On 27 August 2026, Reuters reported, citing the Financial Times, that a group of European governments was asking Brussels to revive work on using immobilised Russian sovereign assets to support Ukraine. Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland were among the states identified in the report. The political signal matters, but it is not yet a confiscation regulation, a transfer order or a French authorisation to move any account. The legal question is narrower and more urgent: can Europe increase the use of interest and other extraordinary revenues while leaving the Central Bank of Russia’s principal untouched, and what would a French bank, creditor or asset holder do if the next proposal goes further? The answer depends on the exact asset, the legal instrument that immobilised it, the entity holding it and the remedy sought. EU institutions already use a carefully separated stream of windfall profits. They have not thereby acquired a general power to transfer the underlying reserve assets. French law adds immediate duties of freezing, non-circumvention, record-keeping and judicial control. This analysis maps the boundary between a permitted revenue transfer, an attempted principal seizure and a private enforcement claim in France.
I. What can the EU use while the Russian principal remains frozen?
A. What did the 27 August report actually revive?
The starting point is the status of the reported proposal. Reuters reported on 27 August 2026, citing the Financial Times, that a group of European governments was asking Brussels to restart work on the issue. The report describes a political request, not the adoption of a Council regulation authorising a new transfer of the Russian principal. That distinction should control every legal and compliance decision made in France during the next phase of the debate.
The existing European mechanism is already substantial. On 3 August 2026, the European Union received €1.4 billion in windfall profits generated by interest on cash balances originating from immobilised Central Bank of Russia assets held by central securities depositories. The European Commission’s Ukraine solidarity page records the 5 August 2026 announcement, identifies the payment as the fifth transfer and says it covers revenue accumulated during the first half of 2026. The same official material records a cumulative total of €8 billion in windfall profits. It also states that 95% is channelled through the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and 5% through the European Peace Facility.
The Commission uses carefully qualified language. Its notice says: “While the assets themselves remain immobilised, the interest on the cash balances does not belong to Russia.” That is the EU’s legal and policy position concerning the particular income stream produced by the immobilisation of cash balances. It is not a judicial declaration that every increase in value connected with a Russian asset has lost its Russian legal character. A coupon, a matured security, a cash deposit, a contractual claim against a custodian and the principal of a central-bank reserve can have different legal identities.
The political debate also uses different numbers for different pools. The Council’s background explanation in French refers to approximately €210 billion of Central Bank of Russia assets immobilised in the European Union. The Council’s February 2024 decision described approximately €260 billion of Central Bank of Russia assets immobilised across G7, EU and Australian jurisdictions, with more than two thirds in the EU. Those figures should not be added together. They describe overlapping geographic and institutional perspectives, not separate funds available for immediate transfer.
The February 2024 framework targeted central securities depositories holding more than €1 million of Russian central-bank assets. The Council required extraordinary cash balances and related revenues to be recorded separately and prevented the depositories from disposing freely of the resulting net profits. The practical effect was a ring-fence: the custodian could not return the assets to Russia, could not treat the unexpected balance as ordinary distributable cash and could not spend the income as if the sanctions had never existed. The Council’s English summary uses the short instruction to “keep corresponding revenues separate”. That separation is the foundation for the transfers that have already occurred.
The 27 August political request therefore sits between two existing positions. On one side, the EU has an operative legal framework for using net profits generated by the immobilisation. On the other, the principal remains subject to immobilisation and, since December 2025, to a more durable prohibition on transfer back to the Russian Federation. A political letter can reopen the policy file; it cannot silently replace the operative regulation.
That is why the first question for a French operator is not “is Europe using Russian assets?” It is “which asset, which revenue, which holder and which act of EU law?” The answer determines whether the operator is implementing an existing duty, receiving a lawful payment from a separated revenue stream or being asked to participate in a new act that still needs legal adoption and judicial scrutiny.
B. Why are windfall revenues treated differently from the Russian principal?
The EU framework combines sanctions law, financial-market infrastructure rules and emergency support measures. The categories overlap in political discussion but remain distinct in law.
First, Article 5a(4) of Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, in its consolidated English version, prohibits transactions related to the management of the reserves and assets of the Central Bank of Russia. The operative text begins: “Transactions related to the management of reserves as well as of assets of the Central Bank of Russia”. A custodian therefore needs a legal basis for every movement, conversion, reinvestment or release connected with the reserve portfolio. The fact that a balance is sitting in euros in a European account does not turn it into an ordinary commercial deposit.
Second, Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 supplies a broad model for understanding the reach of an asset freeze when listed persons or entities are involved. Article 1 defines the freezing of funds as “preventing any move, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds”. Article 2 then prevents funds or economic resources from being made available to designated persons. The text matters for two reasons. It blocks the obvious payment, but it also reaches arrangements that change the location, control, destination or economic availability of the asset. A bank cannot solve a sanctions problem by changing the account label, using a nominee or routing the payment through a third country.
The Central Bank of Russia reserve regime is not identical to an ordinary listing of a private person. That is precisely why the 2024 depository rules had to deal expressly with extraordinary cash balances and net revenues. The legal theory supporting the use of those profits is not that the EU has confiscated the Russian principal. It is that the sanctions prevented the ordinary return or management of the reserve assets, created a separate cash balance at the level of the depository and allowed the Union to regulate the resulting net profits for the benefit of Ukraine.
Third, Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 and the related 2024 acts channel those net profits into Ukraine support. The official EUR-Lex act should be read with the depository rules, not in isolation. The relevant accounting question is whether the sum is a net profit falling within the act, after lawful costs, risks and capital requirements, or whether it is still a Russian asset, a contractual obligation or a return of principal. That classification cannot be replaced by a headline describing every amount as “frozen Russian money”.
Fourth, Regulation (EU) 2025/2600 addresses the principal in a different way. The EUR-Lex text of Regulation (EU) 2025/2600, adopted on the basis of Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, establishes emergency measures concerning the Russian central-bank assets. Its operative logic prohibits a “direct or indirect transfer back to the Russian Federation” of the immobilised assets or reserves. It reinforces immobilisation; it does not by itself create a general distribution order sending the principal to Ukraine.
The distinction is important for French litigation. A prohibition on returning the principal is not the same as a title transferring ownership of that principal to the Union. A rule allowing net profits to support Ukraine is not a judicial forfeiture. A future reparations-financing instrument might create a different structure, but it would need to identify the amount, the recipient, the repayment or risk mechanism, the legal basis and the protection of custodians. It would also have to address the relationship between EU law, international law on state property and domestic rules protecting foreign central-bank reserves.
The EU Court of Justice’s recent trust-asset decisions show why the legal analysis cannot stop at the name on a bank statement. In its judgment of 21 May 2026 in Case C-483/23, ECLI:EU:C:2026:408, together with the joined trust cases C-428/24 and C-476/24, the Court examined “belonging to” and “control” in the context of Regulation No 269/2014. The Court’s reasoning protects the effectiveness of restrictive measures where a sanctioned person exercises indirect or de facto power through a trust. That does not decide ownership of Central Bank of Russia reserves, but it warns custodians that formal separation is not conclusive when the economic reality points to continuing control.
The same reasoning produces a limit. If the Union intends to move principal rather than net profits, it must say so in an act capable of producing that effect. The act must survive review of competence, proportionality, property protection, state immunity and the rights of affected parties. France cannot make that decision alone through a ministerial letter to a bank. French institutions implement the applicable EU framework and national rules; they do not legislate for the Union’s external policy.
II. What can French banks, creditors and asset holders challenge?
A. What must French banks do before any new transfer?
French compliance begins with the domestic freezing framework. Article L562-1 of the Code monétaire et financier defines funds broadly as financial assets and economic benefits of every kind. It includes deposits, balances and other economic value. That breadth matters where a client claims that “only the interest” is affected. The bank must identify the relevant legal source and the way the amount arose; it cannot assume that a new label makes the amount free of restrictions.
Article L562-4 requires the persons and entities within its scope to apply without delay the applicable freezing measures and prohibitions and to inform the minister responsible for the economy. The official text uses the phrase “appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel”. The rule extends beyond a French bank incorporated in France. It covers activities carried out in France by foreign entities, including branches and other forms of establishment or service provision. A foreign custodian dealing with a French account, French payment leg or French branch therefore needs a documented perimeter analysis.
Article L562-5 adds a separate prohibition against making funds or economic resources available directly or indirectly to a person whose funds are frozen. The current Légifrance text prohibits “mettre à disposition directement ou indirectement”. Article L562-6 goes further by prohibiting knowing and voluntary participation in an activity intended to circumvent the measures. The practical risk is not limited to an unauthorised wire. It includes a chain of intermediaries, a substitution of beneficiaries, a sham settlement, a transfer to a controlled entity or a payment that removes the economic effect of the freeze while preserving its appearance.
For a French bank receiving an instruction referring to the 27 August report, the safe sequence is therefore operational rather than political:
- identify whether the balance is Central Bank of Russia principal, interest on cash balances, depository net profit, a payment owed by a private intermediary or an asset of a separately listed person;
- record the exact EU regulation, Council decision, national measure or licence relied on by the instruction;
- confirm whether the act is already in force and whether it covers the bank, the account, the currency, the beneficiary and the date of payment;
- preserve the accounting trail showing the original reserve, the dates of maturity, accrued interest, costs, capital requirements and the calculation of net profit;
- separate principal, income, fees and any amount claimed by a third party instead of netting them in a single transfer; and
- escalate any request that depends only on a press report, a political statement or a proposed future regulation.
The conversion of a gross balance into a net profit is not a clerical detail. It may determine whether the amount falls under the EU’s existing Ukraine-support mechanism or remains subject to the principal freeze. The Council’s February 2024 decision expressly recognised costs and risks for the central securities depositories and allowed a controlled release of part of the profits for capital and risk-management requirements. That structure is different from a bank deciding that it can pay away the principal because the political objective is compelling.
French national law also provides a release procedure for certain domestic freezing measures. Article L562-11 of the Code monétaire et financier allows the competent ministers, in the situations covered by the text, to “autoriser le déblocage et la mise à disposition” of part of frozen funds or economic resources. The provision is not a general licence for a French bank to redesign EU policy. It requires compatibility with public order and with the decisions or acts at the origin of the freeze. It can also be requested by the person concerned or by a third party claiming a right, but the existence of a request is not an authorisation to pay.
The protection for a bank that acts correctly is equally specific. Article L562-13 says: “L’Etat est responsable des conséquences dommageables” of good-faith implementation by the persons covered by Article L562-4 and their directors or employees, and prevents professional sanctions for that good-faith implementation. The official provision does not protect deliberate circumvention, careless classification or a payment made without checking the operative text. A compliance file should show why the operator believed the measure applied and why the payment did or did not fall within a permitted revenue channel.
The central-bank question is more difficult than an ordinary private asset freeze. Article L153-1 of the Code monétaire et financier begins: “Ne peuvent être saisis les biens de toute nature” held or managed by foreign central banks or monetary authorities for themselves or for the foreign state to which they belong. The same article contains a narrow exception for an enforceable, liquid and due claim where the creditor establishes that assets held for the central bank’s own account belong to a patrimony devoted principally to private-law activity. That is not a simple permission to seize a reserve because a creditor has a judgment.
The Court of Cassation’s First Civil Chamber, 12 May 2021, No. 19-13.853, is an essential French reference. In the dispute involving the reserves managed by a foreign monetary authority, the Court treated the statutory non-seizability of central-bank reserves as a protection attached to the nature of the assets, distinct from ordinary state immunity. It recognised the legitimate objective of preserving the functioning of monetary institutions and preventing a blockage of reserves placed in France. The decision does not resolve every question about EU immobilisation, but it makes a private creditor’s shortcut especially difficult.
That principle must be distinguished from the Court of Cassation’s First Civil Chamber judgment of 25 January 2005, No. 03-18.176. There, the Court stated that a foreign state normally benefits from immunity from enforcement, but that an exception can arise where the seized property is connected with a private economic, commercial or civil operation giving rise to the claim. A French apartment bought for private management and a central-bank reserve held for monetary policy are not equivalent assets. The private-operation exception cannot be transplanted to the principal merely because both assets are located in France or in a French-linked custody chain.
The Court of Cassation’s First Civil Chamber judgment of 13 March 2024, No. 21-17.599, supplies another caution. In interpreting diplomatic enforcement immunity, the Court held that the statutory rules must “doivent être interprétées strictement” and distinguished diplomatic-mission assets from property used by a head of state. The case concerned an aircraft, not Russian reserves. Its value here is methodological: a court will examine the precise function, holder and legal connection of the property instead of deciding from a political label such as “Russian assets”.
The broader analysis of the Euroclear liability and €202 billion asset question already published on this desk remains a useful hub for the institutional risk. This new article addresses the narrower gap left by that broad discussion: how the principal and the income stream should be separated, and what a French operator can do when a proposed transfer crosses that boundary.
B. Which court, evidence and remedy control a French dispute?
The remedy follows the act being challenged. A client whose private account is frozen by a French bank, a creditor seeking to reach an asset, a depository disputing a payment instruction and a state challenging an EU act do not start in the same court. The first procedural error is often to treat every dispute as an ordinary debt-recovery claim.
For a private creditor, Article L511-1 of the Code des procédures civiles d’exécution permits a conservatory measure where the claim appears founded in principle and circumstances threaten recovery. The text opens: “Toute personne dont la créance paraît fondée en son principe”. It does not abolish foreign-state immunity, the statutory protection of central-bank reserves or the EU prohibition on making funds available. A creditor still has to prove the debtor, the debt, the asset connection and the absence of a superior immunity or sanctions bar. Obtaining a provisional attachment order is not the same as being entitled to realise a Russian central-bank reserve.
Article L213-6 of the Code de l’organisation judiciaire gives the juge de l’exécution exclusive jurisdiction over difficulties concerning enforceable titles and disputes arising from forced enforcement. It also covers authorisation of conservatory measures, challenges to their implementation and claims for damage caused by enforcement or conservatory measures. That allocation matters after a bank rejects a seizure because the targeted asset is a foreign central-bank reserve. The JEX can assess the execution dispute under the applicable texts; it cannot disregard a directly applicable EU regulation.
The Court of Cassation judgment in No. 19-13.853 illustrates the difference between a valid debt and an available asset. A creditor may hold a legitimate judgment and still face statutory non-seizability because the asset is a foreign monetary reserve. The court’s reasoning also points toward an alternative route: if good-faith application of the freeze creates a compensable loss, a claim against the state or another legally responsible actor may need to be separated from the attempt to seize the protected asset itself. The two claims have different proof, jurisdiction and limitation issues.
Evidence should be preserved before the litigation hardens. Article 145 of the Code de procédure civile permits a person with a legitimate reason to preserve or establish, before proceedings, evidence on which the outcome of a dispute may depend. The official text refers to a “motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir avant tout procès la preuve”. In this field, a properly framed request may target transaction records, custody statements, interest calculations, notices from the depository, payment instructions, compliance correspondence, beneficial-ownership material and the version of the EU act applied on the relevant date. It cannot become a general fishing expedition for every document concerning sanctions.
Urgent relief has a separate role. Article 835 of the Code de procédure civile allows the president of the tribunal judiciaire, even where a serious contest exists, to order conservatory or restorative measures to prevent “prévenir un dommage imminent” or end a manifestly unlawful disturbance. A bank, beneficiary or creditor might invoke that framework to preserve records, prevent an irreversible private transfer or maintain the status quo while the legal instrument is clarified. The judge’s emergency power does not authorise a payment that EU sanctions law prohibits, and the applicant must identify the precise unlawful act rather than rely on the general political controversy.
The same caution applies to a claim against an intermediary. If a custodian refuses to transfer a sum, the claimant must identify whether the refusal concerns principal, interest, a net-profit distribution or a contractual claim. If the custodian transfers funds without a valid EU basis, the opposing party may argue breach of sanctions, breach of mandate, negligence or unjust enrichment, but the legal theory cannot be selected before the asset classification is proved. Article 1240 of the French Civil Code states the general principle that a human act causing damage obliges the person through whose fault it occurred to repair it. That provision is not a sanctions licence or an automatic claim against a bank; it is one possible liability framework after fault, damage and causation are established.
For the principal itself, the dispute may move to the European level. A party affected by an EU act must examine the admissibility and route of a challenge before the General Court, including standing, the nature of the act, the time limit and whether a preliminary reference is more appropriate. A French court can apply EU law and ask the Court of Justice for interpretation, but the applicant should not assume that an emergency filing in Paris automatically suspends a Council regulation. The challenge must connect a concrete measure to a concrete legal defect.
The French litigation file should normally contain at least the following items:
- the custody agreement, account statements and transaction identifiers showing whether the disputed amount is a reserve, a security, an interest balance, a net profit or a third-party claim;
- the chain of title and control, including the relevant central bank, depository, nominee, intermediary, account holder and beneficiary;
- the complete notice of freeze, the listed-person information if applicable, the EU regulation or decision relied on, and any French ministerial or regulatory correspondence;
- a dated calculation separating principal, accrued interest, gross income, lawful expenses, capital buffers, net profit and the amount actually requested for Ukraine;
- the payment request, refusal, authorisation, licence or compliance explanation, with the identity and role of every person who approved it;
- evidence of urgency, threatened dissipation, loss of access, contractual default or reputational harm; and
- a remedy table showing whether the target is a bank, a depository, a public authority, a foreign state, a listed person or the Union itself.
That last distinction prevents a frequent procedural mistake. A Russian private company challenging a personal asset freeze may focus on listing reasons, ownership and control. A Central Bank of Russia reserve dispute engages the special rules on monetary reserves, sovereign immunity and the EU’s emergency sanctions framework. A Ukrainian creditor may have a serious substantive claim and still be unable to execute against the protected principal. A French bank may have a valid commercial obligation to a client and still be required to refuse payment. The strength of the underlying grievance does not decide the identity or availability of the asset.
The best answer to the revived political plan is therefore a controlled legal map, not a slogan. If the EU adopts a new instrument for principal use, French counsel should test its legal basis, operative wording, temporal scope, definition of recipient, allocation of litigation risk and treatment of the custodian. If the EU merely expands an existing windfall-profit channel, operators should apply the current segregation, accounting and reporting rules and avoid describing the payment as a seizure. If a private party is already affected, the immediate work is evidence preservation and classification, followed by the court-specific remedy.
Conclusion
The European Union can continue using a defined stream of net profits generated by the immobilisation of Russian central-bank assets because that stream has been addressed by specific EU acts and separated from the underlying reserve. The reported 27 August 2026 request to revive a broader plan does not, by itself, authorise France, a French bank or a depository to transfer the Russian principal. Any move from income to principal would require an operative instrument that can withstand review of EU competence, property rights, state and central-bank immunity, proportionality and the protection of custodians and affected parties.
For French operators, the practical rule is simple: classify first, locate the exact legal act, preserve the accounting trail and refuse to turn a political announcement into a payment instruction. For creditors and asset holders, a French court may preserve evidence, police an execution measure or review a national act, but it will not erase the EU freeze or the special protection of foreign central-bank reserves by procedural shortcut. The dividing line between lawful windfall-revenue use and unlawful principal seizure is the legal instrument, not the urgency of the headline.