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Nord Stream on Trial: The Ukrainian Extradited From Italy to Germany, the War-Crime Charge, and the Specialty Question France Would Ask

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nord Stream on Trial: The Ukrainian Extradited From Italy to Germany, the War-Crime Charge, and the Specialty Question France Would Ask

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On 14 October 2026, a 50-year-old Ukrainian walked into a Hamburg courtroom, smiled at the packed public gallery, put on headphones for the Ukrainian interpretation, and became the first person ever tried for blowing up the Nord Stream gas pipelines. Serhii Kuznetsov denies everything. German federal prosecutors say he led the team of divers that destroyed three of the four pipelines in the Baltic Sea on 26 September 2022, and they charge him not with ordinary sabotage but with a war crime. He is in that dock only because Italy arrested him in August 2025 on a German European Arrest Warrant and handed him over late last year after weeks of court battles. A second suspect, arrested in Croatia in August 2026 after Poland had refused to extradite him, may follow the same road: a Croatian court approved his surrender to Germany on 18 September 2026, and his lawyer has appealed. For an international reader, the trial is about who bombed the pipelines. For a French criminal lawyer, it is about something just as decisive: the European surrender machinery that carried Kuznetsov from a Rimini hotel to Hamburg, the refusal grounds Italy could have raised, and the specialty rule that may decide whether Germany is even allowed to try him for a war crime when the warrant that delivered him may have said something else. France applies exactly the same instruments, article by article, and French case law answers each of these questions. This analysis follows our 17 October breakdown of why Poland refused extradition while Italy and Croatia surrendered their Nord Stream suspects, and focuses on what the trial phase now changes: the war-crime qualification retained in Hamburg and the specialty rule that conditions it. This analysis follows that thread.

I. From a Rimini hotel to a Hamburg courtroom: the European Arrest Warrant that delivered Kuznetsov

A. How does a European Arrest Warrant carry a suspect from Italy to Germany in a matter of months

The facts of the surrender are now public and undisputed. In August 2025, Kuznetsov was arrested after checking into a hotel near the Italian Adriatic resort of Rimini, acting under a European Arrest Warrant issued by Germany’s federal prosecutors. After several weeks of court battles fighting extradition, during which his surname emerged in court documents, he was transferred to Germany late last year. The Associated Press dates the handover to November 2025. He had previously been identified by German prosecutors only as Serhii K., with his face blurred; at the Hamburg trial he waived his anonymity.

This speed is the whole point of the instrument. Under French law, which transposes the same European framework Italy and Germany apply, the definition is straightforward: “Le mandat d’arrêt européen est une décision judiciaire émise par un Etat membre de l’Union européenne, appelé Etat membre d’émission, en vue de l’arrestation et de la remise par un autre Etat membre, appelé Etat membre d’exécution, d’une personne recherchée pour l’exercice de poursuites pénales ou pour l’exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté privative de liberté.” That text is article 695-11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, and every word matters: a judicial decision, not a political one; arrest and surrender between member states; for prosecution or for serving a sentence. The Rimini arrest and the November transfer are that definition in motion, with Germany as the issuing state and Italy as the executing state.

The mechanism then sorts offences into two lanes. For a list of serious offence categories, the executing state surrenders without checking whether the conduct is also an offence under its own law. French law lists these categories in article 694-32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: participation in a criminal organisation, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in narcotic drugs, trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives, corruption, fraud, money laundering, cybercrime and others. Sabotage of underwater gas pipelines maps naturally onto explosives trafficking and terrorism categories, provided the issuing state’s law punishes the conduct with at least three years of imprisonment. Outside that list, the executing judge may verify double criminality, and article 695-23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the rule plainly: “L’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen peut également être refusée si le fait faisant l’objet dudit mandat d’arrêt ne constitue pas une infraction au regard de la loi française.”

French case law shows how concretely judges apply this control when the issuing state later wants more than the warrant originally covered. In a decision of 29 May 2024, the Criminal Chamber of the Cour de cassation reviewed an extension of surrender effects granted for the enforcement of Polish sentences, and it approved the reasoning that “l’arrêt attaqué énonce notamment que l’extension des effets des mandats d’arrêt européens peut être accordée, soit lorsque les faits reprochés entrent dans l’une des catégories d’infractions visées par l’article 694-32 du code de procédure pénale, soit lorsque ces faits constituent une infraction en droit français.” That is Cass. crim., 29 May 2024, No. 24-82.747. The same Court added a warning that matters for Hamburg: for offences falling within an article 694-32 category, judges may not skip verifying that the conduct is punished under the issuing state’s law by at least three years of imprisonment, because those conditions are cumulative. Transposed to Kuznetsov, the lesson is that every line of the German warrant counts, and a reviewing court checks them one by one rather than waving the file through.

The contrast with the second suspect sharpens the picture. The man German prosecutors call Vladimir Z., identified by Polish authorities as Volodymyr Zhuravlov, was arrested in Poland and then released when a Polish court refused to extradite him to Germany. He was arrested again in the northern Croatian town of Pula in August 2026 on a European warrant, and a Croatian court approved his extradition on 18 September 2026, a ruling his lawyer Ljubo Pavaskovic says he will appeal, according to Croatian state television HRT as reported by the Associated Press on 24 September 2026. German prosecutors describe him as a trained scuba diver who, with others, planted explosives on the pipelines near the Danish island of Bornholm. Two suspects, two executing states, two opposite first answers: Italy surrendered, Poland refused, Croatia approved subject to appeal. That is not inconsistency; it is the system working as designed, with each executing judge applying the same refusal grounds to different files. Readers who want the broader picture of how France handles comparable surrender fights, including the assurances Paris demands before handing anyone over, will find it in our analysis of what France would do with an extradition file like Kim Dotcom’s, and in our breakdown of what a European Arrest Warrant means when the person has already been tried in another EU country.

B. What Italy could have refused, and what France would check before surrendering anyone

The European Arrest Warrant abolished the old political-offence bar that still dominates classic extradition, and the French statute shows it by omission. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists the cases in which execution of a European Arrest Warrant must be refused: amnesty extinguishing prosecution in France, a final judgment for the same facts in France or another member state, a suspect under thirteen at the time of the facts, and discriminatory purpose. On that last ground the text is explicit: “S’il est établi que ledit mandat d’arrêt a été émis dans le but de poursuivre ou de condamner une personne en raison de son sexe, de sa race, de sa religion, de son origine ethnique, de sa nationalité, de sa langue, de ses opinions politiques ou de son orientation sexuelle ou identité de genre, ou qu’il peut être porté atteinte à la situation de cette personne pour l’une de ces raisons.” A political character of the offence itself does not appear in that list. Compare classic extradition, where article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française […] ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. That second paragraph is the old world. Inside the European Union, the warrant system deliberately left it behind, which is why neither Kuznetsov’s Italian judges nor Zhuravlov’s Polish and Croatian judges could refuse surrender on the sole ground that pipeline sabotage during wartime looks political. The indictment’s claim that the saboteurs acted, in the prosecutors’ words reported by the BBC, by order of Ukrainian state agencies, and the Ukrainian president’s consistent denial that Ukraine had anything to do with the blasts, are therefore background, not refusal grounds.

What the executing judge does check, and what France would check identically, is a short list of hard bars. Final judgment for the same facts in another member state blocks surrender; nothing in the published record suggests such a judgment exists for either suspect. Discriminatory purpose blocks surrender; no party alleges it. Age and amnesty are irrelevant here. Double criminality remains available outside the listed categories, and France applies it the same way Italy did. And one protective device deserves attention even though it does not apply to a Ukrainian national: where the wanted person is French or has lived in France continuously for at least five years, article 695-32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows surrender to be conditioned on verification that the person can be sent back to France to serve any sentence the issuing state’s courts impose: “l’exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen peut être subordonnée à la vérification qu’elle peut être renvoyée en France pour y effectuer la peine qui sera éventuellement prononcée par l’autorité judiciaire de l’Etat d’émission pour les faits faisant l’objet du mandat.” Had Kuznetsov been French, Paris could have demanded that return guarantee; Rome, dealing with a Ukrainian, had no such lever.

For completeness, the classic extradition track outside the Union runs on a different procedure that France still uses with countries like Canada, and it is worth knowing because it shows how much heavier the old system is. When the wanted person tells the prosecutor general he does not consent, article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sends the case to the investigating chamber, which hears the person within ten working days and delivers a reasoned opinion within one month: “la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition. Elle rend son avis, sauf si un complément d’information a été ordonné, dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée.” Our analysis of the French opinion stage before any surrender to Canada walks through that sequence step by step. The Kuznetsov file never took that road, because Italy and Germany are both bound by the warrant system, but the comparison explains why the Rimini-to-Hamburg transfer took weeks while classic extraditions take months or years.

II. The Hamburg trial and the specialty question a French court would ask first

A. A war-crime prosecution for burst pipelines: what Hamburg must prove, and what the defence attacks

German prosecutors allege that Kuznetsov played a leading role in a diving team that rented the yacht Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock, using forged identities and intermediaries, sailed into the Baltic, and planted the explosives that ruptured three of the four Nord Stream pipelines off the island of Bornholm on 26 September 2022. Traces of subsea explosives were later found in samples taken from the boat, according to the German account. In the months after the blasts, Western suspicion pointed toward Moscow without direct attribution: Russia had already cut gas flows through Nord Stream 1, Nord Stream 2 had never entered service after Berlin froze certification, and Denmark and Sweden eventually closed their own inquiries, leaving Germany as the last investigating state. In January 2025, Germany’s federal court of justice confirmed that the case fell within German territorial jurisdiction and that prosecutors had a duty to act because it involved undermining the country’s internal security.

The striking choice is the legal qualification. Prosecutors charge the sabotage as a war crime under Germany’s Code of Crimes Against International Law, describing it as an attack by military means against civilian objects, committed while Kuznetsov was, in their account, a serving officer in the Ukrainian army. That framing does heavy work. It explains German jurisdiction over explosions that occurred off the Danish coast. It answers the objection that one ally does not prosecute another ally’s soldiers: a war crime is prosecuted in the interest of international law itself, and successive German governments have insisted the file is judicial, not political. And it raises the stakes enormously for the accused, because a war-crimes conviction carries a different weight from an explosives conviction.

The defence, led before the court by Italian lawyer Nicola Canestrini alongside German colleagues, attacks on three fronts. First, the evidence: four years of investigation produced, in the defence’s words outside the courtroom, no witness, no forensics, no DNA and no fingerprints. As reported by the BBC correspondent in Hamburg, the defence says that four years of investigation produced no witness, no forensic evidence, no DNA and no fingerprints. Second, the fairness of trying a soldier bound to secrecy: if Kuznetsov has an alibi placing him on another classified operation, he cannot disclose it, cannot name the witnesses who would confirm it, and therefore, the defence argues, cannot defend himself. Third, and most technically promising, the surrender itself: the defence told the court the extradition from Italy was flawed because no mention had been made at the time of the war-crime allegation. That third argument is where French law has the most to say, because it has a name in every European courtroom: the specialty rule.

B. The specialty rule: why Germany may need Italy’s permission to try a war crime

Specialty is the promise that underpins every surrender in Europe: the issuing state tries the person it received only for the offences listed in the warrant, and for anything else it must ask the executing state’s permission first. French law states it in article 695-18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Lorsque le ministère public qui a émis le mandat d’arrêt européen a obtenu la remise de la personne recherchée, celle-ci ne peut être poursuivie, condamnée ou détenue en vue de l’exécution d’une peine privative de liberté pour un fait quelconque antérieur à la remise et autre que celui qui a motivé cette mesure, sauf dans l’un des cas suivants”. The exceptions include the person’s express waiver and, crucially, the express consent of the executing judicial authority. The procedure for that consent is set out in article 695-46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “La chambre de l’instruction devant laquelle la personne recherchée a comparu est saisie de toute demande émanant des autorités compétentes de l’Etat membre d’émission en vue de consentir à des poursuites ou à la mise à exécution d’une peine ou d’une mesure de sûreté prononcées pour d’autres infractions que celles ayant motivé la remise et commises antérieurement à celle-ci.” The investigating chamber decides within thirty days, and its decision can be appealed to the Cour de cassation.

Apply that grid to Hamburg and the defence’s third argument comes into focus. If the German warrant described the facts as explosives offences, destruction of property or conspiracy, and the trial court now convicts for a war crime under the Code of Crimes Against International Law, the question is whether the war-crime qualification is the same offence wearing a different label or a different offence requiring Italy’s fresh consent. The defence says no mention of a war crime was made at surrender time, which in French terms is precisely a plea that the specialty boundary has been crossed without the executing state’s consent. The answer will turn on the exact wording of the German warrant and on how German law relates ordinary explosives charges to the international-crimes charge, but the structure of the argument is universal across the Union, and French courts police it strictly.

Two recent decisions of the Cour de cassation show how strict. In the first, the Court reviewed a Spanish surrender to France: a man handed over by Spain on a European Arrest Warrant for the enforcement of a sentence was placed in pre-trial detention for a different offence before any consent to extension had been obtained. The Court recalled the European rule as interpreted by the Court of Justice, namely that a surrendered person facing a different offence from the one that justified surrender may be prosecuted and convicted before consent is obtained, provided no liberty-restricting measure is applied during that phase: “la personne remise peut être poursuivie et condamnée pour une telle infraction avant que ce consentement ait été obtenu, pour autant qu’aucune mesure restrictive de liberté n’est appliquée au cours de la phase de poursuite ou de jugement relative à cette infraction.” It then drew the consequence for detention: “La Cour de cassation en déduit qu’une personne remise à la France en exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen et qui n’a pas renoncé au principe de spécialité ne peut faire l’objet d’une mesure de détention provisoire pour une infraction autre que celle qui a motivé sa remise, avant que son consentement ait été obtenu (Crim., 5 octobre 2021, pourvoi n° 21-84.194, publié au Bulletin).” That is Cass. crim., 10 February 2026, No. 25-87.769, applying the Court of Justice’s Leymann ruling of 1 December 2008. In the second decision, the Court examined an extension of Polish warrants to additional sentences and confirmed that extension is available where the new facts either fall within an article 694-32 category or constitute an offence under French law, while insisting that the three-year penalty threshold under the issuing state’s law be verified in every case: Cass. crim., 29 May 2024, No. 24-82.747.

Three practical consequences follow for the Nord Stream files. First, Kuznetsov’s lawyers will press the Hamburg court to establish exactly what Italy authorised, and if the war-crime charge goes beyond it, to seek Rome’s consent or drop the qualification. Second, Zhuravlov’s Croatian appeal will be fought with the same vocabulary: whatever Zagreb authorises will fence in whatever Hamburg may later try, and his lawyer’s announced appeal is the moment to narrow that fence. Third, anyone advising a client in a comparable position inside France should treat the warrant’s wording as the first battlefield: accept surrender without waiving specialty, read the offence descriptions against articles 694-32 and 695-23, and force any extension through the article 695-46 consent procedure with its thirty-day decision and cassation appeal, rather than discovering the problem at trial when detention has already been ordered.

Conclusion

The Hamburg trial will determine whether prosecutors can tie one former officer to the most consequential sabotage in modern European history with circumstantial evidence, no identified witnesses and no forensic traces, against a defence that wraps denial in a soldier’s duty of silence. But whatever the verdict on the facts, the case has already demonstrated the European Arrest Warrant at full power: an arrest in Rimini in August 2025, a transfer to Germany in November, a trial in October 2026, and a second suspect moving through Croatian courts on the same track after a Polish refusal. The instrument delivers people quickly because it removed politics from the refusal grounds and entrusted everything to judges. The price of that speed is precision: the warrant’s wording defines what the trial may cover, double criminality and the listed categories define what the executing judge checks, and specialty defines what the trial court may judge. France applies each of these rules in identical terms, and its highest criminal court enforces them without indulgence, including against its own prosecutors when they detain a surrendered person for an offence the warrant did not cover. Anyone facing a European warrant, in Paris or elsewhere, should therefore read the file backwards from the trial they fear to the warrant that started it, because the defences of tomorrow are written into the surrender papers of today. For the pre-trial stage of the same files, including the Warsaw refusal reasoning and the double-criminality debate, see our companion analysis of the three-way surrender split between Poland, Italy and Croatia.

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