On 22 September 2026, the International Court of Justice announced that Colombia had walked away from the biggest genocide case in the world. Four days earlier, on 18 September 2026, Bogota told the Court it was withdrawing the declaration of intervention it had filed in April 2024 in the case brought by South Africa against Israel over the Gaza Strip. The move went largely unnoticed outside specialist circles, yet it raises questions that matter far beyond The Hague: what does it mean to intervene before the ICJ, why would a State withdraw, where does the Gaza genocide case now stand, and what could France — which has never intervened — still do through its own courts and its cooperation with international justice? This article answers those questions from the standpoint of a Paris defence practice that handles extradition, surrender to international courts and universal-jurisdiction files every week.
Colombia’s withdrawal changes nothing on the merits of South Africa’s claims, and it releases Colombia from being bound by the Court’s future interpretation of the Genocide Convention. But the case itself marches on, with more than twenty intervening States still on record, provisional measures in force since early 2024, written pleadings advancing through 2026, and parallel avenues — the International Criminal Court’s Palestine investigation and domestic universal-jurisdiction complaints — that keep the same facts before judges in Europe, including in Paris. Understanding the machinery matters because the ICJ does not try individuals, does not issue arrest warrants and does not free detainees; it tells States what the law requires, and national courts, prosecutors and defence lawyers do the rest.
I. What did Colombia’s withdrawal change in South Africa v. Israel?
A. Why did Colombia intervene in April 2024 and walk away in September 2026?
To grasp the news of 22 September 2026, start with the procedure. According to the ICJ press release of 22 September 2026, Colombia notified the Court on 18 September 2026 that it was withdrawing the declaration of intervention it had lodged under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute on 5 April 2024 in the proceedings brought by South Africa against Israel over the Gaza Strip. That announcement carries three pieces of information worth unpacking: the date of the withdrawal (18 September 2026), the legal basis of the original move (Article 63 of the ICJ Statute) and the case it belongs to (South Africa v. Israel, filed 29 December 2023).
Article 63 is the simpler of the two intervention routes at The Hague. The same press release recalls how Article 63 works: any State party to the treaty under interpretation may step into someone else’s case to submit observations on that treaty, on the understanding that the interpretation the Court eventually gives will bind the intervener as well. In other words, any State party to the Genocide Convention can step into South Africa v. Israel, file observations on how the Convention should be read, and accept in advance that the Court’s reading will bind it too. Colombia did exactly that on 5 April 2024, joining one of the longest intervener lists in ICJ history.
That list deserves a full recital because it shows how crowded — and how politically diverse — the case has become. According to the Court’s 22 September 2026 release, the States that have filed under Article 62 or Article 63 are: Libya (10 May 2024); Mexico (24 May 2024); Palestine (31 May 2024, under both Articles 62 and 63); Spain (28 June 2024); Türkiye (7 August 2024); Chile (12 September 2024); the Maldives (1 October 2024); Bolivia (8 October 2024); Ireland (6 January 2025); Cuba (10 January 2025); Belize (30 January 2025, under both articles); Brazil (17 September 2025); the Comoros (29 October 2025); Belgium (23 December 2025); Paraguay (3 March 2026); the Netherlands and Iceland (11 March 2026 each); and Namibia, the United States of America, Hungary and Fiji (12 March 2026 each). Colombia was one of the earliest names on that roll, and it is now the first to leave it.
Why leave? The Court gives no reason, and Bogota’s notification, as summarised in the release, offers none either. International lawyers will recognise at least four plausible, non-exclusive explanations, and honesty requires presenting them as hypotheses rather than facts. First, a change of litigation strategy: an Article 63 intervener accepts that the judgment’s interpretation of the Convention will bind it, which constrains future legal positions; a government reassessing its exposure may prefer the freedom of a non-party. Second, domestic politics: Colombia’s foreign policy orientation has shifted since 2024, and disengagement from a polarising case can be a low-cost diplomatic signal. Third, resource calculation: full participation through memorials, oral observations and monitoring costs money and diplomatic bandwidth, and smaller foreign ministries triage. Fourth, anticipation of the merits phase: as the case moves from provisional measures into years of written pleadings, some States intervene early for the symbolic gesture and step back before the heavy lifting. None of this affects the validity of Colombia’s original 2024 declaration, and none of it withdraws anything from the case file already constituted — the withdrawal operates for the future.
Legally, the effect is narrow but real. Colombia will no longer file observations, will not appear at hearings on the interpretation of the Genocide Convention, and will not be bound under Article 63 by the interpretation the Court eventually gives. South Africa’s application, Israel’s defences, the provisional measures in force and every other intervention stand exactly as before. A withdrawal is not a vote of no confidence in the Court, not a judgment on the merits and not a precedent other States must follow; it is a single party to the Convention reclaiming its freedom to read the treaty as it wishes. For readers tracking the case from France, the more striking fact may be who has never appeared on that list at all: France, a party to the Genocide Convention since 1950, has filed neither an Article 63 declaration nor an Article 62 application, a silence we examine in the second part of this article.
B. Where does the Gaza genocide case stand after three provisional-measures orders?
The case began when South Africa seised the Court on 29 December 2023 with an application alleging that Israel had breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention towards Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as recorded in the Court’s case file. South Africa asked the Court to declare that Israel had breached the Convention — the 1948 treaty that defines genocide, obliges States to prevent it and punishes incitement, attempt and complicity — and it asked urgently for provisional measures, the ICJ equivalent of interim relief, to protect Palestinians in Gaza while the years-long merits phase runs its course.
The Court answered with unusual speed and repetition. By an Order of 26 January 2024 it indicated provisional measures, including that Israel take all measures within its power to prevent genocidal acts; by an Order of 28 March 2024 it indicated additional measures concerning humanitarian assistance; and after South Africa filed a further request on 10 May 2024, the Court, by an Order dated 24 May 2024, confirmed the interim orders already in force and added fresh ones. Three rounds of binding interim orders in five months is exceptional in ICJ practice and explains why the case dominates every discussion of the Court’s current docket. Provisional measures bind the parties as a matter of international law — the Court confirmed their binding character a quarter-century ago — even though the ICJ has no bailiff and enforcement runs through the UN Security Council, where France sits as a permanent member.
September 2026 finds the case in a quieter but decisive phase. The provisional-measures orders remain in force. The written pleadings on the merits — South Africa’s Memorial, Israel’s Counter-Memorial and the replies — are moving through the Court’s calendar, with States’ evidence being compiled through 2026; as one September 2026 Amnesty International publication notes, South Africa has been submitting evidentiary material to sustain its claims, and international NGOs are pressing States to act on the Court’s orders in the meantime. The intervention docket keeps growing even as Colombia leaves: the March 2026 declarations by the Netherlands, Iceland, Namibia, the United States, Hungary and Fiji show that States on all sides of the underlying conflict want a voice in how the Convention is construed. The Court has yet to rule on the admissibility of each declaration, let alone on jurisdiction over the merits or on the merits themselves; a final judgment is years away, which is normal for cases of this magnitude.
Two companion proceedings frame the picture. First, Nicaragua v. Germany, concerning alleged breaches of international obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory including through arms transfers, held public hearings on Germany’s preliminary objections from 7 to 10 September 2026 — a case this desk has analysed separately for its arms-export and complicity arguments, which are built on the same Genocide Convention duties of prevention that South Africa invokes. Readers interested in that parallel track can consult our analysis of Nicaragua v. Germany, genocide prevention and arms transfers before the ICJ. Second, the International Criminal Court’s Palestine situation runs alongside the ICJ case on a different track — individual criminal responsibility rather than State responsibility — with arrest warrants already issued and more sought, a duality examined in our companion piece on ICC arrest, surrender and trial procedure from a French defence perspective. The ICJ tells States what the Convention demands; the ICC pursues the individuals accused of the gravest crimes; national courts, including French ones, form the third level. That third level is where a Paris lawyer’s advice becomes concrete.
II. What can France do — and what can you file in Paris — while the ICJ case runs?
A. Can French courts prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad?
Yes, within strict conditions, and the file most international clients ask about starts here. French criminal law defines the three core international crimes in the Penal Code, and French procedure opens a universal-jurisdiction gateway that has generated some of the most important Court of Cassation rulings of the decade. Anyone considering a complaint in Paris, or anyone worried about one, needs the exact texts — quoted here word for word from the official Légifrance versions verified for this article — before any strategy discussion.
Genocide is defined by Article 211-1 of the Penal Code, which provides: “Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”. The article then lists killing, serious attacks on physical or mental integrity, subjection to destructive conditions of life, measures to prevent births and forcible transfer of children, and punishes genocide with life imprisonment. Crimes against humanity are defined by Article 212-1 of the Penal Code, which provides: “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”. Eleven categories follow, from murder and extermination through imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance, apartheid and other inhumane acts. War crimes are defined by Article 461-1 of the Penal Code, which provides: “Constituent des crimes ou des délits de guerre les infractions définies par le présent livre commises, lors d’un conflit armé international ou non international et en relation avec ce conflit, en violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre ou des conventions internationales applicables aux conflits armés”. Three definitions, three distinct contextual elements — concerted plan to destroy a protected group for genocide, widespread or systematic attack pursuant to a concerted plan for crimes against humanity, armed conflict nexus for war crimes — and confusing them is the most common error in public commentary, as the ICC itself illustrated on 23 September 2026 when it convicted an accused of crimes against humanity while acquitting him of war crimes on the same facts, for want of the armed-conflict nexus proof. Our analysis of that split verdict, with its lessons for French defence strategy, is available in our report on the ICC’s September 2026 CAR judgment, sentence and reparations.
Jurisdiction is governed by Article 689 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “Les auteurs ou complices d’infractions commises hors du territoire de la République peuvent être poursuivis et jugés par les juridictions françaises soit lorsque, conformément aux dispositions du livre Ier du code pénal ou d’un autre texte législatif, la loi française est applicable, soit lorsqu’une convention internationale ou un acte pris en application du traité instituant les Communautés européennes donne compétence aux juridictions françaises pour connaître de l’infraction.” The operational provision for the Rome Statute crimes is Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes”, namely genocide, other crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Penal Code. Three cumulative filters then apply, and each has teeth. First, habitual residence: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, assessed as a sufficient connecting link — duration of presence, conditions and reasons for it, demonstrated wish to settle or remain, family, social, material or professional ties. Second, prosecutorial monopoly: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste et si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne.” Third, subsidiarity checks: the prosecution must verify that the ICC is not already seised and that no other competent international court has requested surrender and no other State has requested extradition.
The Court of Cassation has given Article 689-11 its working shape in two landmark rulings that every Paris practitioner cites. In its plenary judgment of 12 May 2023 (appeal no. 22-80.057, published in the Bulletin), the Court held, in the passage verified from the full text for this article: “Cet article exige que les faits poursuivis en France sous la qualification de crimes contre l’humanité ou de crimes et délits de guerre soient punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis.” That is the double-criminality requirement — but the Court immediately limited it: the second interpretation prevails, namely, in the judgment’s own reasoning, “On en déduit qu’il suffit que les faits sous-jacents soient punis par la législation de l’État où ils ont été commis.” No identity of legal labels is required; murder, torture, rape and barbarity punished as ordinary crimes abroad satisfy the test even if the foreign code knows no category called crimes against humanity. The official record is available at Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, no. 22-80.057. Complementing it, the Criminal Chamber held on 24 November 2021 (appeal no. 21-81.344) that crimes against humanity necessarily include their contextual element — concerted plan, civilian population, widespread or systematic attack — a ruling practitioners consult at Crim., 24 November 2021, no. 21-81.344. The practical consequence is double-edged and must be stated plainly: filing a universal-jurisdiction complaint in Paris is legally possible against a habitually resident suspect for Gaza-related facts characterised as genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, provided the underlying acts were punishable where committed; but the antiterrorism prosecutor alone decides, subsidiarity to the ICC and to extradition requests applies, investigations take years, and dismissal orders can be challenged only through the narrow appeal to the Paris prosecutor general with a hearing of the complainant on request.
Defence-side vigilance mirrors this. Anyone residing in France who exercised command, supplied material support, authorised transfers or administered detention in connection with the Gaza conflict should understand that the same provisions can ground preliminary investigations, that the residence test is factual rather than administrative, and that parallel ICC exposure does not cancel French exposure — it organises priority between them. Early advice on status, travel, document preservation and communication discipline is not optional; it is the difference between a controlled hearing as an assisted witness and a dawn arrest followed by pre-trial detention.
B. How does France surrender suspects to the ICC, and what defences work in Paris?
The second Paris lever is cooperation with the International Criminal Court — the institution that tries individuals where the ICJ judges States. France’s cooperation framework sits in Title I of Book IV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and its opening article sets the tone. Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” Surrender to the ICC is therefore neither extradition in the classic sense nor execution of a European Arrest Warrant; it is a sui generis remise governed by the Rome Statute and the French articles that implement it, with the Paris Court of Appeal as the exclusive judicial hub.
The chain runs as follows. Article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut”. In urgent cases the request may go directly to the locally competent public prosecutor before formal transmission. Then Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the safeguard clients ask about first: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that period the custody rights of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply; the prosecutor verifies identity, notifies the person in a language they understand that an ICC arrest-and-surrender request exists, advises that appearance before the Paris prosecutor general follows within five days maximum, and guarantees immediate access to chosen or court-appointed counsel. If the prosecutor does not release the person, presentation to the liberty-and-custody judge follows, with detention or, where representation at all procedural acts is sufficiently guaranteed, judicial supervision or electronically monitored house arrest.
Transfer to Paris, hearing rights and time limits complete the picture, and each carries a defence opening. The sought person is transferred to the Paris Court of Appeal remand centre within five days, failing which release follows absent insuperable circumstances; the Paris prosecutor general serves the request and the charges in an understood language, takes statements with counsel present, and forwards the file to the investigating chamber, which alone authorises surrender after adversarial hearing. Release applications remain available at any time before the Paris investigating chamber under the Rome Statute’s Article 59 standards, and surrender must occur within one month of the final decision, failing which release follows absent insuperable circumstances — the one-month rule practitioners verify against Article 627-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: “La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction”. Defences that succeed in Paris follow familiar lines: mistaken identity or irregular request, manifest violation of fundamental rights in the requesting process, ne bis in idem, and — most structurally — complementarity and admissibility arguments that the case belongs before a willing and able national court. Political-offence rhetoric, effective against classic extradition, has no purchase against ICC surrender; human-rights arguments must be evidenced, not incanted, with country-of-detention materials, medical files and procedural records rather than press clippings.
For Gaza-related exposure specifically, the articulation between the three levels should be mapped before any step is taken. An ICJ provisional-measures order binds Israel as a State and informs every complicity analysis, but it does not itself order any arrest; ICC warrants, where they exist in the Palestine situation, trigger the surrender chain described above for anyone found in France; and French universal-jurisdiction complaints offer a third path when neither The Hague court is seised of the individual concerned. A coherent file strategy sequences these levels: preserve evidence admissible in each forum, avoid contradictory characterisations of the same facts across forums, and brief counsel in each jurisdiction on what the others are doing. The Colombia withdrawal changes none of this machinery — it simply reminds observers that ICJ coalitions shift while the underlying duties of prevention and punishment, and the French courts’ power to apply them, remain.
Conclusion
Colombia’s exit from South Africa v. Israel, notified on 18 September and announced on 22 September 2026, is a footnote to the merits and a headline for procedure: the first withdrawal from the largest intervention docket the ICJ has ever managed, leaving more than twenty States still in the room and three binding provisional-measures orders still on the table. The case will be decided years from now on the meaning of the Genocide Convention; the immediate legal reality is written in Paris as much as in The Hague, through universal-jurisdiction complaints filtered by the antiterrorism prosecutor, through ICC surrender proceedings centralised at the Paris Court of Appeal, and through the precise French definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes that mirror — without copying — the international treaties. Whether you consider filing, fear being filed against, or simply need to understand what the next ICJ order would change for interests in France, the method is the same: read the exact texts, check the exact dates, test the exact forum, and move early. The Gaza docket will keep evolving week by week; the files prepared now are the ones that will count when it does.