You live in Paris with your children, the marriage is breaking down, and your ten-year-old tells you she wants to explain to the judge where she wants to live. Your spouse says she is too young, that children do not speak in court, or that the other parent put the words in her mouth. Who is right? This guide answers that question for English-speaking expatriates in France, binational couples, foreigners married to a French national, and parents abroad whose divorce or custody case is running before a French court. Every French term is explained the first time it appears. The law is stated as in force on 14 October 2026, with the exact French wording quoted and translated each time so you can check everything against the official texts linked inline. The judge who decides these cases is the juge aux affaires familiales (the family affairs judge, usually shortened to JAF, the single judge at the local tribunal judiciaire, the main trial court, who handles divorce, parental authority, residence of the children, contact rights and maintenance). The short answer is that in France a child who is capable of discernment has a right to be heard, that a request made by the child herself can be refused only on narrow grounds, and that judges who refuse without giving proper reasons in the judgment itself see their decisions quashed on appeal to the Court of Cassation (the supreme court for civil and criminal matters, which reviews legal errors). The longer answer — who may ask, at what moment, in what form, what happens during the hearing, and how much weight the judge gives the child’s words — fills the rest of this guide, including a section on bilingual children, hearings from abroad, and practice before the Paris family court.
I. How your child asks to be heard in France and when the judge must listen
A. Who can request the hearing, when, and what discernment really means for expat children
The foundation is article 388-1 of the Civil Code: « Dans toute procédure le concernant, le mineur capable de discernement peut, sans préjudice des dispositions prévoyant son intervention ou son consentement, être entendu par le juge ou, lorsque son intérêt le commande, par la personne désignée par le juge à cet effet. Cette audition est de droit lorsque le mineur en fait la demande. Lorsque le mineur refuse d’être entendu, le juge apprécie le bien-fondé de ce refus. Il peut être entendu seul, avec un avocat ou une personne de son choix. Si ce choix n’apparaît pas conforme à l’intérêt du mineur, le juge peut procéder à la désignation d’une autre personne. L’audition du mineur ne lui confère pas la qualité de partie à la procédure. Le juge s’assure que le mineur a été informé de son droit à être entendu et à être assisté par un avocat. » (In any proceedings concerning him or her, a minor capable of discernment may, without prejudice to provisions providing for his or her involvement or consent, be heard by the judge or, where his or her interest so requires, by the person appointed by the judge for that purpose. This hearing is a matter of right where the minor so requests. Where the minor refuses to be heard, the judge assesses whether that refusal is well founded. He or she may be heard alone, with a lawyer or a person of his or her choice. If that choice does not appear consistent with the minor’s interest, the judge may appoint another person. Hearing the minor does not confer on him or her the status of party to the proceedings. The judge satisfies himself or herself that the minor was informed of his or her right to be heard and to be assisted by a lawyer — our translation.) Three points in that single paragraph decide most expat disputes. First, the right belongs to the child in any proceedings concerning the child: divorce, residence, contact, parental authority, or a protection order. Second, a request made by the child herself is a matter of right, not a favour. Third, being heard never makes the child a party: she gives her view, she does not sue her parents, and she bears no court costs. Parents who fear that letting a child speak means dragging her into adult litigation can set that fear aside; the statute draws the boundary explicitly.
Discernment (discernement) is the only age-like threshold, and French law deliberately sets no fixed age. The official service-public.fr page on this exact question, Divorce, séparation : un enfant mineur peut-il être entendu par le juge ?, states that the statute sets no age from which a child may be heard, that the child must be capable of discernment — the ability to form a considered view through maturity and understanding — and that the judge decides case by case in light of age, maturity and comprehension. In practice, Paris family judges hear children from around seven or eight upwards with growing frequency, treat requests from ten- to twelve-year-olds as serious by default, and rarely question discernment for teenagers, while a very young child or a child whose letter plainly repeats an adult’s dictation faces closer scrutiny. The language spoken at home changes nothing in law: a bilingual child who expresses herself better in English than in French remains capable of discernment, and the judge arranges interpretation rather than treating the language gap as immaturity. What matters is whether the child can describe her daily life, her school, her relationships with each parent, and what she wishes — not whether she uses legal vocabulary or writes flawless French. A short handwritten note in English, a drawing with a few sentences, or a clear oral statement relayed by a lawyer all count as expressions of a view; none of them is rejected merely because it is brief or imperfect.
Three categories of people can trigger the hearing, and the procedure could hardly be simpler. The child herself may write to the judge at any stage, the parents (one of them, both, or their lawyers) may file a written request, and the judge may also order a hearing on his or her own motion even if nobody asked. Article 338-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: « La demande d’audition est présentée sans forme au juge par le mineur lui-même ou par les parties. Elle peut l’être en tout état de la procédure et même pour la première fois en cause d’appel. » (The request for a hearing is made to the judge without any formal requirements by the minor himself or herself or by the parties. It may be made at any stage of the proceedings and even for the first time on appeal — our translation.) No bailiff’s writ (acte d’huissier, now called acte de commissaire de justice) is needed: a letter on plain paper from the child, sent directly to the judge or passed on through a parent or lawyer, is enough, and a parent’s request is a simple letter to the JAF identifying the case and the child. Because a first request remains possible on appeal, a family that forgot or was refused at first instance gets a second chance before the cour d’appel (the appeal court). One condition precedes everything else: the parents must inform the child of the right to be heard. Article 338-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes the holders of parental authority responsible for telling a child capable of discernment about the right to be heard and to be assisted by a lawyer, requires the summons to carry a notice recalling article 388-1 of the Civil Code, and directs every judgment concerning such a minor to record that the information duty was performed. Judges check the point systematically, usually through a sworn statement (attestation sur l’honneur) from each parent. An expat parent who never told the children they could speak to the judge therefore starts the case on the back foot, while a parent who informed them early, in a neutral way and in a language the child understands, arrives with clean hands. Our companion guide to child custody in France for expats: how the judge decides residence and contact describes the wider custody framework into which this hearing fits, and readers facing the Paris court will find the local litigation context on our Paris family law practice page.
The hearing also has a blocking effect on the fast-track divorce that many expats prefer. Article 229-2 of the Civil Code provides: « Les époux ne peuvent consentir mutuellement à leur divorce par acte sous signature privée contresigné par avocats lorsque : 1° Le mineur, informé par ses parents de son droit à être entendu par le juge dans les conditions prévues à l’article 388-1 , demande son audition par le juge ; 2° L’un des époux se trouve placé sous l’un des régimes de protection prévus au chapitre II du titre XI du présent livre. » (Spouses may not consent mutually to their divorce by private deed countersigned by lawyers where: 1. the minor, informed by his or her parents of the right to be heard by the judge under the conditions laid down in article 388-1, requests to be heard by the judge; 2. one of the spouses is placed under one of the protection regimes provided for in Chapter II of Title XI of this Book — our translation.) In concrete terms, a child who asks to see the judge sends the whole file back to the courtroom: the private-deed divorce without a judge is closed, and the family proceeds through the judicial divorce with a JAF who will hear the child. Lawyers in Paris therefore ask every couple with children, before drafting any private agreement, whether each child was genuinely informed and whether any of them wishes to be heard — because a notaire (the public officer who authenticates deeds) who files an agreement while a child’s request is pending creates a defective divorce.
B. When the judge may refuse, why age alone never suffices, and what three recent rulings teach expat parents
Refusals follow two different regimes depending on who asked, and confusing them is the most common error in expat cases. Article 338-4 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: « Lorsque la demande est formée par le mineur, le refus d’audition ne peut être fondé que sur son absence de discernement ou sur le fait que la procédure ne le concerne pas. Lorsque la demande est formée par les parties, l’audition peut également être refusée si le juge ne l’estime pas nécessaire à la solution du litige ou si elle lui paraît contraire à l’intérêt de l’enfant mineur. Le mineur et les parties sont avisés du refus par tout moyen. Dans tous les cas, les motifs du refus sont mentionnés dans la décision au fond. » (Where the request is made by the minor, refusal of a hearing may be based only on the minor’s lack of discernment or on the fact that the proceedings do not concern him or her. Where the request is made by the parties, the hearing may also be refused if the judge does not consider it necessary for resolving the dispute or if it appears contrary to the minor child’s interest. The minor and the parties are notified of the refusal by any means. In every case, the reasons for the refusal are stated in the decision on the merits — our translation.) Put simply, a child’s own request leaves the judge only two exits — no discernment, or proceedings that do not concern the child — while a parent’s request opens two additional exits — not necessary to decide the case, or contrary to the child’s interest, for instance where a fresh hearing would needlessly destabilise a fragile child shortly after a first one. In both situations the reasons must appear in the judgment on the merits (décision au fond), the decision that actually fixes residence, contact, authority or support; a refusal sent separately by email, by a registrar’s letter, or orally at the hearing, without reasons reproduced in the judgment, violates the statute.
The Court of Cassation enforces that discipline strictly, and three recent decisions, all readable in full on the court’s official site, show exactly where judges go wrong. The first, the judgment of 16 February 2022, appeal No. 21-23.087, concerned a girl born in 2014 whose parents disputed her residence after the mother’s move; the child had formally asked the Orléans appeal court to hear her, the registry replied by email that the presiding judge would not hear her because her age prevented discernment, and the appeal judgment fixed residence with the father without hearing her and without giving reasons for the refusal. The court quashed the whole judgment, holding: « En statuant ainsi, la cour d’appel, qui n’a pas mis la Cour de cassation en mesure d’exercer son contrôle, a violé les textes susvisés. » (By ruling as it did, the appeal court, which did not enable the Court of Cassation to exercise its review, violated the above-mentioned provisions — our translation.) Two lessons follow for expat parents: a refusal communicated only by email counts for nothing if the judgment itself stays silent, and a blanket reference to age, without a concrete assessment of this particular child’s maturity and understanding, cannot support a finding of no discernment. The second decision, the judgment of 12 June 2025, appeal No. 23-13.900, makes the same point even more sharply for small children: a seven-year-old girl had written five handwritten lines saying visits with her father had been catastrophic and that she no longer wished to see him, the mother transmitted the note and asked for a hearing, and the Saint-Denis de La Réunion appeal court refused on the ground that five lines about such events could not justify hearing a seven-year-old, described as far too young, adding that the request had not been made at first instance and that nothing explained why a hearing was needed on appeal. The court recalled: « lorsque la demande est formée par le mineur, le refus d’audition ne peut être fondé que sur son absence de discernement ou sur le fait que la procédure ne le concerne pas » (where the request is made by the minor, refusal of a hearing may be based only on the minor’s lack of discernment or on the fact that the proceedings do not concern him or her — our translation), and quashed for lack of legal basis, because referring to age alone, calling seven far too young in the abstract, and penalising a first-time request on appeal — which article 338-2 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly allows — are each improper grounds. Parents should therefore never assume a young child’s note is worthless: five sincere lines triggered supreme-court review here, and a judge must explain concretely why this child lacks discernment rather than invoking youth in general.
The third decision extends the protection to the most sensitive expat files, those involving domestic violence and emergency protection. In the judgment of 20 May 2026, appeal No. 24-15.753, a mother had obtained an ordonnance de protection (the emergency protection order the JAF can issue where there is plausible danger and a likely victim of domestic violence, with measures on the home, contact and children for up to twelve months), and the father complained on appeal that the children, who wished to be heard, had not been heard and that no reasons for refusing had been given. The court first confirmed: « Ces dispositions sont applicables à la procédure aux fins de délivrance d’une ordonnance de protection. » (These provisions apply to proceedings for the issuance of a protection order — our translation.) It then quashed the custody-related parts of the appeal judgment, because the appeal court had decided residence, contact and support without hearing the children or stating reasons for not doing so. For an expat mother or father seeking or contesting a protection order in Paris while children are involved, the message is that speed never excuses silence: even in urgent proceedings the judge hears the child or explains in the judgment why not. One procedural warning closes this part: a refusal cannot be appealed immediately on its own; it is challenged together with the appeal against the judgment on the merits. In practice that means writing promptly to the judge to request the hearing, keeping proof of the request and of the child’s own letter, reading the judgment to check whether reasons appear, and, if they do not or if they rely on age alone, raising the defect in the appeal — exactly the path that succeeded in all three cases above.
II. What the hearing changes for residence, contact and parental authority, and how Paris handles expat families
A. How the hearing runs, what the judge does with the child’s words, and why the child never decides alone
Many expat parents imagine an intimidating courtroom cross-examination; the reality is deliberately low-key and protective. The child may be heard alone, with a lawyer, or with a person of her choice — an aunt, a grandmother, a trusted adult — unless the judge considers that choice contrary to her interest and appoints someone else. Parents and their lawyers do not attend: the judge, sometimes with the court clerk (greffier) taking notes, speaks with the child in chambers or a small hearing room, in plain language, for as long as needed and no longer. Where the child’s interest requires it, the judge may delegate the hearing to a neutral professional with no ties to the family. Article 338-9 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: « Lorsque le juge estime que l’intérêt de l’enfant le commande, il désigne pour procéder à son audition une personne qui ne doit entretenir de liens ni avec le mineur ni avec une partie. Cette personne doit exercer ou avoir exercé une activité dans le domaine social, psychologique ou médico-psychologique. Elle est avisée de sa mission sans délai et par tout moyen par le greffe. » (Where the judge considers that the child’s interest so requires, he or she appoints to conduct the hearing a person who must have no ties either with the minor or with a party. That person must practise or have practised an activity in the social, psychological or medico-psychological field. The registry notifies that person of the mission without delay and by any means — our translation.) In Paris this delegate is often a psychologist or a specialised investigator attached to the court, particularly where the child is very young, highly anxious, or caught between two fiercely conflicting loyalty demands. A lawyer for the child (avocat d’enfant) may assist throughout; where the parents’ conflict makes independent representation advisable, the Paris bar maintains a dedicated minors’ unit, and families with limited means can ask whether the child’s lawyer may be covered by aide juridictionnelle (the French legal-aid scheme), following the same income-tested route described in our guide to legal aid for divorce and custody in France.
Everything the child says is then filtered through the adversarial principle (contradictoire), the rule that each side must be able to discuss every element the judge uses. Article 338-12 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: « Dans le respect de l’intérêt de l’enfant, il est fait un compte rendu de cette audition. Ce compte rendu est soumis au respect du contradictoire. » (With due regard for the child’s interest, a report of this hearing is drawn up. That report is subject to compliance with the adversarial principle — our translation.) Concretely, the judge or delegate writes a summary — not a full transcript — which joins the file and is communicated to both parents and their lawyers, who may comment on it in their written submissions. Sensitive passages may be phrased to protect the child, but nothing decisive is kept secret from the parents: a judgment that relied on undisclosed statements would itself be vulnerable on appeal. Parents sometimes ask for a copy of an audio recording; French family hearings are not routinely recorded, and the written report is the reference document. The practical consequence is twofold. First, coaching a child with adult arguments usually backfires: experienced judges recognise rehearsed vocabulary instantly, note it in the report, and draw adverse inferences about the coaching parent’s attitude. Second, a sincere, childlike account — school runs, bedtime routines, who helps with homework, how contact weekends actually unfold — carries far more weight than grand declarations about custody law that no eight-year-old would spontaneously produce.
Weight, not outcome, is the correct vocabulary: the child’s words inform the decision without dictating it. Article 373-2-11 of the Civil Code lists what the judge weighs when ruling on parental authority, and its second item reads: « Les sentiments exprimés par l’enfant mineur dans les conditions prévues à l’article 388-1 ; » (The feelings expressed by the minor child under the conditions laid down in article 388-1 — our translation.) The child’s view therefore sits alongside five other families of considerations: the parents’ past practice and prior agreements, each parent’s ability to perform parental duties and respect the other’s rights, expert assessments with regard to age, social inquiries and counter-inquiries, and any physical or psychological pressure or violence by one parent against the other. A teenager’s settled, consistent preference to live with one parent, corroborated by school proximity and daily routine, will often tip a finely balanced residence decision; a young child’s fleeting wish, contradicted by both parents’ established co-parenting and by an expert report, will not. Judges also discount views expressed under obvious pressure: where a parent denigrates the other daily, monitors calls, or rewards rejection, the judge may maintain contact with the rejected parent while ordering therapeutic support, rather than endorsing the refusal. The social inquiry (enquête sociale) frequently ordered under article 373-2-12 of the Civil Code — a qualified professional visits both homes, meets the school, and reports on the family’s situation — complements rather than replaces the hearing: the inquiry describes how the family lives, the hearing reveals how the child experiences it. Neither the inquiry nor the hearing may be used in the debate on the ground for divorce itself, a boundary the statute states expressly. And where the outcome disappoints, the route is an appeal against the merits judgment, in which the hearing report, the reasons for any refusal, and the weight given to the child’s words are all reviewed together.
B. Bilingual children, hearings from abroad, European rules and the practical path before the Paris family court
Expat cases add three layers that purely domestic files never meet: language, distance, and borders. Language first. A child who thinks in English, answers in French with hesitation, or mixes both languages must never be treated as lacking discernment for that reason. Before the Paris JAF, the standard solution is an interpreter sworn before the appeal court (interprète assermenté), booked through the registry; the child’s lawyer may also ask that questions be put simply, that the child be allowed to answer partly in English with consecutive interpretation, and that the report record which passages were interpreted. Parents help most by avoiding last-minute pressure: tell the child in advance that an interpreter will be present, that she may ask for a question to be repeated, and that saying she does not understand is always acceptable. Distance second. Where the child lives abroad — with the other parent in London, New York or Montréal while the French case runs — or where a parent cannot travel, the judge can arrange a hearing by videoconference under domestic procedural tools and European judicial-cooperation instruments, or ask a foreign authority or a French consular service to assist depending on the country and convention in force. Early, concrete proposals win: give the registry the child’s time zone, school holidays and a reliable video contact, offer to cover interpretation costs if needed, and explain why physical presence in Paris is disproportionate. Judges respond better to a one-page practical plan than to a principled refusal to cooperate. The same pragmatism applies where the child lives in France but a parent follows from abroad: Paris hearings are short, and the court lists family matters in timed slots, so a parent flying in should ask the lawyer for the exact call time rather than booking a full day around a vague morning listing.
Borders third, because a French hearing today often conditions recognition abroad tomorrow. article 26 of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility (Brussels II ter) requires Member State courts, acting in accordance with national law and procedure, to give a child who is capable of forming his or her own views a real and effective chance to put those views forward, directly or through a representative or competent body, and to give those views due weight in light of the child’s age and maturity. A French custody judgment that shows the child was heard, or explains in its reasoning why a hearing was impossible or inappropriate in light of the child’s best interests, therefore circulates far more smoothly for recognition and enforcement in another Member State than a silent judgment that invites the foreign court to question whether the child was offered that genuine opportunity. Families straddling the Channel after Brexit live under a different recognition landscape, but the logic is identical: a reasoned French judgment with a proper hearing report persuades a foreign judge faster than a bare order. Keep the hearing report, the judgment and sworn translations together from day one; they form the recognition pack you will hand to any foreign lawyer later.
The Paris and Île-de-France pathway itself deserves a concrete walkthrough, because local procedure shapes outcomes as much as substantive law. Jurisdiction usually follows the children: article 1070 of the Code of Civil Procedure designates, where parents live apart and exercise authority jointly, the JAF of the place where the parent with whom the children habitually live resides — so a family settled in the 15th arrondissement litigates in Paris, while a move to Boulogne-Billancourt, Saint-Denis or Créteil shifts the competent court to Nanterre, Bobigny or Créteil. Filing runs through a lawyer admitted before the relevant court (avocat), by writ or joint petition, with the information notice for the child attached; the registry then sets an orientation hearing, provisional measures on residence, contact and support where requested, possibly a social inquiry or an expert assessment, and the child’s hearing at the moment the judge considers most useful — often after the first exchange of submissions so the questions can be targeted, sometimes urgently where a protection order or a planned relocation presses. The courthouse at Porte de Clichy concentrates Paris family cases in modern, timed hearing rooms with separate waiting areas that limit corridor confrontations; arrive early for security screening, bring identity documents for yourself and family-record evidence for the children (livret de famille, the official family booklet, or birth certificates with sworn translations for foreign documents), and dress for a short, focused conversation rather than a day-long trial. Three Paris-tested recommendations close the practical picture. First, draft the child’s letter with the child, not for the child: date it, keep it in the child’s own words and language, have the child sign it, and transmit it without adult commentary or underlining — judges in Paris read dozens of these letters and spot coaching within seconds. Second, coordinate the hearing with any parallel track: where a protection order, a criminal complaint, or a Hague return file runs alongside the custody case, tell each judge about the other proceedings so the hearing is scheduled once and used consistently rather than repeating an anxious interview three times. Third, never weaponise the request: filing a hearing demand solely to block the other parent’s relocation or to delay a private-deed divorce, then discouraging the child from speaking frankly, damages credibility more surely than any adverse report. Judges in Paris reward the parent who facilitates the child’s voice — booking the interpreter, accepting videoconference, respecting the outcome — and they remember the parent who instrumentalised it.
Conclusion
A child capable of discernment has a French judge’s ear as of right when she asks for it, and only two narrow answers — no discernment, or proceedings that do not concern her — can close that door against her own request; a parent’s request opens two further answers, necessity and best interests, but every refusal must be reasoned inside the judgment on the merits, or the Court of Cassation quashes, as the Orléans email of 2021, the seven-year-old’s five lines from La Réunion in 2025, and the silent protection-order judgment of 2026 each demonstrate. The hearing itself remains a protected conversation rather than a trial: alone or accompanied, possibly through a neutral professional under article 338-9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, summarised in a report open to both sides under article 338-12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, weighed with the other statutory factors under article 373-2-11 of the Civil Code, and never turning the child into a party. For expat families in Paris and Île-de-France, the winning posture combines early information of the child in a language she understands, a short sincere letter in her own words, an interpreter and a videoconference plan where needed, and a judgment trail — hearing report, reasons, translations — that satisfies both the French JAF and any foreign court asked to recognise the decision under Regulation Brussels II ter and the official guidance at service-public.fr. Inform early, request in writing, prepare without coaching, and let the child’s genuine voice do the work it was designed to do.