On 16 September 2026, former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte appeared in public for the first time in eighteen months. Dressed in a black suit and white shirt, the 81-year-old entered the International Criminal Court courtroom in The Hague for a hearing devoted entirely to one question: is he well enough to stand trial? According to Reuters, which covered the hearing, Duterte did not speak in court while his lawyers argued that he suffers from cognitive decline and is not fit to face the murder charges brought against him over his so-called war on drugs, with a trial scheduled to begin in November. The scene crystallises the hardest problem in international criminal justice. Courts built to try the gravest crimes must also answer a profoundly human question: what happens when the defendant is an elderly man whose memory and understanding may no longer allow him to follow the proceedings, instruct counsel, or testify in his own defence? The answer matters far beyond one courtroom in the Netherlands. It matters to every State Party to the Rome Statute, including France, which has written into its own Code of Criminal Procedure a complete machinery for arresting, detaining, surrendering, and if necessary releasing persons wanted by the ICC. This article explains what the Duterte fitness hearing is really about, and then turns the lens on Paris: if an ICC arrest-and-surrender request landed on a French prosecutor’s desk tomorrow, against an elderly or seriously ill suspect, exactly what would French law require, what safeguards would the suspect have, and where could the defence still win time, treatment, or liberty?
I. The Duterte case in The Hague: an 81-year-old defendant whose fitness for trial has become the decisive question
A. Eighteen months in detention on murder charges arising from the war on drugs: how the case reached breaking point
To understand the hearing of 16 September 2026, one must first measure the road already travelled. When Rodrigo Duterte was transferred to the International Criminal Court some eighteen months before that hearing, in the spring of 2025, the event was already historic: a former sitting head of state of the Philippines, arrested and flown to The Hague to answer charges of murder as a crime against humanity, allegedly committed through a state anti-drugs campaign that, according to the figures cited by investigators and human rights organisations, left thousands dead. The prosecution’s theory is well known to followers of the Court. It holds that killings committed in the context of the war on drugs were not isolated excesses by rogue officers but part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population, planned and encouraged at the highest level of the state. That contextual element, the widespread or systematic attack pursuant to a state or organisational policy, is precisely what transforms individual murders, however grave, into crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, and it is the element the prosecution will have to prove beyond reasonable doubt at trial.
For readers in France, the qualification resonates directly with domestic law, because the French Criminal Code defines crimes against humanity in terms that mirror the Rome Statute. Article 212-1 of the Criminal Code provides, word for word: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique : 1° L’atteinte volontaire à la vie ; 2° L’extermination ; 3° La réduction en esclavage”, and the list continues through deportation, torture, sexual violence, and persecution. Wilful killing, the very charge Duterte faces in The Hague, therefore sits at the top of the French definition as well, and it carries the same maximum penalty on both sides of the border: life imprisonment. This symmetry is not an accident. When France adapted its legislation to the Rome Statute in the early 2000s, it deliberately aligned the domestic definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes with the Statute’s language, so that French courts and the ICC would speak, as far as possible, the same legal language. The genocide definition in Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code follows the same logic: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants : – atteinte volontaire à la vie ; – atteinte grave à l’intégrité physique ou psychique”, again punishable by life imprisonment. Anyone reading the ICC arrest warrant against the former president through French eyes will therefore recognise the architecture immediately: a concerted plan, a protected group or civilian population, and underlying acts of killing.
Between the transfer and the fitness hearing, the case followed the familiar rhythm of ICC proceedings. Months of disclosure, written submissions, and status conferences filled the docket, including disputes over the sheer volume of digital evidence the prosecution intends to rely on at trial. Through all of it, the defence returned insistently to a single theme: the age and deteriorating health of the accused. By the time the judges convened the hearing of 16 September, that theme had become the case. A trial scheduled to open in November cannot begin against a defendant who cannot understand it, and the judges therefore had to decide, before anything else, whether the man in the black suit was fit to be tried at all. That is why the hearing, though procedural in form, was substantive in every sense that counts: fitness to stand trial is the gate through which every international prosecution must pass, and when the gate stays shut, even the most meticulously prepared trial cannot open.
B. The hearing of 16 September 2026: cognitive decline, silence in the dock, and a November trial date hanging in the balance
The facts of the hearing itself are stark and undisputed. Reuters reports that Duterte, aged 81, appeared in the ICC courtroom in The Hague dressed in a black suit and white shirt, that the hearing concerned his health and his ability to stand trial, that his lawyers have argued he suffers from deteriorating cognitive abilities and is not well enough to be tried, and that he did not speak in court. Each of those details carries legal weight. The silence of the accused is, of course, his absolute right; no adverse inference may be drawn from it in any court that respects the presumption of innocence. But in a fitness hearing, silence takes on an additional evidentiary dimension, because the judges are watching precisely for signs of comprehension, orientation, and the capacity to follow proceedings. Defence teams in this position typically present independent medical expertise documenting deficits in memory, executive function, or understanding of the charges, while the prosecution and the victims’ representatives test that evidence, sometimes requesting their own examinations, and the Chamber may order further assessments before ruling. The outcome is binary in its consequences even when it is nuanced in its reasoning: either the accused is fit and the November trial proceeds, or he is found unfit, in which case the proceedings must be adjourned, adapted, or in extreme and irreversible cases effectively frozen, since no legitimate criminal justice system tries a person who cannot defend himself.
International practitioners will recognise the pattern. Fitness litigation has shadowed several major international cases, precisely because atrocity trials often arrive years or decades after the alleged acts, when defendants are elderly. What makes the Duterte hearing distinctive is its timing and its transparency: a sitting former president, transferred eighteen months earlier, appearing for the first time in open court not to plead but to be assessed. For the prosecution, the stakes are symmetrical. An unfair trial against an unfit defendant would poison any eventual conviction and hand the defence a lasting appellate weapon; yet an indefinite adjournment would deny the victims the judgment they have awaited, and would keep an 81-year-old man in detention without a trial date. The judges must therefore navigate between two imperatives that both claim the mantle of justice: the fairness owed to the accused and the diligence owed to the victims and to the international community. Their ruling, when it comes, will turn on medical evidence most observers will never see, which is exactly why the hearing itself, public and solemn, mattered so much: it showed the Court confronting the human limits of its own mandate in the open.
There is a final dimension that French observers should not miss. France, as a founding supporter of the ICC, has consistently presented itself as a State Party that cooperates fully and surrenders its own nationals if the Court so requires. The Duterte case tests the sincerity of that posture in every capital, Paris included. If a comparable file, an elderly suspect wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity, landed in France tomorrow, the question would not be whether France cooperates in principle but how, under what deadlines, before which judges, and with what room for the defence to invoke age, illness, and unfitness. French law answers each of those questions with unusual precision, and the answers are less widely known than they should be, even among criminal practitioners. That is the subject of the second part of this article.
II. What France would do with an ICC file like this: the Paris surrender track and the defence weapons it leaves open
A. Arrest and surrender without the classic extradition shields: how the Paris fast track works in practice
The starting point of French law is a declaration of principle that leaves no room for ambiguity. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” France does not merely tolerate the ICC; it participates in the repression of the offences and cooperates with the Court under a dedicated title of its own criminal procedure code. The sentence continues by defining the personal scope of that cooperation: “Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” Every person prosecuted or convicted by the ICC for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes falls within the French cooperation machinery, whatever their nationality and whatever passport they carry. Practitioners should note one technical caveat, visible on the official Legifrance page: these provisions currently carry a deferred-repeal flag linked to the ongoing recodification of criminal procedure, but they remain in force and applicable at the date of this article, and no defence team should mistake a recodification timetable for a gap in the law.
From that principle flows a procedure that differs from classic extradition in every respect that matters to the defence. When the ICC issues a request for arrest and surrender, Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.” Three features deserve emphasis. First, the request is transmitted in original with all supporting documents, and the French authorities verify only its formal regularity, not the merits of the ICC case; there is no French equivalent of a committal hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence, because the evidence belongs to The Hague. Second, the file is centralised immediately on the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal, which means that an ICC arrest anywhere in France, from Roissy airport to a provincial town, converges within hours on a single specialised prosecution office in Paris. Third, execution is nationwide from the outset: the request is enforceable across the entire territory of the Republic. In urgent cases, the article adds, the request may even be addressed directly and by any means to the territorially competent public prosecutor. The contrast with classic extradition, with its diplomatic channel, its months of examination by the investigating chamber, its government decree susceptible to appeal, and its celebrated bars such as the non-extradition of nationals and the political-offence exception, could hardly be sharper. Before the ICC track, those shields simply do not exist in the text: a French national wanted by the ICC can be surrendered by France, and no political characterisation of the acts will stop the machinery, because the crimes within ICC jurisdiction, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, are by definition excluded from the leniency historically shown to political offences.
The safeguards for the arrested person are nonetheless real, immediate, and highly operational, and any defence lawyer receiving the historic telephone call, your client has been arrested on an ICC request, must trigger them within hours. Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commands: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within twenty-four hours, no more, the arrested person must be brought before the local prosecutor, and during that window the custody protections of Articles 63-1 to 63-7, notification of rights, medical examination, access to counsel, apply in full. The prosecutor then verifies identity and delivers a formal notification, in a language the person understands, that they are the subject of an ICC arrest-and-surrender request and that they will appear, within a maximum of five days, before the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal. The same article continues: the prosecutor informs the person “qu’elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office par le bâtonnier de l’ordre des avocats”, and that the person may confer immediately with counsel. For an elderly or ill suspect, the Duterte profile, these first hours are decisive. Counsel must secure a medical examination at once, place on the record every observable sign of confusion, disorientation, or cognitive difficulty, request interpretation into a language the client genuinely masters rather than merely understands, and begin assembling the medical file that will later support both a release application and, in The Hague, a fitness challenge. The five-day window before the Paris appearance is short, and it is the only preparation time the defence will ever get on French soil.
Detention pending surrender is the default, but it is neither automatic nor unchallengeable, and here French law shows its most original feature. Article 627-9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens a permanent door: “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code.” Release, lifting or variation of judicial supervision or electronically monitored house arrest may be sought at any time before the investigating chamber of the Paris Court of Appeal, which decides by reasoned judgment in public hearing, applying the criteria of Article 59 of the Rome Statute. For the defence of an 81-year-old with documented cognitive decline, this provision is the centrepiece of the French phase: it allows counsel to argue, with supporting expert evidence, that continued detention is unnecessary or disproportionate, that house arrest with medical supervision suffices to guarantee surrender, and that the health risks of prison outweigh any flight risk, particularly where the suspect’s condition itself makes flight implausible. The chamber’s decision must be reasoned by reference to Article 59, paragraph 4 of the Statute, which gives defence teams a bilingual argument, French procedural guarantees on one side, the Statute’s own release criteria on the other. One related provision closes a trap that inexperienced counsel might overlook. Article 627-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure warns that where the wanted person is also being prosecuted or has been convicted in France on other charges, the release mechanisms of Articles 627-6, 627-9, and 627-10 are unavailable, and it adds a sentence of considerable practical importance: “La procédure suivie devant la Cour pénale internationale suspend, à l’égard de cette personne, la prescription de l’action publique et de la peine.” ICC proceedings suspend limitation periods in France, so no one should count on time quietly extinguishing either track while The Hague deliberates.
Readers accustomed to the firm’s earlier analysis of ICC cooperation, in particular the September 2026 examination of American sanctions against the Court and France’s surviving duties to cooperate, pay, and prosecute from Paris, will recognise the through-line. External pressure on the Court, whether American sanctions or domestic political controversy, does not suspend the French cooperation title, and the Paris Prosecutor General does not enjoy a discretion to sit on an ICC request for reasons of diplomatic opportunity. The machinery is mandatory, centralised, and fast, which is exactly why the defence must be faster.
B. When age and illness enter the file: medical release in Paris, protective measures, and the French courts as a fallback forum
The Duterte hearing forces a question that the French surrender track answers only in part. Suppose the suspect arrested in France on an ICC request is 81 years old, shows signs of cognitive decline, and may be unfit to stand trial. What can French judges actually do? The first answer lies in the release mechanism just described. Article 627-9 is not reserved for young and healthy defendants; its reference to house arrest under electronic surveillance was written precisely for cases where detention is disproportionate, and advanced age combined with documented illness is the textbook example. Counsel should file early, file with complete medical evidence rather than bare assertions, and frame the request around the Article 59 criteria the chamber must apply: urgency and exceptional circumstances justifying release, and the existence of safeguards ensuring surrender. A documented regime of hospitalisation or home care with constant supervision, surrender of travel documents, and consent to electronic monitoring will often satisfy a chamber that detention adds nothing to the guarantee of surrender while adding considerably to the medical risk. Where the suspect is already convicted or prosecuted in France on separate charges, Article 627-11 shuts this door, and counsel must say so frankly to the client rather than filing a doomed application; credibility before the investigating chamber is a capital that the defence will need again in The Hague.
The second answer concerns assets and victims, because an ICC file is never only about the body of the accused. Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” Protective measures ordered by the ICC, freezing or seizure of assets in France, are executed by the national anti-terrorism prosecutor, at the Treasury’s advance expense, under French procedural forms. The article caps their initial duration, “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans”, renewable once before expiry at the Court’s request. For families and third parties holding property in France that an ICC order might catch, this provision is the map: it identifies the competent authority, the applicable forms, and the time limits within which challenges must be brought. Symmetrically, once the ICC has sentenced, Article 627-16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure channels enforcement through Paris: “Lorsque la Cour pénale internationale en fait la demande, l’exécution des peines d’amende et de confiscation ou des décisions concernant les réparations prononcées par celle-ci est autorisée par le tribunal correctionnel de Paris saisi, à cette fin, par le procureur de la République.” Fines, confiscations, and reparation orders are authorised by the Paris criminal court, which is bound by the ICC decision including on third-party rights, though it may order recovery measures where a confiscation order cannot be directly executed. Victims’ counsel should therefore treat Paris as a forum for reparations enforcement, not merely as a transit lounge for the accused.
The third answer is the most strategic, and it belongs to the doctrine of complementarity. The ICC is a court of last resort; where a State Party genuinely investigates and prosecutes, The Hague steps back. France has equipped itself to be that forum through universal jurisdiction. Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure opens as follows: “Hors les cas prévus au sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre IV pour l’application de la convention portant statut de la Cour pénale internationale, ouverte à la signature à Rome le 18 juillet 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed abroad may thus be tried in France, provided the suspect has habitual residence on French territory, understood as a sufficient connecting link assessed through the duration and conditions of presence, the intention to settle, and family, social, and material ties. The provision demands double criminality, but the Cour de cassation, sitting in its most solemn formation, has given that condition a reading highly favourable to prosecution. In its landmark judgment of 12 May 2023, Assemblée plénière, appeal no. 22-82.468, published in the Bulletin, the Court held: “Cet article exige que les faits poursuivis en France sous la qualification de crimes contre l’humanité, autres que le génocide, ou de crimes et délits de guerre, soient punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis.” It then explained that these offences contain a contextual element, the concerted plan against a civilian population for crimes against humanity, defined by Articles 212-1 to 212-3 of the Criminal Code, and the armed conflict nexus for war crimes, defined by Articles 461-1 to 461-31, and it concluded that double criminality is satisfied in substance where the foreign legislation punishes the underlying acts through ordinary offences. In that case the Court approved a finding “que les faits pour lesquels M. [W] a été mis en examen, sous la qualification de crimes de guerre et complicité, étaient punis, en substance, par la législation syrienne au travers d’infractions de droit commun et de celle d’implication d’enfants dans les hostilités”, and by these reasons, “la Cour : REJETTE le pourvoi”. The practical lesson for ICC-related strategy is direct: where the territorial state’s law punishes murder, torture, rape, and violence as ordinary crimes, French courts may assert jurisdiction over conduct that elsewhere would be labelled crimes against humanity or war crimes, and a suspect present in France may therefore face a French prosecution capable, in complementarity terms, of engaging with the ICC file. Defence teams must integrate this contingency from day one, because arguments deployed to resist surrender may resurface, transformed, before the Paris investigating judges.
None of this diminishes the centrality of fitness. If the medical evidence shows that the suspect cannot understand proceedings, instruct counsel, or follow evidence, that incapacity travels with him from Paris to The Hague: French release judges will weigh it under Article 627-9, and ICC judges will weigh it for trial fitness, as the Duterte hearing demonstrates. The coherent defence strategy is therefore a single medical case built once, documented to the standard of both jurisdictions, and deployed first for liberty in Paris, then for fitness in The Hague, with the French universal-jurisdiction risk monitored throughout. Age is not impunity, illness is not acquittal, but procedure, rigorously worked, remains the ground on which even the gravest cases are won or lost before they are ever tried.
Conclusion
The hearing of 16 September 2026 will not decide whether Rodrigo Duterte ordered or tolerated the killings of the war on drugs; it will decide whether he can be tried at all. That is the paradox the ICC now inhabits: a court created to end impunity for the gravest crimes must sometimes halt, on grounds of age and illness, the very trial the victims have awaited for years. Whatever the judges rule on fitness, and whenever the November trial date holds or slips, the case already delivers three lessons that outlive it. First, medical evidence is now a front-line weapon in international criminal defence, and it must be built early, independently, and to a standard that survives hostile expert review. Second, for any suspect arrested in France on an ICC request, the Paris phase is short, mandatory, and unforgiving: twenty-four hours to the prosecutor, five days to the Prosecutor General, and a permanent release door before the investigating chamber that only well-documented health grounds will open. Third, surrender is not the only French horizon; protective measures, reparations enforcement, and universal-jurisdiction prosecution mean Paris can be the place of detention, the place of asset litigation, and the place of trial itself. The Duterte case is being decided in The Hague. Its procedural shadow falls squarely on Paris, and any defence team that may one day stand in that shadow should study the French cooperation title now, before the telephone rings.