KOHEN AVOCATS · PARIS, FRANCE
Sam Bankman-Fried Sentence: What Can Still Change a 25-Year Federal Term After the Appeal?

Hassan Kohen is a Paris-based lawyer admitted to the Paris Bar (Avocat au Barreau de Paris). Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Sources: U.S. court opinions and official U.S. government publications, read for this article

Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Sam Bankman-Fried Sentence: What Can Still Change a 25-Year Federal Term After the Appeal?

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

Sam Bankman-Fried’s sentence is 25 years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, together with a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion, according to the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 24-961-cr (2d Cir. June 12, 2026). That opinion, decided June 12, 2026, affirmed the judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. On September 10, 2026, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on his behalf, and the Supreme Court docketed it on September 15, 2026 as No. 26-349. The official docket shows that the federal government’s response, first due October 15, 2026, is now due December 16, 2026, after two extensions. That date is the next step on the public record.

For readers searching the sentence, the useful question is what can still change a federal prison term once a court of appeals has affirmed it. The federal answer is a short list: discretionary review by the Supreme Court, a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 once the conviction is final, a statutory sentence reduction, credits earned in custody, and executive clemency. Each route has its own decision-maker, deadline and limits, and some of them were reshaped by the Supreme Court as recently as May 2026. The discussion that follows is general in scope: it describes checks useful in comparable situations and makes no findings about Mr. Bankman-Fried’s situation.

I. Where does a 25-year federal sentence stand after the court of appeals affirms?

A. What the Second Circuit affirmed and what the pending petition asks

The Second Circuit’s opinion states that the jury found Mr. Bankman-Fried guilty of seven counts of fraud and conspiracy related to a cryptocurrency exchange and a cryptocurrency trading firm, after a four-week trial before Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, and that the district court imposed 25 years’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release and a forfeiture of approximately $11 billion. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York described the counts in its sentencing announcement: two counts of wire fraud, two counts of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and one count each of conspiracy to commit securities fraud, commodities fraud and money laundering. The petition’s list of related proceedings dates the district court judgment March 29, 2024.

On appeal, the panel considered challenges to evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, discovery decisions and the forfeiture, and it affirmed on each point. On the defense theory that customers would eventually be repaid, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s fraudulent-inducement decision in Kousisis and wrote that “the fact that a defendant believed victims would ultimately benefit is not a defense to a charge of fraud.” On the forfeiture, the court applied the Eighth Amendment test for excessive fines and concluded that the order was not grossly disproportionate. The same passage records a point many readers raise: “We recognize that $11 billion is a very large amount, especially in the context of an illegal scheme in which many victims may be made whole.” The court then explained that “Congress has fashioned a scheme under which the size of the forfeiture depends on the amount of a defendant’s gains as opposed to some other matrix such as moral culpability.”

The petition filed on September 10, 2026 presents two questions. The first asks when, if ever, a trial court may admit evidence indicating whether victims suffered financial losses in a prosecution brought under the fraudulent-inducement theory, where loss is legally irrelevant. The second asks: “Does the Eighth Amendment permit a forfeiture or other criminal fine that destroys any future prospect of earning a livelihood?” The docket shows that five amicus briefs supporting review were filed on October 15, 2026, by groups identified as Bankruptcy Law Professors, the Due Process Institute, John J. Donohue and others, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Legal Scholars. These are arguments made to persuade the Court to hear the case; none of them is a ruling.

The legal significance of that posture comes from the Court’s own rules. Under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (2026 edition), “Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” The same rule says a petition will be granted only for compelling reasons and lists the kinds of reasons the Court considers, chiefly a conflict between federal courts of appeals or state courts of last resort on an important federal question, or an important question of federal law that the Court has not settled. Rule 10 adds a sentence that frames most petitions: “A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.” A petitioner therefore has to present a question of law of general importance, not just a claim that the trial court got the facts wrong.

For any federal defendant in a comparable position, the first practical check is to read the questions presented page of the petition. It shows what the Court is actually being asked to decide, and it often reveals which parts of a judgment are no longer contested. A conviction can be challenged in a petition while the length of the prison term is not, or a forfeiture can be challenged without any attack on the prison term itself. The second check is the table of contents, which shows whether the petition alleges a conflict among lower courts, the most common reason the Court gives for granting review. A petition that alleges a split is not proof that one exists; it is the petitioner’s description, which the government may dispute in its brief in opposition.

B. What happens between now and a decision on the petition

The calendar after a brief in opposition is fixed by Rule 15 of the same Supreme Court Rules. If a brief in opposition is timely filed, Rule 15.5 provides that the Clerk will distribute the petition, the brief in opposition and any reply brief to the Court for its consideration “no less than 14 days after the brief in opposition is filed,” unless the petitioner expressly waives that waiting period. Rule 15.6 allows a reply brief addressed to new points raised in the opposition, but distribution will not be deferred while the reply is pending. Rule 15.8 lets any party file a supplemental brief while the petition is pending to call attention to new cases, new legislation or other intervening matter. In practice, the docket entry to watch after the response date is the distribution entry, which names the conference at which the Justices will consider the petition.

Rule 16 then describes the possible outcomes. After considering the documents distributed under Rule 15, the Court enters an appropriate order, which may be a summary disposition on the merits. If the Court grants the petition, the Clerk notifies counsel and the court below, and the case is scheduled for briefing and oral argument. If the Court denies it, the Clerk enters an order to that effect, and Rule 16.3 adds: “The order of denial will not be suspended pending disposition of a petition for rehearing except by order of the Court or a Justice.” A denial is not a ruling that the court of appeals was right; it means that the Court has declined to hear the case, and the lower court’s judgment stands.

Readers often ask whether a pending petition pauses a prison sentence. Nothing in Rules 10 through 16 suspends the judgment under review while a petition is pending. A stay is a separate request governed by Rule 23: “A party to a judgment sought to be reviewed may present to a Justice an application to stay the enforcement of that judgment.” Rule 23.3 requires the application to explain why relief is not available from any other court, and it states that, except in the most extraordinary circumstances, a stay application will not be entertained unless the relief was first sought in the courts below. The default position for a defendant who is already serving a sentence is therefore that the sentence continues to run while the petition is considered.

Timing rules also matter for anyone tracking a comparable case. Rule 13.1 makes a petition to review a federal court of appeals judgment timely when it is filed within 90 days after entry of the judgment, and Rule 13.3 explains that the time runs from the date the judgment or order is entered, not from the issuance of the mandate, while a timely petition for rehearing in the lower court changes the starting point. The Court’s docket, rather than press coverage, is the reliable record of these dates: it shows when the petition was filed, when the response is due, every extension, and later the distribution and the order. Checking the docket on the response date, and again about two weeks later, is usually enough to know whether the petition has moved to conference.

A grant would not change the sentence immediately either. If certiorari is granted, the Court decides the questions presented after full briefing and argument, and the usual results are an affirmance, a reversal, or a remand for further proceedings in the lower courts. The limits of the questions presented matter here. A Supreme Court decision on an evidentiary rule or on the Excessive Fines Clause would only reach the parts of the judgment that those questions touch, and any further consequence would be for the lower courts to work out on remand. Families and followers of a case should read any eventual opinion for its final paragraph, which states exactly what the Court did with the judgment below.

II. Which routes can still shorten a federal sentence after direct review ends?

A. The § 2255 motion: one year, usually one attempt, and limited claims

Once direct review is over, the main federal vehicle for attacking a conviction or sentence is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Federal law lets a prisoner claiming that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or federal law, that the court lacked jurisdiction, that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or that it is otherwise subject to collateral attack ask the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. The statute’s timing rule is strict: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.” Under § 2255(f), the period runs from the latest of four dates, the first being “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” The other three are the removal of an unlawful governmental impediment, the Supreme Court’s initial recognition of a new right made retroactive to cases on collateral review, and the date on which the facts supporting the claim could have been discovered through due diligence.

When a conviction becomes final is the question the Supreme Court answered in Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522 (2003), decided March 4, 2003. The Supreme Court held that, for federal criminal defendants who do not file a petition for certiorari, the one-year limitation period of § 2255 starts to run when the time for seeking that review expires, not when the court of appeals issues its mandate. In reaching that result, the Court described the meaning of finality in postconviction law: “Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.” For a defendant whose certiorari petition is pending, Clay points to the day the Supreme Court denies the petition, or decides the case on the merits, as the usual starting date of the one-year clock under § 2255(f)(1).

Federal trial courts continue to apply that rule. In Turner v. United States, No. 22-cv-714-jdp (W.D. Wis. Nov. 25, 2024), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, in an opinion and order entered November 25, 2024, cited Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, for the rule that the one-year period runs from the date the judgment of conviction becomes final. Because no certiorari petition had been filed in that case, the court treated the judgment as final 90 days after the court of appeals denied rehearing and found one of the proposed new claims untimely. The lesson is practical: a prisoner who misreads the start of the clock can lose a claim without any court reaching its merits.

The second question is which claims fit in a § 2255 motion. In Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), decided April 23, 2003, the Supreme Court reviewed a case that began in the Southern District of New York, where the district court had found an ineffective-assistance claim procedurally defaulted because it could have been raised on direct appeal, and where the Second Circuit had affirmed. The Court started from “the general rule that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice,” and then reversed: “We hold that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.” The application is direct: a § 2255 motion is the normal place to argue that trial counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial, because that claim usually needs facts outside the trial record.

Recent decisions show both sides of that rule at work. In Ferebee v. United States, No. ELH-21-0472 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2024), the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, in a memorandum opinion dated April 1, 2024, cited Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, for the point that a “failure to raise on direct appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is not regarded as procedurally defaulted,” while treating the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to his firearm conviction as procedurally defaulted because it had not been raised on direct appeal, and it denied the motion. The opinion shows the line Massaro draws: silence on appeal does not default an ineffective-assistance claim, but other claims that could have been raised on appeal generally are defaulted.

Two further limits shape every § 2255 strategy. First, the statute restricts later attempts. Under § 2255(h), a second or successive motion must be certified by a panel of the court of appeals to contain either newly discovered evidence that, viewed with the evidence as a whole, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty, or a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable. Second, as the Supreme Court explained in its May 28, 2026 opinion in Fernandez, discussed below, claims that were already raised and rejected on direct review typically cannot be relitigated in a § 2255 motion. A prisoner who lost an evidentiary argument on appeal generally cannot simply present it again under a new label.

For any federal prisoner approaching the end of direct review, three checks follow from these texts. Identify the date on which the conviction will become final under Clay, and calendar one year from it while noting whether one of the later triggering dates in § 2255(f) might apply. List the claims that depend on facts outside the trial record, such as advice given about a plea offer or the investigation of witnesses, because Massaro channels those claims into § 2255. Finally, put everything in the first motion, because § 2255(h) leaves very little room for a second one.

B. Sentence reductions, custody credits and clemency

Outside § 2255, a federal prison term is hard to change by design. The governing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), opens with the rule: “The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that” it lists specific exceptions. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may reduce a term on a motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on the defendant’s own motion after the defendant has fully exhausted administrative rights or 30 days have passed since the warden received the request, whichever is earlier. The court must consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), find that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction, and find that the reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission. Under § 3582(c)(2), a court may also reduce a term imposed on the basis of a guideline range that the Commission has later lowered, again subject to the Commission’s policy statements.

The Supreme Court narrowed what counts as an extraordinary and compelling reason in Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. 411 (2026), decided May 28, 2026, on review from the Second Circuit. The district court had granted compassionate release to a prisoner serving life sentences because of doubts about a cooperating witness and about the jury’s verdict, and the Second Circuit had reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed: “A prisoner who collaterally attacks the validity of his conviction must proceed through 28 U. S. C. § 2255, not 18 U. S. C. § 3582.” The Court added that “the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not among the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify compassionate release.” The application for any prisoner is clear: a compassionate-release motion cannot be used to reargue the trial, the evidentiary rulings or the verdict, and those arguments belong in a timely § 2255 motion.

Lower courts began applying Fernandez within months. In United States v. Wade, No. ELH-19-0344 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2026), the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, in a memorandum opinion dated September 24, 2026, cited Fernandez v. United States, 608 U.S. 411, for the demanding standard that governs compassionate release and for the rule that the supposed invalidity of a conviction is not an extraordinary and compelling reason, and it denied the defendant’s motion. For prisoners and their families, the opinion is a reminder that motions filed after May 28, 2026 are measured against that stricter standard.

What does that leave in practice? The Fernandez opinion explains that the role Congress gave the Bureau of Prisons reflects the statute’s focus on a defendant’s personal circumstances, such as advanced age, safety risk, illness and rehabilitation. A prisoner considering this route should first submit a written request to the warden and keep proof of the date of receipt, because the statute’s 30-day alternative to full exhaustion runs from that receipt. The motion should then document the personal circumstances relied on, address the § 3553(a) factors, and explain how the request fits the Commission’s policy statement. A motion built on criticism of the trial asks for something that, under Fernandez, § 3582 cannot provide.

The length of time actually served also depends on credits administered by the Bureau of Prisons rather than on court orders. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), a prisoner serving a term of more than one year, other than a life term, may receive credit of “up to 54 days for each year of the prisoner’s sentence imposed by the court,” subject to the Bureau’s determination that the prisoner displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations during that year. The statute also says: “Credit that has not been earned may not later be granted.” We explained in a separate article why a federal prisoner’s projected release date can change, and the same mechanics apply to any long federal sentence: the date shown by the Bureau is a projection that moves with credits earned or lost.

A second layer comes from the First Step Act’s time credits in 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4). An eligible prisoner who successfully completes evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive activities earns 10 days of time credits for every 30 days of successful participation, and a prisoner assessed at minimum or low risk who has not increased that risk over two consecutive assessments earns an additional 5 days for every 30 days. These credits “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release,” which means they affect where and how the end of the term is served rather than shortening the sentence the judge imposed. Section 3632(d)(4)(D) lists the convictions that make a prisoner ineligible, so the first check for any prisoner is to compare the statutes of conviction with that list.

The last route lies outside the courts. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President “shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” The power covers federal offenses and can take the form of a full pardon or a commutation that shortens the sentence. The Department of Justice’s clemency regulations add a timing rule for commutation requests. Under 28 C.F.R. § 1.3: “No petition for commutation of sentence, including remission of fine, should be filed if other forms of judicial or administrative relief are available, except upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” A petition sent while court proceedings are still pending therefore has to explain what makes the circumstances exceptional.

Taken together, these texts give a clear order of operations for a federal defendant whose appeal has been affirmed. Supreme Court review comes first and is discretionary. A § 2255 motion follows within a year of finality and carries the claims that need new facts, especially ineffective assistance of counsel. Compassionate release is limited, since Fernandez, to personal circumstances and cannot carry attacks on the conviction. Custody credits are administered by the Bureau of Prisons and depend on conduct, programming and statutory eligibility. Clemency remains available at any time, but the Justice Department’s own regulation discourages commutation petitions while judicial relief is still open. Under Clay, a denial of certiorari starts the § 2255 timetable rather than ending the case’s postconviction options.

Conclusion

A 25-year federal sentence affirmed by a court of appeals is not fixed in every respect, but the routes that remain are narrow and each has its own gatekeeper. In the pending Supreme Court case, the next official step is the federal government’s response, due December 16, 2026; if a brief in opposition is filed, distribution to the Justices follows no less than 14 days later unless the petitioner waives that period. After the Court acts, the one-year clock of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 described in Clay becomes the central deadline, with Massaro keeping ineffective-assistance claims available in that motion. Since Fernandez, compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 is no substitute for a challenge to the conviction. Credits under §§ 3624(b) and 3632(d)(4) shape the release date administered by the Bureau of Prisons, and executive clemency remains a separate, discretionary path. For anyone following a comparable federal case, the reliable sources are the Supreme Court docket, the text of these statutes and the opinions that interpret them.

📄 Official circular