. How do French companies and banks survive between OFAC and the French blocking law?

The hardest files after an entity-wide listing would not sit in The Hague but in Paris compliance departments, where a bank, an insurer or a software vendor would receive two contradictory orders: Washington forbidding any service to the Court, Paris and Brussels forbidding compliance with the foreign prohibition. France answers that conflict with the oldest blocking statute in Europe, and it carries criminal teeth. The Article 1 of Law 68-678 of 26 July 1968 provides, and I quote: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux, il est interdit à toute personne physique de nationalité française ou résidant habituellement sur le territoire français et à tout dirigeant, représentant, agent ou préposé d’une personne morale y ayant son siège ou un établissement de communiquer par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, à des autorités publiques étrangères, les documents ou les renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité, aux intérêts économiques essentiels de la France ou à l’ordre public, précisés par l’autorité administrative en tant que de besoin.” The companion provision, Article 1 bis of the same Law, provides, and I quote: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux et des lois et règlements en vigueur, il est interdit à toute personne de demander, de rechercher ou de communiquer, par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, des documents ou renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique tendant à la constitution de preuves en vue de procédures judiciaires ou administratives étrangères ou dans le cadre de celles-ci.” Two duties complete the device: Article 2 of the Law provides, and I quote: “Les personnes visées aux articles 1er et 1er bis sont tenues d’informer sans délai le ministre compétent lorsqu’elles se trouvent saisies de toute demande concernant de telles communications.” And Article 3 of the Law provides, and I quote: “Sans préjudice des peines plus lourdes prévues par la loi, toute infraction aux dispositions des articles 1er et 1er bis de la présente loi sera punie d’un emprisonnement de six mois et d’une amende de 18000 euros ou de l’une de ces deux peines seulement.”

Apply that grammar to the concrete scenario. An American authority asks the Paris branch of a bank for the ICC’s account records, or an American vendor instructs its French subsidiary to cut the Court’s software access and to report back on the data. Transmitting the file to the foreign authority without going through mutual legal assistance exposes the French sender to six months’ imprisonment and an 18,000 euro fine, while the proper reflex is notification of the competent minister. The 1968 law was written for exactly this configuration — a foreign power projecting its prohibitions into French offices — and an entity-wide ICC listing would be its textbook test. Counsel for French groups should therefore prepare three documents now: a notification template to the minister for any American instruction received, a mutual-legal-assistance routing memo so that no record travels to a foreign authority outside treaty channels, and a litigation hold explaining to American parents why the French subsidiary cannot obey. That file, kept current, is what turns a criminal exposure into a managed conflict of laws.

The European layer doubles the protection and adds a damages weapon. Council Regulation 2271/96, the EU Blocking Statute, provides in its Article 5, in substance: no covered operator may comply, directly or through a subsidiary or intermediary, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition stemming from the listed foreign laws, including requests of foreign courts Authorizations exist for cases where non-compliance would seriously damage the operator, granted through the procedures of Articles 7 and 8 — which means the lawful route for a French bank that genuinely cannot survive without dollar clearing is an EU authorization, not silent obedience. And Article 6 adds the clawback, in substance: any covered operator may recover any damages, including legal costs, caused by the application of those foreign laws, from whoever caused the loss A French insurer that loses ICC premiums, a vendor that loses the contract, a bank that pays American fines for having served the Court — each holds a European cause of action to recover from whoever caused the loss. The compliance answer is therefore never to pick a side quietly; it is to document the conflict, seek the EU authorization where needed, and preserve the recovery claim.

France also runs its own domestic freeze machine, and its design exposes by contrast what the American move lacks: time limits, ministers answerable before Trying courts, and judges at the end of the chain. Article L. 562-2 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides, and I quote: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie et le ministre de l’intérieur peuvent décider, conjointement, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”. Article L. 562-3 of the same Code extends the device to United Nations and European designations, and I quote: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”. Six months, renewable, reasoned, reviewable: the French freeze is an administrative police measure under judicial control, and evading it is the criminal offence the Court of Cassation enforced in the November 2023 ruling quoted above. No French minister has ordered any freeze against the International Criminal Court, no United Nations resolution designates it, and no European act lists it — so there is nothing in Paris for a French bank to execute against the Court, and every reason for it to keep executing the Court’s own orders. When clients ask what to do on the morning of an American announcement, the operational answer fits in one paragraph: keep processing ICC payments through non-American rails, route every American instruction to counsel and to the minister, log every bounce and every refusal for the future damages file, request OFAC licenses for unavoidable American touchpoints, and seek EU authorization before any compliance step that would restrict service to the Court. The firms that prepare that playbook this week will be the ones still banking, insuring and hosting international justice next month.

Conclusion

An entity-wide American listing of the International Criminal Court would not be one more designation in a long campaign; it would be an attempt to switch off the tribunal’s payroll, procurement, insurance and banking in the middle of its busiest season — a trial judgment tomorrow, a reparations hearing next week, trial preparations toward 2027. The Reuters reporting establishes that the package is prepared and that the announcement could come during General Assembly week; the Executive Order supplies the blocking language; the registrar’s warning supplies the casualty list. Against that machine, France offers two certainties written in its statutes. The cooperation title of the Code of Criminal Procedure keeps surrender, freezing, sentence enforcement and reparations running through Paris judges on fixed deadlines, and the Court of Cassation punishes whoever evades a French freeze while strictly limiting judges who execute foreign ones. The 1968 blocking law, backed by the EU Blocking Statute, forbids French actors to carry out the foreign prohibition and gives them a damages action when it costs them. International justice has survived hostility before because its law is plumbing: treaties, codes, licenses, correspondent accounts. The week the Court itself is listed, if it comes, will test whether the plumbing holds. In Paris, the pipes are French law, and they point toward The Hague.

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