On September 2, 2026, lawyers for Nicolas Maduro asked a federal judge in Manhattan to throw out the entire American criminal case against him. Their argument is as old as diplomacy itself: Maduro, they say, is the head of a sovereign state, and a sovereign cannot be put on trial by another country’s courts. The motion, filed by defense lawyer Barry Pollack before United States District Judge Alvin Hellerstein, calls the prosecution unprecedented and insists that it violates an absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction that heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have enjoyed for hundreds of years. The stakes could hardly be higher. Maduro, 63, was seized from Caracas during an American military raid on January 3, 2026, flown to New York, and has been held in a Brooklyn federal jail ever since. He has pleaded not guilty to charges including narco-terrorism, conspiracy, drug trafficking and money laundering. If the dismissal effort fails, his trial is scheduled to begin on June 1, 2027. Prosecutors have until October 2 to respond, and the judge will hear argument on November 17. From Paris, where courts have spent the last twenty-five years refining the exact same doctrine, the motion looks like a fascinating but almost certainly losing bet. France’s highest court spoke on head-of-state immunity only last year, and its answer draws a bright line that runs straight through the Maduro case: sitting leaders are shielded, ousted ones are not, and trafficking drugs is nobody’s official function.
I. Can a captured president claim head-of-state immunity in a foreign court?
A. Sitting heads of state are shielded: the near-absolute immunity rule
The starting point of Pollack’s motion is not frivolous. The principle that a sitting head of state cannot be prosecuted before the courts of another country is one of the oldest tenets of international law, treated as fundamental to diplomacy itself. The International Court of Justice stated it with full force in its judgment of February 14, 2002, in the Arrest Warrant case between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Belgium, which concerned an arrest warrant issued against an incumbent Congolese foreign minister. The Court held that throughout the duration of his or her office, a foreign minister when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability, and that no distinction can be drawn between acts performed in an official capacity and those claimed to have been performed in a private capacity. Examining state practice, the Court added that it had been unable to deduce the existence under customary international law of any form of exception to that immunity where the officeholder is suspected of war crimes or crimes against humanity. Full details of the reasoning appear on the Court’s official case page at https://www.icj-cij.org/case/121. The Court was careful to add that immunity is procedural only: the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by an incumbent does not mean impunity, because criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law, and immunity may bar prosecution for a certain period without exonerating the person from all criminal responsibility.
French law says exactly the same thing, and it said it again only last year. On July 25, 2025, the Court of Cassation sitting in full assembly, its most solemn formation, delivered a landmark ruling on the personal immunity of incumbent heads of state, appeal number C 24-84.393, published in full at https://www.courdecassation.fr/decision/68836da7c6072b5ce8fd57b5. The case arose from a Paris investigation into complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, in which an arrest warrant dated November 13, 2023 had been issued against a sitting foreign head of state. The assembly restated the foundations in terms every international lawyer should memorize. Paragraph 9 holds that criminal jurisdictional immunity derives from the sovereign equality of states, in the Court’s own words: “L’immunité pénale de juridiction procède de l’égalité souveraine des États.” Paragraph 10 continues: “Elle s’applique devant les juridictions nationales. Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale.” In plain English: immunity applies before national courts, but cannot be raised before international courts, whose statutes expressly set immunity aside. Paragraph 11 then defines the scope of personal immunity: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel.” Only three people benefit, only while in office, but for every act, private or official.
Two features of that 2025 ruling matter enormously for Maduro. First, the Court confirmed that even the gravest international crimes change nothing for a sitting leader. Paragraph 38 holds that customary international law recognizes no exception or limitation to the criminal jurisdictional immunity of an incumbent head of state suspected of international crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes, and paragraph 43 concludes that crimes against humanity and war crimes are no exception to the principle. The Court expressly distinguished the famous Pinochet decision of the British House of Lords of March 24, 1999, noting that it concerned only the functional immunity of a former head of state, not the personal immunity of an incumbent one. This continues a straight French line running back through the criminal chamber’s decision of September 2, 2020, appeal number 18-84.682, concerning complaints filed in Paris against Egypt’s sitting president, available at https://www.courdecassation.fr/decision/5fca49320668fb1db7f7e91a, where paragraph 24 states: “La coutume internationale s’oppose à ce que les chefs d’État en exercice puissent, en l’absence de dispositions internationales contraires s’imposant aux parties concernées, faire l’objet de poursuites devant les juridictions pénales d’un État étranger.” Paragraph 26 adds that the reported crime, however grave, is no exception to the jurisdictional immunity of incumbent foreign heads of state. And behind both stands the founding 2001 precedent in the Kadhafi matter, criminal chamber, March 13, 2001, appeal number 00-87.215, Bulletin criminel 2001 number 64, quoted in paragraph 24 of the 2025 ruling: customary international law bars prosecutions of incumbent heads of state before the criminal courts of a foreign state absent binding contrary international provisions.
Second, the 2025 assembly addressed precisely the weapon Washington uses against Maduro: non-recognition. Paragraph 19 of the ruling holds that a unilateral act by which a state decides to stop recognizing a government cannot affect the personal immunity of an incumbent head of state by derogating from customary international law, in the Court’s words: “Il résulte de l’ensemble de ces éléments que l’acte unilatéral par lequel un État décide de ne plus reconnaître un gouvernement ne saurait emporter des effets sur l’immunité personnelle d’un chef d’État en exercice en dérogeant à la coutume internationale.” (paragraph 19 of the July 25, 2025 assembly ruling). The United States has not recognized Maduro as Venezuela’s president since 2019, when he was inaugurated after a 2018 election Washington called rigged, and it also denounced his 2024 reelection as fraudulent. Maduro says both votes were fair and has long accused Washington of seeking his removal to control Venezuela’s oil wealth. Under the French reading of customary law, that American non-recognition would be legally irrelevant if Maduro were still the sitting president. Six American international law and criminal defense experts told Reuters that Maduro nevertheless faces an uphill battle, precisely because American courts tend to defer to the president and his cabinet on who counts as a foreign country’s leader. As law professor Chimène Keitner of the University of California, Davis, a former State Department lawyer, told Reuters on September 1, 2026. She explained that, in the rare cases raising this issue, American courts have essentially treated the executive branch’s very decision to bring charges as itself a determination that no immunity applies. That deference is the first wall Maduro must climb, and French law, paradoxically, shows both why his lawyers raise non-recognition and why American judges are unlikely to care.
B. Ousted leaders lose the shield: drug trafficking is no official function
Everything changes once the leader falls, and this is where the motion meets its second and probably fatal wall. Personal immunity belongs only to the officeholder in office. The French assembly said it plainly in paragraph 11, limiting personal immunity to the head of state, head of government and foreign minister in office, and paragraph 22 of the same ruling confirms the mirror image: the later loss of incumbent status after an arrest warrant is issued has no effect on the validity of that warrant, which means proceedings can go forward once the shield of incumbency is gone. Maduro is no longer Venezuela’s sitting ruler in any practical sense. Since his capture, his former vice president and socialist ally Delcy Rodriguez has run the country, increased cooperation with the Trump administration, and, according to Reuters, concluded an unprecedented deal under which the United States would take over around one fifth of Venezuela’s oil reserves. Earlier this year the Rodriguez government still described Maduro as Venezuela’s rightful president and demanded his return, but officials have since gone silent, ramped up cooperation with Washington, and some murals of Maduro in Caracas have been painted over. Pollack argued in his filing that it is incongruous for the United States to recognize Rodriguez, who was appointed by Maduro, while denying Maduro’s own legitimacy, and pointed to January and February statements in which her government still called Maduro the legitimate head of state. But silence since then speaks volumes. As Venezuelan lawyer Nizar El Fakih, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Strategic Litigation Project, told Reuters. In his account, the situation was hugely difficult and politically sensitive for the current authorities in Venezuela. One factor Judge Hellerstein may weigh is whether Venezuela itself still supports the immunity claim, because in upholding Manuel Noriega’s conviction, an American appeals court noted that Panama had never sought immunity for him.
The Noriega precedent is the closest American analogue, and it offers Maduro little comfort. After the United States military captured the Panamanian strongman and brought him to Miami on drug trafficking charges, a federal judge in 1990 rejected his head-of-state immunity claim in part because he never officially held the title of president. Pollack seeks to distinguish that case, arguing that unlike Noriega, the executive branch does not dispute that Maduro was Venezuela’s head of state, but merely claims that after 2019 he did not occupy the position legitimately. The distinction is clever but fragile, because American courts give heavy weight to executive recognition decisions, and Washington’s position since 2019 is unambiguous. Moreover, even if some residue of status immunity survived, only functional immunity could cover a former leader, and functional immunity covers official acts, not private criminal enterprise. Pollack asserts that the acts Maduro is accused of were part of his official duties, and the motion reported by Reuters on September 2, 2026 states that this unprecedented prosecution violates the absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction to which heads of state and foreign officials acting in their official capacities have been entitled for hundreds of years. Yet the indictment describes narco-terrorism, cocaine trafficking conspiracies and money laundering, conduct American prosecutors present as a criminal enterprise run for profit and power, not as acts of sovereignty. No court in Paris would treat drug trafficking as an act of state either: under the French Penal Code, directing or organizing a group for the illicit production, import, export, transport or sale of narcotics carries life imprisonment and a 7.5 million euro fine, under article 222-34 of the Penal Code, which punishes anyone who directs or organizes such trafficking: “Le fait de diriger ou d’organiser un groupement ayant pour objet la production, la fabrication, l’importation, l’exportation, le transport, la détention, l’offre, la cession, l’acquisition ou l’emploi illicites de stupéfiants est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité et de 7 500 000 euros d’amende.” A fast-growing global cocaine trade managed from a presidential palace may be an abuse of state power, but abuse of power for criminal enrichment is precisely what functional immunity does not protect. The combination of lost incumbency, American judicial deference to executive non-recognition, and the private criminal character of the alleged acts makes dismissal on immunity grounds a long shot, which is why the trial date of June 1, 2027 stands.
II. Can a forcible seizure abroad void the American prosecution?
A. In the United States, capture does not kill the case: wrongfully seized, properly tried
Maduro’s second line of attack concerns not who he is but how he got to Manhattan. His lawyers have raised questions about the legality of the January 3 military raid on Caracas and argue that the case should be dismissed because the seizure ran counter to the extradition treaty under which the United States and Venezuela agreed to make formal requests to hand over fugitives. On the surface the argument has intuitive force. Extradition treaties exist precisely so that states hand over suspects through legal process rather than snatching them by force. As Gary Lincenberg, a partner at Bird Marella and former Justice Department lawyer involved in related litigation, told Reuters. Bypassing the treaty in this way, he argued, seemed to defeat the very purpose of having an extradition treaty. Yet more than a century of American case law answers that intuition with a Latin maxim that has survived every challenge: male captus, bene detentus, wrongfully captured, properly detained. American judges have consistently held that a criminal defendant can be prosecuted even if he may have been brought to the United States unlawfully.
The doctrine dates to the case of a Chicago bank clerk who stole from his employer in 1883, fled to Peru, and was captured there by a private detective. The Supreme Court held in 1886 that the conviction stood because the seizure was not governed by the extradition treaty between the United States and Peru. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel expressly relied on that precedent in a memorandum dated December 23, 2025, addressed to the National Security Council, arguing that the forcible nature of a raid to capture Maduro would not imperil his prosecution, and invoking the very doctrine of male captus, bene detentus. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule in 1992 when it refused to dismiss drug cartel-related charges against a Mexican doctor who had been kidnapped and brought to the United States by Mexican nationals recruited and paid by the American Drug Enforcement Administration. Against that wall of precedent, six American experts told Reuters that similar past cases generally do not favor Maduro, and his lawyers face the same judicial reluctance that has defeated every version of this argument for over a hundred years, from a nineteenth-century bank clerk to a Central American dictator. The expected motion on the legality of the capture, announced for the same September 2 deadline, therefore looks even weaker than the immunity claim. For an international audience the lesson is stark: the United States maintains formal extradition treaties, including the one with Venezuela, but its courts treat the method of apprehension as a diplomatic problem, not a jurisdictional defect. The remedy for a violated treaty, if any, belongs to states, not to defendants. France, as the next section shows, takes almost the opposite institutional bet: it builds no doctrine for trying people its commandos seize abroad, because it does not seize them at all.
B. In France, a Maduro-style case could not even be built: narrow universal jurisdiction and extradition by the book
A French lawyer reading the Maduro file immediately asks a different question: could Paris itself prosecute a foreign former president found on French soil for drug trafficking committed abroad, or put him on trial after grabbing him overseas? The answer reveals how differently France organizes transnational criminal justice. French courts do not claim universal power over the world’s crimes. Outside French territory, they may act only where a statute or a treaty gives them competence. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states the doorway principle: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” In other words, perpetrators of offenses committed abroad may be tried in France either where French law itself applies or where an international convention confers jurisdiction on French courts. Article 689-1 then implements that treaty doorway: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” The suspect must be found in France, and the offense must be one the listed conventions cover.
Those conventions cover torture, terrorism, and a closed list of treaty crimes, not drug trafficking by foreign nationals abroad. Article 689-2 gives French courts jurisdiction over torture as defined by the New York Convention of December 10, 1984: “Pour l’application de la convention contre la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, adoptée à New York le 10 décembre 1984, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention.” The broadest provision, article 689-11, allows prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” But even that ambitious text piles up locks: the suspect must have habitual residence in France, assessed through a sufficient connecting link such as the length and conditions of presence, the intent to settle, and family, social, material or professional ties; prosecution can only be launched at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor; and no international court or other state may have requested surrender or extradition. A deposed Latin American president briefly present in Paris and wanted by Washington would fail nearly every one of those tests. Nor would ordinary French criminal law reach him: article 113-6 of the Penal Code extends French criminal law to felonies committed abroad by French nationals, providing that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République.” A personality principle that says nothing about foreign traffickers. And France would never replicate the January 3 raid. Where no treaty provides otherwise, article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the conditions, procedure and effects of extradition are governed by its chapter: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” France requests extradition through judicial channels, with review by the courts and a decree signed by the government subject to challenge before the Council of State. It does not send soldiers to seize suspects from foreign capitals and then ask judges to bless the result. The comparison is the point of this article: the Maduro prosecution is conceivable only in a system that combines worldwide substantive drug laws with the male captus doctrine, and France has deliberately built neither.
Conclusion
When Judge Hellerstein rules on the immunity motion, most likely after the November 17 hearing and well before the June 1, 2027 trial date, the smart money in both New York and Paris is on denial. The motion’s strongest card is the genuine pedigree of head-of-state immunity: the International Court of Justice, France’s assembled Court of Cassation in July 2025, and a consistent French line since the 2001 Kadhafi ruling all confirm that sitting leaders cannot be tried by foreign courts, for any act, however grave the accusation. But that shield expired with Maduro’s power. He no longer governs, his successor cooperates with his captors and has gone silent on his legitimacy, and American courts defer to the executive’s recognition decisions anyway. The fallback claim, that a forcible seizure defeats jurisdiction, runs into 140 years of American precedent holding exactly the opposite, blessed in advance by the Justice Department’s December 2025 memorandum. None of this means the prosecution is ordinary or uncontroversial. Trying a seized foreign ruler before a domestic court for conduct intertwined with his rule stretches the American model of transnational justice to its limit, and the French comparison shows there is nothing inevitable about that model: Paris would demand a suspect on its soil, a treaty conferring jurisdiction, and an extradition request, none of which exist here. Watch three dates: October 2, when prosecutors answer the motion; November 17, when Hellerstein hears argument; and every statement out of Caracas in between, because Venezuela’s own position on its former president may weigh as heavily as any precedent. Whatever the outcome, the case will be cited for decades wherever ousted rulers, immunity claims and cross-border seizures collide, from The Hague to Paris to New York.