On 6 October 2026, two merchant ships were struck by air and sea drones about 70 nautical miles off Byala, inside Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. One of them, the Togo-flagged general cargo vessel ALFA WATAN, sank, and its crew is missing. The other, the Palau-flagged ABLE, carrying grain, was damaged, and its crew was rescued, two of them injured. Bulgaria’s prime minister condemned the attack as a gross violation of international law without attributing it. Ukraine says its navy, working with Bulgaria, established that Russia carried it out. Moscow has not commented. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen condemned the targeting of commercial ships and innocent crews. For an international audience, and for French operators, sailors and insurers exposed on these routes, the questions are immediate and practical: in waters where the coastal state has rights but not sovereignty, who investigates, who prosecutes, and when can France act? This article answers with the texts in hand: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1988 Rome Convention on maritime security, and the French Code of Criminal Procedure and Criminal Code, read through the Cour de cassation’s most recent universal-jurisdiction case law.
I. Drone strikes on merchant ships in an exclusive economic zone: what international law actually says
A. Bulgaria’s EEZ: sovereign rights are not sovereignty, and navigation stays open to all
The attack took place, according to Reuters, about 70 nautical miles (130 km) off the coastal town of Byala, and some 140 nautical miles from the Ukrainian coast, inside what shipping sources describe as Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone — reportedly the first such attack in those waters. The distance matters. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, every coastal state may claim a territorial sea of no more than 12 nautical miles measured from baselines set under the Convention Seventy miles is far beyond that limit, and well within the 200-mile maximum, since the exclusive economic zone extends no further than 200 nautical miles from the baselines used to measure the territorial sea
What does the coastal state own in that zone? Less than many headlines imply. The Convention defines the zone as an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea under a specific legal regime balancing the coastal state’s rights with other states’ freedoms Inside it, Bulgaria holds sovereign rights over the natural resources of the waters, seabed and subsoil, and over other economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, plus jurisdiction over artificial islands, marine scientific research and protection of the marine environment — while it must have due regard for other states’ rights and act compatibly with the Convention Sovereign rights over fish and hydrocarbons are not sovereignty over the water column, and they confer no general criminal jurisdiction over foreign ships passing through.
Navigation, on the contrary, remains open to all States. In the zone, all states enjoy the high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and the Convention opens its high-seas chapter with the rule that the high seas are open to all states, freedom of navigation included That is why the grain carrier ABLE and the cargo vessel ALFA WATAN were lawfully where they were, and why attacking them strikes at a freedom every state enjoys, not at a Bulgarian domestic regulation.
Criminal jurisdiction on the scene therefore belongs first to the flag states. The rule is blunt: ships sail under a single flag and fall under that state’s exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas, save narrow treaty exceptions Togo for the sunken ALFA WATAN, Palau for the damaged ABLE: those two states hold the primary title to investigate and prosecute, and Bulgaria’s role — search and rescue, evidence gathering in its zone, cooperation with the flag states and, as Kyiv describes it, a joint naval fact-finding effort — sits alongside that title rather than above it. The Convention also narrows what warships may do on encounter: boarding a foreign ship on the high seas is justified only on reasonable suspicion of piracy, slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, statelessness or, despite a matching flag, a vessel stateless in reality. Boarding a suspect drone mothership is not an open-ended option; it needs a treaty title or one of these narrow doors.
B. Piracy, maritime terrorism or war crime: naming the attack decides the court
Three qualifications compete, and each sends the file to a different judge. Start with the word filling the headlines: piracy. The Convention defines it strictly: illegal violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another vessel, persons or property on the high seas Two cumulative locks follow: acts “committed for private ends,” and acts by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft A combined air-and-sea drone strike, in the middle of an interstate armed conflict, attributed by one belligerent to the other and unclaimed by anyone, does not fit that box on the facts known on 6 October. If the strike was ordered by a state apparatus, the private-ends condition fails; if it was ordered by no one identifiable yet, the authorship condition cannot be verified. Piracy’s universal jurisdiction is powerful, but it is not a catch-all for every violence at sea, and invoking it here on current facts would be a legal error. That conclusion can change with evidence — a private crew running drone attacks for ransom or sabotage-for-hire would reopen the file — but evidence comes first.
The second box is maritime terrorism, and it fits far better. French law built a dedicated bridge to the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and its 2005 London revision. Article 689-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Pour l’application de la convention pour la répression d’actes illicites contre la sécurité de la navigation maritime et du protocole pour la répression d’actes illicites contre la sécurité des plateformes fixes situées sur le plateau continental, faits à Rome le 10 mars 1988 et révisés à Londres le 14 octobre 2005, peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Crime défini aux articles 224-6 et 224-7 du code pénal ; 2° Atteinte volontaire à la vie ou à l’intégrité physique, destruction, dégradation ou détérioration, menace d’une atteinte aux personnes ou aux biens réprimées par les livres II et III du code pénal ou délits définis par l’article 224-8 de ce code et par l’article L. 5242-23 du code des transports, si l’infraction compromet ou est de nature à compromettre la sécurité de la navigation maritime ou d’une plate-forme fixe située sur le plateau continental” if the offence compromises or may compromise the safety of maritime navigation. Behind that reference, the Criminal Code punishes “Le fait de s’emparer ou de prendre le contrôle par violence ou menace de violence d’un aéronef, d’un navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport à bord desquels des personnes ont pris place,” with twenty years’ imprisonment, raised to life imprisonment “lorsqu’elle est accompagnée de tortures ou d’actes de barbarie ou s’il en est résulté la mort d’une ou de plusieurs personnes.” A drone strike that sinks a cargo ship and leaves its crew missing sits squarely in that catalogue, once authorship is proven.
The third box is terrorism under domestic law, which France can project abroad. Article 421-1 of the Criminal Code states: “Constituent des actes de terrorisme, lorsqu’elles sont intentionnellement en relation avec une entreprise individuelle ou collective ayant pour but de troubler gravement l’ordre public par l’intimidation ou la terreur, les infractions suivantes : 1° Les atteintes volontaires à la vie, les atteintes volontaires à l’intégrité de la personne, l’enlèvement et la séquestration ainsi que le détournement d’aéronef, de navire ou de tout autre moyen de transport, définis par le livre II du présent code ; 2° Les vols, les extorsions, les destructions, dégradations et détériorations, ainsi que les infractions en matière informatique définis par le livre III du présent code” Wilful killing, injuries and the destruction of two merchant vessels, if intentionally connected to an enterprise aimed at seriously disturbing public order through intimidation or terror, match items 1 and 2. One precision matters for the Black Sea: Article 421-2 punishes introducing a dangerous substance “dans les eaux, y compris celles de la mer territoriale,” — including territorial waters. An exclusive economic zone is not territorial sea, so that specific incrimination does not travel 70 miles offshore; the general terrorism provisions above do the work instead. And where explosive drones are the weapon, Article 689-9 adds a universal-jurisdiction title for terrorist bombings: “Pour l’application de la convention internationale pour la répression des attentats terroristes, ouverte à la signature à New York le 12 janvier 1998, peut être poursuivie et jugé dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable d’un crime ou d’un délit d’acte de terrorisme défini par les articles 421-1 et 421-2 du code pénal ou du délit d’association terroriste prévu par l’article 421-2-1 du même code lorsque l’infraction a été commise en employant un engin explosif ou un autre engin meurtrier défini à l’article 1er de ladite convention.”
The fourth box, the gravest, is war crimes — if the conflict nexus is established. Deliberately attacking civilian merchant ships that take no part in hostilities is the textbook case for the war-crimes prohibitions against targeting civilian objects, and French law answers with Article 689-11: “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code” But that door has three locks, and the text says them plainly: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français,” assessed through a sufficient connecting link, and “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” Habitual residence, the antiterrorism prosecutor’s monopoly, subsidiarity to the International Criminal Court and to any extradition request: a war-crimes complaint in Paris over the Black Sea strikes must pass all three, or fail.
Attribution remains the hinge on which every box turns. Bulgaria, the coastal state, had not officially attributed the strike at the time of writing; Ukraine publicly blames Russia and describes a joint naval fact-finding effort; Moscow has made no comment; one maritime security source quoted by Reuters leaned toward Russian responsibility. A French lawyer states it plainly: until an investigation fixes authorship, qualifications are conditional, state responsibility is unproven, and the only established judicial facts are a sunken Togo-flagged ship with missing sailors, a damaged Palau-flagged grain carrier with two injured crew, and a search-and-rescue operation under way with an environmental watch. The day before, Romanian authorities separately reported a fire aboard a ship outside Romania’s territorial waters, and maritime analysts describe an expanding threat into NATO members’ zones — context that raises vigilance, not conclusions.
II. What France can do when a French vessel, sailor or operator is hit next
A. Five doors open the French criminal courts, from the flag to universal jurisdiction
No French victim and no French flag have been reported in the 6 October strikes, and this section is therefore written in the conditional: if a French-linked ship, sailor or company is hit tomorrow, here is exactly how Paris can seize the file. The first door is the flag. Offences committed aboard a French ship are treated as committed on French territory, where “La loi pénale française est applicable aux infractions commises sur le territoire de la République. L’infraction est réputée commise sur le territoire de la République dès lors qu’un de ses faits constitutifs a eu lieu sur ce territoire.” Combined with the flag state’s exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas recalled above, a drone strike on a French-flagged cargo vessel in the Black Sea would give the French courts territorial title without any further condition — the natural forum, and the one insurers and families should address first.
The second and third doors follow the passport. If the drone operators are French nationals, Article 113-6 provides that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime commis par un Français hors du territoire de la République. Elle est applicable aux délits commis par des Français hors du territoire de la République si les faits sont punis par la législation du pays où ils ont été commis.” If instead the victims are French — sailors on a foreign-flagged ship, a French superintendent aboard, French passengers — Article 113-7 answers that “La loi pénale française est applicable à tout crime, ainsi qu’à tout délit puni d’emprisonnement, commis par un Français ou par un étranger hors du territoire de la République lorsque la victime est de nationalité française au moment de l’infraction.” Murder, wilful injury and hijacking of a vessel are crimes, so the passive-personality door opens in full — with one procedural lock for lesser offences, since “Dans les cas prévus aux articles 113-6 et 113-7 , la poursuite des délits ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du ministère public. Elle doit être précédée d’une plainte de la victime ou de ses ayants droit ou d’une dénonciation officielle par l’autorité du pays où le fait a été commis.” Families of French sailors should therefore file a criminal complaint in France immediately and push the coastal state to transmit an official denunciation, rather than waiting for one channel alone.
The fourth door is sabotage against the nation’s fundamental interests. If a strike on maritime trade is shown to target French interests at the request or for the benefit of a foreign power, Article 411-9 punishes “Le fait de détruire, détériorer ou détourner tout document, matériel, construction, équipement, installation, appareil, dispositif technique ou système de traitement automatisé d’informations ou d’y apporter des malfaçons, lorsque ce fait est de nature à porter atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de la nation, est puni de quinze ans de détention criminelle et de 225 000 euros d’amende” with fifteen years’ imprisonment, raised to “vingt ans de détention criminelle et de 300 000 euros d’amende” when committed to serve a foreign power. Sinking grain carriers to choke food exports and drive up insurance and freight costs, in the words of Ukraine’s foreign minister, is precisely the kind of economic-warfare logic this incrimination was written for — provided the investigation proves the purpose, which is the whole difficulty.
The fifth door is universal jurisdiction, and it needs no French flag, no French author and no French victim. The general key is Article 689: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction” Its mechanism, Article 689-1, requires only presence: “En application des conventions internationales visées aux articles suivants, peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises, si elle se trouve en France, toute personne qui s’est rendue coupable hors du territoire de la République de l’une des infractions énumérées par ces articles.” Through Article 689-5, that covers the Rome maritime-security Convention; through Article 689-9, terrorist bombings with explosive devices; through Article 689-2, torture, since “peut être poursuivie et jugée dans les conditions prévues à l’article 689-1 toute personne coupable de tortures au sens de l’article 1er de la convention” against torture. Any suspect found in France — an operator transiting through Paris, a commander seeking medical care, a financier moving funds — can therefore be arrested and judged here for these conventions’ offences, even with no other French link.
The Cour de cassation has just widened that fifth door, and its words bind. On 12 May 2023, the full Assembly, in case no. 22-82.468 concerning torture and war crimes imputed to members of an armed group in Syria, recalled first that “le cas de compétence universelle de l’article 689-2 précité est limité aux tortures imputées à un agent de la fonction publique ou une personne agissant à titre officiel ou à son instigation ou avec son consentement exprès ou tacite” then held that “Cependant, la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire” For the Black Sea, the lesson is direct: if drone operators acted for an entity exercising quasi-governmental authority over territory, the official-capacity lock of the torture convention does not protect them from French courts. And if missing sailors are confirmed dead, the ordinary homicide provision applies without subtlety: “Le fait de donner volontairement la mort à autrui constitue un meurtre. Il est puni de trente ans de réclusion criminelle.” Death must be established, not presumed from disappearance — a point families’ lawyers must handle with care while the search continues.
B. Victims, shipowners and insurers: the practical checklist before the next strike
Law at sea is won or lost in the first 72 hours, on evidence. Crews and operators hit in or near a coastal state’s zone should secure, in order: the voyage data recorder and bridge audio, radar and AIS tracks, drone debris and strike imagery with chain-of-custody notes, medical reports for every injured sailor, and the exact position, course and cargo documents proving innocent passage and lawful presence in the zone. These exhibits decide, months later, whether a prosecutor in Paris, the flag state or the coastal state can characterize terrorism, a maritime-security offence or a war crime — and whether an insurer can contest a war-risk exclusion. Notify the flag state and the coastal state in writing immediately, file a criminal complaint with constitution of civil-party status in France as soon as any French link exists, and transmit the same file to the antiterrorism prosecutor’s office where the terrorism qualification is arguable, since war-crimes and terrorism avenues in Paris run through that office’s exclusive initiative.
Shipowners and charterers trading to the Black Sea should read their war-risk and kidnap-and-ransom clauses tonight, not after the next attack: navigation warranties, excluded zones, notice duties within days, and the interaction between hull, cargo and liability covers when the cause is a drone strike no state has claimed. Document the master’s innocent employment, the charterer’s orders and any naval guidance followed, because subrogated insurers will replay every decision. Sanctions screening belongs in the same review — counterparties, ports and cargoes on the Black Sea routes intersect EU, US and UK restrictions daily — and any payment freeze or seizure must be challenged within its own short deadline rather than left to drift. For French groups, this is also the moment to designate, in advance, the Paris criminal defence practice that will hold the file, coordinate with the flag state and the coastal investigation, and speak uniformly across forums instead of improvising under fire.
Conclusion
The 6 October 2026 strikes off Bulgaria condense the whole grammar of contemporary law of the sea into one burning fact pattern: an exclusive economic zone where navigation is open to all and sovereignty stops at twelve miles, flag states holding the first title to justice, piracy excluded on the known facts, maritime terrorism and terrorist bombing offering France universal jurisdiction over any suspect found on its soil, war crimes available under strict residence, prosecutorial-monopoly and subsidiarity locks, and the Cour de cassation’s 2023 full-Assembly ruling closing the quasi-state loophole for torturers. Attribution is still unproven — Sofia has not named an author, Kyiv accuses Moscow, Moscow is silent — and no official source has established, at the time of writing, any intrusion beyond the two stricken vessels, any French victim, or any environmental damage beyond the search zone. Contracts signed by operators govern their relations before any general analysis does, and only a judge will fix responsibilities. What is already certain is operational: evidence preserved today is jurisdiction won tomorrow. French sailors, owners and insurers on the Black Sea routes should prepare their files now, because the western basin, in the words of the analysts, has just become a different sea.