KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Surrendered by France to Face a $14 Million Fraud Trial in Texas: How Paris Tests an American Extradition Request

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Surrendered by France to Face a $14 Million Fraud Trial in Texas: How Paris Tests an American Extradition Request

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

On Thursday, April 23, 2026, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announced that a man arrested in France had been surrendered to the United States to face a federal fraud prosecution in Texas. The press release from the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Texas announces the extradition from France of an Ivorian national to face federal fraud charges in Texas. According to the same official announcement, the man arrived in the United States from France on April 21, 2026, into the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, after the Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs secured the arrest and extradition from France. Three months later, on July 31, 2026, the same office announced a second indictment in the same alleged scheme, this time against another Ivorian national, as part of an FBI campaign against cyber-enabled fraud described as operating across borders. Every defendant is presumed innocent: as the American announcements themselves recall, since a federal indictment is not evidence of guilt and every defendant remains presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The alleged mechanics, as described by the American prosecutor, are those of a classic credential-phishing operation aimed at the travel industry: deceptive emails purporting to come from the company handling airline reservations for travel agencies, a fake login page, stolen credentials, then tickets booked through the genuine reservation system at the agencies’ expense, for about $14 million in losses spread across approximately 430 travel agencies. Whether those facts are proven is for the Texas trial court alone to decide. But the French side of the story is already instructive, because France does not hand anyone over automatically: surrender follows a judicial opinion, a government decree and a series of substantive filters tested again by the Cour de cassation in October 2026. This article explains, from the French lawyer’s vantage point, what Paris necessarily checked before the April surrender, and what any person arrested in France on an American request should understand about the procedure, the double-criminality test for fraud, the time-bar control and the fair-trial guarantee.

I. Extradited From France to the United States: How Paris Authorizes Surrender

Extradition from France to the United States is classic, treaty-based extradition, not the European Arrest Warrant, which applies only between European Union Member States. France and the United States are both parties to multilateral instruments and bound by a bilateral extradition treaty, but where a treaty does not settle a point, French domestic law governs. That fallback is stated expressly: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre”, in article 696 of the Code of criminal procedure. The chapter in question organizes both the judicial phase, entrusted to the investigating chamber of the court of appeal, and the governmental phase, entrusted to the Prime Minister, with review by the administrative judge. Understanding that two-stage architecture is the key to the whole matter: the court gives an opinion, and only the executive decides, subject to judicial review.

A. Arrest, the Prosecutor General and the Investigating Chamber’s Reasoned Opinion

Everything starts with deprivation of liberty on French soil. French law imposes a very short fuse: “Toute personne appréhendée à la suite d’une demande d’extradition doit être conduite dans les quarante-huit heures devant le procureur général territorialement compétent”, under article 696-10 of the Code of criminal procedure. Before that magistrate, identity is verified and the requested person is informed, in a language they understand, of the existence and content of the extradition request, and told they may be assisted by counsel of their choice or by court-appointed counsel, with an immediate confidential interview; those formalities are recorded on pain of nullity. Within two days of the arrest, the prosecutor general must then notify the person, again in a language they understand, of the documents on the basis of which they were apprehended, and must tell them they may consent to extradition under the simplified procedure and may waive the specialty rule, in the words of article 696-26 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Dans un délai de deux jours à compter de l’arrestation de la personne réclamée, le procureur général notifie à cette dernière, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, les pièces en vertu desquelles elle a été appréhendée.”

Liberty pending the opinion is the exception, detention the default setting. If the prosecutor general decides not to leave the requested person at liberty, the person is brought before the first president of the court of appeal, who orders committal under an extradition warrant at the remand prison of the court’s seat, unless representation at every step appears sufficiently guaranteed, in which case supervision measures may be substituted, pursuant to article 696-11 of the Code of criminal procedure. The choice between consent and opposition then shapes the timetable. A person who tells the prosecutor general they consent appears before the investigating chamber within five working days, and the president verifies that the consent is maintained after warning of its legal consequences; where consent is withdrawn, the ordinary track resumes. Where the person declares they do not consent, the investigating chamber is seized without delay and the person appears before it within ten working days of presentation to the prosecutor general. The decisive text is article 696-15 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Si, lors de sa comparution, la personne réclamée déclare ne pas consentir à être extradée, la chambre de l’instruction donne son avis motivé sur la demande d’extradition.” The same article fixes the deliberation period: “Elle rend son avis, sauf si un complément d’information a été ordonné, dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée.” An unfavorable advisory opinion, once final, kills the request outright; a favorable opinion opens the governmental phase. Review before the Cour de cassation is narrowly confined: an appeal against the chamber’s opinion “ne peut être fondé que sur des vices de forme de nature à priver cet avis des conditions essentielles de son existence légale”, as the same article 696-15 provides.

That formalism is not theoretical. On October 7, 2026, the criminal chamber of the Cour de cassation quashed a favorable extradition opinion issued by the investigating chamber of the court of appeal of Fort-de-France in proceedings brought at Brazil’s request, concerning prosecution for unlawful possession of a firearm and of a restricted-use firearm, and sent the case to the investigating chamber of Basse-Terre, as recorded in Cass. crim., October 7, 2026, No. 26-80.171. The ground for quashing was purely procedural: ruling on the request although no record of questioning had been drawn up at the hearing, the chamber had disregarded the governing texts and the principle they state. The lesson for any requested person in France, American request included, is direct: the opinion must be reasoned, adversarial and formally regular, because any formal defect going to the essential conditions of its legal existence destroys it. Counsel’s first battlefield is therefore the file itself, the regularity of each notification and each record, before the merits of double criminality or time bars are even reached. The broader procedural map, from opinion to decree to administrative review, is developed further in the analysis of the Versailles extradition opinion expected on November 6 in the Canadian request and what follows before the Conseil d’Etat, which walks through the same sequence step by step.

B. The Prime Minister’s Decree and Review by the Administrative Judge

A favorable opinion is necessary but never sufficient. Where the investigating chamber’s reasoned opinion rejects the request and that opinion is final, “l’extradition ne peut être accordée” and the requested person, if not detained on another ground, is released as of right, in the terms of article 696-17 of the Code of criminal procedure. Only a favorable opinion, unquashed, allows the executive to act, and the act is a signed decree: “l’extradition est autorisée par décret du Premier ministre pris sur le rapport du ministre de la justice”, in the words of article 696-18 of the Code of criminal procedure. The decree is the enforceable authorization to surrender, and it starts two one-month clocks that matter enormously in practice. First, the requesting state must collect the person: “Si, dans le délai d’un mois à compter de la notification de ce décret à l’Etat requérant, la personne réclamée n’a pas été reçue par les agents de cet Etat, l’intéressé est, sauf cas de force majeure, mis d’office en liberté et ne peut plus être réclamé pour la même cause”, under the same article 696-18. Second, the decree itself can be challenged before the administrative courts, but swiftly: “Le recours pour excès de pouvoir contre le décret mentionné à l’alinéa précédent doit, à peine de forclusion, être formé dans le délai d’un mois”, and an informal administrative appeal does not interrupt that contentious deadline, still under article 696-18. In the Texas-bound case, the calendar published by the American authorities, arrival in the United States on April 21, 2026, shows a surrender executed within the system, without any public trace of a suspension obtained in Paris; had an appeal for excess of power or interim relief suspended the decree, the transfer could not lawfully have proceeded on that date.

The decree phase is also where diplomatic assurances are crystallized. France may condition surrender on undertakings from the requesting state, for instance on the penalty that will actually be sought or on retrial rights, and the administrative judge verifies legality, including compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. Practitioners treat the month following notification of the decree as the last useful window: referral to the Conseil d’Etat, application for interim suspension, and, in parallel where relevant, an application to the European Court of Human Rights for interim measures. The general architecture of French extradition, from the investigating chamber to the decree, with the guarantees surrounding the requested person and recent criminal-chamber case law from 2023 to 2026, is consolidated in the French-language guide to extradition procedure and the requested person’s guarantees. Once the decree survives review and the handover occurs, French control does not vanish entirely: the specialty principle continues to protect the surrendered person, who was warned from the first days that they could waive it, and any prosecution in the requesting state for a different earlier offence requires France’s consent unless validly waived.

II. The Three Filters France Applies Before Handing Someone to an American Court

Procedure decides how France surrenders; substance decides whether it may. Before any favorable opinion, the investigating chamber must verify the cumulative legal conditions, and it must do so of its own motion where required. Three filters dominate American requests for financial crime: the offence must be punishable on both sides with a sufficient penalty, it must not be time-barred under either law, and the requesting justice system must offer fundamental procedural guarantees. The October 2026 criminal-chamber rulings sharpen each of these controls, and the travel-agency phishing file illustrates all three.

A. Double Criminality and the Penalty Threshold in a Phishing Fraud Case

France only extradites for conduct the requesting state treats seriously and that French law also punishes as a crime or misdemeanor. The threshold rule is laid down by article 696-3 of the Code of criminal procedure: extraditable facts are, first, all acts punished with criminal penalties by the requesting state’s law, and, second, acts punished with correctional penalties by that law where the maximum prison term incurred equals or exceeds two years, or, for a convicted person, where the sentence imposed equals or exceeds two months’ imprisonment. The same article adds the French mirror, which is absolute: “En aucun cas l’extradition n’est accordée par le gouvernement français si le fait n’est pas puni par la loi française d’une peine criminelle ou correctionnelle.” Attempt and complicity follow the same regime where punishable under both laws. Jurisdiction must also fit: France may surrender any person without French nationality who is prosecuted in the requesting state’s name or convicted by its courts and found on French territory, but only where the offence was committed on the requesting state’s territory by one of its nationals or by a foreigner, or outside its territory by one of its nationals, or outside its territory by a foreigner where the offence is among those French law allows France itself to prosecute even when committed abroad by a foreigner abroad, as article 696-2 of the Code of criminal procedure provides. Nationality is itself a bar at the next stage, since extradition is refused where the requested person held French nationality at the time of the offence.

Apply that grid to the Texas file. The American charges announced are conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud and unauthorized use of an access device, federal felonies carrying multi-year maximum sentences, comfortably above the two-year threshold. The French mirror is natural: phishing employees into surrendering credentials through fake login pages, then spending other people’s money, matches the French definition of fraud, since “L’escroquerie est le fait, soit par l’usage d’un faux nom ou d’une fausse qualité, soit par l’abus d’une qualité vraie, soit par l’emploi de manoeuvres frauduleuses, de tromper une personne physique ou morale et de la déterminer ainsi, à son préjudice ou au préjudice d’un tiers, à remettre des fonds, des valeurs ou un bien quelconque, à fournir un service ou à consentir un acte opérant obligation ou décharge”, punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a 375,000 euro fine under article 313-1 of the Criminal Code. Fraudulent manoeuvres, use of false quality, inducing delivery of funds or services to the prejudice of another: each element of the American narrative has a French criminal-law counterpart, so double criminality, on the facts as alleged, presents no visible obstacle. The specialty protection completes the picture: from the first notifications the requested person is told they may refuse to waive it, and practice shows defendants routinely preserve it, as in the October 2026 Macedonian case where the Cour de cassation expressly noted that “M. [T] n’a pas consenti à sa remise ni renoncé au principe de spécialité”, in Cass. crim., October 6, 2026, No. 26-80.296. Preserving specialty means Texas could try the surrendered person only for the facts that justified surrender, unless France later consents otherwise.

B. Time Bars and Fair-Trial Guarantees Under October 2026 Case Law

The second filter is time, and it is bilateral. French statute refuses extradition “Lorsque, d’après la loi de l’Etat requérant ou la loi française, la prescription de l’action s’est trouvée acquise antérieurement à la demande d’extradition, ou la prescription de la peine antérieurement à l’arrestation de la personne réclamée et d’une façon générale toutes les fois que l’action publique de l’Etat requérant est éteinte”, in the words of article 696-4, 5° of the Code of criminal procedure. Two laws, two reference dates: limitation of prosecution is assessed as of the extradition request, limitation of punishment as of the arrest, and acquisition under either law suffices to block surrender. The Cour de cassation gave that rule teeth on October 6, 2026, quashing a favorable opinion of the investigating chamber of Colmar in proceedings at North Macedonia’s request for enforcement of an eleven-year sentence imposed by the Prilep criminal court in March 2019 for alleged trafficking of a minor committed in April 2013, with provisional arrest in November 2025. The Court restated the governing principle verbatim: “l’extradition n’est pas accordée si la prescription de l’action ou de la peine est acquise d’après la législation soit de la partie requérante, soit de la partie requise”, in Cass. crim., October 6, 2026, No. 26-80.296.

The reasoning deserves quotation because it binds every investigating chamber, including for future American requests. The Colmar court had held that prosecution was not time-barred by examining only the requesting state’s law; the criminal chamber held that “il appartenait à la chambre de l’instruction de vérifier, au besoin d’office, si, à la date de l’arrestation de l’intéressé, la prescription de la peine ne s’était pas trouvée acquise au regard tant de la législation macédonienne que de la législation française”, still in Cass. crim., October 6, 2026, No. 26-80.296, and it quashed the opinion for failure to meet the essential conditions of its legal existence, referring the case to Metz. Three practical consequences follow. First, the chamber must examine both legal systems, on its own motion if necessary, and not the requesting state’s alone. Second, it must reason with dates and provisions, not assertions: the quashed ruling had confined itself to affirming non-limitation without citing one date or one applicable article, although the underlying facts dated back to 2013. Third, the reference date for punishment limitation is the arrest, a point that structures defense strategy from day one, because the file’s chronology is frozen by coercion. In the Texas phishing file, where the American announcements describe conduct necessarily spread over time across hundreds of victim agencies, the dual-lens, arrest-anchored verification described by the October 6 ruling is exactly the control Paris had to perform before any surrender, under both American limitation rules and French prescription rules for fraud. No public element suggests limitation was an issue there, but the method is now unmistakable.

The third filter is the justice system awaiting the person. Extradition is refused “Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense”, under article 696-4, 7° of the Code of criminal procedure, and the same article excludes political offences and prosecutions driven by political purpose, offences committed on French territory, cases already finally judged in France, penalties contrary to French public policy, and military offences. For an ordinary federal fraud prosecution in Texas, with counsel, jury, confrontation and appeal, that filter raises no structural difficulty, unlike requests from systems whose courts or procedures France distrusts. Penalty compatibility can still matter in American files generally, since a punishment contrary to French public order blocks surrender, but the charges here, fraud and access-device counts, carry prison terms, not the penalties that trigger that bar. The October 2026 rulings thus leave a coherent message: where double criminality is met, both limitations verified and fair-trial guarantees intact, the investigating chamber may properly give a favorable opinion, the decree may authorize surrender, and the transfer proceeds, exactly as the April 2026 handover to Texas illustrates. Conversely, each missing verification, a limitation examined under one law only, an unreasoned opinion, a missing questioning record as in the October 7 Brazilian case, annuls the process and restarts it before another chamber.

Conclusion

The France-to-Texas surrender of April 2026 condenses the whole French law of extradition into one file: a judicial opinion preceded by forty-eight-hour presentation, counsel, detention under extradition warrant unless supervision suffices, and a reasoned decision within one month of appearance; then a Prime Minister’s decree open to a one-month administrative challenge, with handover within one month of notification failing which release follows as of right; and throughout, three substantive locks, punishability on both sides above the two-year threshold, time bars tested under both laws as of the request or the arrest, and fundamental guarantees of procedure and defense rights in the requesting state. The Cour de cassation’s October 2026 decisions confirm that none of these controls is formal window-dressing: an opinion that checks limitation under one law only is quashed, and an opinion issued without a proper questioning record is quashed as well. For anyone arrested in France on a foreign warrant, the priorities follow from that architecture: secure counsel immediately, decide on consent and on the specialty waiver with full knowledge of their irreversible effects, force the file to show its dates and provisions on limitation, and treat the month after the decree as the final forum where surrender can still be stopped. The Texas phishing prosecution will now test the American allegations at trial, where the presumption of innocence governs; the French phase already tested something else, whether surrender itself was lawful, and on the public record it passed.

📄 Official circular