On 16 September 2026, the General Court of the European Union, Fourth Chamber, handed down two judgments that every person with frozen funds in France should read together. In Trotsenko v Council, T-459/24, the Court dismissed in full the challenge of a Russian businessman listed as a revenue-sector operator. In Gagarina v Council, T-460/24, delivered the same day by the same chamber, the Court upheld the singer Polina Gagarina’s initial listing as a propaganda supporter, then annulled her March 2025 and September 2025 relistings because the Council’s evidence had gone stale. One applicant loses everything; the other wins half her case on a single evidentiary point.
The pair is the clearest practical guide published this year to how Luxembourg reviews Russia sanctions. An EU listing freezes everything at once: Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 imposes a total freeze: all funds and economic resources of listed persons “shall be frozen,” with a matching ban on making any funds available to them. Bank accounts in Paris, a flat in the 16th arrondissement, dividends from a French company: all frozen, all at once. Yet Gagarina shows the one fault line that works: the Council must prove, with current evidence, that the listing reason is still true at the date of each renewal. Our office handles these files in Paris every week, and this piece reflects that daily practice.
I. Why the EU General Court Upheld One Russia Listing and Annulled Another on the Same Day
The rulings land in a crowded week for sanctions news, alongside the court decision covered in our companion piece on the Abramovich ruling and the political fight over the September renewal round described in our analysis of the seven-day truce that kept 3,000 EU Russia listings alive. Both cases arose from the same round of listings. On 24 June 2024 the Council added both applicants to the Russia sanctions lists, then maintained them in September 2024, March 2025 and September 2025. Both brought annulment actions under Article 263 TFEU, both were heard by the same chamber, both judgments were delivered on 16 September 2026. Yet the outcomes diverge sharply, because the two applicants were listed under different criteria and the Council’s evidence aged very differently in each file.
A. Trotsenko Loses Everything: How the Businessperson Revenue Criterion Now Works
Roman Trotsenko was listed as a “leading businessperson operating in Russia,” with documented interests in iron ore and steel, coal, infrastructure and energy companies. The Council’s reasons added that he advised Rosneft chief Igor Sechin, founded and co-owned the AEON Corporation investment group, directed Geopromining Investment, and controlled businesses such as Vorkutagol JSC operating in sectors that fund the Russian Government, making his role one of material support to the government responsible for the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Ukraine.
The legal hook was Article 2(1)(g) of Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Article 3(1)(g) of Regulation No 269/2014, in the version as amended in 2023. The judgment explains that the amended criterion has two relevant prongs: the freezing of assets belonging to leading businesspersons operating in Russia, and the freezing of assets belonging to businesspersons, legal persons, entities or bodies involved in economic sectors providing a substantial source of revenue to the Russian Government. Trotsenko attacked both prongs, and lost on each. The Court first rejected his plea of illegality against the criterion itself, holding that targeting operators in revenue-providing sectors serves the legitimate objective identified since the Rosneft case-law, namely raising the cost to Moscow of its campaign against Ukrainian sovereignty, and recalling that the EU legislature had deliberately widened the net over time so as to catch “an increasingly wide circle of persons.”
The most dangerous passage for future applicants concerns the Council’s recital describing a mutual support relationship between the Russian Government and leading businesspersons, noting that Moscow systematically let prominent businessmen accumulate wealth through natural and other public resources. The Court accepted this interdependence logic as the policy justification for covering leading businesspersons across every sector of the Russian economy, while adding that other businesspersons may be listed where they operate in sectors that fund the government, so as to squeeze Moscow toward ending its war of aggression against Ukraine. In practice, once the Council places an applicant inside a revenue sector, the listing criterion is treated as a policy instrument, and the Court will not second-guess the policy.
Trotsenko then argued he was not even a businessperson of any significance and that his sectors did not fund the government. The Court answered with two definitional rulings that will be cited in every future case. First, the word businesspersons does not cover every small trader; it targets those pursuing a “non-negligible economic activity,” assessed qualitatively or quantitatively. A marginal trader is safe; anyone running real industrial assets is not. Second, on the word substantial, the Court held that the revenue source must be “significant and therefore not negligible.” Iron ore, steel, coal and energy plainly qualify. The applicant’s documented interests in AEON Corporation, Vorkutagol and energy holdings, combined with his advisory role to the head of Rosneft, left no room for doubt, and the Court validated the Council’s assessment of the evidence file by file, including working documents and open-source business data.
The remaining pleas collapsed in the same way. The rights of the defence were respected because the Council disclosed the evidence files and heard the applicant’s observations before the maintenance acts. The duty to state reasons was satisfied because each listing identified the sectors, the companies and the roles precisely enough for the applicant to understand and contest them. Proportionality and the right to property failed because asset freezes are temporary, reversible and subject to derogations, a reasoning the Court has repeated for a decade. The operative part is brutally short: the Court “Dismisses the action” and orders the applicant to pay the costs. For businesspeople, the message is that criterion (g) is now a nearly self-sufficient listing machine: show real industrial assets in a revenue sector, and the Council wins.
B. Gagarina Wins Half Her Case: Why Stale Evidence Kills a Relisting
Polina Gagarina was listed under a different criterion: Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2014/145 and Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation No 269/2014, covering persons supporting actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The statement of reasons described her as a Russian singer, actress, songwriter and model who performed regularly at “State propaganda events,” for example celebrations of the illegal annexation of Ukrainian regions or of the Crimea anniversary, and who had earned significant revenue from frequent state-sponsored appearances since the start of the war.
On the initial June 2024 listing, the Council won convincingly. The evidence file documented a pattern of performances at state propaganda events across several years, and the Court concluded that the Council had proved, to the required legal standard, regular participation in events promoting Russian state propaganda. The September 2024 maintenance was upheld on the same evidence, expressly because barely three months separated it from the initial listing, so the Council committed no error of assessment in treating the applicant as still supporting the targeted actions. A three-month gap keeps the same file probative. Remember that time logic; it is the hinge of the whole case.
The applicant’s fundamental-rights pleas were rejected with reasoning that will disappoint artists and journalists. The Court recalled that freedom of the arts, protected through Articles 11 and 13 of the Charter, is no unfettered prerogative and may be limited under Article 52(1), citing the RT France precedent. It then held that sanctions stay “temporary and reversible,” pointing to the six-month review cycle under Article 6 of Decision 2014/145, and leave the artist free to record and stream her music worldwide, closing “only one channel,” namely concerts inside the European Union, a territory she may not enter. The conclusion is explicit: the initial and September 2024 listings infringed neither her expression nor her art. Sanctions that silence an artist inside the Union remain lawful where the listing itself is justified.
Then came the turn. For the March 2025 and September 2025 maintenances, the Court examined the dates and found a hole: the latest documented propaganda appearance was “the concert of 18 March 2024” in Red Square. No later appearance was documented anywhere in the file. A full year separated that concert from the March 2025 renewal, and eighteen months from the September 2025 renewal. The Court therefore held that the evidence failed to show conduct “still of a regular nature” at the adoption dates, and could not sustain the reasons for the March and September 2025 acts. The operative part follows: the Court annuls the March 2025 and September 2025 Decisions and Implementing Regulations in so far as they concern Ms Polina Sergeevna Gagarina, “Dismisses the action as to the remainder,” and orders each party to bear its own costs.
Three nuances limit the victory, and each matters for strategy. First, the June 2024 and September 2024 listings stand, so the initial freeze was lawful and no damages flow automatically. Second, the annulment covers only the period from 16 March 2025 to 15 March 2026, and the Court expressly noted that the annulment leaves untouched Decision 2026/696, outside the scope of the action, the March 2026 act that maintained the applicant until September 2026. A winning applicant who is immediately relisted must sue again. Third, the Council’s request to freeze the temporal effects of the annulment was rejected as devoid of purpose precisely because the new listing already existed. Gagarina is therefore a precedent about method, not an exit ticket: it forces the Council to refresh its evidence for every renewal, and it gives every listed person a concrete question to put to the file: what recent, dated evidence proves the criterion is still met today.
II. What the Two Judgments Change for Listed Persons With Frozen Assets in France
France is where many of these cases bite: Paris bank accounts, French companies, French real estate, children at French schools whose fees suddenly cannot be paid. EU regulations apply directly in France, so a Luxembourg listing freezes Paris assets overnight without any French decree. But France also provides the daily machinery of the freeze, through its banks, its Treasury administration and its courts, and the two September judgments change how a Paris-based defence should be built. The first half of this part explains the Luxembourg challenge route as it works from France; the second explains how to live under, and loosen, a freeze inside the French system.
A. How to Challenge an EU Listing From France Before the Luxembourg Courts
The only court that can annul an EU listing is the General Court in Luxembourg, seised by an action under Article 263 TFEU. The time limit is strict and short: Article 263 TFEU gives applicants two months from publication, notification or knowledge of the measure. Miss the two months and that listing becomes unchallengeable for the period, which is why our first reflex on any new file is to calendar every renewal the day it publishes in the Official Journal. Each six-month renewal is a new act and opens a new two-month window, so a person who missed 2024 can still attack the March or September 2025 maintenance, exactly as Gagarina did. The two judgments also confirm that the EU courts exercise full review of the lawfulness of EU acts, meaning the Council gets no deference on whether its evidence actually proves the listing reason.
Gagarina teaches the winning structure of such an action. Attack the statement of reasons first: demand the evidence file, check every exhibit’s date, and test whether the file proves present conduct or merely past conduct. For an initial listing, a multi-year pattern can suffice. For a maintenance adopted a year later, the Council needs something fresh, and the judgment draws the line in plain terms: three months after the initial listing, the same file still works; twelve to eighteen months later, without a single new event, it does not. Trotsenko teaches the complementary lesson: do not waste the action on abstract attacks against the criterion itself. His plea of illegality against criterion (g) failed because the Court treats the revenue-sector logic as legitimate policy backed by the Rosneft case-law, and his factual denial failed because industrial holdings in coal, steel and energy are documented in public and commercial records the Council is entitled to use.
From France, two practical points complete the picture. First, interim relief matters more than most applicants realise: funds frozen in Paris do not wait two years for a judgment, so counsel should systematically assess an application for suspension and for an expedited procedure alongside the main action, supported by proof of concrete harm in France, such as a blocked company payroll or a forced sale. Second, French courts remain relevant at the margins. National measures implementing the freeze, such as a bank’s refusal to execute a transfer or an administrative instruction, can be challenged before the French administrative courts, which may refer a validity question to Luxembourg. The French administrative case-law on national freezes is instructive here by contrast: in a May 2023 ruling on a ministerial asset freeze, the Paris administrative court of appeal held that renewal requires only that the conditions of Article L. 562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code remain satisfied, and I quote, “sans que ce dernier ne soit subordonné à l’existence d’éléments nouveaux ou complémentaires par rapport à ceux ayant justifié la précédente mesure de gel” adding that “l’écoulement du temps est par lui-même sans incidence sur les motifs” That is the opposite of the Gagarina rule, and the difference is jurisdictional: French judges reviewing a French ministerial freeze accept continuity, as the Paris court of appeal confirmed in CAA Paris, 17 May 2023, No 22PA03405, while Luxembourg judges reviewing an EU relisting demand currency. A Paris defence must therefore run on both tracks without confusing them. For readers facing the distinct but related problem of establishing who really owns or controls frozen property, our guide on rebutting the control presumption completes this section.
B. How to Obtain Releases and Live Under a Freeze Inside the French System
While the Luxembourg action runs, life continues in Paris, and EU law provides safety valves that French banks apply every day. Article 4 of Regulation No 269/2014 lets national authorities release frozen funds for the “basic needs” of the listed person and dependent family members, covering food, rent or mortgage, medicines, taxes, insurance and utility bills, or for counsel fees and legal expenses. In France, these requests are handled through the minister for the economy and the Treasury administration, and they succeed when they are documented like a loan application: French tax notices, the Paris lease, school invoices, medical bills, and a detailed counsel fee agreement. Legal fees deserve emphasis because they are expressly covered: a listed person is entitled to pay lawyers to challenge the listing, and a bank that blocks counsel fees without a Treasury authorisation request is misapplying the Regulation.
The French enforcement machinery explains why banks behave so cautiously. Article L. 562-4 of the Monetary and Financial Code provides that banks and other obliged entities are “tenus d’appliquer sans délai les mesures de gel” must apply freezes without delay, and must immediately inform the minister for the economy. The persons concerned are broad: Article L. 561-2 subjects banks, insurers, accountants, notaries and many other professionals to the anti-money-laundering and freeze obligations, which is why a listed person’s notary will refuse to complete a Paris sale and the buyer’s bank will freeze the price. The definitions are equally wide: Article L. 562-1 defines funds and economic resources to include cash, deposits, savings products, insurance contracts, receivables and financial instruments, so virtually nothing of value escapes. National ministerial freezes add a second layer: Article L. 562-2 allows the economy and interior ministers to freeze jointly for six months renewable in terrorism cases, while Article L. 562-3 allows the economy minister to freeze, again for six months renewable, the assets of persons designated under UN or EU acts. All such decisions are enforceable from publication, as Article L. 562-9 confirms.
Three French procedural reflexes flow from this framework. First, when a Paris bank freezes without showing a designation, demand the exact legal basis in writing: an EU Annex I listing, a French ministerial order, or nothing, and the answer dictates the remedy. Second, never accept a verbal refusal for a basic-needs or legal-fee release; file a written Article 4 request with full supporting documents so the bank must transmit it and the administration must answer. Third, if a French authority issues or renews a national freeze, remember the Paris case-law asymmetry: the administration needs no new facts to renew, but it must respect the adversarial principle at the renewal stage, since the courts hold that renewal “doit, en principe, être précédée d’une procédure contradictoire,” and must state full reasons, because Article L. 211-2 of the Code of Relations between the Public and the Administration requires every unfavourable individual decision to be reasoned, while Article L. 121-1 subjects reasoned decisions to a prior hearing. Costs follow the outcome: Article L. 761-1 of the Administrative Justice Code governs costs orders in these proceedings. The full reasoning of the leading Paris precedent is published at CAA Paris, 17 May 2023, No 22PA03405, and any Paris practitioner should keep it next to the two Luxembourg judgments on the same desk.
Conclusion
The 16 September 2026 double ruling redraws the litigation map for Russia sanctions in a way that favours prepared applicants and punishes passive ones. Trotsenko confirms that the businessperson revenue criterion is now almost impregnable where the Council documents real industrial assets in coal, steel, energy or infrastructure: abstract attacks on the criterion fail, factual denials fail against commercial records, and rights-based pleas fail against temporary, reversible measures with derogations. Gagarina confirms the mirror image: the propaganda-support criterion is conduct-based, and conduct must be proved as of the date of each renewal, so a file whose latest event is eighteen months old cannot sustain a relisting. The practical synthesis is a two-line checklist for every listed person with French assets. First, calendar each renewal and sue each maintenance within two months, aiming the action at the freshness of the evidence rather than the fairness of the policy. Second, work the French track in parallel: Article 4 releases for living and legal costs, written demands to banks, and administrative challenges to any national measure, using the Paris courts’ own renewal case-law. Sanctions litigation is a rolling six-month war, and after 16 September the side with the fresher file wins.