On 22 September 2026, the president of the world’s smallest independent republic stepped to the podium of the United Nations General Assembly in New York and announced that his country was leaving the International Criminal Court. Within days, Washington publicly applauded the move, the presidency of the Court’s Assembly of States Parties replied with open concern, and international lawyers started asking the question this article answers: what does quitting the Rome Statute actually change, for the departing state, for the Court, and for a country like France that has built its cooperation with The Hague into its own Code of Criminal Procedure? The short answer is that withdrawal is slower, narrower and less protective than the announcement sounded. The longer answer runs through Article 127 of the Rome Statute, two completed precedents, and the French surrender machine in Paris that keeps working regardless of who walks out.
I. Nauru’s exit: what was announced in New York and what the treaty does with it
A. What President Adeang announced at the UN General Assembly, and who applauded
David Adeang, president of Naoero — the name the Pacific micro-state, formerly known as Nauru, is restoring on the international stage — was the first Pacific Islands Forum leader to address the 81st session of the UN General Assembly’s general debate, on 22 September 2026. The speech, reported by RNZ Pacific on 24 September 2026, ranged across sovereignty, the restored country name, deep-sea mining and development status. Its passage on international criminal justice was blunt: the president described the International Criminal Court as one of the multilateral institutions that was becoming ever less relevant to his country, and he told the Assembly that before leaving New York, Naoero would deposit its instruments of withdrawal with the depositary of the Rome Statute. The announcement came hours after the President of the United States used the same rostrum to urge member states to step back from international institutions, a sequence the Pacific press noted explicitly.
The context matters because Naoero’s move did not happen in a vacuum. Since the spring of 2026, the Court has been operating under direct American pressure: Washington imposed institutional sanctions targeting the ICC itself, a step France publicly condemned in mid-October 2026, as this desk has already analysed in its coverage of the American sanctions against the Court and the French response. The Trust Fund for Victims and the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties each issued statements in early October regretting those sanctions. It is in this climate — a Court simultaneously unsealing historic arrest warrants, as with the four Afghanistan warrants on gender persecution, and fending off the hostility of a great power — that the United States publicly congratulated Naoero on its decision to withdraw, a message relayed by Pacific media in early October. A small state’s exit, cheered by a great power that never joined the treaty, is precisely the kind of signal the Assembly of States Parties exists to absorb.
The Assembly’s presidency reacted on 30 September 2026 with a formal statement on the announced withdrawal. Its message, published on the Court’s official site, took note of the situation with concern, recalled Naoero’s contribution to the collective work of the Assembly in support of the Court as an independent and impartial judicial institution, and urged the country to remain a committed State Party and to keep engaging constructively within the Assembly’s framework. The presidency stressed that every State Party is entitled to raise its concerns inside the Assembly and encouraged Naoero to take part in a substantive exchange on the matter. The tone is diplomatic, but the institutional meaning is clear: the Assembly would rather litigate its disagreements in the room than lose members at the door, weeks before its twenty-fifth session convenes in The Hague.
Two side notes round out the picture of the New York speech. First, the president coupled the ICC announcement with an attack on a very different body, the International Seabed Authority, accusing it of stalling the deep-sea mining code his country has awaited for years while its sponsored contractor sits on exploration data — a grievance about multilateral delivery that mirrors the ICC complaint. Second, none of this concerns France directly as a bilateral dispute: no French national, no French company and no French proceeding is named in the affair. The French interest is structural, and it is considerable: Paris is one of the Court’s earliest and steadiest State Party supporters, and French courts apply the Rome Statute every week. That is the angle developed in the second part of this article.
B. Withdrawing from the Rome Statute: the one-year clock, and everything withdrawal does not erase
Leaving the International Criminal Court is a treaty operation governed by a single provision, Article 127 of the Rome Statute, and its mechanics are deliberately slow. Under that article, a State Party may withdraw by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and the withdrawal takes effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the notification itself specifies a later date. The one-year interval is not a courtesy: it is a cooling-off period during which the state remains fully bound, and it gives the Assembly, the Prosecutor and the judges time to secure ongoing files. Anyone reading a headline that a country has quit the Court on the day of the announcement should mentally add twelve months before the exit produces any legal effect, a rule that flows directly from the Statute’s withdrawal clause, whose official English text is published by the Court itself (Rome Statute, ICC official PDF) and recorded with the United Nations Treaty Collection (Rome Statute, UN Treaty Collection).
The second paragraph of the same article then lists what withdrawal cannot wash away, and the list is long. A state is not discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising under the Statute while it was a party, including any financial obligations that have accrued. Its withdrawal does not affect cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings that the withdrawing state had a duty to cooperate with and that began before the withdrawal took effect. Nor does it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter already under consideration by the Court before that date. In plain terms: arrears stay due, pending cooperation files stay open, and preliminary examinations or investigations already launched continue. Withdrawal closes the front door to future obligations; it does not lock the files already on the desk.
History confirms the reading, because Naoero would be only the third state to complete the journey. Burundi, which had become a State Party in 2004, saw its withdrawal take effect on 27 October 2017 — and the Court’s judges authorised the Prosecutor to open an investigation reaching back into the period when Burundi was still bound (ICC situation in Burundi). The Philippines deposited its written notification on 17 March 2018, its withdrawal took effect on 17 March 2019, exactly one year later, and the Court has consistently held that it retains jurisdiction over crimes committed while the country was a party, between 1 November 2011 and 16 March 2019 (ICC situation in the Philippines). That retained jurisdiction is not theoretical: the man arrested in Manila and flown to The Hague in March 2025, former president Rodrigo Duterte, is being tried for acts from the period of membership, with trial currently scheduled to open on 30 November 2026 after the pre-trial litigation this desk has followed step by step, from the October witness ruling to the October decision on the scope of the charges. For Naoero, the arithmetic is identical: whatever the one-year date turns out to be once the notification is received in New York, everything attributable to the membership period remains answerable in The Hague.
There is a further, quieter consequence that Pacific commentators have already raised and that the Stanford international-law clinic documented years ago in a communication concerning Nauru and Manus Island: a withdrawing micro-state does not recover the protection of the Statute’s membership benefits — referral rights, Assembly votes, judge nominations — while keeping none of its exposure. And a state that leaves while the Court is under sanctions pressure weakens the collective shield at the exact moment the Prosecutor, the judges and the Trust Fund for Victims need it most. That collective dimension is why Paris, which condemned the American sanctions against the institution on 13 October 2026, watches withdrawals as a matter of foreign policy, not of bilateral courtesy. France cannot stop a sovereign exit; it can, and does, keep its own cooperation machinery fully engaged, which is what the second part of this article describes.
II. What France does when The Hague calls: surrender in Paris, and the trials Paris holds itself
A. Arrested for the ICC in France: the Paris surrender procedure, from the 24 hours to the one month
France gave the Rome Statute domestic teeth early, through the cooperation statute of 26 February 2002 (Law No. 2002-268 of 26 February 2002 on cooperation with the International Criminal Court), whose provisions now sit in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The opening article of that title sets the tone for everything that follows: for the application of the Statute of the International Criminal Court signed on 18 July 1998, France takes part in punishing the offences and cooperates with that court under the conditions fixed by this title, in the words of Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which adds that « la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre ». The provision covers any person prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes within the meaning of the Statute. Cooperation with The Hague is therefore not a diplomatic favour in French law; it is a statutory duty assigned to named magistrates.
Day-to-day assistance runs through the national anti-terrorism prosecutor. Requests for legal assistance from the Court, with supporting documents, are transmitted to the anti-terrorism prosecutor of the Republic, who acts across the entire national territory, in the presence where applicable of the ICC Prosecutor or his representative, under Article 627-1 and Article 627-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Interim protective measures on French soil, of the kind listed in the Statute’s cooperation article, are ordered by the same prosecutor with Treasury advances, for a maximum of two years renewable at the Court’s request, under Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bank accounts, real estate, company shares: when The Hague asks to freeze, Paris has a designated hand on the lever, with time limits written into the statute.
Arrest for surrender follows its own sealed track, and its deadlines are strict. ICC arrest-and-surrender requests, in original with supporting documents, go to the competent national authorities which check their formal regularity, forward them to the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal and simultaneously execute them across the whole territory of the Republic, under Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Anyone apprehended on such a request « doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent », in the exact words of Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: brought within twenty-four hours before the territorially competent prosecutor, told in a language he understands that surrender to the ICC is sought, that he will appear within five days at most before the Paris prosecutor general, and that counsel of his choice — or court-appointed counsel — will assist him immediately. Transfer to the Paris Court of Appeal district, where applicable, must occur within five days of presentation to the prosecutor, failing which the person is immediately released by decision of the president of the indictment chamber unless transfer was delayed by insurmountable circumstances, under Article 627-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The ruling of the indictment chamber, with the place and date of surrender and the length of detention served toward it, is notified to the Court, and « La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive », in the words of Article 627-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure — surrender within one month of the final decision, failing which immediate release follows, again save insurmountable circumstances. Twenty-four hours, five days, one month: the French surrender track is a timetable, not a discretion.
The money trail has its own endpoint. Authorisation of enforcement granted for ICC fines and forfeitures leads, as the Court decides, to transfer of the proceeds to the Court or to the victims’ fund, and disputes over allocation go back to The Hague, under Article 627-17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Readers who followed the October 2026 statements of the Trust Fund for Victims on the American sanctions will recognise why that plumbing matters: the fund that receives forfeited assets is the same one Washington’s measures purport to squeeze. For a foreign national reading this in London, Washington or Sydney and wondering what would happen if an ICC warrant surfaced during a Paris stopover, the answer is procedural and unsentimental: arrest anywhere in France, a Paris-centred judicial track, counsel from the first hours, and surrender within a month of a final order. The statute leaves the politics of withdrawal to diplomats; it leaves no gap in the chain from a The Hague warrant to a Paris courtroom.
B. When France judges instead of surrendering: universal jurisdiction and the immunity boundary
Surrender is only half of the French system. The other half is the power of French courts to try international crimes themselves, even committed abroad by foreigners — the universal-jurisdiction clause of Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Outside the cases where the Rome Statute applies directly, any person suspected of genocide, other crimes against humanity or war crimes committed abroad may be prosecuted and tried in France, provided « La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français », habitual residence understood as a sufficient connecting link assessed through duration of presence, its conditions and reasons, settlement intent and family, social, material or professional ties. Prosecution lies only at the request of the anti-terrorism prosecutor, and only if no international or national court seeks surrender or extradition — the public prosecutor must verify that the ICC is not already seised. Complementarity, in other words, is written into the trigger of the French case: Paris prosecutes when The Hague does not want the file, and steps back when it does.
The Cour de cassation polices that trigger strictly, as a Syrian case decided on 24 November 2021 shows (Cass. crim., 24 Nov. 2021, No. 21-81.344). A Syrian national under investigation in Paris for complicity in crimes against humanity over 2011–2013 facts challenged French jurisdiction, pointing out that Syria never ratified the Rome Convention and that Syrian criminal law does not incriminate crimes against humanity as such. The indictment chamber thought it enough that Syrian law punishes murder, barbarity, rape, violence and torture, and that the Syrian constitution bans torture. The criminal chamber quashed: crimes against humanity, it recalled, are necessarily committed under a concerted plan against a civilian population in a widespread or systematic attack, so that the requirement in Article 689-11 that the facts be punishable under the law of the place of commission « inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté » — necessarily includes an offence in that legislation containing the constituent element of an attack on a civilian population under a concerted plan. Result: cassation, a declaration that the French courts lacked jurisdiction over those proceedings, and remand to assess the fallout for the file. The lesson for internationally mobile readers is double-edged and very French: France casts its jurisdictional net wide, but the Court of Cassation checks every knot, and a missing double-criminality element sinks the case.
The Assembly Plenary of the Cour de cassation drew the other boundary line — immunity — on 25 July 2025 (Ass. plén., 25 July 2025, No. 24-84.071), in a case about a French national’s alleged complicity abroad alongside a foreign principal perpetrator. On jurisdiction first: the combined provisions of the criminal procedure and criminal codes « permettent de retenir la compétence des juridictions françaises pour connaître d’actes de complicité, commis à l’étranger, par une personne de nationalité française, même si l’infraction a été commise à l’étranger par un auteur principal étranger » — allow French courts to hear complicity abroad by a French national even with a foreign principal offender. On immunity next, the Court restated the classical architecture: jurisdictional immunity flows from the sovereign equality of states, it applies before national courts, and « Le principe de l’immunité ne peut être opposé devant les juridictions internationales, dont les statuts écartent expressément toute immunité, et qui agissent au nom de la communauté internationale » — immunity cannot be opposed before international courts, whose statutes expressly set aside all immunity and which act in the name of the international community. Functional immunity survives the end of office for official acts; sitting-head-of-state personal immunity and its limits belong to the international community to fix; torture as such, however grave, had not entered the exceptions. The appeal was rejected.
Put the two 2021 and 2025 rulings together with the 2002 cooperation statute and the picture is complete — and it is the picture that makes Naoero’s exit legally uneventful for France. A state leaves the treaty: the one-year clock runs, pending files survive, arrears persist. The Court keeps judging the membership years, as Burundi and the Philippines learned. And in Paris, the anti-terrorism prosecutor keeps receiving ICC requests, the Paris prosecutor general keeps presenting surrender cases, the indictment chamber keeps ruling within its month, and French investigating judges keep opening universal-jurisdiction files where the Rome Statute’s conditions are met — subject, always, to the Cassation’s double-criminality check and to immunity law. Withdrawal changes the flag on one seat in the Assembly; it changes nothing in the Palais de Justice on the Île de la Cité.
Conclusion
Naoero’s announced withdrawal from the Rome Statute, delivered from the General Assembly rostrum on 22 September 2026 and welcomed in Washington, will follow the well-worn path of Article 127: written notification to the Secretary-General, a one-year wait, surviving obligations, surviving files, surviving arrears. The Assembly presidency’s concerned reply of 30 September and the American applause describe the politics; the treaty describes the law, and the law is patient. For readers with exposure to ICC situations — officials, contractors, intermediaries who once operated on the territory of a withdrawing state — the practical message is that the membership years do not wash out, as the Burundi and Philippines precedents demonstrate case by case. For readers passing through or settled in France, the message is simpler still: the French cooperation and surrender machinery, from the twenty-four hours of Article 627-5 to the one month of Article 627-10, and the universal-jurisdiction jurisdiction of Article 689-11 under the Cour de cassation’s exacting control, function without regard to who applauds or who walks out. The Court in The Hague loses a vote it would rather have kept; it loses no file, no power and no judge. That is what withdrawal really changes — and what it leaves untouched.