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UN Says US Strikes on Iran Schools Were War Crimes: Can French Courts Prosecute and What Victims in France Can File

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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UN Says US Strikes on Iran Schools Were War Crimes: Can French Courts Prosecute and What Victims in France Can File

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On 17 September 2026, a United Nations fact-finding mission concluded that it had reasonable grounds to believe United States forces carried out two strikes on a school and a sports facility in Iran and that those strikes amounted to war crimes. The same report found that the Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity while crushing street protests. Presented to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva on 21 September, these findings put Paris lawyers and victims living in France in front of two very practical questions: can anyone actually be prosecuted, and if so, where. This analysis explains what the UN experts really said, why the International Criminal Court will probably not be the court that acts, and what precise procedural doors remain open before the French courts for victims and witnesses located in France.

I. What the UN mission found on American strikes and Iranian repression

A. The Minab school and Lamerd sports hall strikes the UN calls indiscriminate

The findings come from the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran, an investigative body created under the authority of the UN Human Rights Council and chaired by Sara Hossain, sitting with expert members Max du Plessis and Viviana Krsticevic. Its new report, submitted to the Council in Geneva, examines American conduct during the war that began in February 2026 and the Iranian government’s response to nationwide unrest that began in late December of the previous year. Reporting from Geneva on 17 September 2026, Reuters summarised the core conclusion in these terms: a UN fact-finding mission on Iran said it had reasonable grounds to believe the United States was behind two military strikes on a school and sports facility in Iran in February, and that these constituted war crimes.

The first strike hit a school in the city of Minab, where more than 150 people were killed, including around 120 schoolchildren, according to Iranian officials. The UN experts established that the school stood adjacent to an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval complex and concluded that the American failure to update the building’s status in targeting databases and to confirm whether it was a military objective went beyond simple negligence. The report concludes that the American planners directed the strike at the school building while aware of a substantial risk of hitting a civilian object, acting recklessly as to that possibility. The experts added that the school was a clearly identifiable civilian object and that they found no evidence it was being used for military purposes. On that basis, the mission characterised the attack as an indiscriminate attack causing civilian deaths and damage to civilian infrastructure, amounting to a war crime under international law.

The second strike hit a sports centre in Lamerd on 28 February. The report says the attack damaged nearby residential buildings and a school, killed and injured 22 civilians, and was likewise indiscriminate, therefore constituting a war crime. The American command had stated in March that its forces launched no strikes into the city of Lamerd on that day, while Reuters had previously reported that an initial internal American military investigation pointed toward American responsibility for the fatal Minab strike, an inquiry the Pentagon has since elevated without publishing preliminary findings. The Pentagon told Reuters its investigation remained ongoing with nothing to announce at the moment, while White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly dismissed the Human Rights Council as having accomplished nothing for human rights and asserted that Iran was the only party in the current conflict that had committed war crimes. The Iranian mission in Geneva did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

These February findings follow an earlier 14 September 2026 statement by the same mission about the summer campaign. The mission reported that on 1 September an American airstrike hit a house in Kuhestak city, Hormozgan province, where wedding celebrations were reportedly underway, and that Iranian media counted five dead, including two children and one woman, with dozens injured. On 30 July, another reported American strike destroyed a residential home in Qeshm city, also in Hormozgan province, reportedly killing a man, a woman and their two-year-old son and injuring their two other children. The mission stressed that both areas are populated by minority communities, Baloch in Kuhestak and predominantly Sunni residents in Qeshm, communities that have historically faced structural discrimination. Its chair called the strikes another devastating reminder of the human cost of the conflict between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, insisting that civilians must be protected at all times and that constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects.

B. Crimes against humanity on the Iranian side and the legal weight of a UN report

The report does not look in only one direction. The mission found that the Iranian authorities carried out a widespread and systematic attack against civilians during protests that erupted in late December, involving unlawful killings, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances and severe restrictions on expression and the press. It said it could not independently verify the death toll but believed the number of dead and injured was likely far higher than the official figures of 3,038 people killed and 25,000 injured. The government’s response, including violence and killings, internet shutdowns and use of the death penalty, marked a significant escalation from previous patterns of suppressing dissent. In the mission’s legal vocabulary, that widespread and systematic character is what turns a brutal crackdown into alleged crimes against humanity, just as the indiscriminate character of the American strikes is what turns them, in the mission’s assessment, into alleged war crimes.

Understanding what such a report is worth in court matters as much as its headlines. A UN fact-finding mission documents, preserves and legally characterises facts, but it indicts no one and tries no one. As Reuters explained, UN fact-finding missions are investigative rather than judicial bodies that open no criminal cases themselves, although their findings can feed criminal investigations by national courts or international tribunals such as the International Criminal Court. In other words, the report is not a judgment. It is a professionally assembled body of evidence and legal analysis that prosecutors, investigating judges and victims’ lawyers can pick up and carry into real proceedings. The mission itself framed the legal test around the classic duties of humanitarian law. Expert member Max du Plessis warned that repeated deadly airstrikes raise serious questions about compliance with the duty to take all precautionary measures to avoid civilian deaths, while the mission recalled that all parties must honour distinction, proportionality and precaution, and that failure to respect those duties may entail international responsibility, including for war crimes. Expert member Viviana Krsticevic added that strikes on civilians should trigger in-depth review of events, methods and impacts to prevent further losses and secure truth, justice and reparations, warning that further strikes risk deepening the suffering and exclusion of already struggling communities.

Two cautions belong here, because a Paris lawyer must give clients the law as it stands and not as headlines suggest. First, every casualty figure attributed to Iranian officials in this coverage remains an allegation until it is tested in an adversarial proceeding, and American denials and the ongoing Pentagon inquiry are part of the record. Second, the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard of a fact-finding mission sits well below the criminal standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that would apply before any criminal court. The report opens doors. It does not decide what lies behind them.

II. The Hague or Paris: where prosecution is actually conceivable

A. Why the International Criminal Court will probably not be the court that tries these facts

The reflex of the international public is to look to The Hague, and the reflex is understandable but misleading here. The International Criminal Court only judges individuals, and only for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. Above all, it only acts where it has jurisdiction. Its founding treaty gives it jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of a member state or by a national of a member state, or over situations referred to it by the United Nations Security Council. Neither the United States nor Iran belongs to the Court, and any Security Council referral route runs into the veto power of the very permanent member whose forces are accused. Those structural features explain why American officials, from administration to administration, have treated the Court’s claims over non-member nationals as illegitimate, and why the current American administration has gone as far as sanctioning the institution’s judges and, according to September 2026 press reports, preparing measures against the Court as such. A referral of the Iranian file by the Council is therefore a political hypothesis rather than a procedural plan.

The complementarity principle adds a second lock. The Court is designed as a backstop that steps in only when national authorities are unwilling or unable to investigate genuinely. The Pentagon states that its investigation remains ongoing, which on paper is exactly what complementarity rewards, even if victims doubt its vigour and no findings have been published. A prosecutor in The Hague would have to demonstrate unwillingness or inability before displacing national proceedings, an uphill demonstration while an American internal inquiry is formally open. None of this means the mission’s findings are useless in The Hague. The report can nourish any preliminary analysis and can support cooperation requests, and France, as a member state of the Court, participates in the repression of these crimes and cooperates with that jurisdiction under the conditions fixed by French statute: article 627 of the Code of criminal procedure provides that for the application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court signed on 18 July 1998, France participates in the repression of offences and cooperates with that court, for acts constituting, within the meaning of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. But cooperation presupposes a case the Court can lawfully open, and on these facts that opening is, to put it plainly, improbable in the short term.

State responsibility before the International Court of Justice is a different track that readers should not confuse with criminal prosecution. The ICJ judges states, never individuals, and only with their consent to its jurisdiction. Claims about unlawful resort to force belong to that forum in theory, while punishment of the reported school and wedding strikes belongs to criminal courts. Keeping the two levels separate, responsibility of the state on one side and criminal liability of commanders and perpetrators on the other, is the first service a lawyer owes a victim who arrives with a press clipping about The Hague.

B. What victims and witnesses in France can concretely file before French courts

France offers something The Hague currently does not on this file: courts that victims can actually seise. French criminal law defines war crimes broadly. Article 461-1 of the Criminal Code provides that the offences defined in the same book, committed during an international or non-international armed conflict and in relation to that conflict, in violation of the laws and customs of war or the international conventions applicable to armed conflicts, against the persons or property protected by the following articles, constitute war crimes or war delicts. Wilful attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks causing civilian death fit that definition in principle, subject to proof of each element. On the Iranian side of the report, French law punishes as a crime against humanity any of the listed acts, from wilful killing to torture, persecution and enforced disappearance, committed in execution of a concerted plan against a civilian population group within a widespread or systematic attack: article 212-1 of the Criminal Code punishes with life imprisonment acts such as wilful killing, torture, persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or sexist grounds, and enforced disappearance, when committed under those conditions. The mission’s description of a widespread and systematic attack on protesters maps directly onto that statutory language, again subject to individual proof.

Substantive definitions are only half the question. The other half is jurisdiction: may French courts judge facts committed in Iran by foreigners against foreigners. The answer runs through two different doors. The first door is the law applicable to French nationals who would be complicit abroad. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code states that French criminal law applies to any felony committed by a French national outside the territory of the Republic, and the full bench of the Court of Cassation confirmed on 25 July 2025 that the combined provisions on complicity and jurisdiction allow French courts to hear acts of complicity committed abroad by a French national even where the principal perpetrator is a foreigner: the Court held that the combined articles on jurisdiction and complicity permit French courts to take cognisance of acts of complicity committed abroad by a person of French nationality, even if the offence was committed abroad by a foreign principal perpetrator. That ruling matters for every file in which French-made equipment, French intelligence, French logistics or French financing is alleged to have assisted foreign strikes.

The second door is universal jurisdiction over the gravest crimes regardless of nationality. Outside the conventions track, article 689-1 of the Code of criminal procedure allows French courts, under the international conventions it lists, to try any person found in France who has committed abroad one of the covered offences. For genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under the Rome Statute system, article 689-11 of the Code of criminal procedure allows French courts to try any person suspected of having committed abroad genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes as defined by the Criminal Code, on condition that the suspect has habitual residence on French territory, understood as a sufficient connecting link with France, that prosecution is brought only at the request of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor, and that no international court or state requests surrender or extradition of the person. Each condition is a potential wall. Habitual residence is not mere transit. The full bench of the Court of Cassation ruled on 12 May 2023 that: “la condition de résidence habituelle, au sens de l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, qui suppose un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France, doit être appréciée en prenant en compte un faisceau d’indices, tels que la durée, actuelle ou prévisible, les conditions et les raisons de la présence de l’intéressé sur le territoire français, la volonté manifestée par celui-ci de s’y installer ou de s’y maintenir, ou ses liens familiaux, sociaux, matériels ou professionnels”. The monopoly of the anti-terrorism prosecutor and the subsidiarity check, no competing ICC or extradition request, mean that a French case advances only if The Hague and every other claimant state stay out. And where the prosecutor closes the file, the complainant who reported the facts may challenge the dismissal before the prosecutor general of the Paris court of appeal, who hears the reporting person on request and answers a manifestly unfounded appeal by reasoned written decision.

Immunity is the third wall, and clients must hear about it early. The same 25 July 2025 full-bench ruling recalls that functional immunity belongs to state agents acting in official capacity, survives the end of functions, and that the Court has never concretely recognised an exception, including for torture: the Court reaffirmed that customary international law prevents the agents of a state from being prosecuted before the criminal courts of a foreign state for acts of sovereignty, added that it falls to the international community to set any limits to immunity, and recalled that in the current state of international law the crime of torture, however grave, does not rank among the exceptions to jurisdictional immunity. That holding concerned neither crimes against humanity nor war crimes, and the Court expressly left the question open for those categories, but any lawyer advising victims must explain that prosecuting serving foreign officials before French courts will meet this objection, while prosecuting former officials, private military contractors or intermediaries without official status stands on firmer ground.

Procedurally, the entry point for a victim in France is the complaint. Article 85 of the Code of criminal procedure allows any person claiming to be harmed by a felony or misdemeanour to lodge a complaint and join as civil party before the competent investigating judge, once the public prosecutor has announced no prosecution or three months have passed since the complaint. In practice, filings concerning international crimes are centralised within the specialised unit for crimes against humanity and war crimes at the Paris judicial court, working under the anti-terrorism prosecutor for the 689-11 track. A well-built filing therefore contains identity and contact details of victims and witnesses, a chronological account distinguishing what the complainant saw from what the press reported, the UN report and its underlying sources clearly referenced as leads rather than conclusions, medical and death certificates, photographs with metadata, and any element locating a suspect or accomplice in France, because habitual residence or presence is the key that turns the jurisdictional lock. Speed matters for preservation even when prosecution looks distant: complaints interrupt limitation issues, fix testimony and create the file that a future change, travel of a suspect to France, a new revelation, a cooperation request, can suddenly activate.

Conclusion

The UN mission’s September 2026 findings are a serious legal event, not a final verdict. Reasonable grounds to believe American strikes on a Minab school and a Lamerd sports hall were indiscriminate and criminal, reasonable grounds to believe the Iranian protest crackdown was a widespread and systematic attack on civilians: both characterisations, if proven person by person and act by act, fit the definitions French law already punishes. The International Criminal Court will most likely remain on the sidelines, for want of jurisdiction over non-member nationals and for want of a Security Council referral that a veto makes illusory. France cannot replace The Hague wholesale, fenced as it is by habitual residence, prosecutorial monopoly, subsidiarity and immunity. But France offers victims something no headline can: a real registry, a real prosecutor, a real investigating judge. Anyone in France who lost relatives in the Minab, Lamerd, Kuhestak or Qeshm strikes, anyone who survived the protest crackdown and reached French soil, anyone holding documents, images or testimony, should have the file assessed now by counsel experienced in international criminal procedure. Evidence cools, witnesses scatter and suspects travel. The law rewards those who prepare early.

Readers interested in how ICC cases reach individual accused may also consult our analysis of the recent ICC conviction in the Said case and surrender practice toward The Hague.

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