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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Arms Exports Make a State Complicit in Genocide? The 7-10 September 2026 Hearings Explained

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Can Arms Exports Make a State Complicit in Genocide? The 7-10 September 2026 Hearings Explained

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In The Hague this week, the International Court of Justice is holding four days of public hearings in one of the most closely watched cases on its docket: the claim brought by Nicaragua against Germany over German military support to Israel and the suspension of German funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. According to the Court’s published case schedule, public hearings run from Monday 7 to Thursday 10 September 2026, and the subject of those hearings is Germany’s preliminary objections, the procedural challenge by which a respondent State asks the Court to throw out a case before any examination of the merits. For governments that export weapons, for defence companies, for victims’ associations and for every lawyer who advises them, the week matters far beyond the courtroom in the Peace Palace.

The question at the heart of the case is stark and commercially explosive: can a State that authorises arms exports to a country engaged in a contested military campaign be held responsible for complicity in genocide? Nicaragua says yes. Germany says the claim has no jurisdictional basis and is inadmissible. In April 2024 the Court already refused to order emergency measures against Germany, concluding by fifteen votes to one that the circumstances did not call for such orders (ICJ case file). That refusal did not end the case, and it prejudges nothing about responsibility. This article explains, for an international readership and through the lens of French procedure as practised daily in Paris, what the September hearings will decide, what legal test would apply if the case ever reaches the merits, and how the very same arms-export question would be tested if it arose before a French criminal or administrative court. Every decisive legal proposition below is anchored in a verified official text or decision, quoted word for word.

I. What the 7-10 September 2026 Hearings in The Hague Will Actually Decide

A. Why is Nicaragua accusing Germany of complicity in genocide before the ICJ?

The story begins on 1 March 2024, when Nicaragua filed an application against Germany before the International Court of Justice. The filing, recorded in the Court’s case file, shows Nicaragua instituting proceedings against Germany and requesting the indication of provisional measures. The application accuses Germany of violating the 1948 Genocide Convention by furnishing military support to Israel, alongside financial and political backing, in the context of the Gaza campaign, and of breaching its obligations by suspending funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Nicaragua asked the Court both to decide the merits in its favour and, urgently, to order provisional measures restraining German military assistance while the case was pending.

Germany’s response was twofold. On the substance of the emergency phase, Berlin argued that Nicaragua’s claim had no basis in the Genocide Convention, that Germany’s arms-export policy complied with international law, and that the dramatic fall in the volume of licences granted after the autumn of 2023 proved that its control system worked. On procedure, Germany raised preliminary objections, the formal mechanism by which a respondent State contests the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of the application. The hearings of 7 to 10 September 2026 are devoted exclusively to those objections. No witness will testify about Gaza. No judge will rule this week on whether genocide occurred. The Court will hear argument on whether it is even entitled to hear the case, and whether Nicaragua’s claim is the kind of claim the Court may entertain.

To understand what is at stake, it helps to recall what happened in the spring of 2024. Nicaragua had asked for provisional measures, the emergency orders the Court can issue to preserve the rights of the parties while proceedings run. After hearing both sides, the Court declined, by fifteen votes to one, holding that the circumstances did not call for such orders. Germany presented that outcome as a vindication. Legally, it was nothing of the sort. A refusal of provisional measures turns on urgency and on the plausibility of the rights invoked at that early stage, on the basis of an incomplete file. It is not a judgment on responsibility, it creates no res judicata on the merits, and it does not prevent the case from continuing. The fact that the Court fixed four days of hearings on the preliminary objections, more than two years later, proves the point: the case is alive, and the respondent State must still defeat it on jurisdiction and admissibility before it can claim victory.

Preliminary objections typically attack on three fronts. First, jurisdiction: did both States validly consent to the Court’s authority over this dispute, for example through matching declarations or through the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention, and does the dispute genuinely concern the interpretation or application of that Convention rather than a broader political grievance about foreign policy? Second, admissibility: even if jurisdiction exists, is the application fit to be heard, or is it moot, premature, an abuse of process, or directed at the wrong respondent when the principal actor is absent from the proceedings? Germany’s public line since 2024 has combined both registers, arguing that the Convention gives the Court no handle on this dispute and that a case about arms transfers to a third State, which is not itself before the Court, cannot properly be decided. Third, the standard of review: at this stage the Court does not weigh the evidence of what happened in Gaza. It asks whether, assuming Nicaragua’s factual allegations to be capable of proof, they could amount to a breach of the Convention by Germany. That is a far lower threshold than the merits test, and applicants clear it more often than respondents admit.

The practical consequence is binary. If Germany’s objections succeed, the case ends without any ruling on German conduct, and the judgment will be studied as a jurisdictional precedent on the limits of complicity claims against supplier States. If the objections fail in whole or in part, the case proceeds to written and oral argument on the merits, with document production, expert evidence and years of additional proceedings, during which every German export licence, end-use assurance and ministerial statement will face adversarial scrutiny. For general counsel of defence groups and for compliance officers, the difference between those two outcomes is the difference between a closed file and a multi-year discovery exposure under the eyes of the world press. That is why this procedural week, dry as it sounds, is the most consequential moment of the case since its filing.

B. Can a State that supplies weapons become complicit in genocide?

The substantive question behind the procedure deserves a clear answer, because much public commentary confuses it. International law distinguishes sharply between the criminal responsibility of individuals, which is a matter for domestic courts and the International Criminal Court, and the responsibility of States, which is what the International Court of Justice adjudicates. Nicaragua is not asking the Court to convict any German official of genocide. It is asking the Court to declare that Germany, as a State, breached its own obligations under the Genocide Convention, in particular the duty not to be complicit in genocide and the duty to prevent it, by providing material support with knowledge of the circumstances in which that support would be used. State complicity of this kind does not require proof that Berlin desired the destruction of a protected group. It requires proof of a contribution, in the form of assistance, furnished with knowledge that the principal actor’s conduct created a serious risk of genocide, in circumstances where the Convention imposed a duty to refrain and to prevent.

That test is demanding by design, and Germany’s defences illustrate why supplier States usually feel protected. First, licensing systems: Germany, like France, subjects every export of war material to prior administrative authorisation, with end-use certificates, inter-ministerial review and stated human-rights criteria. A State that can show individualised, good-faith assessment of each licence, followed by suspension or revocation when the risk picture darkens, has a powerful answer to a charge of knowing assistance. Second, volumes and timing: Berlin has pointed to the collapse in new authorisations after late 2023 as evidence that its system reacted. Third, characterisation of the goods: not every transfer has the same probative weight, and dual-use components, spare parts under old contracts and air-defence systems present different questions from artillery shells or bombs. Fourth, knowledge: complicity presupposes awareness of the facts at the time of the assistance, and a respondent State will argue that press allegations, however grave, are not the same as the specific knowledge the law requires, particularly while international courts had not yet ruled on the underlying conduct.

Nicaragua’s answer, as developed since 2024, is that none of those defences can be assessed in the abstract and at a preliminary stage. Knowledge, on this view, must be judged against the full public record available to a sophisticated exporting State in real time: United Nations reports, humanitarian alerts, domestic parliamentary warnings, media investigations and the positions taken by the exporting State’s own courts and allies. Contribution must be judged against the fungibility of military support in a sustained campaign, where spare parts, air-defence cover and political backing free other resources for offensive use. And prevention, the forward-looking duty, must be judged against what the State actually did when the risk signals multiplied: whether it paused, reviewed, conditioned or simply continued. None of these assessments can be made on preliminary-objection papers alone. They require the merits file, which is precisely why Nicaragua urges the Court to reject the objections and open the merits phase.

Observers should therefore read the September hearings with disciplined expectations. A German win ends the case but decides nothing about the legality of any particular arms transfer. A Nicaraguan win decides nothing about German responsibility but opens a merits phase in which the evidentiary burden will be formidable: Nicaragua would need to prove, transfer by transfer or at least category by category, what was supplied, what Berlin knew and when, and how the assistance connected to the alleged genocidal conduct. Complicity findings against supplier States are vanishingly rare in the Court’s history, and the gap between a plausible claim and a proven breach is wide. But rarity is not immunity, and the detailed scrutiny of a merits phase is itself a regulatory event for every exporting State watching from the sidelines. The judgment on preliminary objections, expected months after the hearings, will set the perimeter of that exposure. Whatever its content, it will become required reading for export-control lawyers across Europe, because the reasoning on jurisdiction over supplier-State claims will outlive this dispute.

II. How the Same Arms-Export Question Would Be Tested Before a French Court

A. How can French judges prosecute complicity in atrocity crimes committed abroad?

France offers one of the most developed laboratories in Europe for the criminal side of the same problem, and its mechanisms are directly relevant to executives, financiers and intermediaries involved in arms transfers. The starting point is a broad jurisdictional gateway. French law provides that “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” In other words, accomplices acting outside France are within reach of French courts whenever French substantive law applies or an international convention confers jurisdiction, which immediately frames arms-brokering, financing and licensing conduct performed from or through France.

For French nationals, the gateway is particularly wide. The Criminal Code states that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République.” Combined with the rule that “Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7 .”, this active-personality principle extends to complicity performed abroad by a French citizen even when the principal perpetrator is a foreign national acting on foreign soil. The Court of Cassation, sitting in its most solemn formation in July 2025, confirmed exactly that construction, holding that “les dispositions combinées des articles 689 du code de procédure pénale, 113-6 et 121-6 du code pénal permettent de retenir la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger”. For a French executive who authorises, finances or facilitates transfers from Paris, Lyon or Marseille, the message is unambiguous: the foreign nationality of the end user is no shield against French jurisdiction over the complicity allegation itself.

Beyond French nationals, France recognises a universal jurisdiction for the gravest crimes, but under strict statutory conditions that practitioners must master. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ;”, followed by crimes against humanity and war crimes. The substantive definitions behind that gateway are severe. French law states that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire”, and that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, each punished by life imprisonment. Three cumulative filters then apply: the suspect must be habitually resident in France, prosecution requires the initiative of the anti-terrorism prosecutor with verification that no international court or other State claims the person, and double criminality applies, meaning the conduct must also be punishable where committed. The Court of Cassation polices that last condition rigorously: in a November 2021 ruling on crimes against humanity arising from the Syrian context, it quashed proceedings where the lower court had been satisfied with ordinary murder or torture provisions in Syrian law, insisting that the foreign legislation must itself capture the structural core of the international crime, the attack against a civilian population pursuant to a concerted plan (Cass. crim., 24 Nov. 2021, No. 21-81.344). In a May 2023 ruling of its plenary assembly on torture as a universal-jurisdiction crime, the Court likewise confined the gateway to the precise treaty definition (Cass., Ass. plén., 12 May 2023, No. 22-82.468). The lesson for counsel is practical: universal jurisdiction in France is real, it has produced trials, but it is a narrow corridor with documentary tolls at every gate, and files fail on residence, on prosecutorial initiative or on double criminality far more often than on the horror of the underlying facts.

The July 2025 plenary ruling adds a final piece of direct relevance to supplier networks: functional immunity. The Court confirmed that agents of a foreign State acting in an official capacity generally enjoy immunity before French criminal courts, yet held that the investigating chamber had correctly refused that immunity to a former central-bank governor facing complicity charges for crimes against humanity and war crimes, given the exceptional gravity of the alleged offences. Transposed to arms-transfer chains, the signal is that official status in a foreign administration does not automatically close the French criminal file when the charges concern the gravest international crimes. Combined with the complicity gateway for French nationals and the universal-jurisdiction corridor for residents, France thus offers victims and associations three distinct doors into the criminal courthouse: nationality-based complicity proceedings, residence-based universal jurisdiction, and, in support of both, civil-party complaints that can trigger judicial investigation. Each door has its guards, each guard demands documents, and the file that wins is the file that proves residence, dates, knowledge and the precise role of each intermediary in the transfer chain.

B. How can an arms-export licence be challenged before the French administrative judge?

The second French testing ground is administrative, and it is the one most closely analogous to Nicaragua’s claim, because it targets the State’s authorisation itself rather than any individual’s criminal liability. In France, war material does not leave the country on a minister’s handshake. The Defence Code establishes a prohibition in principle: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée.” The same Code then organises the exception, stating that “L’autorisation préalable d’exportation, dénommée licence d’exportation, est accordée par l’autorité administrative”, in three forms: general licences for categories of recipients, global licences for identified recipients over a defined period without quantity or amount limits, and individual licences for one or more shipments to a named recipient, all capable of carrying conditions or restrictions on end use. Every licence is therefore an administrative decision, taken by the executive under statutory powers, and every administrative decision in France is in principle reviewable by the administrative courts.

That reviewability is the lever that associations, competitors, journalists and, in some configurations, victims have sought to pull across Europe. The French action for annulment allows a claimant with standing to ask the administrative court to quash a licence for illegality: error of law, error of fact, manifest error of assessment, breach of European commitments or of international obligations binding on France. Crucially, the claimant need not wait years for a judgment on the merits. French administrative procedure provides emergency interim relief, since “Quand une décision administrative, même de rejet, fait l’objet d’une requête en annulation ou en réformation, le juge des référés, saisi d’une demande en ce sens, peut ordonner la suspension de l’exécution de cette décision, ou de certains de ses effets, lorsque l’urgence le justifie et qu’il est fait état d’un moyen propre à créer, en l’état de l’instruction, un doute sérieux quant à la légalité de la décision.” In export-control litigation, that interim track is everything: suspending a licence for the months needed to decide the merits can be commercially equivalent to cancelling it, while a refusal of interim relief lets shipments continue and often empties the main action of practical interest.

Standing and timing are the two filters that decide these cases before the merits are ever reached. On standing, French administrative courts require a direct and certain interest, which recognised associations acting within their statutory purpose have repeatedly been able to demonstrate in matters touching their mission, while purely ideological disagreement without a concrete link to the decision fails. On timing, the two-month challenge period runs from publication or notification of the decision, and export licences are frequently individual decisions notified only to the exporter, which makes them hard for third parties to detect and harder still to challenge in time. The interim judge adds two further demands: urgency, assessed against the imminence of the shipments, and serious doubt, assessed on the papers within days. Claimants who arrive with press cuttings alone lose. Claimants who arrive with the licence references, the customs data, the end-use documents, the United Nations reports contemporaneous with the authorisation and a precise chronology of what the administration knew and when, give the judge the material on which serious doubt can be founded.

For companies and their counsel, the French system yields a concrete compliance checklist that mirrors, on the domestic plane, the issues the International Court of Justice is examining on the interstate plane. Document the risk assessment for each destination at the time of each licence application, not retrospectively. Condition or suspend performance when public risk signals accumulate, and keep the written trace of every review. Attach enforceable end-use and re-export restrictions to each file, because a licence that the exporter can show to be ring-fenced is a different object from a blank cheque. Calendar the two-month third-party challenge window and the permanent exposure to interim suspension applications. And prepare the criminal parallel: the same documents that defend the licence before the administrative judge will be the first exhibits demanded by an investigating magistrate if a complicity complaint is filed under the nationality or universal-jurisdiction gateways. Export control, in the French design, is not a single permit but a continuing evidentiary burden, and the firms that treat it as such are the ones that survive both the administrative challenge and the criminal complaint. That continuing-burden logic is exactly what Nicaragua invokes against Germany at The Hague, transposed from the company to the State: authorising is not a one-off gesture but a responsibility that lasts as long as the weapons flow.

Conclusion

The four days of hearings opening on 7 September 2026 will not say whether Germany is responsible for anything in Gaza. They will answer the prior question on which everything else depends: whether the International Court of Justice may judge Germany’s support for an ally’s campaign under the Genocide Convention at all. A ruling upholding the preliminary objections would close the case and become the leading authority on the jurisdictional limits of supplier-State litigation, cited by every exporting State the next time its licences are challenged. A ruling rejecting them would open a merits phase of exceptional evidentiary intensity, in which licences, volumes, knowledge dates and prevention efforts would be examined transfer by transfer, with a judgment that would shape export-control practice across Europe regardless of its outcome. Either way, the reasoning will matter more than the result, because it will define the perimeter within which the next case against the next supplier State can be built.

For readers with concrete exposure, the week delivers three operational lessons already. First, procedural defences decide international cases as often as the merits, so jurisdiction and admissibility analysis belongs at the very front of any export-control advice, not as an afterthought. Second, the French parallel proceedings show that the interstate case is only one front: criminal complicity gateways for nationals and residents, and administrative challenges to individual licences with interim suspension, give claimants domestic levers that move faster than The Hague and demand the same documentary discipline from companies. Third, in both forums the currency is contemporaneous paper: risk assessments dated the day of the decision, suspension reviews triggered by public alerts, end-use conditions with teeth. The firms and administrations that hold that paper will face the coming wave of litigation with arguments. Those that treated authorisation as a formality will face it with explanations. The Court’s ruling on the objections, when it comes, will tell the world which of the two postures the law rewards.

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