KOHEN AVOCATS FIRM · PARIS 16
Duterte Fit to Stand Trial: What the ICC’s 8 October 2026 Decision Means Before the 30 November Trial

Hassan KOHEN acts in urgent matters, from the police station to the assize court. Initial strategic analysis: €80 incl. VAT, personal reply within 24 hours.

100% confidential · Legal professional privilege · No obligation

Article generated by artificial intelligence, through a process designed and supervised by the firm

Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

Paris Bar Police custody, investigation, assize court CNB listing avocat.fr
Maître Hassan KOHEN, avocat au Barreau de Paris
Hassan KOHEN
Attorney at the Paris Bar

Duterte Fit to Stand Trial: What the ICC’s 8 October 2026 Decision Means Before the 30 November Trial

Speak to a lawyer 06 89 11 34 45

An 81-year-old former head of state will sit in the dock in The Hague on 30 November 2026 — provided his health allows it, day by day, hearing by hearing. On 8 October 2026, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court published its answer to the question that had already delayed this case once: Rodrigo Roa Duterte, former president of the Philippines, is fit to stand trial on three confirmed counts of crimes against humanity arising from the “war on drugs” campaign. An independent panel of experts unanimously found that he can understand the charges, follow the proceedings, grasp the evidence and instruct his lawyers — and the judges paired that finding with adapted sitting hours and continuous medical monitoring rather than a simple green light. For an international audience, the decision is the starting gun of one of the most watched trials in the Court’s history. For a French lawyer, it is something more specific: a textbook application of techniques French courts use every week — concrete verification instead of abstract trust, expertise ordered on the record, health-based adaptation of hearings, and conditional surrender. This analysis first reconstructs what the ICC actually decided in October and the nineteen-month road from a secret arrest warrant to a trial-ready case, then holds that proceedings up to the French mirror: how Paris tests fitness, how it surrenders suspects to international courts, and what its highest criminal court demanded this summer before allowing a sick person to be handed over.

I. The ICC’s October turning point: fit for trial, and a trial date that holds

A. “Fit to stand trial”: the decision of 28 September, published on 8 October

On 8 October 2026, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court made public a decision dated 28 September 2026 that settles, for the trial phase, one of the most sensitive preliminary questions in the case against the former Philippine president: whether Rodrigo Roa Duterte can actually be tried. In the Court’s own words (press release of 8 October 2026):

On 8 October 2026, Trial Chamber III of the International Criminal Court (ICC) made public its decision (dated 28 September 2026) in which it decided that Mr Duterte is fit to stand trial.

The ruling is not a comment on guilt or innocence. It answers a narrower but decisive procedural question: can the accused, today, take part in his own trial in a way that preserves every fair-trial guarantee? The Chamber answered yes, and it did so on the basis of an independent medical assessment rather than on the parties’ assertions alone:

The Chamber was satisfied that the Accused is able to effectively exercise his fair trial rights in the proceedings. The decision of the judges is based on the findings of an independent Panel of Experts as well as on submissions made by the parties and participants on these issues.

The panel’s findings were unanimous, and the Court published their substance in detail. According to the press release:

The Expert Panel unanimously found that the Accused has the capacity to understand the charges, understand the purpose and consequences of the proceedings, follow the course of the proceedings, including the nature and implications of entering a plea, understand the evidence, and instruct counsel in the preparation and conduct of his defence.

That six-part test — understand the charges, understand the purpose and consequences, follow the proceedings including the plea, understand the evidence, instruct counsel — is worth pausing over, because it shows what “fitness” means in The Hague. It is a present-tense, functional test. The question is not whether the accused was ill in the past, nor whether he will need medical care in the future. It is whether, with appropriate arrangements, he can follow a criminal trial and direct his lawyers now. The Chamber paired the finding with exactly such arrangements: it adopted what it calls necessary measures to facilitate the accused’s participation, said it will assess sitting hours on a case-by-case basis depending on the individual circumstances of the witnesses and the accused, and ordered continuous medical supervision with an immediate reporting obligation:

The Chamber instructed the Registry that the Accused’s health be continuously monitored by the Medical Officer of the Court’s Detention Centre. In the event that the Medical Officer identifies any changes in the Accused’s medical condition, such information should be transmitted to the Chamber immediately by the Registry pursuant to the appropriate procedures.

The calendar consequence is immediate and concrete:

The opening of the trial in the Duterte case is scheduled on 30 November 2026.

A fourth status conference was held in The Hague in mid-October to prepare that opening, and Philippine media reported that the prosecution intends to present its first witnesses before the end of 2026. The schedule and directions for the opening will be issued by the judges in due course. For observers, the message is that the fitness litigation — which already delayed the case once at the pre-trial stage — will not delay the trial itself, provided the medical monitoring the Chamber ordered stays reassuring.

One point of method matters for everything that follows. The fitness finding is reversible in practice: if the Medical Officer’s monitoring reports a change, the Chamber can revisit the accommodations, shorten sittings, or pause. Fitness to stand trial is a continuing condition, not a one-off certificate. That is precisely why the decision reads less like a medical verdict and more like a case-management order built around a medical finding — and it is also why comparing it with how French courts handle an accused whose health or mental state is in doubt is instructive rather than artificial.

B. From a secret warrant to a confirmed trial: nineteen months that explain the October decision

The October 2026 decision closes a procedural sequence that began in February 2025 and that already contained, in miniature, every major mechanism of ICC procedure: sealed warrant, arrest by national authorities, surrender, video-link appearance, postponed confirmation, fitness litigation, waiver of presence, and unanimous confirmation of charges.

On 10 February 2025, the Office of the Prosecutor applied for an arrest warrant against Mr Duterte for the crimes against humanity of murder, torture and rape. Pre-Trial Chamber I examined the material and found reasonable grounds to believe that Mr Duterte is individually responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator for the crime against humanity of murder, allegedly committed in the Philippines between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019. The legal threshold applied at that stage is the one set by Article 58 of the Rome Statute, which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to be satisfied that:

There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court

and that the arrest appears necessary, including to ensure the person’s appearance at trial. The Court’s case page summarises the personal scope of the allegations as follows:

Mr Rodrigo Roa Duterte, born on 28 March 1945 and a national of the Republic of the Philippines. President of the Philippines, Mayor of Davao City, Vice Mayor of Davao City, and allegedly the founder and head of the Davao Death Squad (“DDS”), at the time of the relevant conduct.

and the material scope in these terms:

Allegedly responsible for the crimes against humanity of murder and attempted murder, allegedly committed on the territory of the Republic of the Philippines between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 in the context of the “war on drugs” campaign.

Every element of those two sentences must be read with the presumption of innocence attached: “allegedly” appears twice, and the trial opening on 30 November 2026 is precisely where those allegations will be tested against the evidence. The warrant itself was issued as “Secret” on 7 March 2025 and reclassified as “Public” on 11 March 2025. What happened next is described by the Court without ambiguity:

The warrant of arrest against Mr Duterte was issued by the Chamber as “Secret” on 7 March 2025 and reclassified as “Public” on 11 March 2025. On 12 March 2025, Mr Duterte was surrendered to the International Criminal Court after being arrested by the authorities of the Republic of the Philippines in accordance with the warrant of arrest.

Three features of that transfer deserve attention from a French procedural perspective. First, the arrest was carried out by the national authorities of the territorial state in accordance with the ICC warrant — the standard cooperation pattern on which the Court depends, since it has no police force of its own. Second, the surrender followed within a day, which by international standards is exceptionally fast and explains why the initial appearance could take place as early as 14 March 2025. Third, that initial appearance was held with Mr Duterte appearing via video link, as authorised by the Chamber — an early sign of the flexibility around presence and health that would run through the entire case.

The confirmation phase then produced the first fitness episode. The confirmation hearing had initially been scheduled to start on 23 September 2025; on 8 September 2025, Pre-Trial Chamber I postponed it. The defence had requested an indefinite adjournment, arguing that Mr Duterte was not fit to stand trial. The Chamber granted only a limited postponement to adjudicate that request — and on 26 January 2026, it found Mr Duterte fit to take part in the pre-trial proceedings and rejected the indefinite adjournment, relying on the relevant legal principles, the medical assessment of a panel of three independent medical experts, and all the relevant circumstances. The confirmation of charges hearing then took place from 23 to 27 February 2026, after closing submissions from the Prosecutor, the Common Legal Representatives of the Victims and the Defence — and it took place without the accused in the courtroom:

The hearing on the confirmation of charges took place in the absence of the suspect following the Chamber granting Mr Duterte’s request to waive his right to attend the hearing.

That waiver sits in visible tension with the Rome Statute’s headline rule on presence at trial:

The accused shall be present during the trial.

The tension is only apparent: the Statute states the principle in Article 63 while the Court’s practice allows a suspect to waive attendance at specific pre-trial hearings when the Chamber grants the request, as happened here. But the episode is a useful reminder that presence, health and waiver form a single triangle in international criminal procedure. An accused who waives presence once may still insist on full participation later — and a Chamber that accepted a waiver in February can still demand, in October, positive proof of capacity to participate in November. That is exactly what Trial Chamber III did.

On 23 April 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed the charges and committed Mr Duterte to trial:

On 23 April 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all the charges comprised of three counts of crimes against humanity brought by the Prosecutor against Rodrigo Roa Duterte and committed him to trial before a Trial Chamber.

The ICC Presidency constituted Trial Chamber III on 24 April 2026, and on 27 May 2026 that Chamber set the trial opening for 30 November 2026. The October fitness decision is therefore the last procedural lock before the trial starts: charges confirmed unanimously, Chamber constituted, calendar set, accused declared fit, accommodations ordered, monitoring in place. Nineteen months after the Prosecutor’s application, the case is trial-ready.

II. Reading the case through French procedure: fitness, health and surrender

A. When a French court doubts that an accused can be tried: discernment, expertise and the functional question

France has no single statutory formula called “fitness to stand trial”. It answers the same underlying question through three connected mechanisms: the substantive law of criminal responsibility, the procedural law of expert evidence, and the judges’ case-management powers over hearings. Each sheds light on the ICC’s October decision — by similarity in some places, by deliberate difference in others.

The starting point is Article 122-1 of the Criminal Code, in the wording in force on 13 October 2026. Its first paragraph states the classic exoneration:

N’est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui était atteinte, au moment des faits, d’un trouble psychique ou neuropsychique ayant aboli son discernement ou le contrôle de ses actes.

Its second paragraph states the equally important middle case — altered rather than abolished discernment:

La personne qui était atteinte, au moment des faits, d’un trouble psychique ou neuropsychique ayant altéré son discernement ou entravé le contrôle de ses actes demeure punissable. Toutefois, la juridiction tient compte de cette circonstance lorsqu’elle détermine la peine et en fixe le régime. Si est encourue une peine privative de liberté, celle-ci est réduite du tiers ou, en cas de crime puni de la réclusion criminelle ou de la détention criminelle à perpétuité, est ramenée à trente ans.

The conceptual difference with The Hague is sharp and must not be blurred. Article 122-1 looks backwards: it asks what the person’s mental state was at the time of the facts, in order to decide responsibility and then, if applicable, the sentence. The ICC’s fitness test looks at the present: can the person understand and participate now? A French court can therefore face both questions in the same file — a psychiatric expertise on discernment at the time of the offence, and a separate medical assessment of whether the accused can currently follow the trial — without confusing them. The Duterte decision belongs entirely to the second category, and that is why its closest French cousin is not Article 122-1 itself but the procedural machinery of expertise and accommodation.

That machinery begins with Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which gives every investigating or trial court a general power to order expert evidence whenever a technical question arises:

Toute juridiction d’instruction ou de jugement, dans le cas où se pose une question d’ordre technique, peut, soit à la demande du ministère public, soit d’office, ou à la demande des parties ou du témoin assisté, ordonner une expertise.

The text matters in three ways. First, expertise can be ordered at the request of the prosecution, on the court’s own motion, or at the request of the parties — the adversarial balance the ICC struck by relying on an independent panel plus the parties’ submissions has a direct French equivalent. Second, the party requesting expertise may specify the questions it wants put to the expert, which is how fitness examinations stay focused on functional capacities rather than drifting into general psychiatry. Third, when an investigating judge refuses a requested expertise, he must do so by reasoned order within one month — a reminder that in France, as in The Hague, a fitness question once raised must be answered on the record, not left hanging.

Behind Article 156 stands the investigating judge’s broader duty under Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to have a personality inquiry conducted into every person under investigation, covering material, family and social background — mandatory in serious cases, optional for lesser offences. French procedure thus builds, from the investigation stage, a file on who the accused is and what state he is in, well before the trial court has to decide how to try him. The ICC’s independent Panel of Experts plays a comparable role at the international level: it constructs, for the judges, a reliable medical picture on which case-management decisions can rest.

Where France and the ICC converge most visibly is on outcomes. Neither system treats a health problem as an automatic stop to justice. The French trial court adjusts: it can order additional expertise, split or shorten hearings, arrange for the accused to appear by video link in defined situations, or stay the proceedings while ordering care. The ICC did the equivalent in October 2026 — case-by-case sitting hours, adapted participation measures, continuous monitoring with immediate reporting. In both systems the logic is identical: the fair-trial right belongs to the accused, and the court’s duty is to make the trial possible for him, not to choose between trying him somehow and not trying him at all. The French Code even anticipates the sentencing side of that logic: where a disorder justifies it on medical advice, the court must ensure the sentence allows adapted care. Fitness is managed, not merely declared.

B. How France surrenders suspects to an international court — and what its judges demand before handing anyone over

The surrender mechanics of this case — transfer within a day of the warrant going public, and the earlier 2 October ruling on witnesses — were examined in this site’s 5 October analysis of the Duterte surrender file; they are summarised here only as needed. The second French mirror is the surrender route itself. Had an ICC arrest warrant needed execution on French soil, it would not have travelled through ordinary extradition at all. France created a dedicated channel for the International Criminal Court inside the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its design reveals how seriously French law treats both cooperation and control.

Requests for mutual assistance from the ICC go to the authorities competent under Article 87 of the Rome Statute and are then transmitted, in France, to a single specialised recipient:

Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles.

That is Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: ICC assistance requests land on the desk of the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, who acts across the entire national territory, if necessary in the presence of the ICC Prosecutor or his representative. For arrest-and-surrender requests proper, Article 627-4 organises the next step:

Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.

Three features stand out. First, specialisation: the anti-terrorism prosecutor and the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal, not every local office, handle ICC business — the guarantee of consistent practice. Second, nationwide execution from the moment of transmission: once formal regularity is checked, the request is enforced across the whole territory. Third, urgency has its own lane, with direct transmission by any means to the territorially competent prosecutor. The Duterte timeline — warrant reclassified as public on 11 March 2025, surrender on 12 March — shows the same need for speed at the international level, achieved there through national cooperation rather than through a standing international police.

French judges do not, however, surrender blindly. The law forbids extradition outright in a series of protective cases — French nationality assessed at the time of the offence, political offences, offences committed on French territory, res judicata, limitation, penalties contrary to French public order — and, crucially for international cases, where the person would be tried by a court that does not ensure fundamental procedural guarantees and defence rights:

Lorsque la personne réclamée serait jugée dans l’Etat requérant par un tribunal n’assurant pas les garanties fondamentales de procédure et de protection des droits de la défense ;

That is item 7 of Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: no surrender without a concrete showing that the receiving court protects defence rights. The Court of Cassation enforces that demand case by case, in concreto, rather than by trusting labels — the same insistence on a real, present-tense verification that animates the ICC’s fitness test.

Two recent rulings of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation show the doctrine at work, and both speak directly to the Duterte file. On 29 July 2026, in a European arrest warrant case where the requested person’s state of health was at issue, the Court restated the governing principle and the procedure to follow:

Sous réserve du respect des droits fondamentaux de la personne recherchée et des principes juridiques fondamentaux consacrés par l’article 6 du Traité sur l’Union européenne, garanti par l’article 1er, § 3, de la décision-cadre 2002/584/JAI du Conseil du 13 juin 2002 relative au mandat d’arrêt européen et aux procédures de remise entre États membres, telle que modifiée par la décision-cadre 2009/299/JAI du Conseil du 26 février 2009, l’exécution d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ne saurait être refusée pour des motifs autres que ceux que prévoient la décision-cadre et les textes pris pour son application.

Applying the Court of Justice’s E. D. L. case law of 18 April 2023, it held that where there are serious and proven reasons to believe surrender would expose a gravely ill person to a real risk of significantly reduced life expectancy or rapid, significant and irreversible deterioration of health, the executing authority must postpone the surrender and ask the issuing authority for full information on the conditions of prosecution or detention and on the possibilities of adapting them to the person’s state of health — and must refuse surrender if the risk cannot be removed within a reasonable time, or agree a new surrender date if it can. The parallel with Trial Chamber III’s October order is striking: individualised assessment, adaptation of conditions, continuous monitoring, postponement rather than abandonment. When French chambers apply the same method inside the European arrest warrant system — whose refusal grounds are exhaustively listed in domestic law, including Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — they demonstrate that health-based case management is not leniency but standard judicial technique in surrender law.

The second ruling, dated 23 November 2022 and published in the Bulletin, concerned surrender to the British authorities under the post-Brexit EU-United Kingdom Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and it illustrates the neighbouring technique of conditional surrender. The Court approved a chamber of investigation that had made surrender conditional on the issuing state’s undertaking to apply the return-to-serve mechanism:

Selon l’article 604, b), de cet Accord, si la personne qui fait l’objet d’un mandat d’arrêt aux fins de poursuite est résidente de l’Etat d’exécution, sa remise peut être subordonnée à la condition que la personne, après avoir été entendue, soit renvoyée dans l’Etat d’exécution afin d’y purger la peine ou la mesure de sûreté privative de liberté prononcée à son encontre dans l’Etat d’émission.

The full decision — Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 23 November 2022, No. 22-86.162 — also restates the proportionality requirement for arrest-warrant cooperation, while the July 2026 ruling — Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 29 July 2026, No. 26-84.256 — is the current statement of the health-suspension doctrine. Together they describe a French surrender judge who verifies, conditions, postpones and only then hands over — never on trust alone.

That demanding posture is also the context in which France relates to the ICC as an institution. The Court currently works under extraordinary external pressure, including sanctions directed at the institution itself by the United States — pressure France has publicly opposed while maintaining its cooperation obligations, a situation analysed in the October 2026 piece on the American sanctions against the ICC and France’s cooperation framework. And the mechanics of cross-border surrender from Paris — specialty, consent, conditional handover — were examined in the analysis of the Hamburg trial surrender under a European arrest warrant. The Duterte case now adds the missing panel to that triptych: what happens after surrender succeeds, when the accused’s capacity to be tried becomes the question.

Conclusion

On 30 November 2026, Trial Chamber III is expected to open the trial of Rodrigo Roa Duterte on three confirmed counts of crimes against humanity, after an independent expert panel unanimously found that he can understand the charges, follow the proceedings, grasp the evidence and instruct his counsel. The 8 October 2026 decision does not prejudge a single fact of the “war on drugs” allegations, which remain exactly that — allegations, protected by the presumption of innocence until the judges rule on the evidence. What it does is remove the last procedural obstacle to a trial, replacing it with a regime of adapted sittings and continuous medical monitoring that keeps fitness under permanent review. Read with French eyes, the method is familiar: verify concretely rather than trust abstractly, adapt the trial to the person rather than force the person into the trial, and postpone or condition surrender and hearings rather than abandon justice. The three dates to watch now are the opening itself, the first prosecution witnesses before the end of the year, and the judges’ forthcoming directions on how the adapted proceedings will run in practice. Each will show whether the careful procedural construction of October holds under the weight of a trial the whole world will be watching.

📄 Official circular