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The ICC Will Not Withdraw the Netanyahu Warrant: What France Must Do If He Sets Foot in Paris

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The ICC Will Not Withdraw the Netanyahu Warrant: What France Must Do If He Sets Foot in Paris

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On 18 September 2026, the Deputy Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Nazhat Shameem Khan, gave the Court’s clearest public answer in months to the question everyone in The Hague keeps asking: will the arrest warrants against Israeli leaders survive American pressure? she told CNN’s Christiane Amanpour in a weekend interview that the case is still proceeding, that her office has taken no steps to withdraw any arrest warrant application or warrant, and that the team keeps investigating in the situation (Middle East Eye, 22 September 2026; CNN, 18 September 2026). The statement, reported on 22 September 2026, lands amid a full-scale confrontation between Washington and the Court: the United States has sanctioned most of the Court’s leadership while two appeals filed by Israel remain in progress, including one challenging jurisdiction over Israeli nationals.

For an international reader, the drama looks political. For a French lawyer, it is procedural, and that is where it gets sharp. The warrants issued on 21 November 2024 by Pre-Trial Chamber I against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then defence minister Yoav Gallant, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, are still live paper. If either man sets foot in France, one question decides everything: does France arrest and hand him to The Hague, or does immunity stop the police at the airport gate? French courts, meanwhile, have given precise judicial answers in the last fourteen months, including two landmark rulings of the Assemblée plénière on 25 July 2025, and those rulings point in a direction many commentators miss. This analysis explains what the Court decided, what France promised, and what French law actually orders once an ICC surrender request lands on a Paris desk.

I. ICC arrest warrant against a sitting prime minister: what did the judges decide and is the case still alive?

A. The 21 November 2024 warrants: secret arrests, jurisdiction without membership, charges since 8 October 2023

Start with the paper, because everything else flows from it. On 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued warrants of arrest for Mr Benjamin Netanyahu and Mr Yoav Gallant. The Chamber first ruled on two requests submitted by Israel on 26 September 2024. In the first, Israel challenged the Court’s jurisdiction over the Situation in the State of Palestine in general, and over Israeli nationals in particular. The Chamber rejected that challenge, noting that the acceptance by Israel of the Court’s jurisdiction is not required, as the Court can exercise its jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial jurisdiction of Palestine (ICC press release, 21 November 2024). That single finding carries the whole file: a State does not need to join the Rome Statute for its nationals to face ICC warrants when the alleged crimes were committed on the territory of a State that accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.

The warrants target crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from at least 8 October 2023 until at least 20 May 2024, the day the Prosecution filed the applications. The Chamber’s findings centre on the role of the two men in impeding humanitarian aid, depriving the civilian population of objects indispensable to survival, including food, water, medicine and medical supplies, as well as fuel and electricity, in violation of international humanitarian law. The arrest warrants are classified as secret, in order to protect witnesses and victims and to safeguard the conduct of the investigations (ICC press release, 21 November 2024). Secrecy here is a tactical choice, not a weakness: the existence of the warrants is public, the operational details are not, which is exactly how an international police file is supposed to work while suspects keep travelling.

Two features of this file matter for France. First, the warrants have never been suspended. Israel challenged them, and the litigation continues: two appeals remain in progress, including one challenging the Court’s jurisdiction over Israeli nationals because Israel is not a member of the Court. An appeal does not suspend an arrest warrant. As long as no Chamber withdraws them, every State Party owes the Court the same duty: arrest the person on its territory and surrender him. Second, the Prosecution’s office keeps working the file. Deputy Prosecutor Khan’s September 2026 interview exists precisely to kill the rumour that sanctions quietly froze the case. The rumour is dead. The warrants are alive, the investigators are working, and the travel risk for the men named in them grows with every border they cross.

B. Arrested in France at the ICC’s request: the chambre de l’instruction decides in fifteen days, not fifteen months

If the ICC asks France to arrest and hand over a suspect, France does not run an extradition. It runs a surrender, and the difference is decisive. Extradition under article 696-4 of the Code of criminal procedure is fenced with refusal grounds that every defence lawyer knows by heart: “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise ; 2° Lorsque le crime ou le délit à un caractère politique ou lorsqu’il résulte des circonstances que l’extradition est demandée dans un but politique”. None of that architecture applies to the ICC track. For the Court, the founding text is article 627 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Cooperation is the principle, stated in one sentence, and everything that follows is machinery to execute it fast.

The machinery runs like this. The ICC transmits a request, France arrests, and the person appears before the chambre de l’instruction. Conservatory measures shielding victims and freezing assets can already run upstream: under article 627-3 of the Code of criminal procedure, protective measures requested by the Court are ordered by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years, renewable in the same conditions before expiry. Then comes the surrender hearing, and its tempo shocks anyone used to extradition litigation. Under article 627-8 of the Code of criminal procedure: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation.”

Read that provision the way a defence lawyer reads it, because every word is a wall. The chamber checks for manifest error, identity and paperwork, then orders surrender and jails a free man for that purpose. Any other question, immunity included, goes back to the ICC, which deals with it. Fifteen days to rule, two months on cassation appeal. Compare that with ordinary extradition, where the chambre de l’instruction gives an opinion, the government signs a decree, and the Conseil d’Etat can suspend it. The ICC track compresses all of that into weeks. And surrender is not a blank cheque for the receiving court either: French judges police the specialty rule with real teeth. On 10 February 2026, the Criminal Chamber quashed a ruling that had placed under judicial supervision a man surrendered by Spain under a European arrest warrant without first checking specialty, recalling that a surrendered person who has not waived specialty cannot face detention for pre-surrender facts other than the one that justified surrender (Cass., crim., 10 February 2026, No. 25-87.769). The lesson travels to The Hague: France hands over, but it hands over for the charges on the paper, and it watches what happens next.

II. Can immunity save the suspect in Paris: what the Quai d’Orsay claims and what the Assemblée plénière answered?

A. The French government’s Article 98 line: “such immunities apply” and must be considered before any handover

Six days after the warrants, France spoke, and every word was weighed. On 27 November 2024, the foreign ministry said France would respect its international obligations, then added that the Israeli leader was covered by immunity rules that apply to States not party to the ICC. The statement, delivered after Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot told Franceinfo radio that the Court’s statute deals with questions of immunity for certain leaders, says France will respect its international obligations while considering the Israeli leader covered by the immunity rules benefiting States that are not party to the Court: a State cannot be required to act incompatibly with its international-law immunity obligations toward non-party States, and those immunities would have to be weighed if the Court asked France to arrest and hand the men over (Le Monde with AFP, 27 November 2024). Barrot added that the final word belongs to the judicial authorities. That last sentence is the one that counts, because it moves the file from diplomats to judges, and judges have now spoken.

The government’s reasoning invokes the genuine fault line of the Rome Statute: article 27 strips official capacity of any exonerating effect, while article 98 tells the Court not to press a surrender request that would force the requested State to breach its immunity obligations toward a third State. France reads article 98 as a shield for sitting leaders of non-party States. Human rights groups read article 27 as the sword that cuts through it, recalling that article 27(2) expressly denies immunity before the Court, a statute France itself ratified. Both readings cannot win at the same time, and the tie-breaker is procedural: who decides, and where? Under article 627-8, the French chambre de l’instruction does not decide immunity; it refers any such question to the ICC. The immunity fight therefore happens in The Hague, under articles 19 and 98 of the Statute, between the suspect’s lawyers and the Prosecution, while the man waits in a French cell under the surrender order. The Quai d’Orsay’s statement is a diplomatic position. It is not a court order, and it binds neither the chambre de l’instruction nor the Criminal Chamber.

Washington’s sanctions add noise, not law. The United States has sanctioned the Court’s leadership across the board, yet sanctions on judges do not suspend warrants, do not amend the Statute and do not release France from its cooperation duty under article 627. France already analysed this exact pressure scenario in depth when the American sanctions machinery targeted the Court’s officials and support networks, and the conclusion stands: the French track keeps running while the political storm passes overhead. The Khan interview confirms the Prosecution reads it the same way. A suspect who counts on sanctions to dissolve his warrant is betting on politics against procedure, and procedure is winning so far.

B. The 25 July 2025 Assemblée plénière rulings: personal immunity blocks French courts, never the international court

Here is the part most coverage misses. On 25 July 2025, the Assemblée plénière, the most solemn formation of the Court of Cassation, handed down two rulings that draw the map of immunity in French law with unusual clarity, and the map favours surrender to the ICC.

The first ruling concerns a sitting head of State. After complaints by a Franco-Syrian victim and an association over two chemical attacks with sarin gas on 5 and 21 August 2013 against the civilian population, attributed to Syrian military units operating under a chain of command placed under the direct orders of the president, investigating judges issued an arrest warrant on 13 November 2023 against the Syrian president for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Paris chambre de l’instruction refused to annul it. The Assemblée plénière quashed that ruling and went further than a simple reversal: “DIT que le mandat d’arrêt délivré le 13 novembre 2023 contre M. [S] est nul” (Cass., Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.393). The reasoning is a full course in immunity law. Personal immunity, distinct from functional immunity, belongs only to the sitting head of State, head of government and foreign minister, and covers all acts, private or official: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice.” It is a manifest procedural bar that the judge must raise on his own motion: “Constituant ainsi un obstacle procédural manifeste à l’exercice de sa compétence par une juridiction nationale, l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge.” Non-recognition of the leader changes nothing, and losing office after the warrant changes nothing either: “la régularité d’un mandat d’arrêt, au regard du droit des immunités, doit s’apprécier en fonction de la situation factuelle au jour de sa délivrance.” In plain terms, French investigating judges cannot prosecute a sitting foreign president, even for chemical weapons, even for crimes against humanity.

But the same ruling states the exception that decides the Netanyahu file: “Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale” (Cass., Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.393). Immunity stops at the door of national courts. It does not enter international ones, whose statutes expressly set it aside. The ICC is exactly such a court. So the Assemblée plénière’s logic, read whole, does not protect a suspect from the ICC in France; it routes him to it. France may not try him in Paris, but France must hand him to the judges who can.

The companion ruling of the same day proves the mirror image. It concerns a former Syrian central bank governor, a French-Syrian dual national placed under European Union sanctions in his personal capacity, placed under formal investigation in December 2022 for complicity in crimes against humanity and war crimes, money laundering and criminal association, after investigators uncovered financial schemes built to circumvent sanctions and support the regime, alongside cooperation between the Syrian central bank and a company directly involved in designing chemical weapons. He claimed functional immunity as a former State agent. The Assemblée plénière rejected the appeal and kept the investigation alive (Cass., Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.071). Functional immunity belongs to State agents acting in the exercise of their functions and survives the end of office: “L’immunité de juridiction fonctionnelle, distincte de l’immunité personnelle, est reconnue aux agents de l’État agissant dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions.” Yet complicity in crimes against humanity, sanctions evasion and chemical-weapons financing are not sovereign acts a French court must respect. Paired with the first ruling, the message is complete: sitting leaders are shielded from French prosecution, former officials are exposed to it, and nobody is shielded from the international court.

The criminal Code backs the same architecture. French courts can try genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad: under article 689-11 of the Code of criminal procedure, “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal”. And the definition of crimes against humanity sits in the criminal Code itself, whose logic the statute carries into the criminal Code itself. Under article 212-1 of the Criminal Code, what counts is “l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, and the list expressly includes, at item 10°, “Les actes de ségrégation commis dans le cadre d’un régime institutionnalisé d’oppression systématique et de domination d’un groupe racial sur tout autre groupe racial ou tous autres groupes raciaux et dans l’intention de maintenir ce régime”. Universal jurisdiction in Paris is real, and it runs on these texts. It simply stops, for sitting leaders, where personal immunity begins, and that is precisely why the ICC track exists.

Conclusion

Put the pieces together and the scenario writes itself. The warrants are valid, unpublished in their operational detail, unappealed in their effects and actively investigated, as the Deputy Prosecutor confirmed on 18 September 2026. The suspect travels. The ICC asks. France arrests. The Paris chambre de l’instruction checks identity and paperwork within fifteen days, orders surrender, and sends every immunity argument to The Hague, where the suspect’s lawyers can litigate jurisdiction, complementarity and article 98 before the judges who own those questions. The Criminal Chamber reviews within two months. At no point does a French judge rule that a foreign prime minister is above the ICC, because the Assemblée plénière said the opposite: immunity shields sitting leaders from French courts, never from the international court whose statute expressly discards it. The foreign ministry’s 2024 statement is noted, transmitted and then overtaken by procedure. American sanctions change nothing in this chain; they punish the Court’s people without touching the warrants’ legal force.

Three practical lessons follow. First, anyone travelling with an ICC suspect, advising him or hosting him in France should understand that the airport is the courtroom door: once the request lands, the timeline is days, not years, and the only questions a French judge answers are identity and manifest error. Second, the immunity battle must be prepared in The Hague, not in Paris, under the Statute’s own appeal routes, where two Israeli appeals are already running. Third, victims and associations watching from France have a working forum: universal jurisdiction under article 689-11 keeps French investigations alive against former officials and accomplices, as the July 2025 rulings confirm, while the ICC track handles the sitting leaders French courts cannot touch. The Khan interview did not create this machinery. It reminded the world it is switched on. Related coverage on this desk follows the pressure campaign against the Court’s officials and support networks (United States sanctions and the ICC machinery: how France resists), the wave of ICC membership withdrawals and what exit really changes (five States walk out of the ICC), and the immunity battles around sitting leaders in other forums (the Maduro immunity motion tested against the French Assad ruling).

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