The most consequential judgment still waiting on the Court’s docket is the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar over the treatment of the Rohingya, and commentary published on 12 October 2026 places the ruling on whether Myanmar’s actions constituted genocide later this year: the case brought by The Gambia against Myanmar over the treatment of the Rohingya. The merits hearings closed in The Hague from 26 to 29 January 2026, and the judges are now deliberating. When the ruling lands, it will be read in foreign ministries around the world. But it will also be read in Paris courtrooms, in asylum files, in sanctions compliance memos and in criminal complaints — because France is not a bystander in this case. On 15 November 2023, Paris joined Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in a joint declaration of intervention, and the Court ruled on the admissibility of the intervening states’ declarations in orders of 3 July 2024 and 25 July 2025. Eleven states now intervene in the proceedings.
This article explains, from a French lawyer’s perspective, what the coming judgment can and cannot change in France. Part I retraces where the case stands after six years of proceedings and why France sits at the counsel table. Part II turns to French law: who can be prosecuted in Paris for genocide or crimes against humanity committed in Myanmar and under which locks, what Rohingya asylum seekers can draw from a Hague finding, and how European sanctions and asset freezes connect to the case.
I. Gambia v. Myanmar at The Hague: the genocide ruling France helped shape
A. From provisional measures to the January 2026 merits hearings, where does the case stand?
The case is entitled Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar), and it is registered as case number 178 on the Court’s docket. The Gambia asked the Court to declare that Myanmar breached the Genocide Convention through its treatment of the Rohingya group, and it accompanied its application with a request for provisional measures — emergency orders meant to protect the group while the case moves toward a final judgment.
On 23 January 2020, the Court unanimously indicated provisional measures, and their substance sets the benchmark against which any final judgment will be read. Under the Order of 23 January 2020, Myanmar must use every means at its disposal to prevent, against the members of the Rohingya group on its territory, any act falling under the Convention definition of genocide — killings, grave physical or mental harm, living conditions designed to destroy the group in whole or in part, and measures blocking births within the group. A second unanimous measure extends the duty to the armed forces: the military, irregular units and any organization or person under Myanmar’s control, direction or influence must commit none of those acts, and neither conspiracy, direct and public incitement, nor complicity. The full order is published on the Court’s case page for The Gambia v. Myanmar (case 178).
The proceedings then moved through the written phase and a judgment delivered on 22 July 2022, after which the case advanced to the merits. The Court held hearings on the merits from 26 to 29 January 2026, with verbatim records published day by day on the case file. That sequence matters for French readers for a simple reason: at each stage, the Court has treated the allegations as serious enough to order a sovereign state to restrain its own army, to keep the case alive past jurisdictional challenge, and to devote four days of hearings to the facts. The question now is no longer whether the Court takes the file seriously. It is whether the judges will call what happened by its legal name — genocide — and what follows from that word.
The timing explains why the case is back in the headlines. Commentators now openly discuss state responsibility for the clearance operations of 2017, the continuing statelessness of the Rohingya, the violence they still face and the deadly sea crossings by which they flee. The October 2026 opinion debate focuses on whether Muslim-majority states that backed the case will act on the ruling once delivered. For France, the relevant question is narrower and more practical: Paris already chose its side procedurally, and French courts will have to live with the legal consequences of whatever the judgment says.
B. Why is France already a party to a case between The Gambia and Myanmar?
France is an intervener. Under the Court’s Statute, a state that considers that it has an interest of a legal nature in the construction of a convention at issue may file a declaration of intervention, putting before the Court its reading of the treaty provisions in dispute. On 15 November 2023, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom filed a joint declaration of intervention in the proceedings, setting out their common construction of the Genocide Convention’s provisions. The Maldives filed its own declaration, and further states followed: the proceedings are now captioned as involving eleven intervening states. The declarations, with English and French versions, are listed on the Court’s intervention page for case 178.
The intervention was contested and examined. Myanmar filed written observations on the Maldives declaration and on the six-state joint declaration, and The Gambia filed its own observations; both sets of observations are dated 15 January 2024 on the Court’s file. The Court then ruled on admissibility in an order of 3 July 2024 on the admissibility of the declarations of intervention, followed by an order of 25 July 2025 on the admissibility of further declarations. In other words, France’s presence at the table has been tested by both parties to the case and confirmed by the Court. That procedural detail carries three consequences that French practitioners should grasp now, before the merits judgment arrives.
First, an intervener has nailed its legal colours to the mast. France offered the Court a construction of the Genocide Convention — on what genocide means, on what intent requires, on what state responsibility entails — and the coming judgment will adopt, refine or reject constructions of exactly those provisions. Whatever the Court says will therefore speak, indirectly but audibly, to France’s own reading of the treaty. Second, the intervention signals how Paris wants the Convention to be understood by every court that applies it, including French courts. And third, the judgment will arrive in a French legal order that already possesses the tools to act on it: a genocide offence defined in the Penal Code, a universal-jurisdiction mechanism in the Code of Criminal Procedure, an asylum system built around the Geneva Convention, and a sanctions apparatus that freezes the assets of designated persons. Part II examines each in turn.
II. What a genocide finding changes inside French courts
A. Can French judges prosecute genocide committed in Myanmar?
Yes — in principle — and the path runs through three layers of French law: the definition of the crimes, the jurisdictional gateway, and the locks the Court of Cassation has placed on that gateway. Start with the definitions. Article 211-1 of the Penal Code provides that “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”, followed by the list of acts — killing, serious physical or mental harm, destructive conditions of life, measures against births, forcible transfer of children — and the penalty: “Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” The full text is on article 211-1 of the Penal Code on Légifrance. Next to it, article 212-1 punishes crimes against humanity: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, with the catalogue running from murder and extermination to deportation, torture, sexual violence and persecution. See article 212-1 of the Penal Code on Légifrance. Both definitions mirror the international treaties, and both carry life imprisonment — which is why an ICJ finding that acts in Myanmar fit the international definition of genocide would speak directly to the French definitions.
The gateway is article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the universal-jurisdiction provision for the gravest crimes. It states that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, listing genocide as defined in the Penal Code, other crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The wording in force was verified for this article on Légifrance: article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on Légifrance. But the same article builds three locks around the gateway. First, presence: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, assessed through a sufficient connecting link — length of presence, reasons for it, intention to settle, family, social, material or professional ties. A suspect merely transiting through Roissy airport does not qualify; a suspect living in France does. Second, prosecutorial monopoly: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” The Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor — who houses the crimes-against-humanity unit — holds the key, and must first check that the International Criminal Court has not opened proceedings and that no other court or state claims the person. The distinction matters here: the Hague court now deliberating is the International Court of Justice, which judges states, while individual criminal responsibility belongs to the International Criminal Court, whose surrender procedure from France follows a different track, described in our analysis of how France surrenders suspects to the ICC. Third, a remedy against inertia: “Lorsque, en application de l’article 40-3 du présent code, le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris est saisi d’un recours contre une décision de classement sans suite prise par le procureur de la République antiterroriste, il entend la personne qui a dénoncé les faits si celle-ci en fait la demande.” A dismissal can therefore be challenged before the Paris prosecutor general, who must hear the complainant on request.
The general framework behind that gateway is article 689 of the same code: French courts may try perpetrators or accomplices of offences committed abroad “lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction”. See article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on Légifrance. And the Court of Cassation has clarified the two most practical extensions. On double criminality — the condition that the facts be punishable where committed — the Criminal Chamber ruled on 24 November 2021, in case number 21-81.344, that “Les crimes contre l’humanité sont définis au chapitre II du sous-titre Ier du code pénal, et nécessairement commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, and therefore that “l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté.” The decision, which quashed the appellate ruling and remanded the case, is published as Cass. crim., 24 November 2021, no. 21-81.344. Concretely, a Paris complaint targeting facts in Myanmar would have to survive exactly this test: does the law of the place of commission punish an offence built around an attack on a civilian population pursuant to a concerted plan? An ICJ judgment describing precisely such an attack would not decide that test by itself, but it would hand the complainants the most authoritative factual record ever assembled for arguing it.
On complicity, the Assemblée plénière — the Court’s most solemn formation — ruled on 25 July 2025, in case number 24-84.071, that “les dispositions combinées des articles 689 du code de procédure pénale, 113-6 et 121-6 du code pénal permettent de retenir la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger.” See Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, no. 24-84.071. The two cited Penal Code provisions say, respectively, “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République” (article 113-6 of the Penal Code) and “Sera puni comme auteur le complice de l’infraction, au sens de l’article 121-7” (article 121-6 of the Penal Code). The practical reach is considerable: financing, arming, equipping or otherwise assisting atrocities from or through France, by a French national, can ground French jurisdiction even where the principal perpetrators are foreign and acted abroad. After an ICJ genocide finding, every French-linked supply chain touching Myanmar’s military apparatus would need to be re-examined — by companies for exposure, and by prosecutors and victims’ associations for opportunity.
B. What does the ruling change for Rohingya asylum seekers and frozen assets in France?
Criminal prosecution is only one of the three French doors a Hague judgment can open. The second is asylum. France recognizes refugee status through the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum. Article L511-1 provides that “La qualité de réfugié est reconnue” to three categories, including, at item 3, “A toute personne qui répond aux définitions de l’article 1er de la convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés.” See article L511-1 of the CESEDA on Légifrance. Failing refugee status, article L512-1 grants subsidiary protection: “Le bénéfice de la protection subsidiaire est accordé à toute personne qui ne remplit pas les conditions pour se voir reconnaître la qualité de réfugié mais pour laquelle il existe des motifs sérieux et avérés de croire qu’elle courrait dans son pays un risque réel de subir l’une des atteintes graves suivantes”, listing death penalty or execution, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, and, for civilians, serious individual threat from indiscriminate violence in armed conflict. See article L512-1 of the CESEDA on Légifrance.
An ICJ judgment does not grant asylum by itself — protection remains individual, and each applicant must still show personal exposure to persecution or serious harm. But country-of-origin evidence decides these cases, and there is no stronger country evidence than a unanimous or majority finding by the principal judicial organ of the United Nations that the applicant’s group was targeted for destruction as such. A merits judgment finding genocide, or even a detailed judgment stopping short of the word while documenting systematic persecution, would become the single most authoritative exhibit in any Rohingya file before the French asylum authorities and the National Court of Asylum: on the reality of the group, on the intent behind the operations against it, on the absence of state protection, and on the internal-flight alternative, which collapses when the persecutor is the state itself. Lawyers preparing Rohingya claims in France should therefore track the delivery of the judgment the way they track country-guidance updates — because its paragraphs will be cited in hearings within weeks.
The third door is economic pressure. The European Union maintains restrictive measures against Myanmar, and on 27 April 2026 the Council extended them until April 2027, as announced in its press release on the extension of the EU restrictive measures against Myanmar. Those measures — arms embargo, export restrictions, asset freezes and travel bans against listed individuals and entities — apply directly in France, and French law supplies the national freezing tool. Article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques” belonging to or controlled by persons and entities designated under United Nations Chapter VII resolutions or acts adopted under the European treaties, or acting for them. See article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code on Légifrance. An ICJ genocide finding would not automatically add names to the EU list, but it would raise the political and legal pressure for further designations — and each new designation means frozen bank accounts, blocked transactions and prohibited business relationships enforceable from Paris. Companies and banks with any Myanmar exposure should map their counterparties now; the mechanics of challenging or living under such listings from France are examined in our analysis of EU sanctions listings and how to challenge them from France.
Honesty requires stating the limits with equal clarity. A merits judgment of the International Court of Justice binds the states that are parties to the case; it does not convict any individual, award damages to any victim, or order any company to pay. Enforcement runs through politics — the UN organs, the states that pledged to act, the national courts willing to take the relay. France, having intervened to defend its reading of the Convention, will be among the states whose credibility is on the line when the judgment lands. And French courts, armed with universal jurisdiction, asylum law and sanctions tools, are among the best-placed national courts in Europe to give that judgment a practical afterlife. The Hague will speak the law; Paris can make it bite.
Conclusion
The International Court of Justice heard four days of merits argument in January 2026, eleven states intervene in the proceedings including France, and a ruling on whether Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya is expected before the year is out. For France, three consequences follow regardless of the exact wording the Court chooses. First, the criminal door stands technically open: genocide and crimes against humanity are defined in articles 211-1 and 212-1 of the Penal Code, article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows prosecution of suspects habitually resident in France at the sole initiative of the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, and recent Court of Cassation decisions — 21-81.344 on double criminality and 24-84.071 on complicity by French nationals abroad — have mapped the locks on that door with unusual precision. Second, the protection door widens: articles L511-1 and L512-1 of the CESEDA give Rohingya applicants the legal frames, and a Hague finding would supply the decisive country evidence. Third, the pressure door swings with the sanctions regime the EU extended to April 2027, implemented in France through tools such as article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code.
None of this happens automatically, and none of it replaces the political question the October debate poses to the states that backed this case. But the legal ground in France is prepared, the procedural tools exist, and the factual record is about to receive the highest judicial imprimatur available. Victims’ associations should ready their complaints, asylum lawyers should ready their exhibits, and compliance departments should ready their counterparty maps. When the judgment falls, the lawyers who have done that work will be the ones who turn a page of international law into protection, prosecution or pressure — in Paris, in French, before French judges.