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Vanuatu v. France at the ICJ: Who Owns Matthew and Hunter Islands and Their Waters?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Vanuatu v. France at the ICJ: Who Owns Matthew and Hunter Islands and Their Waters?

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On 1 September 2026, the International Court of Justice announced that Vanuatu had filed an application against France over two uninhabited volcanic islands in the South Pacific, Matthew and Hunter, and over the maritime boundary between Vanuatu and New Caledonia. The twist that every newsroom glossed over is procedural: the case does not exist yet. Filed under Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, the application has merely been transmitted to Paris, and no trial, no hearing and no provisional measure can happen unless France affirmatively consents to the Court’s jurisdiction. This piece explains what Vanuatu really asked for, why Paris can simply decline, what hundreds of square kilometres of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf have to do with two rocks nobody lives on, and, above all, how French courts in Paris, Saint-Denis de La Réunion or Nouméa already police these waters today, as the Court of Cassation confirmed on 16 June 2026.

I. Can Vanuatu Really Drag France Before the ICJ Over Matthew and Hunter Islands?

A. What did Vanuatu file at The Hague on 1 September 2026?

The facts are undisputed because they come from the Court’s own Registry. In press release No. 2026/22 of 1 September 2026, the International Court of Justice states that Vanuatu filed its application the previous day, in a dispute with France sovereignty over “Umaenupne (Matthew)” and “Umaeneg/Leka (Hunter)” Islands, plus “a single maritime boundary” for the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf facing New Caledonia. Two claims, therefore, travel together: sovereignty over the land, and a single all-purpose maritime boundary for the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf facing New Caledonia. That pairing is standard practice at The Hague. Land dominates the sea in the Court’s method, so the State that wins the island usually wins the maritime projection that comes with it, and Vanuatu has framed the case accordingly.

The geography explains why Port Vila cares. As Le Monde with AFP reported on 1 September 2026, The volcanic islands lie several hundred kilometres east of New Caledonia but are claimed by Vanuatu, which won independence from “joint British and French rule in 1980.” Nobody lives there. But, in the newspaper’s words, Although the islands are uninhabited, their sovereignty gives New Caledonia, and therefore France, a “large exclusive economic zone.” That zone is where the money is: fishing licences in the water column and access to the resources of the seabed and subsoil. Each island potentially generates a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 nautical miles and continental shelf rights. In a region where tuna licences are a budget line for Pacific States and where seabed minerals attract growing attention, the maritime tail wags the territorial dog. Vanuatu’s claim to a single boundary for both the water column and the seabed is designed to settle the whole package at once rather than litigating zone by zone for another decade.

The historical argument is decolonisation. Port Vila presents the file as unfinished business from independence: the New Hebrides condominium is the only Franco-British joint administration of its kind in colonial history, and its 1980 settlement left Matthew and Hunter under French administration, attached in practice to New Caledonia. Le Monde recalls that Vanuatu has long staked its claim on cultural and historical grounds, invoking the ties of southern islanders to islets of “less than a square kilometre” each. Earlier this year, Prime Minister Jotham Napat accused France of colonialism over the dispute and threatened to use “all diplomatic and international legal means” if discussions broke down. Vanuatu has protested that arrangement since independence, arguing that the colonial carve-up was decided without consulting the indigenous population concerned. France answers, in substance, that the islands were never part of the condominium’s territory and were validly retained, a position Paris has held without interruption for more than four decades. That clash between a title inherited from the colonial administrator and a claim grounded in the incompleteness of decolonisation is exactly the kind of dispute the Court was built to decide, provided both parties agree to let it.

The filing follows a failed negotiation sequence, which matters both legally and diplomatically. Le Monde records that Talks have been held at “ministerial and leadership levels” between the two countries. When Port Vila concluded that dialogue had run its course, it turned to The Hague instead. A demonstrated attempt to negotiate in good faith is not a formal admissibility condition before the Court in a territorial case, but it shapes the political narrative: Vanuatu presents itself as the reasonable State that tried dialogue first, while France will present the same sequence as proof that a bilateral process exists and should continue. Expect both readings to coexist in the coming months.

The domestic French resonance is immediate. Le Monde notes that the issue is politically sensitive in France, where the far right accuses President Emmanuel Macron of preparing to give away overseas territories. The Foreign Ministry rejects the charge and insists there is “no question of ceding sovereignty”, while acknowledging a “long-standing dispute” dating back to Vanuatu’s independence. Any French government therefore litigates on two fronts: the legal front at The Hague and the political front at home, where yielding an inch in the Pacific is portrayed as weakness. That context also explains why Paris guards the precedent effect: anything conceded on Matthew and Hunter would be quoted back to France in its other island disputes and in New Caledonian waters, where the institutional debate over the territory’s future remains open. A small Pacific filing thus sits at the intersection of decolonisation law, maritime economics and French domestic politics, which is precisely why it deserves more than a wire-service paragraph.

B. Why can France simply say no to the Court?

Here is the point most coverage fudged: no case is currently pending. The Registry’s press release quotes the exact mechanism Vanuatu invoked. Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court provides: where jurisdiction depends on consent “yet to be given”, the application “shall be transmitted to that State” but is not “entered in the General List”, and no step in the proceedings is taken until the respondent State consents. The technique has a Latin name, forum prorogatum: jurisdiction founded on consent given after the application is filed. The consequence is stated bluntly in the same release: “No action will be taken” until France consents. Le Monde puts it in plain language: The Pacific island has applied to initiate proceedings, but the case can only go ahead if France accepts that “international judges have jurisdiction” over the dispute. Until Paris answers yes, there is no respondent, no written pleadings, no hearing and no judgment to comment on.

This is entirely normal in the architecture of the Court. Unlike a domestic tribunal, the International Court of Justice has no compulsory jurisdiction over States that have not accepted it. Jurisdiction rests on consent, expressed through a special agreement submitting a defined dispute, through a compromissory clause in a treaty, or through matching declarations under the optional clause. France has deliberately kept itself outside the optional-clause system for decades, and nothing in the United Nations Charter obliges a Member State to litigate a sovereignty dispute it prefers to handle bilaterally. France is not legally required to accept Vanuatu’s invitation, and the forum prorogatum route is one the Court sees only rarely. Vanuatu’s lawyers know this. Filing under Article 38, paragraph 5, is a calculated move: it puts a formal offer on the table, starts the political clock, and forces Paris to say no publicly rather than letting the file sleep in a foreign ministry drawer.

That refusal, if it comes, carries its own costs, which is the second half of Vanuatu’s calculation. France is a founding Member of the United Nations and of the Court, and the Court’s official cases-by-country index lists sixteen contentious cases involving France, from the Nuclear Tests cases to the Equatorial Guinea immunity proceedings, a record that places Paris under political pressure to accept at least the principle of judicial settlement. A flat refusal would sit uneasily with France’s self-image as a champion of a rules-based international order, particularly in the Pacific, where Paris courts regional partners against a background of strategic competition. Conversely, accepting jurisdiction would expose Paris to the risk of losing islands it has administered for generations and to the precedent effect on Mayotte and on New Caledonian waters. The most likely French response, on past form in comparable files, is neither a swift yes nor a brutal no: it is delay, counter-proposals for continued bilateral talks, and possibly a narrowly drafted special agreement if negotiations ever mature. Readers should therefore treat every headline announcing a “trial” between Vanuatu and France with scepticism. There will be no trial without a French letter of consent, and no such letter has been announced.

Vanuatu has a fallback that fits its track record. If Paris declines, the available route is an advisory opinion from the Court. The advisory route does not require French consent, because advisory proceedings are not a trial between two parties: a UN organ, typically the General Assembly, asks the Court a legal question and the Court answers it. The opinion is not formally binding like a contentious judgment, but in practice it reshapes negotiations. The precedent that makes this threat credible is Vanuatu’s own: as Le Monde recalls, Vanuatu is no stranger to the Hague court: its historic climate case led judges to declare that States must act against climate change under international law. The same playbook, applied to an incomplete-decolonisation claim over Matthew and Hunter, would let Vanuatu move the dispute from a bilateral dialogue it considers exhausted to a multilateral forum where the arithmetic of votes favours small island States. France’s legal strategists must therefore weigh not only the Article 38, paragraph 5, application on their desk, but also the General Assembly resolution that could follow a refusal.

For companies, shipowners and individuals, the practical upshot of this first part is simple. No ICJ judgment will redraw the maritime map around Matthew and Hunter tomorrow, next month or probably next year. The applicable law in those waters remains, for now, French law as enforced by French authorities, alongside the international law of the sea. Anyone operating there, fishing there or signing contracts about resources from there must reason under current French enforcement practice, not under a hypothetical future boundary. That is the subject of the second part.

II. Who Gets the Fish, the Seabed and the Waters Around Matthew and Hunter?

A. Why do two uninhabited volcanic rocks decide hundreds of square kilometres of sea?

Under the modern law of the sea, the island owns the sea, not the reverse. Sovereignty over a naturally formed area of land, even tiny and uninhabited, generates a territorial sea, and where the feature qualifies as a full island it can generate an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 nautical miles plus continental shelf rights over the seabed and subsoil. Two volcanic cones like Matthew and Hunter, sitting roughly 300 kilometres east of New Caledonia, therefore project French or Vanuatu claims across broad stretches of Pacific water rich in tuna and potentially in seabed minerals. Vanuatu’s request for “a single maritime boundary” covering both the water column and the seabed shows it wants one clean line doing double duty for the water column and the seabed, the efficient solution courts favour when the coastal geography allows it.

France organises these spaces through domestic law that applies from the Channel to the Pacific without interruption. The national framework for the sea is set by Article L219-1 of the Environment Code, which provides: “La stratégie nationale pour la mer et le littoral est définie dans un document qui constitue le cadre de référence pour la protection du milieu, pour la réalisation ou le maintien du bon état écologique, mentionné au I de l’article L. 219-9 , pour l’utilisation durable des ressources marines et pour la gestion intégrée et concertée des activités liées à la mer et au littoral, à l’exception de celles qui ont pour unique objet la défense ou la sécurité nationale.” The same article extends that strategy, in principle and orientation, to maritime areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction overseas, with implementation through metropolitan sea fronts and overseas sea basins. In plain terms, Paris does not govern New Caledonian waters as an afterthought: they are inside the national maritime strategy, and any fishing licence, scientific campaign or seabed exploration project around Matthew and Hunter is examined through that lens long before any judge in The Hague draws a line.

The precise seaward limits around French territories are fixed by regulation, historically the decrees of 3 February 1978 taken under the 1976 statute on the economic zone. Their exact wording and their relationship with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were tested this very year before the Court of Cassation, as the second half of this part will show. What matters here is the method French authorities apply on the water: the exclusive economic zone is the default enforcement space for fisheries policing, environmental protection and resource management, measured from baselines, and foreign vessels operating inside it without authorisation expose themselves to interception, escort to port, prosecution and confiscation. Whether the flag is Vanuatu, Fijian or French is a separate question from where the line ultimately runs, and French patrols apply the line as published in French regulations until a court, French or international, says otherwise.

On the merits of sovereignty, the Court, if it ever hears the case, would apply its classic two-step method. First, it would look for a legal title: a treaty, a colonial boundary delimitation, or an instrument attributing the islands to one administration. France relies on the proposition that Matthew and Hunter were never part of the Franco-British condominium of the New Hebrides and remained French, administered from New Caledonia. Vanuatu relies on the proposition that the 1980 independence settlement, concluded without consulting the populations concerned, cannot amputate the territory of the new State. Second, in case of doubt, the Court would weigh the effectivités, the concrete displays of State authority: administration, legislation, policing of the waters, scientific missions, search-and-rescue responsibility, and the reaction or silence of the other party. Decades of French administration, French place-names on the charts, French patrols and the absence of any permanent Vanuatu presence would be weighed against Vanuatu’s continuous diplomatic protests since 1980, which, under the Court’s case law, prevent French possession from becoming uncontested. None of this can be prejudged from Paris or Port Vila press releases. But the structure of the argument is stable, and any private actor investing in the area should understand that both chains of title will be pleaded at length if consent is ever given.

The maritime delimitation, if reached, would follow the equally settled three-stage method: draw a provisional equidistance line, adjust it for relevant circumstances such as coastal configuration, disproportionate island effects or historic usage, then check the result against the disproportionality test comparing coastal lengths with allocated areas. Small islands facing a larger landmass such as Grande Terre often receive reduced effect, sometimes confined to a territorial sea enclave, while their exclusive economic zone projection is cut back in favour of the mainland coast. Vanuatu will therefore argue that Matthew and Hunter, whichever sovereign holds them, should not amputate its own 200-mile projection from inhabited islands; France will answer that New Caledonia’s coasts generate the dominant entitlement. The single-boundary request compresses all of this into one line, which is elegant for diplomats and brutal for the loser. Fishing companies holding licences on either side should read that sentence of the application twice: the day a boundary moves, the licensing authority changes with it.

B. Arrested, fined or sued in France over disputed Pacific waters: how do Paris courts react?

The most useful precedent of the year for anyone navigating near Matthew and Hunter comes not from The Hague but from Paris. On 16 June 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, in judgment No. 24-86.030 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR00828), quashed an acquittal granted by the Saint-Denis de La Réunion Court of Appeal to the owner of a French-flagged vessel prosecuted for maritime transport offences. The appeal court had acquitted on the ground that the location of the offences might not lie inside the exclusive economic zone, since, in its view, the domestic limits of that zone had not been validated by international law. The Court of Cassation rejected that reasoning outright. Its answer deserves quotation because it governs every French prosecution at sea: “Aux termes du premier de ces textes, les juridictions pénales sont compétentes pour interpréter les actes administratifs, réglementaires ou individuels et pour en apprécier la légalité lorsque, de cet examen, dépend la solution du procès pénal qui leur est soumis.” Criminal courts, in other words, do not hide behind doubts about maritime limits; they interpret the administrative act fixing them and rule. And on the substance, the Court recalled the second text: “Selon le second, la loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises à bord des navires battant pavillon français, ou à l’encontre de tels navires ou des personnes se trouvant à bord, en quelque lieu qu’ils se trouvent.” A French-flagged vessel answers to French criminal law wherever it floats, including in waters whose international status is debated.

The two statutory pillars of that judgment are worth keeping open in a browser tab. Article 111-5 of the Criminal Code states: “Les juridictions pénales sont compétentes pour interpréter les actes administratifs, réglementaires ou individuels et pour en apprécier la légalité lorsque, de cet examen, dépend la solution du procès pénal qui leur est soumis.” And Article 113-3 of the Criminal Code states: “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises à bord des navires battant un pavillon français, ou à l’encontre de tels navires ou des personnes se trouvant à bord, en quelque lieu qu’ils se trouvent. Elle est seule applicable aux infractions commises à bord des navires de la marine nationale, ou à l’encontre de tels navires ou des personnes se trouvant à bord, en quelque lieu qu’ils se trouvent.” The decision also names the instruments that fix the French economic zone: “les décrets n° 78-146 et 78-149 du 3 février 1978 pris en application de la loi n° 76-655 du 16 juillet 1976, relatifs à la zone économique exclusive au large des côtes du territoire de la République, au regard de la Convention des Nations unies pour le droit de la mer”. The lesson for operators around Matthew and Hunter is direct. If you sail under the French flag, French maritime, safety, crew and environmental rules follow you into the disputed area, and a French court will not acquit you on the theory that the zone’s international status is uncertain. If you sail under a foreign flag inside the zone as published by France, you face the symmetrical risk: interception and prosecution under French fisheries and environmental law.

French jurisdiction does not stop at the criminal shore. Civil and commercial disputes arising from Pacific operations can be brought to French courts through the classic gateways. Article 14 of the Civil Code provides: “L’étranger, même non résidant en France, pourra être cité devant les tribunaux français, pour l’exécution des obligations par lui contractées en France avec un Français ; il pourra être traduit devant les tribunaux de France, pour les obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger envers des Français.” And Article 15 of the Civil Code adds: “Un Français pourra être traduit devant un tribunal de France, pour des obligations par lui contractées en pays étranger, même avec un étranger.” A charter party signed with a Nouméa-based company, a supply contract for a fishing campaign in the disputed zone, or a joint venture over seabed exploration data can therefore end up before the Paris courts or the Nouméa courts even when the foreign counterparty never set foot in France. Drafting an arbitration or jurisdiction clause is not a luxury in these files; it is the clause that decides where a future dispute about a moved maritime boundary will be fought.

French criminal law also reaches beyond the flag in defined cases. Article 113-6 of the Criminal Code provides: “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République. Elle est applicable aux délits commis par des Français hors du territoire de la République si les faits sont punis par la législation du pays où ils ont été commis.” And Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure adds: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” These texts matter in the Pacific context whenever French nationals, French companies or French-registered vessels are involved in incidents in contested waters, from collisions to environmental damage to labour offences aboard. The investigating judge in Paris, Nouméa or Saint-Denis does not wait for The Hague to delimit the zone before opening a file.

The same firm that defends an extradition or an International Criminal Court surrender file in Paris works with this broader toolbox every day, and the Vanuatu filing is a reminder of how wide it is. France cooperates structurally with international criminal justice: Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” Interim protective measures for the Hague court are executed in France under Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which states: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans. Elles peuvent être renouvelées dans les mêmes conditions avant l’expiration de ce délai à la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” Beyond treaty cooperation, French courts exercise universal jurisdiction over the gravest crimes: Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code. La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français, celle-ci se définissant par un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France.” The substantive definitions sit behind it: Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code states: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” And Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code states: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage ; 4° La déportation ou le transfert forcé de population ; 5° L’emprisonnement ou toute autre forme de privation grave de liberté physique en violation des dispositions fondamentales du droit international ; 6° La torture ; 7° Le viol, la prostitution forcée, la grossesse forcée, la stérilisation forcée ou toute autre forme de violence sexuelle de gravité comparable ; 8° La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international ; 9° La disparition forcée ; 10° Les actes de ségrégation commis dans le cadre d’un régime institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans l’intention de maintenir ce régime ; 11° Les autres actes inhumains de caractère analogue causant intentionnellement de grandes souffrances ou des atteintes graves à l’intégrité physique ou psychique.”

Concretely, anyone with a file touching Matthew, Hunter or the New Caledonia-Vanuatu maritime front should do four things now. First, audit the flag, the licences and the charts: operate under the limits as published by France until a court says otherwise, because French patrols and prosecutors do exactly that. Second, keep evidence of compliance aboard: logbooks, catch declarations, safety certificates and crew papers, since the 16 June 2026 judgment shows that French courts decide these cases on the papers, not on theories about international validation. Third, secure the contracts: jurisdiction and applicable-law clauses designating Paris, Nouméa or arbitration, so a future boundary shift does not move the dispute to a forum you never chose. Fourth, if an interception, a seizure or a summons occurs, act within hours: administrative detention of a vessel, criminal custody and limitation periods for challenging a seizure do not wait for diplomats. A Paris advocate who pleads before the investigating judge, the maritime tribunals and the international courts can hold those three fronts together while The Hague decides whether it will ever hear the case.

Conclusion

Vanuatu’s application of 1 September 2026 is a serious legal move wrapped in a patient strategy. It asks the International Court of Justice for everything at once: sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter and a single maritime boundary for the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf facing New Caledonia. It uses the forum prorogatum of Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, which means France holds the key and no proceedings exist until Paris consents. And it keeps an advisory-opinion fallback that Vanuatu, of all States, knows how to operate. France, for its part, weighs forty years of administration and the precedent effect on Mayotte and New Caledonia against its standing as a defender of international justice. Nothing will be decided quickly, and readers should distrust any headline proclaiming a trial that has not been consented to. In the meantime, the law that governs the waters around Matthew and Hunter is French law as interpreted this year by the Court of Cassation: criminal courts fix the applicable limits themselves, the French flag carries French criminal law everywhere, and Articles 14 and 15 of the Civil Code open the doors of French civil courts to contract disputes born in the Pacific. Island sovereignty may be debated at The Hague for years. Vessel seizures, crew prosecutions and licence disputes are decided in France within weeks, and that is where preparation must start today.

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