On 16 September 2026, a courtroom in The Hague did what few international courts have ever done: it sent a former head of state to prison for 25 years. Hashim Thaçi, the man who led Kosovo from guerrilla war to its 2008 declaration of independence and then served as its president, was found guilty of war crimes — arbitrary detention, torture, cruel treatment and murder — committed by fighters under his authority in the late 1990s. Three of his former Kosovo Liberation Army comrades were convicted with him. The same judges acquitted all four of crimes against humanity. The verdict landed like a shockwave in Pristina, where crowds watching on giant screens fell silent, and it sets up the next act every international conviction eventually reaches: appeal, enforcement, and the question of where convicted men actually serve decades behind bars. This analysis explains what the judges decided, why a former president could not hide behind immunity, and — the question our Paris office hears after every Hague verdict — what France would do with a file like this: when Paris can prosecute a foreign rebel leader itself, when it arrests and surrenders instead, and what guarantees French judges demand before anyone is handed over.
I. Why the Hague court gave Hashim Thaçi 25 years for war crimes
A. What the judges convicted him of: murder, torture and 385 arbitrary detentions
The judgment was delivered by the Trial Panel of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in case KSC-BC-2020-06, the trial of Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi. The court announced that it had found all four accused “criminally responsible for the war crimes of arbitrary detention against 385 individuals, cruel treatment against 49 individuals, torture against 303 individuals, and murder against 96 individuals.” Thaçi received 25 years of imprisonment, Krasniqi 25 years, Veseli 18 years and Selimi 13 years, “with credit for time already served” — the four men have been held in the court’s Hague detention facilities since their transfer on 4 and 5 November 2020.
The core of the conviction is a joint criminal enterprise. The judges found that during the Kosovo conflict the four men “contributed significantly” to a common criminal purpose that targeted people perceived as opponents of the Kosovo Liberation Army’s political and military goals: Kosovo Albanians linked to rival political or military forces such as the LDK and FARK, individuals alleged to be connected with the FRY and Serbian authorities, and members of ethnic minorities including Roma and Serbs. The methods were killings, arrests and detention without due process, physical and psychological mistreatment, intimidation and harassment. With limited exceptions, the Panel found no evidence that any of the victims had engaged in criminal activity, taken an active part in hostilities, or presented any legitimate security concern for the KLA. The court put it bluntly: the vast majority of the victims were innocent civilians, described — often falsely and generally without basis — as collaborators or spies, and many recounted lasting psychological and physical consequences of their ordeal.
Each man’s individual role was spelled out. Thaçi sat on the KLA General Staff and headed its Political Directorate, making him, in the Panel’s finding, a key member in formulating and implementing the common purpose: setting up detention facilities, identifying people perceived as opposing the KLA, arresting and detaining them and, if necessary, killing them. That included the targeting of alleged collaborators, the creation of structures, competent bodies and regulations to do so, and the deployment of “special warfare” against opponents through communiqués, political declarations and public statements expressing tolerance and encouragement for crimes against them. The Panel also found that Thaçi personally took part in crimes, including the arrest, arbitrary detention and interrogation of 13 parliamentarians and the arrest, detention, transfer and murder of Behajdin Allaqi. He further disseminated false information about detainees and victims, gave false assurances of compliance with international humanitarian law on behalf of the KLA, and contributed to a policy of impunity for perpetrators.
Kadri Veseli headed the KLA’s Intelligence Directorate, responsible for identifying, gathering information about, monitoring and neutralising persons suspected of being collaborators. The Panel found him personally involved in identifying and targeting opponents, many of whom were eventually murdered, and noted that the so-called intelligence behind many arrests, detentions and killings was little more than unverified rumour. Rexhep Selimi, as inspector general and head of the Operational Directorate, held less direct authority than the others, but the judges found that as a General Staff member he failed to ensure the KLA complied with international humanitarian law and instead tolerated serious violations of it; he also took part in the arrest and detention of the 13 parliamentarians. Jakup Krasniqi, General Staff member, Political Directorate member, spokesman and deputy commander, was found to be a key architect of the policy of targeting opponents, encouraging crimes through communiqués, political statements, speeches and orders — including statements claiming responsibility for assassinations and punitive measures against collaborators and warnings such as “[c]ollaborators are warned that we will kill them if they continue to follow the wrong path.”
The acquittal on crimes against humanity matters as much as the convictions. The Panel found the accused not guilty of crimes against humanity “because the Specialist Prosecutor failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.” The men were also cleared in connection with a number of specific war-crimes incidents. The distinction is a textbook lesson in international criminal law: murder and torture become crimes against humanity only when attached to a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, and the prosecution could not prove that contextual element to the criminal standard even while proving dozens of individual war crimes. Defence teams in every Hague courtroom will study that split verdict, because it shows that scale alone — hundreds of detentions, nearly a hundred murders — does not automatically satisfy the legal definition.
The judgment also describes the conditions in which the trial was fought. The Panel highlighted “a persistent climate of witness intimidation”: several prosecution witnesses recanted earlier statements, dodged basic details, lied to the Panel, recited rehearsed lines or otherwise changed their accounts. The judges nonetheless acknowledged that most witnesses appeared with courage and determination, several in the face of intimidation and attempts to discourage them from testifying. The Presiding Judge stressed two boundaries of the case that critics on both sides tend to blur: the trial was not about the legitimacy of the Kosovo Liberation Army and its goal of an independent Kosovo, but about the criminal means some of its members used; and it did not deal with the crimes Serbian forces and paramilitaries undoubtedly committed against Kosovo Albanians, but exclusively with whether the crimes charged in the indictment were committed and whether these accused bore criminal responsibility for them.
The scale of the proceedings explains why the trial lasted more than three years. The indictment was confirmed on 26 October 2020 and amended three times before a lesser-redacted version was filed on 27 February 2023. The trial opened on 3 April 2023, the prosecution closed its case on 15 April 2025, counsel for the 156 participating victims presented their case in July 2025, the defence cases ran from September to December 2025, evidence closed on 19 December 2025 and closing statements were held from 9 to 18 February 2026. The Panel heard 273 witnesses, admitted 5,467 exhibits, took judicial notice of 1,017 adjudicated facts plus 29 agreed facts, and generated a 29,238-page transcript. For context on the human shock of the verdict, Le Monde with AFP reported that Kosovo’s former president “was sentenced to 25 years by a tribunal in The Hague on Wednesday, September 16, for war crimes,” that Krasniqi received 25 years, Veseli 18 and Selimi 13, and that the crowd gathered in Pristina to watch the sentencing live fell silent as the outcome became clear. The verdict also carried an immediate political aftershock: as Le Monde with AFP reported, expectations of a possible acquittal had drawn huge crowds to rallies over the preceding weekend, and hundreds gathered again in the capital ahead of the verdict — a mobilisation that confirms why the appeal and the enforcement of these sentences will be watched as closely as the trial itself.
B. Why a former president had no immunity to hide behind
The first question non-lawyers ask about this case is how a court can imprison a former president at all. The answer has two layers: the mandate of the court, and the timing of the indictment. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers are not a foreign tribunal imposed from outside. They were created under Kosovo law: on 3 August 2015 the Kosovo Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment and a dedicated Law, following an arrangement agreed between Kosovo and the European Union, to adjudicate allegations of crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law. The Chambers are attached to every level of the Kosovo court system — Basic Court, Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court — and apply Kosovo law alongside customary international law and international human-rights law. They sit in The Hague and are staffed with international judges and an independent Specialist Prosecutor, with funding from the EU and contributing states including the United States, Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. In short, this is Kosovo trying its own nationals under its own law, relocated to the Netherlands for witness protection and judicial independence. That design removes the usual sovereignty objection at the root.
The second layer is timing, and it is decisive. Thaçi resigned the presidency and surrendered after the 2020 indictment; he has been in detention in The Hague ever since. He was therefore prosecuted as a former official, not a sitting one. International law draws a hard line here. A serving head of state, head of government or foreign minister enjoys personal immunity that blocks foreign criminal proceedings entirely while in office. Once the office ends, that personal shield falls away, and no residual functional immunity covers war crimes, torture or crimes against humanity. France stated the first half of that rule unambiguously last year: on 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation held, in appeal no. 24-84.393, that “L’immunité personnelle reconnue aux chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice, doit être examinée d’office par le juge national” — the personal immunity of a serving head of state, head of government or foreign minister must be examined by the national judge of his own motion, even if nobody raises it. Applying that principle, the Court quashed the Paris investigating chamber’s ruling of 26 June 2024 in its entirety — “CASSE et ANNULE, en toutes ses dispositions, l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, en date du 26 juin 2024” — ruled with no referral back (“DIT n’y avoir lieu à renvoi”), and declared void the arrest warrant issued on 13 November 2023 against a serving head of state: “DIT que le mandat d’arrêt délivré le 13 novembre 2023 contre M. [S] est nul.”
The contrast with Thaçi is exactly the point. Had an indictment come while he still sat in the presidency, French courts — and most foreign courts — would have been barred from touching him for as long as he remained in office, and a French judge would have had to raise that bar on his own initiative. Because the indictment was confirmed after his resignation, no personal immunity stood in the way, and nothing in French or international law extends a former leader a functional immunity for arbitrary detention, torture or murder. That is why the Specialist Prosecutor could lawfully have him arrested and transferred in November 2020, and why the 25-year sentence pronounced six years later rests on unassailable jurisdictional ground. For readers following other Hague dockets — including the ICC trial judgment expected against the Seleka commander Mahamat Saïd — the lesson is general: sitting leaders are shielded, former leaders who ordered or organised atrocities are not, and resignation or loss of office opens the prison door that immunity had kept shut.
II. What France would do with a war-crimes file like the Thaçi case
A. Can Paris prosecute a foreign rebel leader for war crimes committed abroad?
Yes — under strict conditions that every practitioner in Paris knows by heart, because they decide whether a complaint filed in France lives or dies at the intake stage. French substantive law covers the full catalogue. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie” and kindred acts, punished by life imprisonment. Article 212-1 provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique,” including “5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international ; 6° La torture.” War crimes are defined by Article 461-1: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés, à l’encontre des personnes ou des biens visés aux articles 461-2 à 461-31.” And Article 461-2 punishes with the aggravated penalties of Article 462-1 “les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité physique ou psychique de la personne ainsi que l’enlèvement et la séquestration” committed against persons protected by the international law of armed conflict. Arbitrary detention, torture and murder in a non-international armed conflict — the exact charges that convicted Thaçi — therefore have direct equivalents in French criminal law.
The procedural key is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, France’s universal-jurisdiction statute for the gravest crimes. It provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide”, crimes against humanity, and “3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three locks guard that door. First, “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France” — the suspect must habitually reside in France, meaning a sufficient connecting link assessed on the length and conditions of presence, the reasons for it, the demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and family, social, material or professional ties. Second, “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne” — only the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor can trigger the case, and only if no international or national court is seeking surrender or extradition of the suspect. The prosecutor must verify that the ICC is not seized and that no competent international court or foreign state has requested the person. In plain terms, France is a court of last resort, not first instance: where a Hague court is already trying the suspect, Paris stands aside.
Two rulings of the Cour de cassation give that statute its practical shape, and both favour prosecution of rebel leaders of the KLA type. On 12 May 2023, the Assemblée plénière held in appeal no. 22-82.468 that the universal jurisdiction for torture under Article 689-2 — which allows French courts to try “toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention” against torture (Article 689-2) — reaches beyond state agents: “Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire.” A guerrilla army controlling territory and behaving like a government — precisely the KLA’s position in parts of Kosovo in 1998-1999 — therefore cannot hide behind its non-state character. The same ruling defines habitual residence functionally: “La notion de résidence habituelle, énoncée à l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale pour la poursuite du crime de génocide, des autres crimes contre l’humanité et des crimes et délits de guerre commis à l’étranger, suppose un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France”, assessed through a bundle of factual indicators, since “Il résulte de la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne que la résidence habituelle est une notion fonctionnelle et protéiforme, variant selon le contexte et l’objectif de la règle, et est appréciée par une analyse reposant sur un faisceau d’indices, soit les circonstances de fait propres à l’espèce (CJUE, 22 décembre 2010, aff. C-497/10, Barbara Mercredi c. Richard Chaffe, § 46 et 47).” A suspect living openly in France for months, with family, paperwork and daily life there, meets that test; a man changing planes at Roissy does not.
The same strictness that opens the door for war crimes narrows it for crimes against humanity — which helps explain why the Thaçi prosecutors lost that count. On 24 November 2021, the Criminal Chamber held in appeal no. 21-81.344 that “Les crimes contre l’humanité sont définis au chapitre II du sous-titre Ier du code pénal, et nécessairement commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique,” and that the dual-criminality requirement of Article 689-11 — the acts must also be punishable where committed — “inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté.” French judges, like the Hague Panel, insist on the contextual element: a concerted plan, a civilian population, a generalised or systematic attack. Hundreds of proven detentions and murders are not enough without it. Any victim group or NGO preparing a Paris complaint in the Kosovo file — or any comparable file — must therefore document not only the suffering but the plan, the orders and the system behind it, exactly as the communiqués and “special warfare” directives did the heavy lifting in The Hague.
B. Arrest in France, surrender abroad and serving a Hague sentence
Suppose a man in Thaçi’s position lands in France tomorrow: a former rebel commander, convicted or wanted by an international court for war crimes, located by border police at Roissy on an Interpol red notice or a surrender request. What happens in the first 48 hours is pure French procedure, and it is where cases are won or lost. France may arrest on the foreign warrant, bring the person before the Paris prosecutor and then the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, which rules on surrender or extradition — but French law draws lines no requesting authority can cross. Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française” — France never extradites its own nationals, who are instead prosecuted at home — “2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique.” War crimes, torture and crimes against humanity are never treated as political offences, so that shield would not help a Thaçi-like suspect, but the nationality shield is absolute: had any of the four held French citizenship, The Hague would have had to accept a French trial instead of a transfer.
Where the death penalty is on the table anywhere in the requesting file, French judges impose the strictest guarantee in European extradition law. On 30 January 2024, the Criminal Chamber held in appeal no. 23-83.549 that under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 696-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “ lorsque la peine de mort est encourue à raison des faits pour lesquels l’extradition est demandée, il appartient à la chambre de l’instruction de s’assurer que l’Etat requérant prend l’engagement, dénué de toute ambiguïté, que cette peine, si elle venait à être prononcée, ne sera pas appliquée à la situation spécifique de la personne réclamée” — the requesting state must give an unambiguous commitment that a death sentence, if ever pronounced, will not be applied to the specific situation of the person sought, and a ruling that fails to verify that effective guarantee is quashed. The Kosovo sentences are prison terms, so the rule bites less obviously here, but the method is the lesson: French courts verify foreign assurances concretely and individually, not as diplomatic boilerplate. The same verification reflex applies to prison conditions, the reality of appellate review, and the protection of the surrendered person against inhuman treatment — points on which defence teams routinely file expert reports, CPT findings and medical evidence before the Paris chamber.
After conviction, the decisive phase is enforcement: the 25-year, 25-year, 18-year and 13-year terms must be served somewhere, with credit for the six years already spent in Hague detention. International sentences are served in states that have signed enforcement agreements with the court, under the court’s supervision and human-rights standards — which is why convicted persons’ lawyers lobby hard, and early, over the destination state, its prison regime, family-visit logistics and early-release rules. For France, the mirror question arises whenever Paris is asked to enforce a foreign international sentence or to receive a convict: French judges examine the legality of the foreign judgment, the absence of political persecution, and the compatibility of the remaining sentence with French public order and the Convention. And where the convicted man instead reaches France as a fugitive — the scenario that produced this month’s arrest in France of a Canadian fugitive wanted on fraud charges — the playbook is identical in structure: challenge the warrant’s validity, the identification, the dual criminality, the specialty rule that bars prosecution for facts beyond the surrender request, and every guarantee surrounding detention and trial in the requesting state.
Three practical consequences follow for readers touched by files of this kind. First, members of diasporas in France who suffered detention, torture or the murder of relatives in the Kosovo conflict — or in any comparable conflict — can still file criminal complaints in Paris: the war-crimes provisions have no short limitation trap comparable to ordinary offences, the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s dedicated war-crimes unit receives them, and the 2023 Assemblée plénière ruling confirms that perpetrators who acted for a territory-controlling armed group cannot plead their non-state status. Second, anyone who learns that a foreign warrant or red notice names them should have the file checked before travelling: French arrest on a red notice is swift, but detention pending the Paris chamber’s decision can be fought with a prepared package — identity defences, political-prosecution evidence, medical files, and assurances litigation. Third, families of the convicted should organise the enforcement phase now, not after the appeal: destination-state submissions, sentence-computation memos crediting Hague time served, and monitoring of detention conditions are the unglamorous work that determines where and how the next two decades are spent. The appeal itself will revisit the Panel’s factual findings and the 96 murders, 303 tortures and 385 detentions one exhibit at a time — and after the witness-intimidation findings, the Appeals Panel’s treatment of recanted testimony will be the passage every international practitioner reads first.
Conclusion
The Thaçi judgment of 16 September 2026 will stand as one of the defining international verdicts of the decade: a former president sentenced to 25 years alongside his wartime comrades, on meticulously counted war crimes — 385 arbitrary detentions, 303 cases of torture, 49 of cruel treatment, 96 murders — while the crimes-against-humanity count collapsed for want of a proven widespread or systematic attack. It confirms three rules that govern every cross-border atrocity file. A court created by the affected state itself, sitting abroad with international judges, wields legitimacy that no sovereignty objection can easily dent. Immunity protects sitting leaders only, and only while they sit; the day the office ends, the arrest warrant becomes writable, as the Cour de cassation’s July 2025 ruling and the post-2020 Thaçi prosecution demonstrate from opposite sides of the same line. And France, as a jurisdiction of last resort, holds a complete toolkit — universal jurisdiction for resident suspects, surrender proceedings ringed with Convention guarantees, and a 2023 precedent extending torture jurisdiction to territory-controlling rebel groups — that makes Paris one of the few places in the world where victims of foreign atrocities can still open a criminal file and where suspects facing foreign warrants get one of the most demanding judicial reviews in Europe. Verdicts end trials; they never end cases. The appeals, the enforcement negotiations and the complaints yet to be filed in national courts are where the Thaçi precedent will now do its real work.