On 24 July 2026, in New York, the states that built the International Criminal Court did something they had never done before: they fired their own prosecutor. By secret ballot, an absolute majority of 82 States Parties found that Karim Khan had committed serious misconduct and a serious breach of duty, and removed him from office under Article 46 of the Rome Statute. Two months later, the chair is still empty. The Assembly of States Parties has yet to announce a timetable for nominations or an election, while the two Deputy Prosecutors run the Office of the Prosecutor on an interim basis, as they have done since Khan took leave in May 2025 and was suspended on 8 June 2026. And yet the machine keeps moving: Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all charges against former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte on 23 April 2026 and set his trial to open on 30 November 2026, prosecutors presented the case against Libyan prison chief Khaled El Hishri at a confirmation hearing in mid-September 2026, and a verdict was delivered in September 2026 in the case of Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, whom France surrendered to The Hague. For anyone facing an ICC arrest warrant, advising a client named in an ICC case, or simply trying to understand whether the Court can still order arrests while it has no chief prosecutor, the answer matters enormously. This analysis explains how the removal happened, who really prosecutes now, and what France must still do when The Hague calls: arrest within hours, transfer to Paris within days, and surrender after a tightly framed judicial review.
I. Why the ICC removed Prosecutor Karim Khan and who runs the trials now
A. How 82 states sacked a sitting prosecutor under Article 46 of the Rome Statute
The decision fell on 24 July 2026, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, where the Assembly of States Parties held a special session on disciplinary proceedings involving an elected official. The Assembly adopted a decision, by secret ballot, by an absolute majority of 82 States Parties, finding that Mr. Karim Khan committed serious misconduct and serious breach of duty and removed him from office under Article 46 of the Rome Statute. The Presidency of the Assembly added a call for due respect for the privacy and the rights of all parties concerned. The Court itself, in its statement of 24 July 2026, took note of the decision, repeated that the Prosecutor had been found to have committed serious misconduct and serious breach of duty, and likewise called for respect for the privacy and rights of everyone involved.
Removal under Article 46 is the heaviest weapon the Rome Statute gives the states against their own elected officials, and it had never been used against a prosecutor. The procedure sits at the opposite end of the appointment mechanism: under Article 42 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the Assembly, and the same majority logic governs removal. The symmetry is deliberate. A prosecutor who can indict sitting heads of state must be independent from day-to-day political pressure, yet answerable to the states for grave personal misconduct. The vote of 24 July 2026 shows that the lock can actually be turned.
The road to New York had been long. Khan took a leave of absence in May 2025 after sexual misconduct allegations surfaced, and he was then suspended from duty on 8 June 2026 pending the disciplinary process. As the Associated Press reported from the United Nations, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court was removed from office on Friday, nearly two years after sexual misconduct allegations against him first emerged. His departure, the same account notes, comes as the ICC continues handling cases involving some of the world’s most powerful leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Khan had expanded the Court’s reach with some of its most consequential cases, including the arrest warrant issued for Putin and the case against Netanyahu, but his departure created another crisis for an institution already struggling with questions about its credibility.
The institutional context makes the crisis graver than a single personnel matter. Writing on 2 September 2026, an international-law scholar described the removal, against a backdrop of American and Russian sanctions and state withdrawals, as the gravest crisis in the Court’s history, one capable of threatening its very existence (International Law Blog, 2 September 2026). The sanctions, he records, are now targeting the ICC President, nine judges of the Court, its two Deputy Prosecutors, the Prosecutor removed on 24 July, and a staff member who is a candidate for election as an ICC judge. Five states, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Venezuela, have announced withdrawal from the Assembly’s 125 members. The United States, which has adopted sweeping sanctions against the Court analysed on this site in our account of the American blanket sanctions and what they change for cooperation with France, is openly campaigning against international criminal courts. None of this excuses or explains the Prosecutor’s personal conduct, but it explains why the succession is not a routine vacancy: the next prosecutor inherits a court under fire.
For victims, witnesses and defence teams, the practical question is immediate. Every pending arrest warrant, every confirmation hearing, every trial was built by an Office of the Prosecutor that has had no elected chief for over a year. Defence counsel in several cases have already tested whether that gap weakens the prosecution. So far, the Chambers have treated the Office as continuous and fully capable. Understanding why is the key to advising any client with ICC exposure today.
B. Who prosecutes Duterte, El Hishri and Said while the chair is empty
The short answer is the two Deputy Prosecutors, and the Court says so officially. The Deputy Prosecutors will continue to provide the leadership, management and direction of the Office of the Prosecutor, as they have done since Mr Khan took a leave of absence in May 2025 and following his suspension from duty on 8 June 2026. Throughout this process, the Court adds, it has continued to carry out its mandate and activities, thanks to the professionalism and dedication of staff members. In other words, there has been no legal vacuum: the Office never stopped, because the deputies never left.
The docket proves the point. In the Philippines situation, the confirmation of charges hearing in Prosecutor v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte opened on 23 February 2026 and closed on 27 February 2026, conducted in the suspect’s absence after the Chamber granted his request to waive attendance. Then, on 23 April 2026, Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously confirmed all the charges comprised of three counts of crimes against humanity brought by the Prosecutor against Rodrigo Roa Duterte and committed him to trial before a Trial Chamber. The opening of the trial is scheduled for 30 November 2026. Every one of those steps after May 2025 was taken by an Office led only by the deputies, and the judges treated its acts as fully valid. Two further articles on this site follow the Duterte proceedings in detail, a pattern that shows how the Court keeps building trial-ready cases without an elected chief.
The Libya file tells the same story. In mid-September 2026, ICC prosecutors presented the case against Khaled El Hishri, the former Mitiga prison official arrested in Germany, at the confirmation of charges hearing, and the case is now set toward a trial opening in May 2027, as analysed in our account of the El Hishri charges, the German surrender and what France would do with the same file. In the Central African Republic file, September 2026 brought a verdict in the case of Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, a suspect France itself had arrested and surrendered, examined in our analysis of the Said verdict and the French surrender. Add the Darfur reparations proceedings for Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman and the Palestine and Ukraine investigations still running, and the picture is clear: a headless prosecution that keeps prosecuting.
The succession itself is stuck. More than a month after the removal, the Assembly of States Parties had still announced no public timetable for nominations or an election to replace him, according to field reporting from Nairobi-based Journalists for Justice in late August 2026. Under Article 42 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the Assembly for a single, non-renewable term, and the rules impose a months-long process of nominations and public scrutiny. Commentators urge speed: the next prosecutor should be chosen quickly, possibly by elevating one of the two deputies who have run the Office for over a year, while resisting any political litmus test on investigations (JusticeInfo analysis), notes one expert, referring to Khan’s two deputies, who have been in charge since Khan took leave more than a year ago. The same analysis floats a shortcut, electing a new prosecutor quickly for a limited term of four years to see out the rest of Khan’s nine-year tenure, but warns that member states must resist applying any political litmus test that would exempt certain investigations or targets. After three failed elections in the Court’s history, the next vote will be judged on the moral authority of the person chosen, and the states know it.
For practitioners, three consequences follow. First, no court has accepted the argument that acts of the Office since May 2025 are invalid for want of an elected prosecutor; the deputies’ authority is stated, public and continuous. Second, confirmation and trial schedules, Duterte in November 2026, El Hishri toward May 2027, keep running, so limitation-style or delay arguments based on the vacancy face long odds. Third, the election, when it comes, could shift prosecutorial strategy, particularly on the most politically exposed files, which is why defence teams and victims’ counsel alike must prepare for a change of personnel mid-stream. The ICC is not paralysed. It is operating on interim leadership, under sanctions, with an election overdue, and still setting trial dates.
II. What France must still do when The Hague calls: arrest, surrender and freeze
A. How France arrests and surrenders an ICC suspect in Paris within days
France is not a bystander in this system. It signed the Rome Statute on 18 July 1998, revised its Constitution to allow cooperation, ratified the treaty, and then built a complete surrender procedure inside the Code of Criminal Procedure. The founding principle is stated bluntly in the Code: Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. The same article extends the scheme to anyone prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes within the meaning of Articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute. Cooperation is therefore not discretionary diplomacy. It is a statutory duty, and the Said surrender shows France applies it.
Day-to-day cooperation runs through the anti-terrorism prosecutor in Paris. Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Those documents go to the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, who gives them full effect, and in urgent cases they can be sent to that magistrate directly and by any means. Execution follows the same channel: mutual assistance requests are executed by the anti-terrorism prosecutor or by the Paris investigating judge, acting across the whole national territory, in the presence where relevant of the ICC Prosecutor or representative. The Paris centralisation is the point: one entry door, national reach, no local court able to slow the process.
Arrest for surrender follows its own track, and the clock runs fast. Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République. In urgent cases the request can go directly and by any means to the locally competent prosecutor. Anyone arrested on such a request doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent, with the custody safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 applying, identity verified, and information given in a language the person understands that a surrender hearing will follow within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general.
Paris then takes over the body as well as the file. La personne réclamée est transférée, s’il y a lieu, et écrouée à la maison d’arrêt du ressort de la cour d’appel de Paris. Transfer must occur within five days of presentation to the prosecutor, failing which the person is immediately released by order of the president of the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, unless transfer was delayed by insurmountable circumstances. La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure. The person appears before it within eight days of presentation to the prosecutor general, with a possible additional eight days at the request of either side, questioning on the record, and a hearing and ruling in public unless publicity would harm the proper conduct of the proceedings.
Two features of the French scheme deserve emphasis for international readers. First, provisional measures are available early: protective measures on French territory under Article 93(1)(k) of the Statute are ordered, with Treasury costs advanced, by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years, renewable at the Court’s request. Assets can therefore be frozen in France while the ICC case is still being built. Second, a concurrent French case does not stop surrender: Articles 627-4 to 627-10 also apply where the person is prosecuted or convicted in France on other counts, though detention in that situation cannot benefit from release under Articles 627-6, 627-9 and the second paragraph of 627-10, and the ICC proceedings suspend the French limitation periods for that person. Paris can hold the suspect for The Hague even while French courts have their own claims on him.
The closest French precedent for an international surrender of this type remains the Kabuga case, where Paris handed a Rwandan genocide suspect to the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals. The Court of Cassation’s criminal chamber, on 30 September 2020 in case 20-83.181, defined the investigating chamber’s control in terms that every ICC defence lawyer in France should memorise: Il résulte de l’article 13 de la loi du 2 janvier 1995 auquel renvoie l’article 2 de celle du 22 mai 1996 applicable en l’espèce, que le contrôle de la chambre de l’instruction consiste seulement, en cette matière, à vérifier si les conditions de remise sont remplies quant à l’identité de la personne, la production des titres en vertu desquels la demande est formée, l’existence de faits entrant dans la définition posée à l’article 1er de cette loi, et l’absence d’une erreur évidente. And the Court added: Ce contrôle inclut par ailleurs, si sa violation est invoquée, le respect des garanties fondamentales accordées à la personne réclamée. Identity, papers, qualifying facts, no manifest error, plus fundamental guarantees if invoked: that is the whole battlefield. Arguments about how the request was transmitted, or about examinations used to confirm identity, were held to fall outside that control. The ICC surrender track in Articles 627-4 to 627-10 works on the same philosophy, with even less room for merits review, because France does not retry the ICC’s case.
One more French principle travels into ICC practice: specialty. A person surrendered to France under a European Arrest Warrant who has not waived specialty cannot be detained for an offence other than the one that justified surrender without consent, as the criminal chamber recalled on 5 October 2021 in case 21-84.194, and the investigating chamber must verify compliance when the point is raised. The Rome Statute carries its own specialty rule for persons surrendered to the Court. For a suspect arrested in Paris on an ICC warrant, the practical lesson is symmetrical: check exactly which charges the warrant covers, because anything beyond them will need a waiver or a fresh procedure.
B. Can a defence lawyer use the leadership vacuum to block surrender from France
The tempting argument writes itself: no elected prosecutor, no valid prosecution, no lawful surrender. It will be made, and in France it will almost certainly fail. Start with the French judge’s mandate. The investigating chamber verifies identity, titles, qualifying facts and the absence of manifest error, plus fundamental guarantees when invoked. Nothing in Articles 627-4 to 627-10 asks the Paris judges to audit the internal governance of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor, to verify who signed an internal memorandum, or to second-guess whether the deputies should have sought fresh confirmation of investigative acts after July 2026. A vacancy at the top of the requesting institution is not an identity error, a missing title, a non-qualifying fact or a fundamental-guarantees violation. The Kabuga ruling shows how narrow the gate is: even complaints about transmission of the request and identity-verification examinations were ruled out of scope.
The ICC side of the argument is no stronger. The Rome Statute gives the Office continuity by design: the deputies lawfully exercise leadership when the Prosecutor is unavailable, and the Court has now said so publicly for the period since May 2025. The Chambers that confirmed the Duterte charges in April 2026 and advanced the El Hishri and Said cases through 2026 necessarily treated the deputies’ acts as the acts of the Office. An arrest warrant signed or confirmed during the interim period carries the same legal force as one from 2024, because the authority flows from the Office, not from one man’s name. Defence teams that want to attack the leadership gap must do it in The Hague, before the Pre-Trial or Trial Chamber seized of the case, not before the Paris investigating chamber, which has no jurisdiction over ICC institutional disputes.
That does not leave the defence unarmed in France. The battle is fought on the four Kabuga checkpoints plus guarantees, and each can be real. Identity challenges work where fingerprints, photographs or civil records do not line up, particularly for suspects using multiple names across borders. Title challenges work where the warrant, the request and the supporting documents do not match, are stale, or were overtaken by a withdrawal or amendment the French file does not reflect. Qualification challenges work where the facts as described cannot meet the definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes that Article 627 incorporates. And fundamental guarantees, expressly preserved by the Court of Cassation, cover everything from the right to an interpreter and counsel at each Paris step to medical fitness for surrender, prison conditions on transfer, and the specialty protection described above. A lawyer who arrives at the Paris hearing with certified civil records, a clean chronology of the ICC documents, and a medical file will achieve more than one who arrives with press cuttings about The Hague’s politics.
Timing is the other weapon, and the Code sets the tempo. Twenty-four hours to the local prosecutor, five days to transfer to Paris, eight days to the investigating chamber hearing: each deadline missed without insurmountable circumstances opens a release application. In concurrent French-proceedings cases under Article 627-11, release is harder, but the suspension of limitation periods and the strict sequencing still reward counsel who diary every step. For families, the practical advice is concrete: instruct Paris counsel within hours of the arrest, demand the ICC file in a language the client understands, secure independent medical evidence immediately, and prepare the guarantees bundle before the eight-day hearing, not after. The leadership crisis in The Hague changes none of these deadlines. If anything, it makes rigorous Paris procedure more valuable, because a flawless French surrender file is the one thing the current turmoil cannot disturb.
Looking ahead, the election of the fourth prosecutor could still reshape individual cases. A new chief may reprioritise situations, settle or discontinue marginal lines of investigation, or bring a different charging philosophy to confirmation hearings. JusticeInfo’s warning against any litmus test that would exempt certain investigations or targets captures the fear of victims’ groups: that a successor chosen to placate powerful states might quietly shelve the Palestine file or slow-walk politically costly cases. Conversely, a prosecutor elected on a credibility platform might accelerate arrest-warrant applications to prove the Court’s vitality. Clients with ICC exposure should therefore be advised in two timeframes: the immediate French procedure, governed entirely by the Code and the existing warrants, and the medium-term prosecutorial strategy, which the election will reset. Only the first can keep someone out of a cell in Paris this month.
Conclusion
The ICC has fired its prosecutor and not yet chosen another, and the Court is still working. That is the paradox of The Hague in September 2026: an institution its enemies describe as finished keeps confirming charges, holding hearings and setting trial dates, from Duterte’s November 2026 trial to El Hishri’s road to May 2027 and the Said verdict already delivered. The deputies’ interim leadership, publicly affirmed by the Court since May 2025, gives the Office unbroken legal continuity, and no chamber has questioned the validity of its acts. France, for its part, owes The Hague the same cooperation as before: anti-terrorism prosecutor as single entry point, arrest executed nationwide, transfer to Paris within five days, investigating-chamber review within eight, and surrender after a control limited to identity, titles, qualifying facts, manifest error and fundamental guarantees. The leadership vacuum offers no serious lever against surrender from France; the real defences remain documentary, medical and procedural, fought deadline by deadline in Paris. When the Assembly finally elects the fourth prosecutor, strategy may shift, but warrants will not evaporate. Anyone named in an ICC case should prepare now, in Paris, under the Code as it stands, rather than betting on politics in New York or The Hague.