On 24 June 2026, three sitting judges of the International Criminal Court walked into the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and sued the President of the United States. Judges Kimberly Prost of Canada, Solomy Bossa of Uganda and Reine Alapini-Gansou of Benin asked a federal judge to declare Executive Order 14203 unlawful and to block the sanctions Washington imposed on them for their work on ICC investigations into Afghanistan and Palestine. It was, as their counsel put it, the first time ICC judges themselves went to court to challenge their designation, and the fifth lawsuit filed against the same executive order. Two months later, on 18 August 2026, the administration answered by sanctioning the Court’s own president, Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, while the Treasury issued a wind-down licence that expired on 17 September 2026, the very day this analysis is published. For readers in France, the episode is not distant American theatre. France is a State Party to the Rome Statute, French prosecutors and the Paris investigating judge execute ICC requests on French soil every year, French banks process euro payments linked to The Hague, and French courts decide who gets surrendered to the Court. This analysis sets out what the judges’ lawsuit says, what the sanctions machine does to a judge in practice, and what France must still do: cooperate with the Court under articles 627 to 627-11 of the Code of criminal procedure, apply asset freezes only on United Nations or European Union legal bases under the Monetary and Financial Code, and protect people and organisations targeted by the American measures.
I. Can ICC Judges Really Sue the U.S. Government? The June 2026 New York Lawsuit Explained
A. Which ICC Judges Sued Donald Trump, Where and What They Demand
The complaint was filed in New York on 24 June 2026, and the Open Society Justice Initiative, which represents Judge Prost alongside the firm Foley Hoag as co-counsel, published the filing the same day. The three plaintiffs are not junior officials: Judge Prost has sat on the ICC bench since March 2018 and previously served in Canada’s Department of Justice, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the United Nations; Judges Bossa and Alapini-Gansou likewise sat on ICC judicial panels dealing with the Afghanistan and Palestine situations. All three were among eight ICC judges designated by the Trump administration under Executive Order 14203. The others designated under the same order include the ICC Prosecutor, both Deputy Prosecutors, the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Palestine, whose designation is the subject of a separate legal challenge, and three Palestinian human rights organisations. Designating eight judges of an eighteen-judge court means the sanctions reach nearly half the bench of the world’s permanent criminal court.
The order they challenge was signed on 6 February 2025. It declares a “national emergency” in relation to ICC investigations involving nationals of the United States and nationals of certain allies of the United States that have not consented to ICC jurisdiction, including Israel, and it authorises sanctions, including asset freezes and travel restrictions, against foreign individuals who have participated in or supported those investigations. The plaintiffs’ attack runs on three tracks. First, they argue the order exceeds statutory authority because it violates international law, contradicts other acts of Congress, and rests on a putative national emergency that does not exist. Second, Judges Prost and Bossa contend that the freezing of their assets violates due process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Third, all three judges assert that their designations are arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The relief sought is declaratory and injunctive: a judicial declaration that the order and the designations are unlawful, and an injunction stopping their enforcement against the judges.
The judges’ case did not arrive in a vacuum. It is the fifth lawsuit brought against Executive Order 14203, and in the earlier cases federal courts had already found the order unconstitutional because it imposes impermissible free-speech limitations on those assisting the Court. Two further actions sharpened the fight over the summer. On 15 July 2026 advocacy groups sued over the free-speech effects of the order, and on 11 August 2026 four human rights organisations, the American Friends Service Committee, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch and the Open Society Institute, filed their own challenge in the Southern District of New York, arguing that the sanctions illegally punish individuals and organisations affiliated with the Court, infringe constitutional rights to free speech, association and religion, exceed presidential powers and rest on a pseudo emergency with no basis in fact. The judges’ lawsuit is therefore the judicial-independence wing of a broader five-front litigation campaign, and the only one brought by the sanctioned judges in their own names. As James A. Goldston, executive director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, summarised, prosecuting judges for their rulings is “an unprecedented attack on judicial independence”. In his reading, the three judges are being punished for deciding cases independently and for handing down decisions the administration dislikes, in an attempt to steer their future rulings.
One procedural detail matters for everything that follows in France. The legal representation of Judge Prost is provided under an Office of Foreign Assets Control general licence authorising United States persons to provide legal services to designated individuals. Washington itself concedes, through its licensing practice, that even a sanctioned judge must be able to hire a lawyer. That concession will matter when French banks and insurers claim they cannot touch any file connected to a listed person: the sanctions regime itself contains doors, general licences and wind-down authorisations, and a lawyer’s first job is to check which door is open before accepting a refusal.
B. What U.S. Sanctions Do to an ICC Judge: Frozen Accounts, No Banks, No Insurance
To understand why judges took the extraordinary step of suing a government, it helps to measure what designation does to daily life. The organisation representing Judge Prost describes the effect bluntly as a “financial death penalty”: dollar accounts frozen, credit cards, online platforms, banking services and health insurance withdrawn, and speaking engagements in the United States made impossible. An asset freeze blocks every dollar-denominated channel, and because almost every internationally active bank maintains correspondent relations with the United States financial system, the freeze radiates far beyond American territory. Credit cards stop working, online platforms close accounts, health insurers walk away, and universities cancel invitations because paying a plane ticket could count as a prohibited transaction. A judge keeps her robe and her salary in The Hague, but loses large parts of modern economic life.
The campaign then escalated to the top of the institution. On 18 August 2026, as Reuters reported from Washington, the United States designated the ICC’s sitting president, Judge Tomoko Akane of Japan, and Abdoulaye Seye of Senegal, a senior trial lawyer in the Office of the Prosecutor who had worked on the team that sought an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and who has been nominated for election as an ICC judge. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the two had taken part in ICC efforts to “investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute” officials of a government that has not accepted ICC jurisdiction. The Court replied, in statements reported the same day, that threatening judges for applying the law puts the international legal order itself at risk and undermines the rule of law. Targeting a sitting court president has no precedent in the history of the Rome Statute system, and sanctioning the presidency and a trial lawyer together strikes at both ends of the judicial process at once. The Netherlands, which hosts the Court, publicly disapproved: Dutch Foreign Minister Tom Berendsen invited Judge Akane to discuss continued support and wrote that international courts and tribunals must be able to carry out their mandates freely. Judge Akane herself had warned in December that the American sanctions would paralyse the Court across all its situations and cases and “jeopardize its very existence”. The Court later quantified the scale: nine of its eighteen judges, both Deputy Prosecutors and members of the Prosecutor’s office found themselves under American measures.
The same August package revealed the clockwork of sanctions practice. The Treasury coupled the designations with a general licence authorising the wind-down of transactions involving Judge Akane and Mr Seye through 17 September 2026. A wind-down licence is a standard sanctions tool: existing contracts may be closed out, but no new business may be written, and after expiry even the closing of old positions needs a fresh authorisation. Readers who follow this publication’s companion analysis of the August designations and the French and European shields, US Sanctions on the ICC President: What France’s Blocking Shield Means for You, will recognise the machinery. The present article takes the story one step further: the judges are fighting back in court, and the fight changes what lawyers, banks, witnesses and suspects in France should do now. The earlier American salvo had already shown the pattern: targeted sanctions in the previous year against ICC prosecutors and judges over the arrest warrants for Mr Netanyahu and former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, as well as over the past Afghanistan examination, froze American assets and cut the listed persons off from the dollar system. Each wave follows the same script, and each wave triggers the same question in Paris: does any of this have legal force on French soil?
The short answer is that an American designation has no direct legal force in France, but it has considerable practical force through fear. No French bank is bound by an American executive order as such. Yet compliance departments, terrified of losing dollar clearing, frequently apply American lists as if they were French law, freeze first and ask questions later, and push the cost of their caution onto customers, associations and counsel. That gap between law and practice is precisely where a French lawyer earns her fee: by forcing the file back inside French and European law, demanding the exact legal basis of every refusal, and using the licences, exemptions and remedies the texts provide. The rest of this analysis maps those bases, starting with the duty France owes the Court, which no foreign sanction can suspend.
II. What Does the U.S. Attack on the ICC Change in France? Cooperation, Money and Protection
A. Does France Still Have to Arrest and Surrender Suspects to the ICC?
Yes, without any change. The American sanctions do not amend the Rome Statute, they do not suspend France’s implementing legislation, and they do not give any French authority a reason to slow down a surrender file. France transposed its cooperation duties into a dedicated title of the Code of criminal procedure, and that title applies in full today. Its opening article states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The provision is available in force on the official codified text at article 627 of the Code of criminal procedure. Note the personal scope that follows in the same article: the rules apply to any person prosecuted before the Court or convicted by it for acts constituting, within the meaning of articles 6 to 8 and 25 of the Statute, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. A United States designation of a judge, a prosecutor or even a suspect changes nothing to that scope: French cooperation runs toward the Court, not through Washington.
In practice, cooperation arrives on a prosecutor’s desk as a request for mutual assistance. The channel is fixed by law: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives.” That is article 627-1 of the Code of criminal procedure, and it names the single entry point in France, the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, who takes all useful steps on the request and may receive it directly and by any means in urgent cases. Execution follows the same centralised logic: “Les demandes d’entraide sont exécutées, selon les cas, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste ou par le juge d’instruction de Paris qui agissent sur l’ensemble du territoire national en présence, le cas échéant, du procureur près la Cour pénale internationale ou de son représentant, ou de toute autre personne mentionnée dans la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.” That is article 627-2 of the Code of criminal procedure. Two features deserve attention from an international reader. First, the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor and the Paris investigating judge act across the entire national territory, so an ICC file never gets lost between regional offices. Second, the ICC Prosecutor or her representative may be present during execution, which means the Court watches its own requests being carried out, an additional guarantee against quiet non-execution.
Cooperation also covers money and property. Where the Court needs assets preserved for eventual confiscation or reparations, French law provides: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste.” And: “La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans.” Both sentences come from article 627-3 of the Code of criminal procedure, which allows renewal on the Court’s request before expiry. The two-year ceiling with judicially supervised renewal is the French answer to open-ended asset freezes: preservation, yes, but time-limited, Treasury-funded and renewable only on a reasoned request. No American sanctions list can substitute itself for this procedure, and no French prosecutor may refuse a Court request on the ground that the Hague official who signed it appears on a foreign designation list.
The most sensitive cooperation measure is the arrest and surrender of a person found in France. Here French law is deliberately fast and deliberately protective at the same time. Speed first: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” That is article 627-5 of the Code of criminal procedure, which adds that the person is informed, in a language she understands, that she is the subject of an arrest request for surrender purposes and that she will appear within a maximum of five days before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal. Protection then takes over in Paris: “La mise en liberté ou la mainlevée ou la modification du contrôle judiciaire ou de l’assignation à résidence sous surveillance électronique peut être demandée à tout moment à la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris qui procède conformément à l’article 59 du statut et à la procédure prévue aux articles 148-1 et suivants du présent code.” That is article 627-9 of the Code of criminal procedure, and the same article requires the investigating chamber to rule by a reasoned judgment delivered in public hearing. Finally, the system closes escape routes through domestic proceedings: “La procédure suivie devant la Cour pénale internationale suspend, à l’égard de cette personne, la prescription de l’action publique et de la peine.” That is article 627-11 of the Code of criminal procedure. A suspect cannot wait out the Hague clock behind a French file.
Readers facing the best-known ICC arrest warrants will find the French procedure applied to concrete cases in this publication’s earlier analysis, Netanyahu ICC Arrest Warrant: France, Surrender and Europe. The point for today is narrower and stronger: every step described above, from the anti-terrorism prosecutor’s desk to the Paris investigating chamber, remains fully operative while the judges’ New York lawsuit runs its course, and none of it depends on the state of American sanctions. A defence lawyer in France should therefore never accept an argument that an ICC request has lost authority because the requesting judge or prosecutor is under American sanctions. The request draws its authority from the Statute and from articles 627 and following, and only a decision of the Court itself, or of the competent French judicial authority on statutory grounds, can stop it. Conversely, a person arrested in France for surrender to the Court keeps every procedural guarantee, including release applications at any time before the Paris chamber, and those guarantees are enforced by French judges who answer to French law, not to foreign designation lists.
B. Can a French Bank Freeze You Because Washington Listed the ICC? How to Get Paid and Stay Protected
The second question is the one that fills lawyers’ inboxes: a Paris association supporting ICC witnesses sees its transfer returned, a French counsel’s fees from an ICC-related client are blocked, an insurer cancels the professional policy of a listed person’s lawyer, and each time the bank or insurer points to the American list. French law draws a hard line here. Asset freezes in France are administrative police measures taken on precise legal bases, not reflexive copies of foreign lists. The Monetary and Financial Code defines the vocabulary first: “Pour l’application du présent chapitre, on entend par :” That opening is article L562-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code, which then defines each covered category, from terrorist acts to foreign interference. The freezing power itself belongs to the Minister for the Economy: “Le ministre chargé de l’économie peut décider, pour une durée de six mois, renouvelable, le gel des fonds et ressources économiques”, for funds belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons who commit, attempt, facilitate or finance acts sanctioned or prohibited by resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter or by acts taken under European Union treaty provisions, or who are designated under those resolutions or acts. That is article L562-3 of the Monetary and Financial Code. The architecture is unmistakable: United Nations resolutions, European Union acts, six months renewable, ministerial decision. An American executive order is none of those. A French bank that freezes an account “because of OFAC” without a French or European legal basis is not applying French law; it is applying its own fear of American secondary effects, and that choice can be challenged.
Challenge it how? The method depends on who you are. Start with the document every compliance department must produce: the exact legal basis of the refusal, in writing, with the reference of the French or European text applied. A generic invocation of “international sanctions” or “internal policy” is not a legal basis. If the bank cites a European Union regulation, check whether the person or transaction is actually listed in its annexes; the August 2026 ICC designations were American measures, and European annexes did not mirror them. If the bank cites a French ministerial freeze, demand the order and check its six-month duration and renewal. If the bank cites only the American order, the refusal rests on private risk management, and private risk management must still comply with French banking duties: the duty to execute payment orders, the right to an account, the prohibition of abusive termination of the banking relationship, and the contractual notice periods in the account agreement. Each of these gives a lever, from a formal demand letter to an emergency application before the competent court, and for professionals the faster route is often the banking mediator combined with a parallel court filing that concentrates minds.
Lawyers and associations have additional shields that the judges’ own case illustrates. Legal services to designated persons can be provided under OFAC general licences, as the representation of Judge Prost shows, so a French bank that blocks counsel’s fees should be asked which licence it examined before refusing. Humanitarian, journalistic and witness-support activities benefit from European humanitarian exemptions built into most Union sanctions regulations, and none of the American ICC designations creates a European prohibition on paying a French lawyer, hosting a witness or funding a legal defence. Where an insurer cancels coverage, the same discipline applies: produce the clause, name the listed text, and explain in writing why an American designation voids a French insurance contract. Most cancellation letters collapse at that stage into a renegotiation. Where they do not, the file becomes a contract-liability dispute like any other, to be brought before the French courts with the correspondence as exhibit one.
Three practical reflexes close this section. First, keep money inside the euro system for ICC-related work: payments in euros between French accounts never need dollar clearing, which removes the compliance department’s favourite argument at a stroke. Second, paper everything: every refusal, every returned transfer, every oral statement from an account manager should be confirmed in writing the same day, because a discrimination or breach-of-contract file is won on documents, not on memories. Third, separate the roles: the person who negotiates with the bank should not be the person who decides the litigation strategy, and both should be coordinated by counsel before the first angry phone call, not after the third frozen payroll. The wind-down licence that expired on 17 September 2026 is a reminder that sanctions calendars move fast: authorisations lapse, designations expand, and a file reviewed in August can be out of date in October. A diary with the expiry dates of every licence and every freeze, checked monthly, is the cheapest insurance a cross-border file can buy.
Conclusion
The images of June 2026 will stay in the history of international justice: three sitting international judges, Prost, Bossa and Alapini-Gansou, filing suit in Manhattan against the government that sanctioned them, arguing that a “national emergency” cannot be conjured to punish judicial decisions, that frozen bank accounts without due process violate the Fifth Amendment, and that designations untethered from evidence are arbitrary and capricious. They joined two waves of advocacy lawsuits, won the backing of earlier court findings that the executive order’s speech restrictions are unconstitutional, and forced the sanctions regime to defend itself in open court. Then August showed the regime’s answer: the unprecedented designation of the Court’s president and of a senior trial lawyer, coupled with a wind-down licence whose expiry on 17 September 2026 marks the moment this article goes to press. The litigation will take months or years, and its outcome in American courts cannot be predicted from Paris.
What can be stated from Paris, with the texts in hand, is everything else. France’s duty to cooperate with the Court under article 627 and the articles that follow it stands untouched: mutual-assistance requests still land on the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor’s desk under article 627-1, still get executed across the whole territory with the ICC Prosecutor present under article 627-2, still support time-limited protective measures under article 627-3, and still lead to twenty-four-hour presentment, five-day Paris appearance and permanent access to the investigating chamber under articles 627-5 and 627-9, with limitation periods suspended under article 627-11. Asset freezes in France still require a United Nations or European Union basis, decided by the Minister for the Economy for six renewable months under article L562-3, within the definitions of article L562-1: an American list alone freezes nothing in French law. And the practical lesson of the judges’ lawsuit travels well: sanctions regimes contain licences, exemptions and doors, from OFAC legal-services authorisations to European humanitarian exceptions, and every refusal by a bank or insurer must be forced to name its exact legal basis before it is accepted. The judges chose the hardest forum available, a foreign court reviewing its own government’s emergency powers, and they chose it because judicial independence is worth defending where it is attacked. In France the defence is quieter and closer to home: keep the cooperation channel open, keep ICC-related money in euros, keep every refusal letter, and bring the file to counsel before the freeze, not after. The Court in The Hague cannot do its work if the States around it look away; France, host to no ICC detention centre but party to every ICC obligation, has no legal reason to blink.