On 24 September 2026, a court in Croatia ruled that a Ukrainian man identified only as Vladimir Z., arrested in August in the coastal city of Pula, can be extradited to Germany over the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline blasts. The report, carried by Reuters on the basis of Ukraine’s Suspilne news portal, is the latest turn in the most politically charged sabotage file in Europe. German federal prosecutors say the man was one of the scuba divers who planted explosives on the pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm, and that he was arrested on a European arrest warrant. He denies any involvement, according to his lawyers.
The case matters far beyond one diver. A first suspect, former Ukrainian army officer Serhii K., was arrested in Italy in August 2025, transferred to Germany in November, and charged by German prosecutors in July 2026 with orchestrating the blasts while acting on behalf of Ukrainian state entities, a charge he denies. The same Vladimir Z. had already been the subject of a German extradition request in Poland last year, where a judge refused surrender on the ground that, if Ukraine was responsible for the attack, it was a just act. Kyiv has repeatedly denied any role. Two judges, two opposite answers, one European arrest warrant system that is supposed to be automatic: the contrast explains why this story leads bulletins from Frankfurt to Warsaw.
For an international reader with a file in France, the question is practical. What would happen if the arrest had taken place in Paris, Lyon or Nice rather than Pula? French procedure under a European arrest warrant looks nothing like classic extradition, yet it keeps real defences: proportionality, human rights, double jeopardy, the guarantee of return for French nationals and residents, and review by the chambre de l’instruction with an appeal to the Cour de cassation. This analysis explains first why Croatia said yes and Poland said no, then exactly how France would handle a Nord Stream file, so that a wanted person, a family member or a company caught in the blast radius knows what to prepare, what to file, and when. Those facing a surrender file in France often start by reading how extradition defence before the French courts is organised in practice.
I. Why Croatia Agreed to Hand Over the Nord Stream Suspect While Poland Refused
A. How does a European arrest warrant from Germany work once the suspect is arrested in Croatia?
Germany’s federal prosecutors announced on 19 August 2026 that a second Ukrainian suspect had been arrested in Croatia and would be extradited to Germany. The BBC, citing the same prosecution statement, reported that the suspect was arrested in Pula and that German prosecutors alleged that the suspect participated in the necessary dives for the sabotage. The AP carried the same sequence. A month later, on 24 September 2026, Reuters reported that a Croatian court had ruled that the man can be extradited to Germany. The legal instrument behind both steps is the European arrest warrant, and understanding it explains why the Croatian decision was expected and why the Polish refusal stands out.
French law gives the textbook definition that applies across the Union. Under the Code of criminal procedure, as published on Legifrance, Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté. Germany is the issuing state, Croatia the executing state. Once the warrant is entered in the Schengen Information System, any police check in Pula can turn into an arrest, followed by presentation to a judge, detention pending surrender, and a court decision on surrender within tight deadlines set by the EU Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.
The Framework Decision was built to replace slow diplomatic extradition between Member States with surrender between judges. Double criminality is abolished for a list of 32 serious offences, including sabotage and terrorism, when punishable in the issuing state by at least three years. Causing explosions and sabotage of energy infrastructure plainly falls in that zone. The executing judge does not retry the facts, does not ask whether the evidence is strong, and does not ask whether prosecution in Germany is opportune. The judge checks identity, the validity of the warrant, the applicable time limits, and the narrow refusal grounds. That is why most European arrest warrants end in surrender within weeks.
Germany’s jurisdiction claim is straightforward and has been accepted by its courts. German media and the BBC report that German courts treat the destruction of Nord Stream 1 as falling within German jurisdiction because the pipelines end at Lubmin in the German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Under the law of the sea and German criminal law on attacks against infrastructure with effects on national territory, Berlin claims the right to prosecute even though the explosions occurred near Bornholm in international waters. Whether that theory would survive a full trial is a different question, but at the surrender stage a Croatian, Polish, Italian or French judge does not decide jurisdiction on the merits. The judge only verifies that the warrant describes punishable acts and that no mandatory bar applies.
The offences described by German prosecutors map directly onto French categories, which is the test a French judge would apply if the arrest had happened in France. French criminal law punishes La destruction, la dégradation ou la détérioration d’un bien appartenant à autrui par l’effet d’une substance explosive, d’un incendie ou de tout autre moyen de nature à créer un danger pour les personnes est punie de dix ans d’emprisonnement et de 150 000 euros d’amende, and raises the penalty where the act is committed by an organised gang, since L’infraction définie à l’ article 322-6 est punie de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle et de 150 000 euros d’amende : 1° Lorsqu’elle est commise en bande organisée. Underwater demolition of a gas pipeline by a dive team using explosives would, in French terms, sit at the top of that scale, before any terrorism aggravation is even considered. The point is not academic: it shows that double criminality would be satisfied in France without discussion, leaving the defence to fight on other grounds.
Croatian procedure then follows the standard script. Arrest on the warrant, hearing on identity and consent, detention, examination of bars to surrender, decision of the competent county court, appeal to the Supreme Court of Croatia, then physical handover to German authorities who must bring the person before an investigating judge promptly. Reuters noted that after surrender the suspect will be brought before an investigating judge to face charges of causing explosions and sabotage. Denial of involvement, which his lawyers have entered, is irrelevant at this stage. Consent would have accelerated surrender to a matter of days; opposition triggers full judicial review but rarely changes the outcome when the file is a classic serious-crime warrant between two EU states with functioning justice systems.
The lesson for families and employers is concrete. When a European arrest warrant circulates, travel inside Schengen becomes the risk. A hotel registration in Pula, a traffic stop in Milan, a border check at the Gare du Nord can each trigger the same chain. The critical hours are the first 48 after arrest: lawyer in the executing state, lawyer in the issuing state, proof of residence, employment, family ties, medical file, and any element showing a real risk of rights violation. Waiting for the surrender decision to organise the defence is waiting too long.
B. Why did a Polish judge refuse the same suspect while Croatia authorised surrender?
The same Vladimir Z. had already been sought by Germany in Poland. According to the BBC, a Polish judge refused the German extradition request, reasoning that if Ukraine was responsible for the attack, then it was a just act. A lawyer in Poland told the Polish agency PAP that the man detained in Croatia was the same client whose surrender Poland had refused. The contrast with Croatia could not be sharper, and it exposes the fault line European judges prefer not to discuss openly: sabotage of an adversary’s energy infrastructure during an armed conflict sits at the border between ordinary crime, state act, and the political offence exception.
EU law in principle leaves almost no room for a political refusal inside the European arrest warrant. The Framework Decision removed the political offence exception that still exists in classic extradition. A judge in Krakow or Gdansk is not supposed to ask whether blowing up Nord Stream was legitimate resistance or criminal sabotage. The judge is supposed to surrender. The Polish decision therefore reads as an act of judicial resistance dressed in political language, and it is precisely the kind of reasoning the Court of Justice of the European Union has repeatedly rejected. Yet it happened, and it shows that even within a supposedly automatic system, a determined executing judge can find factual or legal cover to refuse.
Classic extradition law, which still governs requests from outside the Union and illuminates the values behind the system, states the political bar openly. French law provides that L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique. That second paragraph is the vocabulary the Polish judge reached for, even though it does not formally apply between EU members. The argument would run: destruction of a Russian export pipeline after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is inseparable from the armed conflict, prosecution serves a political reading of that conflict, and surrender should be refused.
French courts would not follow the Polish path on a European arrest warrant, and it is important to say so bluntly. The Cour de cassation enforces the Framework Decision strictly and quashes surrender decisions that add conditions the statute does not contain. In a 2020 extradition ruling that remains the reference on judicial discipline, the criminal chamber recalled, in the reasoning reported by Voyage, that la chambre de l’instruction donne un avis défavorable à l’extradition si elle estime que les conditions légales ne sont pas remplies ou qu’il y a une erreur évidente, and it cassated a decision that had refused on a ground outside that closed list. Transposed to a European arrest warrant, the message is identical: no refusal outside the statutory boxes, no political improvisation. A French chambre de l’instruction that refused a German warrant for Nord Stream sabotage on the ground that the act was just would be quashed.
That does not mean the political dimension is useless in France. It is rechannelled into admissible defences. Discrimination in prosecution, risk of inhuman treatment, risk of a flagrantly unfair trial, double jeopardy, prescription, and the guarantee of return are the lawful vehicles. French statute commands mandatory refusal of a European arrest warrant where L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants, including amnesty in France, final judgment for the same facts with sentence executed or no longer enforceable, minority under thirteen, and, crucially, proof that the warrant was issued to prosecute on discriminatory grounds linked to sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation. A defence that Germany targets Ukrainians as such would fail on the facts, but a defence built on concrete risks in detention or trial can succeed if documented.
The Polish refusal also creates a practical sequel. If Poland definitively refused surrender for the same acts, Germany now asks Croatia to surrender for the same facts after another Member State said no. That raises ne bis in idem, mutual trust, and abuse of process arguments the Croatian defence will have exhausted and that a French defence would press harder. A prior refusal is not a European acquittal, but it can support arguments about forum shopping, proportionality, and the need for guarantees. The Croatian court’s reported answer is that none of that outweighs mutual recognition. The file now moves to Germany, where the investigating judge, then the trial court, will have to prove individual participation dive by dive, boat charter by boat charter, explosive trace by explosive trace.
II. Arrested in France on a German Warrant: the Chambre de l’Instruction, Cassation and the Real Defences
A. What would the Paris chambre de l’instruction check before authorising surrender from France?
Imagine the arrest happens at Roissy or in a Paris hotel rather than Pula. French police execute the German European arrest warrant, the person is brought before the general prosecutor, notified of the warrant, and asked whether consent is given to surrender. Almost every advised person refuses consent in a serious file, because consent waives the specialty rule and accelerates handover without full review. From that refusal, the procedure is judicial from start to finish, which is the French edge over purely administrative systems.
The general framework is set by the opening article of the extradition chapter, which also irrigates European arrest warrant reasoning by analogy. The Code provides that En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre. For European arrest warrants, the Framework Decision and its French transposition in articles 695-11 to 695-51 of the Code of criminal procedure take precedence, but the reflex is the same: no surrender without a judge, no judge without adversarial debate, no debate without a file the defence has seen.
The extradition track shows the method most clearly. The Code states that Lorsque la personne réclamée a déclaré au procureur général ne pas consentir à son extradition, la chambre de l’instruction est saisie, sans délai, de la procédure. The person appears within ten working days, assisted by counsel and an interpreter, the prosecutor presents requisitions, the defence pleads, and the chambre gives a reasoned opinion within a month. A 2025 Cour de cassation ruling illustrates the seriousness of that hearing. In a Brazilian extradition file, the Court examined a complaint that the chambre had ruled without the person present, showing through M. [T] [X] a formé un pourvoi contre l’arrêt de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Fort-de-France, en date du 17 septembre 2024, qui, dans la procédure d’extradition suivie contre lui à la demande du gouvernement brésilien, a émis un avis favorable that presence, interrogation and defence rights are not formalities. A European arrest warrant hearing before the chambre de l’instruction follows the same adversarial logic, with even shorter time limits.
On a German warrant for Nord Stream facts, the Paris chambre de l’instruction would work through a checklist. Identity and correspondence between the person arrested and the person sought. Validity of the warrant and description of the facts, dates, place near Bornholm, legal qualification in Germany. Double criminality or membership of the 32-category list dispensing with it. Applicable penalty thresholds. Mandatory bars under article 695-22, which the court consults through the rule that L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen est refusée dans les cas suivants. Optional bars under article 695-24, where the statute says L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut être refusée for concurrent French proceedings, territoriality, extraterritoriality limits, third-state final judgments, or prescription. Detention conditions and proportionality. Then, if surrender is authorised, the decision on the guarantee of return for French nationals and long-term residents.
A very recent ruling shows how strictly the Cour de cassation controls that review without re-trying the facts. On 12 August 2026 the criminal chamber rejected a challenge to surrender to Cyprus, in a file where Un mandat d’arrêt européen a été émis par les autorités judiciaires chypriotes à l’encontre de Mme [Z] [S], de nationalité lituanienne, recherchée aux fins de poursuites pour des faits qualifiés de complot en vue de commettre un crime, complot en vue de commettre une fraude et transactions frauduleuses concernant des biens immobiliers appartenant à autrui. The Court refused to second-guess the chambre’s assessment of double criminality and opportunity of prosecution, confirming that the chambre checks criminality in French law, not the merits. For Nord Stream, that means the Paris judges would confirm that underwater explosive sabotage is punishable in France under articles 322-6 and 322-8 and move on. The fight would shift to bars, guarantees and rights.
Two French specificities would dominate a Nord Stream file. First, nationality and residence. French law allows the executing court to condition surrender of a French national or a person continuously and lawfully resident for at least five years on a guarantee of return to serve any sentence in France, since Lorsque la personne recherchée est de nationalité française ou réside régulièrement sur le territoire national de façon ininterrompue depuis au moins cinq ans, l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat. A Ukrainian diver merely passing through France could not claim it, but a Ukrainian long-term resident, a refugee with five years of regular stay, or a French-Ukrainian dual national could. Preparing proof of five years of continuous lawful residence, tax notices, leases, school certificates, is therefore decisive from day one.
Second, the specialty rule and onward surrender. Once surrendered to Germany, the person may only be prosecuted for the facts in the warrant unless the French chambre consents to extension. The same logic that led the Cour de cassation to police extensions strictly in the Moroccan-Belgian-French chain of its 2020 decision would apply. Defence counsel in France should therefore negotiate the exact perimeter of the warrant now, because broadening from sabotage to terrorism, treason, or environmental war crimes later will require a new French consent that can be fought.
B. How can surrender from France still be refused or delayed: prison conditions, politics, double jeopardy?
Refusals of European arrest warrants in France are rare but real, and they cluster around three poles that a Nord Stream defence would develop simultaneously. The first pole is detention and trial rights in the issuing state. Since the CJEU Aranyosi and Caldararu line, reinforced by recent rule-of-law case law, an executing court that finds systemic deficiencies plus an individual real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment must postpone and ultimately may refuse surrender. Germany is not the target of such findings, and no French court would describe German prisons as systemically deficient. The argument would therefore need individualisation: specific threats linked to the war context, medical incompatibility with detention, or a documented risk connected to notoriety. General references to overcrowding or to the seriousness of the charge do not suffice. Medical certificates, expert reports, and precise CPT or ECHR materials on the exact detention centre matter more than press clippings.
The second pole is discrimination and political persecution in the warrant itself. The mandatory bar for discriminatory prosecution exists but is interpreted narrowly. Showing that Germany prosecutes Ukrainians for Nord Stream while not prosecuting others for comparable pipeline attacks would require hard comparators, not commentary. Showing that the warrant pursues the person for political opinions rather than for alleged dives would require internal prosecution documents, which the defence does not have at the surrender stage. The Polish just-act narrative has no statutory home in French European arrest warrant law and would be counterproductive if pleaded as such. The competent French pleading translates the intuition into admissible language: lack of objective evidence linking this individual to the dives, mistaken identity, alibi, and request for additional information from Germany under article 695-28, which often buys time and sometimes reveals weaknesses.
The third pole is ne bis in idem and parallel proceedings. Here the Nord Stream file is unusually fertile. If Poland refused surrender after examining the same facts, if Italy already surrendered a co-suspect for the same operation, if Ukraine, Denmark, Sweden or another state opened and closed files on the same dives, each final decision can ground a mandatory or optional refusal. French courts apply the rule through the provisions cited above, refusing where a final French or Member State decision for the same facts exists with sentence executed or no longer enforceable, and able to refuse where a third-state final decision exists or where French proceedings are pending. The defence must therefore map every proceeding touching the same material acts: German investigation, Polish refusal, Italian surrender, Swedish and Danish discontinued inquiries into the blasts, Ukrainian denials and any domestic file. Each order to obtain, translate and file. A bare assertion that Sweden closed its file proves nothing; the operative part of the Swedish closure decision, with its personal and material scope, proves something.
Prescription and territoriality complete the toolkit. French courts may refuse where the acts were committed in whole or in part on French territory, or where French law would not allow prosecution for extraterritorial acts of this kind, or where limitation has run under French law for acts triable in France. Nord Stream facts sit far from French territory and recent in time, so these bars look weak, but they must be checked rather than assumed. Cyber assistance, financing through French entities, or preparation meetings in France, if any were alleged, could paradoxically open an optional refusal based on partial French territoriality combined with a request for French prosecution. Defence counsel should ask the question early rather than discover a French nexus after surrender.
Procedure itself offers leverage that truly matters in high-profile files. Requests for additional information suspend the clock. Appeals to the Cour de cassation against a surrender decision suspend handover. Applications to the European Court of Human Rights for interim measures under Rule 39, though exceptional against Germany, remain available where an arguable Article 3 or Article 6 claim is documented. Each step must be reasoned and evidenced; dilatory tactics without substance damage credibility and accelerate surrender. The credible French strategy is opposite: short, documented, cumulative. Identity and alibi file, residence and return guarantee file, prison-conditions file with individualised medical evidence, ne bis in idem file with foreign decisions in full, proportionality file showing that questioning in France or by video-link could precede surrender.
After surrender, the defence moves to Germany but keeps a French anchor. The guarantee of return, if obtained, ensures any sentence is served in France near family. Specialty protects against charge creep. Counsel in both countries coordinate on the investigating judge phase, forensic challenges to dive logs, boat rental records, explosive residues, telephone geolocation, and the command-responsibility theory reportedly built around the first suspect acting on behalf of state entities. The Croatian decision authorises handover; it does not establish guilt. The German trial court will have to prove, diver by diver, who descended, who handled explosives, who ordered and funded, and under what legal qualification. That is a long road from a Pula hotel corridor to a criminal conviction in Karlsruhe or Berlin.
Conclusion
The Croatian court’s decision of 24 September 2026 to allow extradition of Vladimir Z. to Germany restores the ordinary course of the European arrest warrant after the Polish exception. Arrest in Pula on a German warrant, judicial review in Croatia, handover to Germany, presentation to an investigating judge: the machine worked as designed. The Polish refusal remains the outlier that proves the rule, a political reading of sabotage in wartime that French courts would not adopt as such but would translate into admissible defences around evidence, identity, double jeopardy and individual rights. No official source has established responsibility for the Nord Stream blasts beyond the German prosecution’s allegations, which the suspects deny and Kyiv rejects, and only the German trial judge will decide guilt.
If the same man had been arrested in France, the Paris chambre de l’instruction would almost certainly find double criminality satisfied under articles 322-6 and 322-8, reject any just-act theory, and focus on the serious work: five-year residence and return guarantees, ne bis in idem after the Polish refusal, precise prison and trial guarantees, and the exact perimeter of specialty. That is where files are won or narrowed. Anyone learning that a German, Croatian or other European warrant may exist should not wait for a hotel lobby arrest to prepare proof of residence, medical documentation, foreign decisions in full text, and coordinated counsel in both states. The warrant system rewards the prepared and punishes improvisation, and in a file as exposed as Nord Stream, preparation starts now.