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US Sanctions on the ICC: Can France Still Cooperate With The Hague?

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US Sanctions on the ICC: Can France Still Cooperate With The Hague?

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On 9 October 2026, the United States did something it had never done before: it placed full sanctions on the International Criminal Court itself, as an institution. Until then, Washington had targeted individual prosecutors and judges. This time, the Court as such is in the crosshairs, with its assets under United States jurisdiction exposed to seizure and a grace period of 180 days, described by commentators as a six-month window, before the core restrictions bite. The announcement landed within hours of the Nobel Peace Prize going to Navi Pillay, the South African jurist and former ICC judge, and it drew immediate condemnation from France, Germany, Spain, Japan, the Netherlands, the European Union and the United Nations.

For an international audience watching from London, New York, Dublin, Toronto or Sydney, the headlines look like a distant duel between Washington and The Hague. They are not. If you live, work, bank, litigate or run a non-governmental organisation in France, these sanctions sit at the intersection of three legal orders that all claim a piece of you: American extraterritorial sanctions, European Union protective rules, and France’s own statutory duty to cooperate with the ICC. A Paris bank that freezes the wrong transfer, a French company that cuts ties with an ICC-linked partner out of fear of the dollar, or a lawyer who stops transmitting evidence to The Hague could each break a different law while trying to obey another.

This article explains what the United States decided and why, how The Hague answered, and above all what changes in France: the Paris machinery that keeps cooperation running, the French courts’ own power to try atrocity crimes, and the European shield that forbids EU operators from simply obeying the American measures. The position defended here is straightforward. Nothing in the American sanctions releases France from its obligations, and nothing authorises a French operator to stop cooperating with the Court. But the collision of regimes creates concrete traps, and the 180-day grace period is the time to defuse them.

I. What Washington decided against the ICC in October 2026

To understand the October 2026 escalation, it must be read as the third rung of a ladder the United States has been climbing since early 2025. Each rung widened the circle of targets, and each was justified by the same argument: the Court has no jurisdiction over Americans and Israelis, and investigating them anyway is a political act. The Hague’s answer has been equally constant: the Court is an independent judicial institution created by treaty, and sanctioning judges for doing their jobs is an attack on the rule of law itself.

A. From individual designations to sanctions against the institution itself

The starting point is the executive order signed by President Donald Trump in February 2025, titled Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court. The order leaned on provisions of the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, a statute whose stated purpose is to shield United States military personnel acting to protect American national interests from ICC prosecution. That order opened the door to asset freezes and visa bans against Court officials involved in investigations touching the United States or its allies.

The door was then used. Earlier in 2026, Washington designated the Court’s president, Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, and a senior trial lawyer, Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio presented that round as part of a mission to protect Americans from a court he described as politicised and illegitimate, saying the designated individuals had directly engaged in ICC efforts to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute officials whose governments had not consented to ICC jurisdiction. The Court replied that the designations were a flagrant attack on the independence of an impartial judicial institution. It added that the measures undermine the rule of law and jeopardise the international legal order, while stressing that it would continue to discharge its mandate with independence and impartiality, in full accordance with the Rome Statute and in the interest of victims.

The 9 October 2026 move crosses a different line. According to legal analysis published on 16 October 2026, the United States sanctioned the Court as an institution, and although Washington had previously sanctioned individual prosecutors and judges, this is the first time it has specifically targeted the institution itself. The practical consequences flow from the standard machinery of American sanctions: the federal government may seize ICC assets located in the United States or controlled by United States persons, which in practice means dollar accounts, American service providers, software licences, cloud hosting and any contractor with an American nexus. Reporting on the announcement describes specially licensed exceptions, including a 180-day grace period giving the Court and its member states time to address the concerns raised by Washington, a window other commentators describe as a six-month grace period before many of the sanctions take full effect.

The political message was deliberately blunt. Secretary Rubio stated that the United States and its people are not subject to ICC jurisdiction. He added an ultimatum widely reported in the press: either the Court ends the investigations and arrest efforts he described as threats, or the United States will dismantle the Court. That framing matters for what follows, because it confirms that Washington’s objection is jurisdictional and structural, not limited to one case file. Anyone in France who cooperates with the Court should therefore assume the pressure is designed to last, not to fade after a single news cycle.

B. The jurisdiction dispute behind the escalation, and how The Hague answered

The American argument rests on a fact nobody contests: the United States signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but never ratified it, so it is not a party to the treaty that created the Court in 2002. From Washington’s perspective, it follows that the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over American nationals, and the Trump administration extends the same reasoning to Israeli nationals, since Israel has likewise never ratified the Statute. The investigations that triggered the confrontation fit this pattern exactly. In 2024, the Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, a move President Trump denounced as illegitimate and baseless action targeting America and its close ally Israel. Alongside that file sits the ICC’s long-running examination of alleged crimes connected to the Afghanistan conflict, which potentially implicates American personnel. The Court also issued or planned warrants concerning leading Hamas officials, several of them now deceased, a detail that undercuts the claim that the Prosecutor pursues only one side.

The Court’s institutional answer came in two layers. First, the legal layer: the ICC condemned the October 2026 sanctions as an attempt to obstruct the course of justice and prevent the Court from doing what 125 States Parties created it to do, calling the measures an assault on the rule of law and on the foundations of the international legal order built on the principle that no one stands above the law. Second, the operational layer: the judges signalled that the Court will keep working, keep its cases moving and keep protecting victims and witnesses, sanctions or not. That second promise is the one with the most immediate practical value for practitioners in France, because it means cooperation requests, victim applications and counsel mandates continue to flow toward Paris while the political storm passes overhead.

The timing amplified the shock. The sanctions were announced on the same day the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Navi Pillay, the South African jurist who served as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, sat as an ICC judge, and led a UN-mandated commission whose September 2025 findings on Gaza drew worldwide attention. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the new American measures as a serious blow, and the Netherlands, which hosts the Court on its territory, joined Spain in condemning them. France’s foreign ministry published its own condemnation of the new sanctions targeting the Court, standing alongside Germany, Spain, Japan and the European Union in defence of the institution. For a French reader, that alignment is not decorative. It is the political premise of the legal analysis that follows: Paris has publicly chosen its camp, and French law gives that choice hard teeth.

II. What the sanctions change in France

Here is the question every general counsel, banker, association director and defence lawyer in Paris is asking: do the American sanctions change anything about what France and French residents must do? The short answer is no on the substance, and considerably more than nothing in practice. The substance does not move because France’s obligations toward the ICC flow from treaties and French statutes that no American executive order can amend. The practice moves because American sanctions bite through the dollar, through American technology, and through the fear they inspire in compliance departments. This second part examines both sides in turn: first the French cooperation machinery that keeps running regardless of Washington, then the European shield and the concrete traps it does not automatically neutralise.

A. France keeps cooperating: the Paris machinery that serves The Hague

France is a party to the Rome Statute, as is every member state of the European Union, and that membership carries a hard obligation to cooperate with the Court in its investigations and prosecutions. At the European level, the Union concluded an agreement on cooperation and assistance with the ICC back in 2006, committing EU institutions to facilitate the Court’s work. Added to the duties that flow from hosting the Court on EU territory in the Netherlands, these commitments form the backdrop against which any French debate must take place: cooperating with the ICC is not a favour Paris does The Hague, it is a treaty obligation implemented by detailed French legislation.

That legislation lives in the Code of Criminal Procedure, which devotes a full set of provisions to cooperation with the ICC. Mutual legal assistance requests from the Court are sent, in original or certified copy with supporting documents, to the authorities competent under article 87 of the Statute, and transmitted to the national anti-terrorism prosecutor in Paris, who gives them all useful effect, under article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Execution on the ground is entrusted either to that same prosecutor or to a Paris investigating judge, both empowered to act across the entire national territory, under article 627-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Even protective measures ordered by the Court, such as the conservatory measures contemplated by the Statute, are executed on French soil at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, under article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. None of these channels requires or invites a French magistrate to second-guess the Court’s jurisdiction, and none of them is suspended by a foreign sanctions programme.

When the Court seeks a person rather than documents, the procedure tightens further around Paris. Arrest requests for the purpose of surrender are addressed, with full supporting papers, to the competent authorities, which verify their formal regularity and transmit them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal while executing them throughout France, under article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Anyone arrested on such a request must be brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent prosecutor, who verifies identity, gives the Article 63-1 to 63-7 rights, and informs the person, in a language they understand, that they will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general in Paris, assisted by counsel of their choice or court-appointed counsel, under article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Paris investigating chamber then orders surrender where it finds no manifest error, referring any other question to the Court itself, under article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The architecture is deliberate: France controls formal regularity and fundamental rights, while jurisdiction over the merits belongs exclusively to The Hague.

The machinery does not stop at arrests. When the ICC asks France to enforce its fines, confiscations or reparation orders, authorisation is granted by the Paris criminal court seized by the public prosecutor, under article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the resulting sums or property are transferred to the Court or to the victims’ fund, under article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is where the American sanctions could one day create the sharpest friction in practice, because transfers to The Hague that transit through dollar clearing or American correspondent banks may be blocked or questioned even though a French court has ordered them. The legal answer remains that the French court order stands; the practical answer is to route and document such transfers so they never depend on a jurisdiction that claims the right to stop them.

France does not only assist the ICC; its own courts can try the same atrocities when the suspects are on French soil. French criminal law defines genocide as acts committed under a concerted plan to destroy all or part of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, under article 211-1 of the Criminal Code, and punishes with life imprisonment a list of acts committed under a concerted plan against a civilian population as part of a widespread or systematic attack, under article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, while war crimes cover offences committed during an international or non-international armed conflict in violation of the laws and customs of war, under article 461-1 of the Criminal Code. Jurisdiction over such facts committed abroad by foreigners is organised by article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the universal-jurisdiction provision created by the law of 9 August 2010, which requires in particular that the suspect habitually reside in France and that the facts be punishable where committed.

The Cour de cassation gave that provision its authoritative reading in a landmark ruling of its full assembly on 12 May 2023, appeal no. 22-82.468, concerning torture, enforced disappearances and war crimes allegedly committed in Syria by members of the armed group Jaysh al-Islam. On double criminality, the Court held that the condition laid down in article 689-11, in the exact words of its reasoning, “ne requiert pas une identité de qualification et d’incrimination”, meaning it requires no mirror-image match of legal labels between French and foreign law, only that the underlying facts be punishable in the state where they occurred. On habitual residence, the Court ruled that the concept is neither a principal residence nor a permanent one, but demands more than mere transit or a stay of a few hours: it calls for stability, assessed through a bundle of indicators such as the duration, conditions and reasons of the person’s presence in France, their demonstrated wish to settle or remain, and their family ties. The full reasoning appears in Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, no. 22-82.468. A companion ruling of 1 February 2023, no. 22-82.235, added that even at the stage of a special seizure ordered during a preliminary investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity committed abroad, the investigating chamber must examine an immunity defence raised by the suspect, since a proven immunity would deprive the French courts of the universal jurisdiction granted by article 689-11, in combination with the seizure provisions of article 706-153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see Criminal chamber, 1 February 2023, no. 22-82.235. The combined message is powerful in the present context: even if the ICC were slowed by sanctions, France retains its own jurisdictional hooks over atrocity crimes, and French judges have shown they will use them. Readers interested in how states themselves react when the ICC’s membership shifts will find a useful companion in our analysis of Nauru’s withdrawal from the Rome Statute and what it means for cooperation with France.

B. The European shield, and the traps it does not automatically remove

The European Union’s answer to extraterritorial sanctions has a name: the blocking statute. As recent analysis of the October 2026 measures explains, the statute is designed to protect persons within the Union from the application of a third country’s extraterritorial laws, first by making foreign court judgments that give effect to such laws unenforceable before European courts, and second by prohibiting EU operators from complying with the foreign extraterritorial rule unless they have obtained an express waiver. The logic is simple to state and demanding to apply: a French bank, company, university, law firm or association must not give effect to the American ICC sanctions merely because Washington demands it, and a United States judgment punishing someone for dealing with the Court should find no enforcement judge in Paris.

Whether the statute formally covers the ICC sanctions depends on its annex listing the targeted foreign laws, a technical question the Commission alone can settle by updating that list, as it has done for other American sanctions regimes in the past. But several commentators argue that deploying the blocking statute for the ICC would be both wise and arguably required: wise for its deterrent effect against further escalation, and required under existing commitments, starting with the 2006 EU-ICC cooperation and assistance agreement, continuing with the duties of host states to facilitate the work of an organisation seated on their territory, and ending with the loyalty every Rome Statute party owes to the institution it joined. On that reading, all EU member states, acting jointly as ICC members facing an existential threat to their Court, carry a legal duty to protect it, and an EU-level blocking measure would coordinate national responses instead of leaving each member state and each national court to weigh enforceability alone.

That shield, however, does not make the danger disappear by itself, for three practical reasons French operators should weigh now, during the grace period, rather than after it expires. First, the dollar remains the weak point. A French bank that clears dollars, a French insurer that reinsures in New York, or a French technology company that runs on American cloud and software licences can be hurt by United States measures even when European law tells them to resist, because the cost of losing dollar access or American licences may exceed any European penalty for over-compliance. The rational response is not disobedience to either side but engineering: map every dollar or United States-person touchpoint in ICC-adjacent payments, shift Court-related transfers to euro channels, and document each step so that a future auditor, European or American, sees a deliberate compliance architecture rather than improvisation.

Second, over-compliance is the silent killer. Banks and platforms routinely go further than sanctions require, freezing accounts linked to NGOs, journalists, witnesses or counsel whose only connection to the ICC is legitimate cooperation. A victims’ association receiving Court-ordered reparations through the mechanism of article 627-17, an expert paid for testimony, or counsel receiving fees for representing a defendant in The Hague could each see transfers delayed or accounts closed by a risk-averse intermediary. Any affected person in France should treat such a freeze as a dispute to be fought, not a verdict to be accepted: demand the legal basis in writing, invoke the blocking statute’s prohibition on giving effect to the foreign measure, escalate within the bank, and where needed seize the French courts, which alone decide what is enforceable on French territory. The Cour de cassation’s 2023 case law shows French judges engaging deeply with ICC-adjacent questions; they will not treat an American designation as self-executing in France.

Third, people who work with the Court need personal protection plans. Defence counsel, victims’ representatives, expert witnesses and NGO staff who travel, publish, or hold assets across the Atlantic face a double exposure: designated-person risk on the American side, professional-duty risk on the European side if they abandon their clients or mandates. Practical precautions drawn from sanctions practice include separating ICC-related files and accounts from other business, avoiding unnecessary United States touchpoints for Court work, keeping evidence and privileged material on infrastructure outside United States jurisdiction, reviewing travel and visa exposure, and recording all cooperation as compliance with French and European legal obligations. None of this requires breaking American law from French soil; it requires organising one’s affairs so that obeying French and European law does not create needless exposure elsewhere.

Conclusion

The October 2026 American sanctions mark the gravest crisis the International Criminal Court has faced: for the first time, the institution itself, not only its office-holders, is designated, its assets are exposed, and its suppliers must choose sides. The Hague has answered with defiance, Paris and its European partners with public condemnation, and the Secretary-General with alarm. But beyond the communiqués, the legal picture from Paris is stable and should reassure anyone who cooperates with international justice from France. The Rome Statute binds France, the 2006 agreement binds the Union, and articles 627-1 to 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure give French magistrates precise orders that no foreign executive act can rewrite: receive, execute, arrest, bring before a judge within twenty-four hours, surrender where there is no manifest error, and enforce fines and reparations for victims. Alongside that cooperation channel, French courts hold their own universal jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, interpreted broadly by the Cour de cassation in May 2023 and February 2023, so that accountability does not depend on a single institution in a single city.

What the sanctions do change is the operating environment: dollar payments, American technology, anxious banks and exposed travellers. The European blocking statute exists precisely for this collision, forbidding EU operators from giving effect to the extraterritorial measures and denying enforcement to foreign judgments built on them, with waivers available for genuine conflicts. The 180-day grace period the Americans themselves granted is therefore best used as a compliance window: map exposures, reroute transfers, brief banks in writing, and protect the people who carry the cases. Courts pass; files remain. France chose The Hague’s side in public, and its statutes had already chosen it in law.

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