On 10 September 2026, two stories collided in Brussels. EUobserver reported that Ukraine faces a financial gap of $27 billion to survive the rest of the year, a warning Volodymyr Zelensky delivered to allies on Ukraine’s Independence Day. The same week, members of the European Parliament pushed to use frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, and the Financial Times reported that EU states had revived the plan to tap Moscow’s immobilised billions. Close to 170 billion euros in frozen Russian assets are parked at the Brussels clearing house Euroclear, with wider estimates putting the total frozen across the EU at around 210 billion euros. The question dominating every chancellery in Europe is brutally simple: can the West take that money and give it to Kyiv? And the answer, seen from a Paris courtroom, is far more complicated than the headlines suggest.
Freezing is not seizing. That distinction is the whole ballgame. Since 2022, the European Union has immobilised the assets of the Central Bank of Russia held in Europe, most of them securities and cash balances sitting in accounts at Euroclear in Brussels. In December 2025, after a marathon summit, EU leaders agreed to fund Ukraine through a massive joint loan rather than by confiscating the assets outright, precisely because Belgium, home to Euroclear, warned that an outright seizure would violate international law and expose the depository to severe Russian legal retaliation. In August 2026, three former senior officials proposed transferring the frozen accounts to a new EU instrument acting as custodian, shielding Belgium from liability. Now, with winter approaching and Ukraine’s finances deteriorating, the seizure debate is back. Meanwhile, Moscow is fighting back in court: on 3 March 2026, the Central Bank of Russia announced it had filed an action for annulment before the General Court of the European Union in Luxembourg, challenging the regulation that freezes its assets indefinitely.
This article explains, for asset holders, creditors, banks and counsel, what French and EU law actually say. First, whether Brussels can lawfully seize Russia’s frozen central-bank billions, through the lens of the French judge-made law on immunity from execution, which is among the strictest in Europe for creditors. Second, how a frozen person or entity challenges an EU listing or enforces rights from Paris, step by step, with the remedies that really work in Luxembourg and before the French enforcement judge.
I. Can Brussels Seize Russia’s Frozen Billions for Ukraine?
A. Why French Judges Protect Foreign Central-Bank Reserves, Even in Wartime
Start with the rule that kills most seizure fantasies at birth. In France, the foreign-exchange reserves held by a foreign central bank cannot be seized. The provision is short, absolute in its opening words, and worth quoting in full: “Ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature, notamment les avoirs de réserves de change, que les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères détiennent ou gèrent pour leur compte ou celui de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent.” That is the first paragraph of Article L. 153-1 of the French Monetary and Financial Code. The rest of the article allows only one narrow door: a creditor holding an enforceable title for a liquid and due claim may ask the enforcement judge for authorisation to proceed, and only if it proves that the assets held by the foreign central bank belong to funds used for an activity governed principally by private law.
The Cour de cassation gave this text its full meaning in a landmark published judgment of 12 May 2021 (No. 19-13.853, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2021:C100351), in litigation between the company Commisimpex and the Republic of Congo, available on the Court’s official website. The First Civil Chamber held that this unseizability “est instituée, en raison de la nature des biens concernés, afin de garantir le fonctionnement de ces banques et autorités monétaires, indépendamment de l’immunité d’exécution reconnue aux Etats étrangers.” In other words, the protection of central-bank reserves stands on its own feet: it does not depend on state immunity, and it cannot be brushed aside by arguing that the foreign state behaved badly. The Court added that “elle poursuit un but légitime en ce qu’elle vise à préserver le fonctionnement d’institutions qui concourent à la définition et à la mise en oeuvre de la politique monétaire et à prévenir un blocage des réserves de change placées en France.” And it found the interference proportionate: “Elle se trouve proportionnée, dès lors qu’elle ne s’applique qu’aux valeurs ou biens détenus en France par les banques centrales ou les autorités monétaires étrangères et non à l’ensemble du patrimoine de l’Etat ou des Etats étrangers dont elles relèvent.”
This matters enormously for the Russian-assets debate. The billions parked at Euroclear are central-bank reserves. Any creditor, and any government designing a seizure mechanism, runs straight into this wall: in France, reserves are unseizable by nature, not merely immune. The Cour de cassation expressly distinguished the two concepts, recalling that immunity attaches to a person while unseizability attaches to property, and that even the third-party garnishee, sued for damages for not paying out, may rely on it. A European confiscation scheme that ignored this would have to override not only international law but a domestic protection the highest French civil court has declared legitimate and proportionate under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of its First Protocol.
Beyond central-bank reserves, the general French law of immunity from execution is codified, since the so-called Sapin 2 Act of 9 December 2016, in the Code of Civil Enforcement Proceedings. Article L. 111-1 states the baseline: “L’exécution forcée et les mesures conservatoires ne sont pas applicables aux personnes qui bénéficient d’une immunité d’exécution.” Article L. 111-1-1 then requires the prior authorisation of the enforcement judge, by order on petition, before any conservatory or enforcement measure against property belonging to a foreign state. And Article L. 111-1-2 lists the only three keys that open the door: “1° L’Etat concerné a expressément consenti à l’application d’une telle mesure ; 2° L’Etat concerné a réservé ou affecté ce bien à la satisfaction de la demande qui fait l’objet de la procédure ; 3° Lorsqu’un jugement ou une sentence arbitrale a été rendu contre l’Etat concerné et que le bien en question est spécifiquement utilisé ou destiné à être utilisé par ledit Etat autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales et entretient un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.” Diplomatic property enjoys an even stronger shield under Article L. 111-1-3, which demands an express and specific waiver.
The case law refines each key. On waiver, the Cour de cassation held on 10 January 2018 (No. 16-22.494, published, available on the Court’s website) that, for diplomatic property, “ces dispositions législatives, qui subordonnent la validité de la renonciation par un Etat étranger à son immunité d’exécution, à la double condition que cette renonciation soit expresse et spéciale”. But the Court has also refused to make waiver harder than the statute requires: on 13 April 2023 (No. 18-20.915, on courdecassation.fr), it ruled that where the assets are not specifically used for diplomatic or consular missions, “la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution, consentie par cet Etat dans le litige l’opposant à la société Commisimpex, suffisait pour que les actifs en cause puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, peu important qu’ils aient consisté en des créances fiscales, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale.” And most recently, on 13 March 2024 (No. 21-17.599, on courdecassation.fr), again in Commisimpex against the Republic of Congo over the seizure of a presidential aircraft in June 2020, the First Civil Chamber stated: “Selon les principes du droit international coutumier reflétés par la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur les immunités des Etats et de leurs biens, la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit pour que les biens d’un Etat, quels qu’ils soient, puissent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution, sans que soit en outre requise une renonciation spéciale.” The Court upheld the seizure because “il n’était ni soutenu ni démontré que l’aéronef saisi faisait partie des moyens mis à la disposition de la mission diplomatique en France de la République du Congo,” drawing a sharp line between a diplomatic mission’s own means and assets merely assigned to a presidency.
The same customary-law foundation appears in the 3 November 2021 judgment (No. 19-25.404, on courdecassation.fr): “Selon le droit international coutumier, tel que reflété par l’article 19 de la Convention des Nations Unies du 2 décembre 2004 sur l’immunité juridictionnelle des Etats et de leurs biens, à défaut de renonciation à l’immunité d’exécution, ou d’affectation des biens saisis à la satisfaction de la demande, les biens d’un Etat étranger ou de ses émanations ne peuvent faire l’objet d’une mesure d’exécution forcée, en vertu d’un jugement ou d’une sentence arbitrale, que s’il est établi que ces biens, situés sur le territoire de l’Etat du for, sont spécifiquement utilisés ou destinés à être utilisés autrement qu’à des fins de service public non commerciales et ont un lien avec l’entité contre laquelle la procédure a été intentée.”
Apply this to Moscow’s billions. Russia has consented to nothing, has earmarked nothing for Ukraine’s claims, and central-bank reserves are the textbook example of property used for sovereign, non-commercial public purposes, monetary policy, which is precisely what Article 21 of the 2004 United Nations Convention singles out for absolute protection. No French enforcement judge could authorise a seizure under L. 111-1-2, and L. 153-1 bars it independently. That is why Belgium’s objection is not political theatre: it is the correct reading of the law as French courts apply it every week. Confiscation would require either Russian consent, which will not come, or a new international legal basis strong enough to displace immunity from execution, which does not yet exist. This is also why the “reparations loan” idea was engineered the way it was: Ukraine would borrow against the assets and repay only if Russia one day pays reparations, precisely to avoid the legal qualification of confiscation.
B. What the EU Freeze on Russian Assets Actually Does, and What It Forbids
The European freeze is an administrative immobilisation, not a transfer of ownership. Its backbone is Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 (CELEX:32014R0269), adopted under Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP (CELEX:32014D0145), which freezes all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by listed persons and entities, and prohibits making any funds or economic resources available to them. For the Central Bank of Russia specifically, the related sectoral framework was tightened step by step until the Council adopted, at its December 2025 summit, Council Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 (OJ L 2025/2600), the so-called Freezing Regulation. Its Article 6(1) prolongs the freeze on the Central Bank’s European assets indefinitely: the assets will only be released once Russia ceases its aggression against Ukraine and provides reparation. The six-month renewal cycle that normally applies to EU restrictive measures no longer gives Moscow a periodic political window.
Three consequences follow, and each is routinely misunderstood. First, the assets still belong to Russia. Euroclear’s balances remain Russian property; the freeze merely paralyses every movement. Interest, coupons and maturities accruing inside the frozen accounts, the so-called extraordinary revenues, can be skimmed off for Ukraine under separate EU decisions without touching the principal, which is legally a different operation from confiscation. Second, the freeze binds everyone inside the EU, including French banks, insurers, custodians and their compliance departments, under criminal and administrative penalties that make over-compliance the rational reflex. Third, the freeze is reviewable. Every listing, and the Freezing Regulation itself, can be challenged before the EU courts in Luxembourg, which is exactly what the Central Bank of Russia did in March 2026 with its action for annulment under Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
The due-process constraints on the Council are real, and Luxembourg enforces them. In the foundational Kadi judgment of 3 September 2008 (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, on EUR-Lex), the Court of Justice annulled an EU asset freeze imposed under a UN Security Council resolution because the listed person had been denied the right to be heard and to effective judicial review, rights that belong to the constitutional core of EU law and cannot be sacrificed even to international security obligations. Since Kadi, the Council must give each listed person individual, specific and concrete reasons, disclose the evidence in sufficient time to allow observations, and survive the General Court’s review for manifest error of assessment. Listings supported only by press clippings or by association with a regime, without a demonstrated individual role, are routinely annulled. That is the quiet engine behind the wave of individual delistings, and it frames the Central Bank’s pending case: commentators expect the action to be declared admissible, since the Bank is directly and individually concerned, but to face an uphill battle on the merits, given the Council’s wide discretion in foreign policy and the gravity of the stated objective.
The political timeline shows how the law channels the politics. December 2025: EU leaders choose the 90-billion-euro joint loan, Plan B, because confiscation cannot command unanimity and Belgium refuses to sacrifice Euroclear. August 2026: former officials float the custodian-instrument workaround, transferring the accounts to an EU vehicle that would shoulder Russia’s future legal claims. September 2026: with Ukraine’s documented 27-billion-dollar shortfall and a hard winter ahead, the Parliament and several capitals demand movement, while the Commission studies structures that use the assets as collateral or harvest their revenues without formally expropriating the principal. Every proposal is reverse-engineered around the same obstacle: ownership and immunity. As long as no court has ordered Russia to pay, and no waiver exists, the principal cannot be taken, only borrowed against, and even borrowing against it requires Belgium’s consent and a liability shield the other 26 Member States must underwrite.
One more French angle is often missed in Brussels commentary. If any EU instrument ever purported to authorise the taking of central-bank reserves held in France, it would collide with L. 153-1 as interpreted by the Cour de cassation in 2021, and with the Convention rights the Court weighed. EU law has primacy, but a regulation that ordered Member States to confiscate immune reserves would itself face actions for annulment in Luxembourg and preliminary references on fundamental rights, proportionality and the customary international law of immunity, which EU courts treat as binding on the Union. The litigation would last years, during which the assets would remain frozen and unusable. Paradoxically, the strongest short-term value of the frozen billions for Ukraine is therefore the status quo plus the revenue stream, not a seizure whose legal foundations would be litigated for a decade.
II. How Do You Challenge or Enforce an Asset Freeze From Paris?
A. How Sanctioned Owners Get EU Listings Annulled in Luxembourg
For the listed businessman, the bank, or the sovereign fund whose accounts are paralysed, the road to Luxembourg is codified and, contrary to legend, frequently travelled with success. Our firm recently analysed an individual annulment obtained against the Council in the case of a former senator, a judgment that follows the same template as dozens of delistings each year, and readers challenging a personal listing will find the detailed playbook there: EU Court Annuls Sanctions Against Ex-Senator Oleg Tkach: How to Challenge an EU Listing and Unfreeze Assets From France. The present section states the general method that applies to every file, individual or institutional.
Standing and time limits come first. Under Article 263 TFEU, a person or entity directly and individually concerned by a listing regulation may bring an action for annulment before the General Court within two months of notification or publication, extended by a ten-day period on account of distance. Missing the deadline is usually fatal, although each six-month renewal of a listing, and each amending regulation that maintains the name with fresh reasons, opens a new window. The Central Bank’s March 2026 action was filed against the new Freezing Regulation precisely to catch a fresh act. The first reflex in Paris must therefore be calendaring: identify every Council act touching the client, compute each deadline, and file protectively rather than waiting for the perfect file.
The pleas that win are technical, not political. The General Court does not judge whether sanctions against Russia are wise; it checks whether the Council respected the rules for this file. The classic winning pleas are: breach of the duty to state reasons, where the summary of reasons merely recycles the listing criterion without explaining the client’s individual role; manifest error of assessment, where the evidence does not support the asserted role, for example a resigned directorship, a sold shareholding, or functions with no link to the regime’s policies; breach of the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial protection, where observations filed with the Council went unanswered or evidence was disclosed too late; and breach of proportionality and the right to property under Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where a sweeping freeze is maintained for years without re-examination of the individual situation. The Council’s file often leans on open-source material; systematically auditing each exhibit, proving dates, corporate exits and the absence of decision-making power, is the unglamorous work that wins cases.
Procedure matters as much as substance. After filing, the applicant may seek interim measures, suspension of the freeze, but the threshold is punishing: urgency plus serious and irreparable harm, and the General Court almost never suspends sanctions because financial harm is deemed reparable. Do not build the strategy on interim relief. Instead, run two tracks in parallel: the Luxembourg action for annulment, and the administrative request to the Council for delisting with fresh exculpatory evidence, which the Council must genuinely examine at each renewal. Simultaneously, apply to the competent national authority, in France the Treasury, for authorisations to release frozen funds for basic needs, legal fees and other permitted purposes under the regulation’s derogation clauses. These authorisations keep the client alive and the defence funded while Luxembourg works, and a well-documented derogation file demonstrates good faith that judges notice.
Expect the Council to relist. A frequent pattern is annulment followed within months by a fresh listing on reformulated grounds. The answer is to treat the first victory as precedent, not as the end: file again, invoke res judicata and the authority of the first judgment’s factual findings, and force the Council to produce genuinely new material. Costs follow the event in Luxembourg, so a winning applicant generally recovers a significant part of its legal expenses. And throughout, mind the American layer: several ICC and sanctions files now carry parallel US designations, and the EU’s Blocking Statute, Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 (CELEX:31996R2271), prohibits EU operators from complying with certain foreign sanctions laws, which creates a compliance conflict that must be managed explicitly rather than discovered during a banking dispute.
B. What to Do in Paris If Your Funds Are Frozen, or If You Want Them Seized
Whether you are the target of the freeze or the creditor hoping to attach frozen assets, the Paris playbook starts at the same place: identify exactly what is frozen, where, and under which legal basis. Demand from the bank the precise reference of the freeze, the Council regulation and listing entry relied upon, and the date of the measure. French banks routinely freeze first and explain later, sometimes sweeping in non-listed family members, homonyms, or entities merely connected to a listed person. A significant share of files unravels at this stage: wrong person, expired listing after a Council renewal dropped the name, funds outside the regulation’s scope, or a listing that Luxembourg has annulled but the bank’s screening database has not updated. Before drafting a single pleading, verify the listing’s current status in the Official Journal and the EU sanctions map, and pull the statement of reasons. This verification costs days and saves years.
If you are the listed person, sequence the remedies. First, the Luxembourg track described above, with strict deadline discipline. Second, the Council delisting request with new evidence. Third, the French track for day-to-day survival: applications for release authorisations, challenges to over-blocking before the French courts, and, where the bank has frozen assets beyond what the regulation requires, an action for breach of the bank’s duties, since a bank is not entitled to invent sanctions the regulation does not impose. Where funds are needed to pay counsel, say so early and document it: the regulations’ derogations for legal fees exist precisely so that the right to a defence survives the freeze, and French judges are receptive to applications framed as access-to-justice measures. Keep every euro of the frozen estate accounted for, because the General Court will ask what happened to it, and so will the French tax administration.
If you are the creditor eyeing frozen Russian assets, be blunt with yourself about the odds. Against central-bank reserves, L. 153-1 and the 2021 Cour de cassation judgment close the French door, and no enforcement judge can reopen it: the authorisation procedure of Article L. 111-1-1 cannot be granted where the substantive conditions of Article L. 111-1-2 are structurally absent, no Russian consent, no earmarking, no commercial use. Against other Russian state property in France, the creditor must hold a judgment or arbitral award, obtain the judge’s prior authorisation, and prove either an express waiver or commercial use linked to the debtor entity, following the template of the Commisimpex aircraft seizure upheld in 2024, where the Court accepted that “la renonciation expresse à l’immunité d’exécution suffit” for non-diplomatic assets. Against assets of listed oligarchs rather than the state, immunity does not apply at all, but the EU freeze does: frozen property cannot be seized for the creditor’s benefit while the freeze lasts, and any distribution requires a release authorisation. The realistic creditor strategy is therefore to secure conservatory measures where possible, position the claim for the day a settlement, reparations mechanism or delisting unfreezes value, and meanwhile pursue solvent co-debtors and commercial assets outside the sanctions perimeter.
Paris offers one genuine tactical advantage that few foreign counsel exploit: the French enforcement judge’s exclusive gatekeeper role. Because Article L. 111-1-1 centralises every state-asset measure on a prior judicial authorisation, a well-prepared petition, arbitral award, waiver clause, commercial-use evidence, can be ruled on quickly, and a refusal is appealable with a full record for Luxembourg or for the enforcement courts of other jurisdictions. Conversely, a creditor who seizes first and seeks permission later will be annulled, as the Cour de cassation showed on 10 January 2018 when it annulled measures taken without respecting the express-and-specific waiver requirement. Procedure is substance here: the judge who must authorise is the same judge who will later control proportionality, and credibility earned at the authorisation stage pays dividends at every later hearing. Build the file as if the judge knew nothing about Russia, Ukraine or sanctions, because on the law of immunity, none of that changes the test.
Finally, mind the criminal perimeter. Circumventing EU restrictive measures, structuring transfers to dodge a freeze, or making funds available to a listed person exposes directors, bankers and advisers to prosecution in France, and the 2026 enforcement climate is unforgiving. Every restructuring of a frozen holding, every intra-group payment, every licence application must be documented as compliance, reviewed against the exact wording of the listing regulation, and, where doubt exists, submitted for prior authorisation rather than executed on counsel’s private reading. The firms that survive sanctions regimes intact are not the cleverest; they are the most boring, the ones whose paper trail shows a question asked before every movement.
Conclusion
The September 2026 push to hand Moscow’s frozen billions to Kyiv is politically understandable and legally premature. The money is frozen, not forfeited. Under French law, the core of it, central-bank reserves, is doubly protected: by the customary international law of immunity from execution, which the Cour de cassation applies through the 2004 United Nations Convention, and by the standalone unseizability of Article L. 153-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which the Court upheld in 2021 as a legitimate and proportionate shield for monetary institutions. The EU freeze itself, from Regulation 269/2014 to the indefinite Freezing Regulation 2025/2600, immobilises without expropriating, and its revenues can lawfully flow to Ukraine while the principal stays Russian property pending cessation of aggression and reparation. The Central Bank of Russia’s annulment action in Luxembourg will test that architecture, and the smart money expects admissibility with an uphill merits fight.
For listed persons, the lesson of Luxembourg is the opposite of despair: reasoned, evidence-driven challenges win regularly, derogations keep life and defence funded, and each renewal opens a new door. For creditors, the lesson of Paris is discipline: central-bank reserves are out of reach, state commercial assets are reachable only through the enforcement judge’s prior authorisation with a waiver or proven commercial use, and frozen private fortunes must be positioned, not seized, until the freeze lifts. In both postures, the winning file is the boring one, exact references, exact dates, exact exhibits, presented to the right judge in the right order. That is what our cabinet does every week between Paris and Luxembourg.