On 24 September 2026, France cleared the state aircraft carrying Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu through French airspace on his way to address the United Nations General Assembly in New York, although an International Criminal Court arrest warrant has targeted him since November 2024 over alleged war crimes. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the clearance was granted “in full conformity with international law” and that the Rome Statute imposes no duty regarding the overflight of French territory by a state plane carrying a person sought by the Court. Paris is a State Party to the Rome Statute, formally bound to cooperate with the Court, including by arresting suspects who enter its territory — yet the aircraft crossed, landed nowhere in France, and nobody was arrested.
This was the second time in nineteen months. On 2 February 2025 the same government authorised the same passenger on the same kind of route, and answered for it before the National Assembly. The repetition matters because it converts an incident into doctrine: France now has a stated, written, twice-applied position on what an ICC arrest warrant does — and does not — require when the wanted person flies over rather than lands. For executives, officials, journalists and counsel advising anyone exposed to an ICC warrant, an Interpol notice or a cross-border arrest request, the episode draws the brightest line in international criminal procedure: transit is not presence, overflight is not entry, and everything changes the moment wheels touch French tarmac. This analysis sets out what happened, what the Rome Statute truly obliges, and what French judges would do if the wanted person landed at Roissy instead of crossing at 35,000 feet.
I. Why an ICC arrest warrant stops at the edge of French airspace
A. What happened on 24 September 2026, and why it was the second clearance in nineteen months
The facts are established by contemporaneous wire reporting on the 24 September 2026 clearance. On 24 September 2026, Paris defended its decision to let the Israeli Prime Minister’s aircraft cross French airspace en route to the United Nations, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Pascal Confavreux telling reporters that international law required no action despite the ICC arrest warrant over alleged war crimes. His operative sentence, in the wire’s English rendering, was that the Rome Statute imposes no obligations concerning overflights of French territory by a state aircraft carrying a person targeted by an arrest warrant. France, a signatory of the Court’s founding statute bound to cooperate including by arresting suspects who enter its territory, characterised the clearance as “in full conformity with international law”.
The context sharpens the picture. The warrants in question were issued in 2024 against Netanyahu and his then-defence minister as well as the then-military commander of Hamas. Israel rejects the jurisdiction of the Hague-based court, denies war crimes in Gaza, and is contesting the warrants against Netanyahu and his former defence chief Yoav Gallant. Flight-tracking data showed the aircraft routing over Greece, Italy and France; a spokesperson for Italy’s Foreign Ministry said they could not immediately answer whether Israeli authorities had sought permission for an overflight. A year earlier Netanyahu had flown a circuitous route to New York to skirt the airspace of several European countries, including France. This time he flew straight through. The diplomatic backdrop was electric: Washington has opened a campaign to isolate the Court, the American President had that same week urged ICC member states to quit what he called an “out of control institution”, and France publicly stated that it condemns the threats against the Court. Netanyahu’s visit itself was unusually short — arrival in New York around 9 a.m. Eastern Time for the address, departure later the same day.
French readers learned the next day that the scene was a repeat. A national daily headlined that the Prime Minister, indicted by the ICC, had once again crossed French airspace without consequence — “une nouvelle fois”. The first crossing is documented in an official parliamentary source that any defence lawyer can cite. On 2 February 2025, the same aircraft on a Washington-bound official journey crossed Greek, Italian and French airspace, and a member of the National Assembly questioned the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs: how could France, bound by Article 86 of the Rome Statute to cooperate in arrest, allow a person sought by the Court to use airspace that international law treats as national territory, and had France expressly authorised it. The Government’s published answer is the doctrinal twin of the September 2026 statement: The published answer confirms the flight was expressly authorised to use French airspace on its official journey to Washington, in what the Government described as full respect for French rights and obligations under international law. It continued: On the law, the answer states that the Rome Statute creates no obligation as regards overflight by a state aircraft carrying among its passengers a person under arrest warrant. And it closed the loop on the warrants themselves: On the warrants of 21 November 2024, the answer pledges that France will honour its international obligations, faithful to its long-standing support for international justice and the independent work of the Court.
Three practical points emerge from pairing the two clearances. First, France expressly authorises these overflights; this is clearance, not inadvertence — the February 2025 answer uses “a été autorisé”, the September 2026 briefing speaks of “clearance”. Any argument that the aircraft slipped through unnoticed fails against the Government’s own words. Second, the legal reasoning is identical across nineteen months and two governments’ statements: the Rome Statute’s cooperation duties attach to persons on the territory, not to passengers overflying it in a foreign state aircraft. Third, the political balancing is explicit: support for the “travail indépendant” and independent work of the Court on one side, strict textual reading of the cooperation obligation on the other. Counsel advising a wanted person should read this as neither impunity nor protection — it is a transit-only position, and it evaporates on landing.
B. What the Rome Statute truly requires: arrest on the territory, and the unresolved immunity quarrel
The cooperation architecture of the Rome Statute is vertical and territorial. Article 86 lays down the general obligation of States Parties to cooperate fully with the Court in its investigations and prosecutions. Article 89 obliges them to comply with requests for arrest and surrender of persons found on their territory. Articles 87 and 91 organise the channels and contents of such requests. Article 102 draws the categorical line that many commentators blur: surrender is the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court under the Statute; extradition is the delivering up of a person by one State to another under treaty or national law. The official consolidated text of the Statute is published by the Court itself. Nothing in this architecture mentions airspace, overflight, or transit at cruising altitude. France’s reading — no obligation attaches to a state aircraft merely crossing the sky — is therefore a literal one, and no State Party has publicly demonstrated the contrary with a treaty provision.
The harder question is what happens on the ground, because there two provisions of the Statute pull in opposite directions and France has taken a position on each side at different moments. Article 27 declares official capacity irrelevant: sitting heads of state and government enjoy no immunity before the Court. The parliamentary question of 2025 recalled that the Court’s Second Pre-Trial Chamber clarified on 24 October 2024 that, under Article 27, heads of state and government — including those from non-party States — have no immunity from arrest warrants. Article 98, conversely, provides that the Court may not press a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law concerning the immunities of a third State, unless that third State waives them. France’s stance of 27 November 2024, published by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, leans on the second provision: France, it says, will honour its international obligations, on the understanding that the Statute both demands full cooperation with the Court and provides that no State may be required to act inconsistently with its international-law obligations concerning the immunities of non-party States. Such immunities, Paris added, apply to the Prime Minister and the other ministers concerned, and would have to be taken into consideration if the Court were to request their arrest and surrender.
International lawyers will recognise the fault line immediately. Israel is not a State Party to the Rome Statute; France treats Israel as a third State whose serving Prime Minister carries personal immunity under customary international law, triggering Article 98. The Court’s Prosecutor and Pre-Trial Chambers have repeatedly held that Article 27 removes such immunity where the situation reaches the Court through Security Council referral or the territoriality of a State Party — the Palestine situation — and the Court rejected Israel’s jurisdictional challenges in proceedings whose decisions are published on the Court’s own record system, including the warrant file of 21 November 2024. France has not disavowed the Court’s reading for The Hague while maintaining its own reading for Paris: cooperate fully, but weigh non-party immunities if an arrest-and-surrender request arrives. That duality is the whole French position in one sentence, and it explains both the overflight clearance and the careful vocabulary around it. For the travelling wanted person, the lesson is narrow but vital: French skies are not French soil for cooperation purposes in the Government’s doctrine, while French soil triggers a judicial machine that starts within hours — with immunity as the first and possibly decisive battle.
II. What France must do if the wanted person lands: arrest in Paris, then the immunity fight
A. The French ICC-arrest machine: twenty-four hours, a Paris judge, and a one-month clock
If the aircraft had landed at a French airport, the overflight doctrine would have been irrelevant and a different, fully codified procedure would have seized the file. France implemented the Rome Statute through a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whose opening article provides: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” The text, in force as consulted on 30 September 2026, is published by Légifrance in the Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on French cooperation with the International Criminal Court. Cooperation with the Court lives in this separate title; extradition to foreign States lives in a separate chapter whose portal rule states: “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre.” That is the Article 696 of the Code of Criminal Procedure setting the general regime of extradition to foreign States. Surrender to the Court and extradition to a State are different tracks, different judges, different defences — the very distinction analysed in depth in our earlier study of American sanctions against the ICC and what France must still do to cooperate from Paris.
The arrest sequence is timed to the hour. The Code provides: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that window the custody safeguards of Articles 63-1 to 63-7 apply. After verifying identity, the prosecutor informs the person, in a language they understand, of the arrest-for-surrender request and of appearance within five days maximum before the Prosecutor General at the Paris Court of Appeal: “Après avoir vérifié l’identité de cette personne, ce magistrat l’informe, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris.” The rights notice is explicit — “elle pourra être assistée par un avocat de son choix ou, à défaut, par un avocat commis d’office” — with immediate access to counsel, and the record goes straight to Paris. If liberty is not granted, the liberty-and-custody judge orders detention, or may impose judicial supervision or electronic monitoring where appearance at every step seems sufficiently guaranteed. These are the terms of the Article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on arrest for surrender to the ICC and presentation within twenty-four hours, which cross-refers to the extradition detention-escape rule in the Article 696-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on arrest warrants where the requested person evades supervision.
Two further provisions complete the picture counsel must hold in mind from the first phone call. Conservatory measures on French territory at the Court’s request — freezing assets, preserving evidence — are ordered at the Treasury’s advanced expense by the anti-terrorism prosecutor, for a maximum of two years: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans.” That is the Article 627-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on conservatory measures for the ICC ordered by the anti-terrorism prosecutor. And surrender is not open-ended: “La personne réclamée est remise dans un délai d’un mois à compter du jour où cette décision est devenue définitive, faute de quoi elle est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction” — the one-month transfer-or-release clock of the Article 627-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on surrender within one month or immediate release. Defence teams diary that deadline from finality, because transport logistics, medical fitness and concurrent national cases can all create release leverage.
Contrast this with classic extradition outward to a requesting State, where the filters are broader and the bars better known. Extradition is refused for French nationals judged at the time of the offence, for political offences or requests tainted by political purpose, and for offences committed on French territory, as the opening items of the Article 696-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure listing the bars to extradition provide — “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française, cette dernière étant appréciée à l’époque de l’infraction pour laquelle l’extradition est requise”. Every request must travel through diplomacy with its supporting title: “toute demande d’extradition est adressée au gouvernement français par voie diplomatique et accompagnée soit d’un jugement ou d’un arrêt de condamnation, même par défaut, soit d’un acte de procédure pénale décrétant formellement ou opérant de plein droit le renvoi de la personne poursuivie devant la juridiction répressive, soit d’un mandat d’arrêt” — the Article 696-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on diplomatic transmission of extradition requests with supporting orders. In ICC surrender most of these filters shrink or vanish, because the requester is a court bound by its own fair-trial statute rather than a foreign government: Paris judges verify identity, coverage by the warrant, and manifest error — not the Prosecutor’s evidence, which is challenged in The Hague.
B. The two courtroom battles after arrest: personal immunity first, surrender guarantees second
The first battle on landing would be immunity, and French case law has just made it unavoidable. On 25 July 2025 the Court of Cassation sitting in plenary assembly — its most solemn formation — quashed a Paris investigation-chamber ruling in a crimes-against-humanity file and annulled outright an arrest warrant issued against a sitting foreign head of state. The holding is now the cornerstone of every immunity argument pleaded in France: “L’immunité personnelle, distincte de l’immunité fonctionnelle, est reconnue aux seuls chef d’État, chef du gouvernement et ministre des affaires étrangères, en exercice. Elle concerne tous les actes accomplis, tant à titre privé qu’à titre officiel.” Because such immunity is a manifest procedural bar to national jurisdiction, “l’immunité personnelle doit être examinée d’office par le juge” — examined by the judge on their own motion, whether or not the defence raises it. The Court grounded the rule in custom and sovereign equality: “L’immunité personnelle, qui trouve son fondement dans la coutume internationale, a pour objet de permettre l’exercice des fonctions régaliennes de représentation internationale et de préserver un État souverain de toute ingérence étrangère.” The operative part cancelled the warrant with no remand. Read the full reasoning in the plenary-assembly ruling of 25 July 2025 on ex officio examination of sitting heads-of-state immunity, appeal 24-84.393.
The companion precedent extends the shield to official acts after office. On 13 January 2021 the Criminal Chamber rejected proceedings against a former American President and members of his administration, army and agencies over alleged abduction, arbitrary detention, torture and barbarity, holding that “Les faits incriminés, reprochés à un ancien président des Etats-Unis et à différents membres du gouvernement, fonctionnaires ou membres de l’armée américaine, ne peuvent être assimilés à de simples actes de gestion mais constituent des actes relevant de l’exercice de la souveraineté de l’Etat.” Customary international law, absent a contrary binding international rule, bars prosecuting a State’s agents for sovereign acts. See the Criminal Chamber ruling of 13 January 2021 on functional immunity for sovereign acts, appeal 20-80.511. Transposed to an ICC landing scenario, the defence matrix is therefore two-layered: while in office, personal immunity covering all acts and examined by the judge without prompting; after office, residual functional immunity for sovereign acts. Against this matrix the ICC side deploys Article 27 and the Pre-Trial Chamber’s October 2024 clarification, while France’s executive adds its Article 98 position of November 2024. No French court has yet had to choose between them on an ICC surrender file involving a non-party serving leader — the overflight clearances precisely avoided creating that test case — and honest counsel tells clients the outcome would be genuinely uncertain, litigated up to the Court of Cassation and potentially to Luxembourg and Strasbourg on the cooperation-versus-immunity question.
The second battle, if immunity fails, concerns the guarantees attached to surrender. French judges do not transfer people unconditionally; they condition transfers. The clearest recent illustration comes from European Arrest Warrant law but expresses a general judicial reflex. On 23 November 2022 the Criminal Chamber upheld an investigation chamber that conditioned surrender to the British authorities on application of Article 604(b) of the EU-United Kingdom Trade and Cooperation Agreement, under which surrender may be made conditional on the person being returned to the executing State to serve any sentence — the return guarantee. The Court approved a chamber that “subordonne la remise de la personne concernée” to that guarantee mechanism. See the Criminal Chamber ruling of 23 November 2022 conditioning surrender on the return guarantee, appeal 22-86.162. In ICC surrender the analogue is specialty and the Statute’s own protections: the Court tries only the charges in the warrant, and French counsel negotiates, documents and polices the perimeter of what surrender covers. The same reflex appears in the American pressure campaign surrounding the Court — asset freezes, visa bans, the push to move the Assembly of States Parties meeting out of New York — analysed in our companion coverage of the Said trial judgment and what ICC conviction, sentence and reparations mean from France: each coercive measure becomes material for arguments about the fairness and integrity of the receiving jurisdiction, whether the receiver is a State or the Court under siege.
For the client and the lawyer, the operational synthesis fits on one page. A transit clearance is not an arrest clearance: the Government authorises the sky and would order the arrest on the tarmac, through the 24-hour presentation, the five-day Paris appearance, and the one-month transfer clock. Immunity is pleaded from the first hour, documented with official-capacity evidence, and framed for ex officio examination — while anticipating that the prosecution answers with Article 27 and the October 2024 clarification. Concurrently, counsel prepares the guarantee layer: specialty perimeter, return mechanics, medical and family documentation, and the diary of every deadline. And because ICC warrants frequently remain under seal until execution, anyone with exposure to a situation under preliminary examination or investigation keeps ICC-aware counsel on call in each jurisdiction of landing — not merely in the jurisdiction of departure. The aircraft that crossed France on 24 September 2026 proved the first half of this synthesis; nobody should mistake it for proof of the second.
Conclusion
France’s position is now stated twice, in matching words nineteen months apart: the Rome Statute imposes no obligation concerning the overflight of French territory by a foreign state aircraft carrying a person sought by the International Criminal Court, and such overflights are expressly authorised in full conformity with international law. The warrants of 21 November 2024 remain live, the Court’s claim to reach non-party officials under Article 27 stands contested by Israel and qualified by France under Article 98, and the American campaign against the institution raises the temperature around every cooperation decision. None of that changes the landing rule. On French soil, arrest follows within hours before a Paris judge, counsel intervenes within a day, immunity is examined by the court on its own motion under the plenary-assembly precedent of July 2025, and surrender must occur within a month of finality or liberty follows. Overflight is a corridor; landing is a courtroom. Anyone navigating between the two needs the corridor mapped and the courtroom prepared — before take-off.