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Vanuatu v. France at the ICJ: Who Owns Matthew and Hunter Islands?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Vanuatu v. France at the ICJ: Who Owns Matthew and Hunter Islands?

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On 1 September 2026, the Republic of Vanuatu filed an application with the International Court of Justice in The Hague in a dispute against France over two uninhabited volcanic islands in the South Pacific, Matthew Island and Hunter Island, and over the maritime boundary between Vanuatu and the French territory of New Caledonia. The Court immediately transmitted the application to Paris, and stated publicly that ‘no action will be taken in the proceedings unless and until France consents to the Court’s jurisdiction in the case.’ That single sentence is the whole story for now: Vanuatu has knocked on the door of the World Court, but France holds the key, because Paris has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. As Le Monde reported from The Hague, ‘Vanuatu is seeking to open a case against France at the International Court of Justice over two disputed and strategically important islands in the Pacific Ocean’, while ‘under court rules, the case can only go ahead if France agrees that international judges have jurisdiction over the dispute.’ The stakes reach far beyond two rocks in the ocean. Sovereignty over the islands decides who controls the surrounding territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, with direct consequences for fishing rights and seabed resources. The case also revives a decolonization quarrel dating back to Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, and it lands in Paris in the middle of a heated domestic debate over French territory in the Pacific. This article explains, from a French lawyer’s perspective, how Vanuatu’s procedural gamble works, why the precedent of Djibouti v. France matters, what the Court would examine if France ever said yes, and which rules of French domestic law already lock in Paris’s room for maneuver.

I. Can Vanuatu drag France before the World Court without Paris saying yes?

No. And understanding why is the first thing any reader of this case must grasp, because the entire architecture of the International Court of Justice rests on the consent of states. Vanuatu’s application is built on a procedural device called forum prorogatum, which is a request for jurisdiction addressed to a state that has not yet accepted it. Everything that follows depends on one letter from Paris.

A. Why Vanuatu needs France’s consent before any trial can begin

The application filed on 1 September 2026 asks the Court to decide a dispute described by the Registry as ‘concerning Vanuatu’s sovereignty over Umaenupne (Matthew) and Umaeneg/Leka (Hunter) Islands… and concerning the establishment of a single maritime boundary between the exclusive economic zones and continental shelf of Vanuatu and France (with respect to New Caledonia)’. Vanuatu seeks to found jurisdiction on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides: ‘When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon a consent thereto yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not however be entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings, unless and until the State against which such application is made consents to the Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the case.’ In plain terms, the case does not legally exist yet. It is not on the Court’s General List. No judge is seized. No timetable runs. The application sits in a diplomatic waiting room until France answers.

This mechanism exists because Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court’s Statute allows states to declare that they accept compulsory jurisdiction, ‘ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: the interpretation of a treaty; any question of international law; the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.’ France has made no such declaration in force against Vanuatu, so the compulsory route is closed and only forum prorogatum remains. The contrast with the case filling the Peace Palace this very week is instructive: from 7 to 10 September 2026, the Court is holding public hearings on Germany’s preliminary objections in the case brought by Nicaragua over alleged breaches of obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, a case that is already on the General List and already past the consent stage, as shown on the Court’s public calendar. Readers who want the full procedural anatomy of that parallel ICJ battle can consult our analysis of Nicaragua v. Germany and its preliminary objections. Vanuatu v. France is one step behind: it may never reach a courtroom at all.

France now faces three options. It can consent, in which case the case is entered in the General List and proceeds like any other. It can refuse expressly, in which case the application dies quietly and the Registry takes no further action. Or it can say nothing, which produces exactly the same legal result as a refusal, since silence is not consent. The French government made no immediate public statement on the merits of the application, which follows standard practice: states rarely answer forum prorogatum invitations in the press. They answer by diplomatic note, months later, after inter-ministerial review. Anyone describing this filing as Vanuatu suing France at the World Court is therefore getting ahead of the law. Vanuatu has invited France to be sued. France has not accepted the invitation, and nothing compels it to do so.

B. The one time France said yes: the Djibouti precedent of 2006-2008

France is not allergic to forum prorogatum. It has done it before, and that precedent is the best available guide to what Paris weighs when such an invitation arrives. On 9 January 2006, the Republic of Djibouti filed an application against France concerning the refusal of French authorities to execute an international letter rogatory in the investigation into the death of Bernard Borrel, relying on Article 38, paragraph 5, of the Rules. France answered by a letter dated 25 July 2006, and the Court’s own account of the case records that ‘France consented to the jurisdiction of the Court by a letter dated 25 July 2006, a consent given only for the purposes of the case and strictly within the limits of the claims as formulated by Djibouti.’ The Court then rendered its judgment on 4 June 2008, after first settling a sharp disagreement between the parties over the exact scope of the consent France had given.

Three lessons from that episode apply directly to Vanuatu. First, France consents when the dispute is narrow, technical and treaty-based: Djibouti invoked a bilateral mutual-assistance convention, and Paris could ring-fence its consent claim by claim. Vanuatu’s case is the opposite: sovereignty over territory plus a full maritime delimitation with New Caledonia. That is existential, not technical, and no French government can ring-fence a ruling that might redraw the map of the Republic. Second, France drafts its consent letter with a scalpel. The 2006 letter limited consent strictly to the claims as formulated, and Paris litigated the boundaries of its own consent before the merits were even reached. If France ever consented in the Vanuatu matter, which today looks unlikely, expect an even narrower letter, possibly excluding the sovereignty question itself. Third, consent is a political act as much as a legal one. In 2006, cooperating with the Court cost Paris little and demonstrated good faith toward a treaty partner. In 2026, consenting to litigate French sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter would detonate a domestic political crisis, since, as Le Monde notes, the issue is politically sensitive in France, with far-right figurehead Marine Le Pen accusing President Emmanuel Macron of seeking to give away French overseas territories. A government that consents to put national territory on the table before foreign judges would hand its opponents a ready-made campaign.

The most probable outcome, on the balance of precedent and politics, is therefore silence or refusal, followed by a return to bilateral negotiation. That is not a failure of international justice; it is how the system is designed. And the negotiation track is not empty: President Macron received Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Jotham Napat at the Elysee Palace in July 2025, and earlier this year, Prime Minister Napat accused France of colonialism over the dispute and threatened to use ‘all diplomatic and international legal means’ if discussions broke down. It was after those discussions stalled that Port Vila turned to The Hague. Filing a forum prorogatum application is often, in substance, a negotiating tactic dressed in judicial robes: it raises the cost of the status quo for the other side and creates a deadline for talks. Whether Paris reads it that way will determine everything that happens next.

II. If France accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, what would the judges actually decide?

Assume for a moment that Paris surprises everyone and consents. The case would then become one of the most significant territorial and maritime disputes before the Court in years, combining a sovereignty title contest over two islands with a request for a single maritime boundary covering both the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. Here again, a French lawyer’s view of the file is distinctive, because French domestic law itself narrows what any French government can concede, and French courts have built a dense body of case law on how foreign sovereignty claims are treated in France.

A. Two volcanic islands, one colonial history, and a maritime jackpot

The geography is simple and the history is not. Matthew Island and Hunter Island are ‘volcanic islands’ lying ‘several hundred kilometers east of the French overseas territory of New Caledonia’, each ‘less than a square kilometre in size’. Nobody lives there. But ‘although these islands are uninhabited, sovereignty over Matthew and Hunter allows New Caledonia, and therefore France, to have a large exclusive economic zone.’ That sentence explains why two uninhabited rocks can sustain a decades-long dispute: under the law of the sea, land dominates the sea, and whoever owns the land draws a 12-mile territorial sea around it, plus, if the feature legally qualifies as an island, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf with exclusive rights over fish, minerals, hydrocarbons and marine scientific research.

Vanuatu’s claim is rooted in decolonization. The archipelago lived under joint British and French rule until Vanuatu’s independence in 1980, and Port Vila argues that its independence remains unfinished business. Vanuatu ‘has previously staked a claim to the islands on cultural and historical grounds, saying that the people in the south of Vanuatu have long-standing ties to the islets’, and its prime minister has framed the dispute openly as a colonial legacy. France, for its part, treats the islands as French territory administered from New Caledonia, a position it has maintained continuously, and Paris rejects any suggestion that it is preparing to give them up. Before the Court, this would become a classic title confrontation: Vanuatu invoking succession to colonial boundaries and the principle that decolonization must preserve the territorial integrity of the new state, against France invoking continuous and peaceful administration, or effectivites, over decades. International judges weighing such claims examine colonial instruments, maps, diplomatic correspondence, legislative acts incorporating the islands into French administration, and any evidence of protest or acquiescence by the other side. Vanuatu’s decades of uninterrupted protest since 1980 help its case on acquiescence, while France’s continuous administration helps its own. Neither side would arrive empty-handed.

The legal regime of the features themselves would form a second battlefield. Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that ‘An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.’ Such an island generates the full suite of maritime zones. But paragraph 3 adds the famous restriction: ‘Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.’ Matthew and Hunter are uninhabited volcanic formations. If the Court classified them as rocks within the meaning of paragraph 3, they would generate only a territorial sea and a contiguous zone, and the vast EEZ and shelf claims around them would collapse for whichever state owns them. If instead they qualified as full islands, the owner would gain enormous maritime space facing New Caledonia. International jurisprudence on paragraph 3 is demanding: tribunals have required objective capacity to sustain habitation or economic life, not mere potential or the presence of a lighthouse. Volcanic, waterless, uninhabited features are precisely the type of territory that struggles to pass that test. Paradoxically, this means Vanuatu’s sovereignty claim and its maritime ambitions could pull in opposite directions: winning the islands but losing the EEZ if the features are rocks, a result France might quietly prefer to losing both.

French domestic law then locks the French position from the inside, and this is the point foreign commentators most often miss. Article 53 of the French Constitution provides that treaties or agreements ‘ceux qui comportent cession, échange ou adjonction de territoire, ne peuvent être ratifiés ou approuvés qu’en vertu d’une loi’, and adds the categorical safeguard that ‘Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n’est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées.’ Any settlement transferring Matthew and Hunter to Vanuatu would therefore require an act of Parliament and, arguably, the consent of the populations concerned, which in practice means the inhabitants of New Caledonia, who have already voted three times on their institutional future. No French president can trade these islands over a handshake. The maritime dimension is equally fenced in by statute. France’s exclusive economic zone rests on Law No. 76-655 of 16 July 1976 on the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone and the ecological protection zone off the coasts of the territory of the Republic, and its territorial sea on Law No. 71-1060 of 24 December 1971 on the delimitation of French territorial waters, while the seabed and foreshore belong to the inalienable maritime public domain, since “Le domaine public maritime naturel de L’Etat comprend : 1° Le sol et le sous-sol de la mer entre la limite extérieure de la mer territoriale et, côté terre, le rivage de la mer.” The same code locks the system shut: “Les biens des personnes publiques mentionnées à l’article L. 1 , qui relèvent du domaine public, sont inaliénables et imprescriptibles.” And it adds that “Les biens du domaine public sont utilisés conformément à leur affectation à l’utilité publique. Aucun droit d’aucune nature ne peut être consenti s’il fait obstacle au respect de cette affectation.” These texts do not decide who owns Matthew and Hunter, but they explain why Paris cannot treat the file as a minor diplomatic irritant: the islands anchor a whole architecture of French maritime sovereignty in the Pacific, and dismantling it would require the full legislative apparatus of the Republic.

Finally, the delimitation request itself would be governed by Article 74 of the Convention, which directs that ‘The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.’ Agreement first, adjudication second: that hierarchy is exactly why the 2018, 2019 and 2025 negotiation rounds matter legally, not just diplomatically. A court seized of the delimitation would ask whether the parties genuinely attempted agreement, whether provisional arrangements were respected, and what equitable result the coastal geography commands between Vanuatu’s islands and New Caledonia’s eastern coast. The fishermen, shipowners and energy companies operating in those waters should understand that until a boundary is fixed by agreement or judgment, every exploration permit and every boarding at sea sits on a contested legal foundation.

B. What France would test before any judge: immunity, treaties, and the enforcement record

Suppose the case proceeds. France would arrive in The Hague with a litigation culture forged in its own courts, where judges handle foreign sovereignty claims every week and have developed precise tools for them. Three strands of French case law illuminate how Paris thinks about state sovereignty when it meets a courtroom, and each would shape the French defense strategy.

The first strand is the immunity of the foreign state from enforcement. In a judgment of 3 February 2021, the First Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled in the long-running Commisimpex litigation against the Republic of Congo, appeal No. Q 19-10.669 against the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 6 September 2018, a decision reported at the Court’s official record of the 3 February 2021 ruling. In the same line, on 3 November 2021, the same chamber decided the Rasheed Bank affair, appeal No. F 19-25.404 against the Paris judgment of 17 October 2019, concerning a conservatory seizure converted into attachment against an entity described in the proceedings as an emanation of the Iraqi state, under the rules on immunity of execution derived from the United Nations Convention of 2 December 2004, as recorded in the official record of the 3 November 2021 ruling. The through-line is consistent: French courts protect foreign state assets with a high threshold, requiring proof that seized property serves private purposes before enforcement is allowed. Transposed to Vanuatu, the message is that France treats sovereignty as a shield that courts must handle with restraint, and Paris would demand the same restraint from the World Court regarding its own territorial title.

The second strand is the immunity of jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments against states. On 28 June 2023, the First Civil Chamber decided the case of an American claimant seeking to enforce in France a 1998 judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Islamic Republic of Iran, appeal No. U 21-19.766 against the Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 16 March 2021, documented in the official record of the 28 June 2023 ruling. The Court of Cassation’s handling of that file shows how French judges reconcile comity toward foreign judgments with the customary rule of state immunity, refusing to turn France into an enforcement machine for other countries’ confrontations with sovereign states. For the Vanuatu dispute, the parallel is instructive: just as France declines to let its courts become the enforcement arm of foreign sovereign disputes, it will decline to let an international court redraw its Pacific boundaries without its consent. Sovereignty, in the French judicial tradition, is not a technicality to be routed around; it is the starting point of the analysis.

The third strand is the constitutional rank of treaties, which cuts in the other direction and explains why France takes The Hague seriously even when it refuses jurisdiction. Article 55 of the Constitution states that ‘Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve, pour chaque accord ou traité, de son application par l’autre partie.’ France has ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Charter containing the Statute of the Court, so both instruments outrank ordinary French statutes in the domestic hierarchy. Paris cannot dismiss the Convention’s delimitation rules or the Court’s authority as foreign law of lesser rank; they are part of French law itself. That is precisely why France litigates at The Hague with exceptional care when it does consent, as it did against Djibouti, and why a refusal in the Vanuatu case would be framed as an exercise of the sovereign right the Court’s own Statute protects, not as contempt for international law. The distinction matters for businesses and shipowners: French maritime enforcement in the Pacific, from fisheries inspections to seabed permits, continues under domestic law regardless of the ICJ application, and operators should comply with French requirements in the disputed zone while monitoring the diplomatic track, rather than betting on a Court case that does not yet exist.

One recent signal confirms that French courts remain fully engaged with the boundary between international justice and immunity. On 25 July 2025, the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly quashed an investigating chamber’s annulment order in criminal proceedings opened on complaints of crimes against humanity and war crimes arising from chemical attacks in Syria, appeal No. C 24-84.393, as shown in the official record of the 25 July 2025 plenary ruling. The message for international observers is that France asserts its own courts’ jurisdiction over the gravest international crimes while policing immunities through strict procedure. A state that prosecutes universal-jurisdiction cases at home is not a state hostile to international courts; it is a state confident enough in its own legal order to choose, case by case, where each dispute belongs. Vanuatu’s invitation will be assessed through exactly that lens in Paris: does this dispute belong in The Hague, or at the bilateral negotiating table where Articles 74 and 83 of the Convention say delimitation should begin?

Conclusion

The most likely ending of Vanuatu v. France is also the quietest: no French consent, no entry in the General List, no trial, and a return to bilateral talks under the shadow of The Hague. That would not mean Vanuatu miscalculated. By filing a forum prorogatum application at the exact moment when negotiations were declared deadlocked, Port Vila has converted a slow bilateral irritant into a time-pressured file on the French government’s desk, with worldwide press coverage and a legal time bomb that detonates the day Paris signs any consent letter. France, for its part, holds strong cards: continuous administration, a demanding Article 121 test for uninhabited volcanic features, and a Constitution that makes any territorial concession a parliamentary and popular decision rather than an executive gift. But Paris also pays a price for silence, measured in Pacific diplomacy, where small island states watch closely how the former colonial powers treat decolonization claims, and in credibility, since a champion of the law of the sea cannot indefinitely refuse the very procedures that law provides. Watch three signals in the coming months: any French diplomatic note answering the application, any movement toward a fourth round of bilateral talks, and any provisional arrangement for fisheries or scientific research in the disputed waters, since interim cooperation is what Article 74 expects pending final delimitation. If none of these move, the file will sleep in the Registry’s waiting room, legally nonexistent but politically alive. Our broader coverage of how ICJ cases live or die after filing, including what happens when states ignore the Court, continues in our dossier on South Africa v. Israel and the non-compliance question at the ICJ.

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