On 10 October 2026, the United States took a step no American administration had taken before: it placed full sanctions on the International Criminal Court itself as an institution. The announcement, delivered by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the stated ground that the United States and its people are not subject to ICC jurisdiction, allows the federal government to seize ICC assets in the United States or controlled by American persons, with only narrow licensed exceptions including 180-day grace period licenses. Three days later, on 13 October 2026, France answered. Paris declared that it condemns the American institutional sanctions against the Court, noted that after sanctions on judges and staff — including French judge Nicolas Guillou — it is now the institution itself that is targeted, and called on the United States to withdraw the measures while reaffirming full support for the ICC and its staff. The Court itself answered the same week, describing the designation as an attack on an independent treaty-based judicial institution mandated by 125 States Parties to handle genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression, and pledging to keep discharging its mandate independently and impartially, on the basis of law and evidence alone, for the victims of the gravest crimes. For an international reader watching from London, New York, Dublin, Toronto or Sydney, the confrontation raises a concrete question: what does an American sanctions designation against a Hague-based court change, in practice, inside France — for suspects who might be arrested on French soil, for companies and banks handling ICC-linked funds, and for the lawyers, NGOs and witnesses who cooperate with the Court from Paris? The short answer is that nothing in the American measures suspends France’s duties as a State Party, and that European and French law actively forbid giving effect to them on French territory. This article explains why, step by step, with the exact texts that govern.
I. Washington escalates against The Hague, and Paris refuses to follow
A. From sanctions on ICC judges to sanctions on the institution itself
The October 2026 designation did not come out of nowhere. It is the culmination of a campaign that began with Executive Order 14203 on imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court, signed on 6 February 2025 in response to ICC arrest warrants issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant, and to the ICC investigation into possible American war crimes in Afghanistan. That order drew its domestic legal authority principally from sections of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, the statute by which Congress sought to shield American military personnel acting to protect American national interests from ICC prosecution. Throughout 2025 and 2026, Washington used that framework to sanction individual ICC judges and staff members — among them a French judge, Nicolas Guillou, a fact the French foreign ministry singled out by name in its October statement. What changed on 10 October 2026 is the scale: the designation now hits the Court as an institution, meaning its bank accounts, its property, and any transaction touching the American financial system or an American person can be frozen or blocked. The only breathing space Washington offered consists of specially licensed exceptions, including 180-day grace period licenses giving the ICC and its States Parties time to address American concerns. The symbolism of the calendar did not go unnoticed: the announcement landed the very day South African jurist Navi Pillay, a former ICC judge, won the Nobel Peace Prize for her work in international justice.
Two features of the American move matter for anyone reasoning under French or European law. First, the sanctions are an act of American domestic law with claimed extraterritorial reach: they purport to oblige banks, companies and individuals worldwide to cut ties with a designated person — here, an international court seated in The Hague. Second, they collide head-on with treaty obligations that France has written into its own statute book. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute; France is, and has been since the beginning. Under Article 86 of the Rome Statute, headed General obligation to cooperate, under which every State Party must cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. Requests for cooperation travel, under Article 87, through diplomatic or other designated channels — and on the French side, Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directs ICC requests for assistance to the competent authorities designated under Article 87 of the Statute, and Article 88 requires States Parties to keep national procedures available for every form of cooperation specified in that Part. France has built exactly those procedures into its Code of Criminal Procedure, and no American executive order repeals them. That is the legal ground on which Paris planted its flag on 13 October, adding that, together with its European partners and the other States Parties to the Rome Statute, France is actively working to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially, for the victims of the most serious crimes. The reference to European partners is not diplomatic padding: they point to a concrete European legal instrument, the Blocking Statute, examined below, which makes compliance with the American sanctions unlawful inside the Union.
Readers sometimes ask whether the American designation means the ICC will stop functioning, or that its arrest warrants lapse. It does not. A sanctions listing freezes assets and chokes transactions; it does not vacate judicial acts. Warrants already issued remain valid judicial decisions of an international court, and States Parties remain bound to execute them under Part 9 of the Statute. The ICC Presidency said exactly this in its own way: the designation aims to disrupt the operations of the Court and to intimidate those who work for it or cooperate with it, and that the Court will not be deterred. Disruption is real — the Court has publicly acknowledged continuity and resilience planning with its States Parties — but disruption is not acquittal, and it is not impunity. Anyone in France who is the subject of ICC proceedings, or who assists a person in that position, must reason on the basis that French cooperation machinery keeps running, as Section II explains.
B. Why France’s reply carries legal weight, not just diplomatic polish
France’s statement of 13 October 2026 does three things at once, and each of them has practical consequences. First, it condemns the American institutional sanctions against the Court. Condemnation by a State Party matters because the Rome Statute system runs on State cooperation; public refusal to recognise the sanctions signals to French banks, companies and administrations that Paris will not treat the designation as a lawful reason to freeze ICC-related activity in France. Second, it personalises the stake: by recalling sanctions already imposed on judges and staff, including French judge Nicolas Guillou, France reminds its audience that the dispute is not abstract — a French magistrate elected to an international court has already been targeted, and the protection of French nationals serving international justice is a national interest. Third, it commits: Paris calls on Washington to withdraw the sanctions, reaffirms full support for the ICC and its staff, and couples that with joint European action to keep the Court able to fulfil its mission independently and impartially.
That commitment is credible because France has given itself the domestic tools to honour it. The cornerstone is Article 627 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, in force on the date of writing, which provides: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The same title organises, article by article, everything the Rome Statute requires: arrest with a view to surrender, judicial review before the Paris courts, transit, provisional protective measures, and enforcement of sentences. France therefore does not cooperate with the ICC as a matter of political goodwill that an American sanctions package could erode; it cooperates because its own Code orders it to, and a French prosecutor or investigating judge needs no diplomatic green light to apply Articles 627 and following. This is the insider point that foreign commentators often miss: in the French system, ICC cooperation is ordinary criminal procedure, handled by the same magistrates and the same liberty-and-custody judges as any serious case, under the control of the Paris prosecution service and the Paris investigating chamber. American sanctions change none of those competences.
The European layer reinforces the French one. The European Union has, since 1996, maintained a Blocking Statute — Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 — whose very purpose is to neutralise the effects within the Union of foreign sanctions laws that the Union considers unlawful in their extraterritorial application. The French Treasury, which administers the system day to day, recalls first that France and the European Union firmly reject the use of extraterritorial sanctions by third countries. The same official page explains that Regulation 2271/96 cancels, within the EU, the effects of any foreign court decision based on the laws and instruments listed in its annex, and that it forbids EU operators from complying with those sanctions unless exceptionally authorised by the Commission where refusal would seriously harm their interests or those of the Union. Whether and how swiftly the American ICC sanctions are listed in that Annex is a matter for the EU institutions, and France has promised to work jointly with its European partners precisely on this front — but the mechanism exists, it has been used against earlier American sanctions regimes, and any bank or company in France must factor it in before cutting off an ICC-linked client at Washington’s request. France adds its own national shield, examined in Section II, which dates back to 1968 and carries criminal penalties.
II. What the standoff changes in practice for cases and companies in France
A. ICC proceedings on French soil continue under French criminal procedure
Consider first the person who matters most in any cooperation system: the individual whose arrest and surrender the ICC requests. If that person is found in France, the American sanctions do not create a defence, a delay, or a parallel procedure. French law applies, and it is precise. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that twenty-four-hour window, the Safeguard provisions of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 — notification of rights, access to a lawyer, medical examination, consular notification for foreign nationals — apply. The prosecutor then verifies identity and gives formal notice, in a language the person understands, of the arrest request for surrender purposes. The statute continues: the person is told “qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris”,” with the assistance of counsel of her choice or court-appointed counsel, an immediate confidential interview, and a written record transmitted at once to the Paris prosecutor general. If the prosecutor does not release the person, she is brought before the liberty-and-custody judge, who orders detention on remand — unless representation at every step is sufficiently guaranteed in light of Article 59 of the Rome Statute, in which case judicial supervision measures under Articles 138 and 142-5 may be ordered instead — and Article 627-6 organises the transfer and detention of the requested person at the remand prison within the jurisdiction of the Paris Court of Appeal. Every one of those time limits — twenty-four hours, five days maximum — runs from instruments of French law, and the American designation of the requesting institution appears nowhere in them. A lawyer defending such a client in Paris should therefore build the case on the classic French grounds — identity, manifest error, ne bis in idem consultation under Article 89(2) of the Statute, medical incompatibility with detention, treaty-based bars — rather than on any expectation that the Cour de cassation would treat American sanctions as a reason to refuse surrender. No French court has that power, and no American measure gives it to them.
The same continuity governs the ICC’s property and evidence measures in France. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure entrusts the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor of Paris with ordering, on French territory, the protective measures referred to in Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute, at Treasury expense and under the forms of the Code: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” Crucially, “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans” renewable on the same terms before expiry at the Court’s request, with difficulties reported through Article 87 consultations. Two practical consequences follow for asset holders. First, if the ICC asks France to freeze identified assets for the benefit of victims or future forfeiture, the Paris prosecutor can and must act — the American sanctions on the ICC give the holder no lawful excuse to dissipate them, and dissipation could engage criminal liability for concealment or contempt of the French order. Second, and symmetrically, if an American authority asked a French bank to freeze the same assets on the basis of the United States’ own Russia-style logic applied to the Court, the bank would face two contradictory orders — and under the EU Blocking Statute and French blocking law, it is the French and European order that prevails on French territory. Anyone confronting such a conflict should have the competing instruments reviewed side by side by counsel before moving a single euro, because obeying the wrong one creates liability in the other jurisdiction. The broader extradition and surrender practice of the Paris courts, described in our analysis of French extradition procedure before the investigating chamber and the guarantees of the requested person, follows the same logic: French judges apply French statutes and treaties, not foreign sanctions lists.
One further scenario deserves mention because it directly affects expatriates and dual nationals reading this from abroad: transit and presence. The Rome Statute system assumes that suspects, witnesses and even convicted persons move between States Parties — for surrender, for testimony, for enforcement of sentences. Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute provides that the Court may send any State where a person is found a request for arrest and surrender, with the supporting material, and ask for that State’s cooperation in arresting and surrendering the person. A person who transits through a Paris airport or resides in France while subject to ICC proceedings cannot count on American sanctions to make France look away; conversely, a witness or counsel cooperating with the Court cannot be lawfully penalised in France for that cooperation. Victims participating in ICC proceedings keep their right to be heard, and defence teams keep their duty of confidential communication — both protected under French professional secrecy, which no foreign sanctions measure overrides. In short, for every human situation the Statute contemplates, the French procedural answer is unchanged by the events of October 2026.
B. The European and French shield: why obeying Washington from Paris can itself be unlawful
The second practical front concerns money, contracts and compliance — the daily life of companies, banks, insurers, NGOs and law firms in France that deal, directly or indirectly, with the ICC, its staff, its counsel, or its suppliers. Here the October 2026 sanctions bite hardest: an American bank will refuse dollar payments to a sanctioned institution; cloud providers, airlines and insurers with American exposure may suspend services; and compliance departments worldwide receive automated alerts urging them to cut ties with anything ICC-related as a precaution. Inside France, however, acting on those alerts can violate French and European law. The EU Blocking Statute described above prohibits European operators from complying with the covered foreign requirements, with only exceptional Commission authorisation where refusal would seriously harm their interests or those of the Union; it wipes out the effects within the Union of foreign judgments based on those laws and gives harmed operators a right to recover their loss from those who caused it. The lesson is procedural, not theatrical: a French company that believes it cannot avoid American exposure does not simply obey Washington — it applies to the European Commission for authorisation, documents the serious harm, and meanwhile continues to perform its European obligations. Self-help compliance with American sanctions, without authorisation, is the one course the French Treasury’s presentation forbids.
France doubles that European shield with a national criminal statute that predates the ICC by three decades and has lost none of its force. Article 1 of Law No. 68-678 of 26 July 1968, in the version in force on the date of writing, provides: “Sous réserve des traités ou accords internationaux, il est interdit à toute personne physique de nationalité française ou résidant habituellement sur le territoire français et à tout dirigeant, représentant, agent ou préposé d’une personne morale y ayant son siège ou un établissement de communiquer par écrit, oralement ou sous toute autre forme, en quelque lieu que ce soit, à des autorités publiques étrangères, les documents ou les renseignements d’ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique dont la communication est de nature à porter atteinte à la souveraineté, à la sécurité, aux intérêts économiques essentiels de la France ou à l’ordre public, précisés par l’autorité administrative en tant que de besoin.” In plain terms: a French company cannot hand over its books, its client files or its transaction data to a foreign authority — including under the pressure of a foreign sanctions investigation — where that disclosure would harm France’s sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order. Violations carry criminal penalties, and French courts have applied the statute against information-gathering for foreign proceedings. For a Paris law firm holding an ICC defence file, for an NGO administering victim-support funds linked to Hague proceedings, or for a bank asked by an American correspondent to justify ICC-related transfers with full client documentation, Article 1 is not folklore: it is the text to put on the table, in French, before answering any extraterritorial request. Combined with professional secrecy and data-protection law, it gives French actors a solid, good-faith basis to refuse disclosures that Washington’s sanctions logic would demand.
What should a prudent actor in France do, concretely, in the weeks after 10 October 2026? First, map exposure: list every contract, payment flow and service that touches the ICC, its organs, its listed staff, or defence and victims’ counsel, and identify which counterparty might invoke the American sanctions to suspend performance. Second, do not pre-emptively breach: terminating an ICC-related contract or freezing a client’s funds out of caution vis-à-vis Washington can constitute breach of contract and, where the Blocking Statute applies, unlawful compliance with a foreign prohibition — the mirror image of the risk the compliance team thought it was managing. Third, use the authorised channels: where American exposure is genuinely unavoidable, seek the Commission authorisation under Articles 7 and 8 of the Blocking Statute rather than improvising, and record every request received from American authorities or counterparties for the file. Fourth, protect people: French staff seconded to The Hague, counsel appearing before the Court, and witnesses preparing testimony from France should receive written confirmation that their cooperation remains lawful and protected under French law, so that no bank de-risking or travel scare deters them from lawful participation in international justice. None of these steps requires heroic defiance of the United States; each of them is the ordinary application of statutes that were written for exactly this kind of conflict of sovereignties. France’s promise to act jointly with its European partners will be judged, in the end, not by communiqués but by whether French courts, French banks and French companies hold this line in the files that land on their desks this autumn.
Conclusion
The October 2026 American sanctions on the International Criminal Court are the most serious attack a major power has mounted against the Rome Statute system, and France has named them for what they are: institutional sanctions that follow personal sanctions on judges including a French magistrate, now aimed at the Court itself. But condemnation alone protects no one, and the French position is strong precisely because it does not rest on rhetoric. It rests on Article 86 of the Rome Statute, which obliges every State Party to cooperate fully with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction; on Articles 627, 627-3 and 627-5 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, which turn that duty into twenty-four-hour presentations, five-day maximum referrals to the Paris prosecutor general, and two-year renewable protective measures ordered by the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor; and on the EU Blocking Statute and the French 1968 blocking law, which forbid giving effect to the American measures from French territory. For suspects, witnesses, counsel, companies and banks, the practical message is therefore steady rather than alarming: ICC proceedings continue, French cooperation machinery keeps running, and compliance with Washington’s sanctions from Paris requires European authorisation, not improvisation. History will judge this moment, as the ICC Presidency said — and on the French side of the record, the statutes are already written.