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Hungary Freed 2,525 Traffickers Instead of Jailing Them: EU Court Condemns the Scheme, What France Does Differently

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Hungary Freed 2,525 Traffickers Instead of Jailing Them: EU Court Condemns the Scheme, What France Does Differently

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On 15 October 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union condemned Hungary for emptying prison sentences imposed on traffickers of their substance. A Hungarian government decree adopted in 2023 provided that a final custodial sentence for trafficking, combined in the same decision with an expulsion order, was automatically converted into what Budapest called special reintegration detention. In practice, the convicted person simply had to leave Hungary within three days and stay away for the duration of the sentence. The press release published by the Court in Luxembourg on the day of the judgment states the outcome bluntly: by converting the final custodial sentences imposed for trafficking in human beings into special reintegration detention, Hungary has infringed EU law. The official text adds that 2,525 people were subjected to the scheme before the decree was repealed on 19 August 2025. For readers in France, the ruling matters twice. First, because France prosecutes the same conduct on its own soil under a severe regime that contrasts sharply with the Hungarian shortcut. Second, because French courts regularly receive European arrest warrants issued by Hungary, and a condemnation of this magnitude inevitably feeds the arguments raised in Paris against surrender.

I. The Luxembourg ruling of 15 October 2026: Hungary punished for replacing prison with departure

A. What Hungary did: final sentences converted into an order to leave within 72 hours

The mechanism condemned by the Court was created by a Hungarian government decree adopted in 2023. The Court describes it as follows: where a court imposes a final custodial sentence for the preparation or commission of the offence of trafficking in human beings and orders the expulsion of the convicted person in the same decision, the sentence is automatically converted into special reintegration detention. The conversion was therefore not a sentence adjustment decided case by case by an enforcement judge. It was automatic, triggered by the combination of a final prison term and an expulsion order pronounced together.

The content of the substitute measure is described in the judgment summary in concrete terms: it means only that the convicted person is under an obligation to leave Hungarian territory within 72 hours of his or her release in order to travel to the country of his or her former habitual residence or to the country of which he or she is a national and is prohibited from returning to Hungarian territory for the entire duration of the special reintegration detention. A person sentenced to several years in prison walked free, left the country within three days, and simply had to stay away until the nominal sentence expired. The Court notes the scale of the scheme: the decree was repealed on 19 August 2025 and 2,525 people were subject to the special reintegration detention scheme on the basis of that decree. More than two thousand convicted traffickers and smugglers therefore avoided serving their custodial sentences in Hungary.

The European Commission, which brought the infringement action, argued that the decree created a systemic risk of total impunity for the offence of facilitating illegal immigration and undermined the high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice, as well as the effectiveness of the European Union common policy on immigration and border control. The case, registered as C-521/25 Commission v Hungary, was decided on 15 October 2026, and the Court upheld the Commission action in full. Readers should note the precise scope of the condemnation. The Hungarian decree covered trafficking offences, but the breach of EU law found by the Court also concerns the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, meaning organised migrant smuggling. The footnotes of the official summary identify the instruments at stake: Articles 1 and 3 of Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, and Article 1(1) and (3) of Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on strengthening the penal framework against facilitation. The ruling therefore speaks to every Member State practice that would replace real punishment of smuggling networks with administrative removal.

B. Why European Union law forbids it: a penalty must be effective, dissuasive and proportionate

European Union criminal policy rests on a simple formula that appears in nearly every directive and framework decision: penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. The Court applied that threefold test to the Hungarian substitute measure and found that it failed each branch. On effectiveness, the reasoning is straightforward: that penalty, initially imposed as a custodial sentence, is not enforced as such, since it is converted into an obligation to leave Hungarian territory and a prohibition on returning there for the duration of the sentence imposed, and consequently, it cannot be classified as effective. A prison sentence that nobody serves is not a penalty in the European sense, whatever label domestic law gives it.

On dissuasion, the Court reasons in terms of the message received by criminal networks: persons involved in trafficking in human beings could be reassured that, if apprehended and tried in Hungary, they would, at worst, be deported from Hungarian territory and prohibited from returning there for a certain period, so the penalty cannot, therefore, be regarded as dissuasive either. A smuggling organisation operating across borders treats deportation from one country of transit as a business cost, not as a punishment. It relocates its drivers and guides to another route. Only the real prospect of years in prison changes the calculation, and that prospect had been administratively erased.

On proportionality, the defect identified by the Court is the automatic character of the conversion. The official summary states that the conversion of the custodial sentence into special reintegration detention and the release of the person concerned are automatic, without any individual assessment of the circumstances of the offence or of the character of the person who committed it. The fact that the ban on returning lasts as long as the prison term imposed does not cure the defect, because duration alone does not reflect an individualised assessment of gravity and personality. European proportionality requires the judge to weigh the facts and the offender, not to run an administrative conveyor belt from cell to border.

The judgment adds a second layer concerning aggravated smuggling. Under EU law, certain facilitation offences must be punishable by a custodial sentence with a maximum of not less than eight years, namely intentionally assisting persons who are not nationals of a Member State to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member State, where those offences have been committed for financial gain, as an activity of a criminal organisation or while endangering the lives of the persons who are the subject of the offence. Because the Hungarian decree also covered those aggravated cases, the Court found an additional breach: conduct that Brussels requires to carry at least eight years of custody was being answered with a plane ticket and a re-entry ban. Finally, the procedural consequence of an infringement ruling should be recalled as the Court itself states it: if the Court of Justice finds that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, the Member State concerned must comply with the judgment without delay, and persistent non-compliance can lead to a further action seeking financial penalties. Hungary repealed the decree in August 2025, but the 2,525 releases already granted cannot be undone, which is precisely why defence lawyers across Europe will now cite this ruling far beyond the Hungarian borders.

II. What the ruling changes for cases connected to France

A. Can a French court still surrender a smuggler to Hungary on a European arrest warrant?

The most immediate practical question concerns the European arrest warrant. France surrenders hundreds of requested persons every year to other Member States, and Hungary issues warrants for smuggling and trafficking suspects who may be arrested on French territory, at the Italian border, in Paris airports, or anywhere else. Defence lawyers will now argue that a State condemned for systematically refusing to enforce custodial sentences cannot claim the mutual trust on which surrender depends. The argument is serious, but French case law sets a high bar before a surrender can be refused or suspended, and the ruling of 15 October 2026 does not automatically block anything. Understanding the exact test applied by French courts is therefore essential for anyone concerned by a Hungarian warrant.

The starting point is the principle of mutual recognition. The French Court of Cassation recalls it in these terms: the implementation of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant, which simplifies the surrender procedure, rests on the principles of trust and mutual recognition between Member States, which require each of them to consider, except in exceptional circumstances, that all the others comply with Union law and the fundamental rights enshrined therein. Those words come from a recent decision of the Criminal Chamber, delivered on 21 January 2025 under appeal number 24-87.212, concerning a European arrest warrant issued by the Italian authorities. The chamber rejected the appeal and authorised surrender, but the reasoning it confirmed is the framework within which every challenge to a Hungarian warrant will now be examined. The official text of that decision deserves close reading, because it states the two cumulative filters that protect requested persons without dismantling mutual trust.

The first filter concerns systemic or generalised deficiencies in the issuing State. The Paris judges whose decision was upheld had found that the defence had not demonstrated the existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies, affecting either certain groups of persons or certain detention centres, as regards detention conditions in the issuing Member State, capable of constituting an exception to the general regime of automatic surrender under the European arrest warrant on account of insufficient protection of fundamental rights. In other words, general press articles or broad institutional reports are not enough. The same decision dismisses as insufficient articles of the press or the report of the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption produced by the defence, describing them as general in nature and constituting neither proof nor objective and precise material capable of substantiating the alleged risk. The lesson for Hungarian warrants is direct: the judgment of 15 October 2026 is stronger than a press article because it is a binding finding by the EU highest court that Hungary failed to enforce custodial sentences in a defined category of cases. It documents a systemic enforcement failure affecting 2,525 convicted persons. A defence team can credibly invoke it as objective material showing a systemic problem in the Hungarian enforcement system, at least for smuggling and trafficking sentences. But systemic material alone never suffices. The Court of Cassation requires a second, individualised step.

The second filter is the personal, real risk to the requested person. The Criminal Chamber confirms that the investigating chamber must look for the absence of serious and substantiated grounds for believing that surrender would expose the person to a real risk of a significant reduction in life expectancy or a rapid, significant and irremediable deterioration of his or her state of health. That formulation was given in a health context, where the requested person relied on medical follow-up after a hip prosthesis, but the structure of the test is general: systemic deficiency plus individual exposure. Applied to a smuggler wanted by Hungary, the question becomes whether surrender would expose that specific person to a real risk connected to the documented Hungarian practice, for example a sentence that would in practice not be enforced, followed by release and re-entry into a criminal network, or conversely detention in conditions incompatible with fundamental rights. Defence teams should be careful with the first variant of the argument. Complaining that Hungary punishes too softly is a paradoxical ground for refusing surrender, since surrender exists to ensure prosecution, and a requested person can hardly claim a right to be punished more severely. The stronger use of the Luxembourg ruling in a French surrender hearing is indirect: it evidences that Hungarian enforcement decisions in this field are administrative and automatic rather than judicial and individualised, which supports requests for additional information from the issuing authority, and in appropriate cases a temporary suspension of surrender, before any final decision.

French statute lists the cases in which execution of a European arrest warrant must be refused, and the list is closed. Article 695-22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that execution of a European arrest warrant shall be refused in the following cases, then enumerates amnesty extinguishing prosecution in France, a final decision for the same facts with the sentence executed or under execution, minority under thirteen at the time of the facts, and discriminatory purpose. The discrimination ground is worth quoting because it shows the philosophy of the system: surrender is refused if it is established that the warrant was issued for the purpose of prosecuting or sentencing a person on account of his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation or gender identity. The full text is available on the official Legifrance site. None of these statutory grounds covers a systemic leniency in the issuing State, which confirms that the Luxembourg ruling operates through the judge-made fundamental-rights review, not through automatic refusal. For families following cases similar to those already examined by French courts on Hungarian warrants, including the file discussed in our analysis of how a Paris court tests a Hungarian European arrest warrant, the practical advice is unchanged in structure but enriched in substance: challenge surrender with precise, personalised evidence, attach the official CJEU ruling as proof of a documented systemic practice, ask the investigating chamber to seek supplementary information from Budapest on the exact enforcement regime that would apply, and request, where health or detention conditions so justify, a temporary suspension rather than an outright refusal that the statute does not provide.

B. How France punishes smugglers and traffickers when it prosecutes them itself

The contrast with French domestic law is striking, and it explains why the Luxembourg ruling resonates in Paris. France does not deport smugglers instead of punishing them. It prosecutes them, often severely, under a layered regime that distinguishes migrant smuggling from human trafficking while punishing both with long custodial sentences that are genuinely enforced. Anyone operating on the French end of a route, driver, passeur, safe-house keeper, document supplier, or organiser, faces this framework, and foreign nationals arrested in France cannot count on any equivalent of the Hungarian shortcut.

The base offence is defined by Article L. 823-1 of the Code on the Entry and Residence of Foreigners and the Right of Asylum: subject to the exemptions provided for, facilitating or attempting to facilitate, by direct or indirect aid, the irregular entry, movement or residence of a foreigner in France is punishable by five years imprisonment and a 30,000 euro fine. The official Legifrance text adds an extraterritorial reach that matters for cross-border networks: the provision applies even when the acts are committed by a person located on the territory of another State party to the Schengen Convention. France can therefore prosecute the foreign-based organiser of a network whose drivers are caught at Menton or in the Channel Tunnel area. The companion provision, Article L. 823-2, extends the same five-year penalty to facilitation committed on the territory of another Schengen State or of a State party to the Palermo Protocol against migrant smuggling. The official text confirms both extensions, which means a smuggler who never sets foot in France but organises entries into France from abroad remains within the reach of French courts.

Aggravation follows the seriousness of the conduct. Article L. 823-3 provides that the offences defined in Articles L. 823-1 and L. 823-2 are punishable by ten years imprisonment and a 750,000 euro fine when committed in an organised group, when they directly expose foreigners to an immediate risk of death or injury causing mutilation or permanent infirmity, when they submit foreigners to living, transport, working or housing conditions incompatible with human dignity, when committed with an airport or port restricted-zone pass, or when they remove foreign minors from their family environment. The same article raises the penalty to fifteen years of criminal imprisonment and a one-million euro fine where two of those circumstances combine, including organised-group commission. The official Legifrance text sets out each circumstance in full. These are the provisions applied to the overcrowded boats in the Channel, the refrigerated lorries, the forest camps, and the organised networks dismantled every year between Calais, Paris and the Italian border. The Hungarian practice of converting final sentences into departure orders has no equivalent here: Article 707 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the opposite principle, since sentences pronounced by criminal courts are, except in cases of insurmountable circumstances, to be enforced effectively and as promptly as possible. The official text continues by describing an enforcement regime aimed at reintegration, adapted as the sentence is served, but the starting command is effectiveness. A French court that sentences a smuggler to eight years expects eight years of enforcement, modulated by sentence-adjustment judges, not a bus ticket to the border.

French law then draws a firm line that the Hungarian decree blurred: smuggling is not trafficking, and trafficking carries its own heavier regime. Article 225-4-1 of the Criminal Code defines trafficking as recruiting, transporting, transferring, sheltering or receiving a person for exploitation purposes, by threat, constraint, deceit, abuse of authority, abuse of vulnerability, or payment. The official text punishes the basic offence with seven years imprisonment and a 150,000 euro fine, and provides that trafficking of a minor needs no aggravating circumstance and is punishable by ten years imprisonment and a 1,500,000 euro fine. Exploitation covers sexual exploitation, forced labour, servitude, organ removal, begging, and work or housing conditions contrary to dignity, and it expressly includes forcing the victim to commit crimes. French courts apply these provisions strictly, including at the boundary between labour exploitation and trafficking. On 3 June 2026, the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation partly quashed and partly upheld a case in which a château owner using Polish workers housed on site in undignified conditions had been convicted of submitting vulnerable persons to unworthy housing. The Court approved the reasoning that the housing on the worksite constituted one of the counterparts of the work performed without payment for overtime, holding that the court of appeal, by reasons within its sovereign assessment, had justified its decision. The full decision, appeal number 24-85.420, is published in the official Legifrance justice database. The message for employers and intermediaries in France is clear: exploitation through housing and undocumented labour is punished as a criminal offence against persons, not managed as an administrative irregularity.

The same rigour appears on the victims side, which completes the contrast with a system that simply removes people. A smuggled migrant is not the same as a trafficking victim, and French law treats the two differently, but it protects victims who cooperate. Article L. 425-1 of the foreigners code provides that a foreigner who files a complaint against a person accused of trafficking or pimping, or who testifies in criminal proceedings for those offences, is issued a one-year temporary residence card marked private and family life, provided he or she has broken all ties with that person, and the card is renewed for the duration of the criminal proceedings. The official Legifrance text states each condition. Compensation follows through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Commission: Article 706-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows any person suffering harm from facts presenting the material character of an offence to obtain full compensation for personal injury, and its conditions expressly list offences under Articles 225-4-1 to 225-4-5 among the offences opening the right even without a one-month incapacity threshold. The official text confirms the listing. Victims exploited in France can therefore obtain residence, protection and money, while offenders face real prison. Readers seeking the practical steps, complaint, reflection period, appeal against refusal or removal order, will find them detailed in our guide to the residence permit for trafficking victims who file a complaint in France. And for the broader picture of when French judges halt a removal altogether, our roundup of cases in which French courts stop an extradition or surrender shows the same logic at work: enforcement must be real, individualised, and compatible with fundamental rights, whether the person is prosecuted in France or claimed by another State.

One exemption in French law deserves emphasis because foreign readers often misunderstand it. Article L. 823-9 shields family members and purely humanitarian helpers from prosecution for aiding irregular movement or residence: ascendants, descendants, siblings and spouses are exempt, as is any person whose act gave rise to no direct or indirect consideration and consisted in providing legal, linguistic or social advice or any other aid for an exclusively humanitarian purpose. The official text lists each category and adds that the family exemptions do not apply in polygamy situations. France therefore distinguishes the smuggler who profits from the citizen who helps, the opposite of a system that treated 2,525 convicted offenders as an administrative burden to be exported. The comparison is the heart of the Luxembourg ruling: a penalty an enforcement system refuses to serve is not a penalty at all.

Conclusion

The judgment of 15 October 2026 will not empty prisons or fill them by itself. Hungary repealed its decree in August 2025, and the 2,525 people released under the scheme will not be re-incarcerated by a Luxembourg ruling. But the decision fixes a European standard with unusual clarity: a custodial sentence that the State systematically refuses to enforce, replacing it with an order to leave the territory, is not an effective, dissuasive and proportionate penalty, and a Member State that maintains such a scheme breaches Union law. For France, three consequences follow. First, French courts now hold an authoritative finding of systemic non-enforcement in Hungary for smuggling and trafficking sentences, which defence teams will attach to every challenge to a Hungarian European arrest warrant, and which investigating chambers will have to assess under the two-step test of systemic deficiency and individual risk. Second, the ruling validates the French model of real enforcement, from the five-year base penalty for facilitation to the fifteen-year organised-group maximum, from the effectiveness command of Article 707 to the compensation and residence rights of victims. Third, it warns every actor in the chain, police, prosecutors, judges and legislators, that administrative shortcuts in criminal enforcement do not survive European review. The border can be policed, smugglers can be expelled after they serve their sentences, but the sentence must be served. That is what Luxembourg said, and that is what Paris already does.

📄 Official circular