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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Arms Exports on Trial for Genocide — and What a French Court Would Do

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Nicaragua v. Germany at the ICJ: Arms Exports on Trial for Genocide — and What a French Court Would Do

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From 7 to 10 September 2026, the International Court of Justice in The Hague heard Germany’s preliminary objections in the case Nicaragua brought against it over arms exports to Israel. Nicaragua argues that German weapons licences, worth 378 million dollars in the last three months of 2023 alone against 45 million in the first three, facilitated acts in Gaza that could amount to genocide, in breach of the 1948 Genocide Convention. Germany answers that the case should never reach trial: Nicaragua skipped the required prior negotiation, the Court lacks jurisdiction, and every export passed a review system stricter than international standards. The judges will now decide, likely within months, whether the case lives or dies before any examination of the merits. Whatever The Hague decides, the file raises a question that matters far beyond the Netherlands: what would happen if such a case landed in Paris? France prosecutes genocide and war crimes committed abroad under a universal-jurisdiction regime that its highest court has just sharpened, and it runs one of Europe’s tightest prior-licensing systems for arms exports. This article explains both trials — the one underway in The Hague and the one France is equipped to hold.

I. Can an arms supplier stand trial in The Hague for someone else’s war?

A. How did Nicaragua build a genocide case out of Germany’s export licences?

Nicaragua filed its application in March 2024, accusing Germany of aiding and abetting genocide through its military support for Israel after the Hamas attacks of 7 October 2023. The claim is unusual because neither Nicaragua nor Germany is a direct party to the Gaza conflict. Nicaragua’s answer, presented to the judges on 8 September 2026, is that both states are parties to the 1948 Genocide Convention, and that the Convention obliges every party not to facilitate genocide anywhere. According to Al Jazeera’s coverage of the hearing, Nicaragua’s counsel Carlos José Argüello Gómez told the Court that it was inconceivable Germany had been unaware of a serious risk of acts amounting to genocide, pointing to export licences worth 378 million dollars issued in the final quarter of 2023 compared with 45 million in the first quarter. The figures, drawn from German government data discussed in court, are the numerical spine of the case: sales surged precisely as the war intensified.

The procedural history matters because it already produced one defeat for each side. In April 2024 Nicaragua asked the Court for emergency provisional measures ordering Germany to halt weapons exports. Reporting by DW on the September 2026 hearings recalls that Nicaragua’s legal team tried and failed to secure that emergency order at the height of the conflict, while Germany equally failed in its bid to have the case thrown out summarily at the earliest stage. The case therefore survived its first contact with the judges without gaining interim relief — a pattern familiar to Court watchers. Nicaragua’s claim also builds openly on South Africa’s parallel genocide case against Israel, in which the Court found in January 2024 that it was plausible that some rights protected by the Genocide Convention had been violated, a finding Nicaragua invokes as the factual backdrop for Germany’s alleged knowledge of a serious risk. Readers who followed that parent case will find its French implications examined in our analysis of the South Africa v. Israel proceedings and what a French court would do with a genocide file.

Three factual concessions frame the current phase. First, Germany does not deny the volume of its exports: it is the second-largest arms supplier to Israel after the United States. Second, Berlin suspended military exports in August 2025 as casualty figures rose, then resumed them months later, citing the stability of the ceasefire arrangement between Israel and Hamas — a resumption Nicaragua presents as proof that the risk assessment was political rather than legal. Third, a German lawyer told the Court back in April 2024 that deliveries since October 2023 consisted of general equipment such as vests, helmets and binoculars, a characterisation Nicaragua disputes and which the merits phase, if it ever opens, would test against end-use evidence. None of these points has been decided. At this stage they are arguments, and the only question before the judges is whether the arguments may be heard at all.

The legal core of Nicaragua’s case is the Convention’s complicity and prevention architecture. Article III of the Genocide Convention punishes complicity in genocide, and Article I obliges contracting parties to prevent it. The Court’s case file, published on the official ICJ page for Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), frames the dispute as one about obligations owed to the international community as a whole. Nicaragua further relies on documents it says it sent to the German foreign ministry, together with public statements describing the dispute, to show that Germany was put on notice long before The Hague became involved. Whether notice plus licences equals responsibility is a merits question. The September hearings concerned only the doorway to that question.

B. How is Germany trying to close that doorway before any trial?

Germany opened the hearings on Monday 7 September 2026 with a double-layered defence: procedure first, substance in reserve. Its principal advocate, Julia Monar, legal adviser to the German Foreign Ministry, told the judges that Nicaragua had not followed the proper steps before filing and that much of the case falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction. As DW reported, her formal request was blunt: the Court should reject Nicaragua’s claims outright. The argument has two limbs. The first is that states bringing a dispute to the Court are expected to attempt to resolve it through negotiation first, and Germany contends Nicaragua was never interested in hearing Berlin’s view but simply wanted to drag it before the judges. Nicaragua denies this, pointing to its correspondence with the German foreign ministry and to press releases describing the dispute — a factual duel the Court will have to arbitrate on the papers.

The second limb is jurisdictional in the strict sense. A case in which neither applicant nor respondent is a direct party to the underlying conflict is rare before the Court, and Germany argues the dispute, as framed, does not belong there. Its representatives stressed that German arms exports are documented, published, and subject to review procedures more stringent than international requirements — language designed to show both transparency and good faith, the two qualities a respondent needs when the applicant alleges a serious risk was ignored. Al Jazeera’s account of the Monday session notes Monar’s argument that Nicaragua’s conduct showed it had never been interested in hearing Germany’s view and had simply sought to bring Germany before the Court. If the judges accept either limb, the case ends without a single witness being heard. If they reject both, a full trial on the merits would likely take years and would turn on the findings of the separate Gaza-related cases pending in The Hague, including the South Africa proceedings and the International Criminal Court’s own files.

The calendar is what makes this story urgent rather than academic. Hearings on preliminary objections typically produce a judgment within months, and that judgment will be binary: proceed or stop. A decision to proceed would keep a major Western arms exporter under genocide-complicity proceedings for years, with disclosure, expert evidence on end use, and political costs at every stage. A decision to stop would confirm how narrow the doorway to state responsibility remains when the respondent is a supplier rather than a perpetrator. Either outcome will be dissected in every capital that licenses arms exports — including Paris, where the licensing state and the prosecuting state are the same Republic, and where the courts have spent the last three years building the sharpest universal-jurisdiction case law in Europe.

II. What would a French court do with an arms-export genocide file?

A. Could France prosecute genocide committed abroad, and who could stand in the dock in Paris?

French criminal law defines genocide in terms that mirror the 1948 Convention while adding its own architecture. Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code, available on Légifrance, provides: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique ; – soumission à des conditions d’existence de nature à entraîner la destruction totale ou partielle du groupe ; – mesures visant à entraver les naissances ; – transfert forcé d’enfants. Le génocide est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité.” Crimes against humanity sit alongside it: article 212-1 of the same Code, published on Légifrance, provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, followed by eleven categories from wilful killing to extermination, torture, deportation, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts. War crimes complete the triptych: article 461-1, on Légifrance, covers offences “commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés”. Any French genocide file therefore starts from definitions as demanding as the Convention’s — concerted plan, protected group, listed acts — and any defence begins by testing each element.

The decisive French particularity is extraterritorial reach. Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on Légifrance, states: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” For genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, article 689-11, on Légifrance, goes further: “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three locks condition that jurisdiction, and each lock is a battleground: the suspect must have a habitual residence in France defined by a sufficient connecting link; prosecution requires a decision of the anti-terrorism public prosecutor; and no international court or foreign state may have requested surrender or extradition. The same article details the assessment: “Ce lien est apprécié notamment au regard de la durée actuelle ou prévisible de présence de l’intéressé sur le territoire français, des conditions et des raisons de cette présence, de la volonté manifestée par l’intéressé de s’y installer ou de s’y maintenir ou de ses liens familiaux, sociaux, matériels ou professionnels.”

Those locks were forged into usable tools by two landmark rulings of 12 May 2023, both sitting in plenary assembly — the gravest formation of the Court of Cassation. In the first, appeal no. 22-82.468, published on the Court’s official site, the judges held that “la condition de résidence habituelle, au sens de l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, qui suppose un lien de rattachement suffisant avec la France, doit être appréciée en prenant en compte un faisceau d’indices, tels que la durée, actuelle ou prévisible, les conditions et les raisons de la présence de l’intéressé sur le territoire français, la volonté manifestée par celui-ci de s’y installer ou de s’y maintenir, ou ses liens familiaux, sociaux, matériels ou professionnels.” Habitual residence is therefore a bundle of indicators, not a stamp in a passport: duration, reasons for presence, intention to settle or remain, family, social, material and professional ties. A suspect passing through for a three-month university programme, as in that case, fails the test; a suspect durably settled in France passes it. In the second, appeal no. 22-80.057, published on the Court’s official site, the plenary assembly grounded the whole regime in sovereignty — “la compétence universelle des juridictions françaises, laquelle relève de la souveraineté de l’État en matière pénale” — and clarified the double-criminality condition: “la condition de double incrimination, telle qu’énoncée dans ledit article, ne requiert pas une identité de qualification et d’incrimination.” No mirror-image offence abroad is required; it suffices that the foreign law punishes the underlying conduct in substance.

The regime is not theoretical. On 7 May 2025 the Criminal Chamber, in appeal no. 25-81.446 published on the Court’s official site, quashed a Paris investigating chamber ruling that had reversed an investigating judge and dismissed genocide charges: “CASSE et ANNULE l’arrêt susvisé de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, en date du 22 janvier 2025, mais en ses seules dispositions ayant infirmé la mise en accusation de Mme [L] du chef de génocide, toutes autres dispositions étant expressément maintenues”. A genocide indictment that a Paris court had closed was reopened by the highest court and sent back for retrial. For anyone reasoning about a French arms-export file, the lesson is direct: French courts claim the power to try foreigners for genocide committed abroad when the connecting links exist, they interpret those links broadly, and they reverse dismissals. An executive of a company that supplied weapons used in atrocities, if habitually resident in France, could face the specialised crimes-against-humanity unit in Paris; a foreign official transiting through Charles de Gaulle could, by contrast, fail the habitual-residence test — the same distinction the Court drew in May 2023. Where an extradition request competes with a Paris prosecution, the French forum’s priority rules and the bars on surrender for certain penalties shape the outcome, as explained in our guide to blocking surrender from France when the requesting state threatens irreducible life sentences, while the mechanics of arrest on international alerts are detailed in our analysis of Interpol diffusions, arrest in France and deletion remedies.

B. Could France block the weapons themselves before they leave its territory?

Prosecuting after the fact is only half of the French system. The other half is prior licensing: weapons are supposed to be stopped at the border of the decision, not at the border of the country. Article L2335-2 of the Defence Code, on Légifrance, lays down the prohibition: “L’exportation sans autorisation préalable de matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés vers des Etats non membres de l’Union européenne ainsi que des territoires exclus du territoire douanier de l’Union européenne est prohibée. L’autorité administrative définit la liste de ces matériels de guerre et matériels assimilés soumis à autorisation préalable ainsi que les dérogations à cette autorisation.” No prior licence, no lawful export outside the Union. Article L2335-3, on Légifrance, frames the instrument itself: “L’autorisation préalable d’exportation, dénommée licence d’exportation, est accordée par l’autorité administrative”, in the form of general licences or individual licences, each carrying its scope, duration and conditions. Every French arms deal with a non-EU destination therefore passes through an administrative decision that can be challenged, suspended and annulled by the administrative courts — a procedural surface that criminal complicity cases do not offer.

That administrative decision is not discretionary in the political sense alone. France applies the European Union’s common rules for controlling exports of military technology and equipment, whose Criterion Two is directly on point. The EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP requires Member States to deny an export licence where a clear risk exists that the equipment might be used for internal repression, and to exercise special caution where serious human rights violations have been established by competent United Nations, EU or Council of Europe bodies. The test is formulated in terms of clear risk assessed case by case in light of the nature of the equipment — language that advocacy groups and administrative judges can wield against a licence granted to a destination whose record is documented by UN bodies. In a French variation of the Nicaragua scenario, the fight would therefore begin before the administrative judge with an application to suspend or annul the export licence, invoking the clear-risk standard, and only later — if weapons were delivered and used in atrocities — continue before the criminal judge on complicity theories.

Complicity in French criminal law is not a loose moral judgment. It requires a punishable principal act, a material contribution of aid or assistance, and knowledge. Applied to an arms file, each element invites forensic dispute: were the delivered items capable of the uses alleged, or were they, as Germany argued about its own deliveries, general equipment such as protective gear and optics? Did the supplier know of the serious risk, and when? What did the end-use certificates promise, and what did post-shipment reality show? The German figures debated in The Hague — 45 million in early 2023, 378 million in the final quarter — illustrate how timing evidence becomes knowledge evidence: a surge in licences after atrocity reports begin is harder to present as routine commerce. In Paris, the same chronology would be built from customs data, licensing archives, corporate correspondence and UN documentation, and tested against the definitions of articles 211-1, 212-1 and 461-1 quoted above. The defence would answer with the licence itself — an authorisation granted by the Republic is a powerful fact — and with the attenuation between a licensing official, a boardroom and a battlefield. The prosecution would answer that a licence is an administrative shield, not a criminal one, and that knowledge of a clear risk can survive a signature.

Practically, a Paris file of this type travels three roads at once. Victims and associations can file criminal complaints and seek civil-party status before the specialised unit, forcing the prosecutor to decide and creating a written refusal that can be appealed — the very mechanism article 689-11 organises around the anti-terrorism prosecutor and the Paris prosecutor general. Administrative litigants can attack the licences themselves. And where suspects or witnesses sit abroad, extradition and mutual legal assistance determine whether the file lives: France does not extradite its own nationals, conditions surrender on human-rights bars, and weighs competing requests. The Nicaragua hearings show the state-to-state version of that architecture; the French system shows its individual version, with lower thresholds for opening a case and higher ones for closing it, as the May 2025 quashing of a Paris dismissal demonstrates.

Conclusion

The Hague will decide within months whether Nicaragua’s case against Germany proceeds to a full trial or dies on preliminary objections. If it proceeds, the Court will have to answer the hardest question in the law of state responsibility: when does licensing someone else’s weapons become participating in someone else’s crimes. If it stops, the judgment will map, for every exporting capital, exactly where the doorway narrows — prior negotiation, jurisdiction, the standing of a state that is not itself a victim. Neither outcome ends the underlying movement. The Genocide Convention was drafted to be enforced, South Africa’s parent case continues, and national courts are filling the space international procedure leaves open. France is the clearest example: a Criminal Code that punishes genocide with life imprisonment, a universal-jurisdiction statute that the Court of Cassation has twice sharpened in plenary assembly, a May 2025 ruling reopening a Paris genocide indictment, and a prior-licensing regime that makes every export outside the Union an administrative decision subject to judicial review. Suppliers, officials, victims and their counsel should read the coming ICJ judgment together with the French case law above — because the next arms-export genocide file may not be argued in The Hague at all. It may be opened in Paris.

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