On 22 September 2026, standing before nearly 130 heads of state at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, United States President Donald Trump told every member of the International Criminal Court to walk out. According to the United Nations’ own meeting coverage of the 22 September address, the President also called on all States Parties to the International Criminal Court to formally withdraw from this rogue institution. The same address described the Hague-based Court as full of evil people with no jurisdiction over the United States and called on nations to withdraw from it. The demand landed one day after press reports that Washington is preparing sweeping institutional sanctions that would, according to reporting by The Wall Street Journal relayed by Al Jazeera on 21 September 2026, prohibit most transactions with the ICC after a grace period of six to seven months.
For anyone exposed to an ICC arrest warrant, working with the Court, or holding frozen funds anywhere near these battles, the question is brutally practical: does a speech at the General Assembly change what happens if you land at Paris-Charles de Gaulle tomorrow morning? The short answer is no — and the reasons lie in the withdrawal machinery of the Rome Statute itself, in France’s cooperation statutes, and in the way French courts actually examine surrender files. Withdrawal takes a year, never wipes out cooperation already owed, and France’s domestic procedure for handing a person to The Hague keeps running regardless of American rhetoric. This analysis sets out what was really said in New York, what the law says about quitting the Court, and how a surrender case unfolds in Paris, step by step, with the defences that actually work.
I. What Trump Demanded at the UN on 22 September 2026 — and What Quitting the ICC Really Takes
A. Why Did Trump Tell Every ICC Member State to Withdraw? The Speech, the Sanctions Machine and the Wave of Exits
The 22 September address was not an isolated outburst. It was the public peak of a pressure campaign built over more than a year, and each layer of that campaign is documented. Washington, as Al Jazeera summarised on 21 September 2026, had already sanctioned more than a dozen ICC judges and prosecutors under an executive order signed by President Donald Trump in February 2025. In August 2026, the net widened to the top of the institution: the Court’s President Tomoko Akane and senior trial lawyer Abdoulaye Seye were added to the list, with restrictions taking effect on 17 September. In July, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a July campaign to further isolate the Court and urged other countries to withdraw from it. The institutional sanctions now reportedly on the table would be a different order of magnitude: the planned US sanctions would prohibit most transactions with the ICC after a grace period of six to seven months, with the decision possibly finalised during the UN General Assembly week in New York or soon afterwards. Banks and companies, which typically take an especially cautious approach to US sanctions because they rely on access to the American financial system, would then have to choose between the dollar system and any business with the Court. The Court’s own leadership has warned, in terms relayed by the same reporting, that sanctions on the organisation as a whole could interfere with its ability to buy information technology and insurance services, hire investigators and make routine payments, including salaries for American employees.
The stated American grievance is jurisdictional and has been constant for nearly three decades: the Court, in Washington’s view, had exceeded its authority by pursuing officials from countries that are not ICC members. The United States, like Israel, has never joined the Court. Relations deteriorated sharply after the Court issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant over alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Washington had already objected to the earlier ICC investigation into alleged abuses in Afghanistan involving US personnel. The UN record of the speech confirms the tone: alongside the withdrawal call came attacks on the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO and the International Maritime Organization, all presented as vehicles of imposed global governance.
The withdrawal call is also landing on fertile ground, because States have already started leaving. Al Jazeera’s 21 September account records that Chad and Venezuela moved in July to withdraw from the Court, following Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The Court’s oversight body publicly urged Chad and Venezuela to reverse course in early August. Each of these exits follows the same legal track described below — written notification to the UN Secretary-General, one year before effect — which means none of them has yet released the departing State from anything. And the campaign is meeting resistance in court: four US-based rights groups sued the Trump administration in August, arguing that existing sanctions obstruct their legal and human rights work. A related front opened the same week at the Court itself: Rodrigo Duterte appeared in person at the ICC for the first time over the killings in the Philippines’ anti-drugs campaign, a case that exists only because withdrawal does not kill pending proceedings — the very principle examined now.
For readers of this desk, the companion piece to this analysis covers the sanctions machinery in detail: Trump Readies Sanctions Against the Entire ICC: What It Means for Investigations and French Cooperation. What follows here is the other half of the picture: the withdrawal law, which the New York speech put at the centre of the news cycle.
B. Can a State Simply Quit the ICC? Article 127’s One-Year Clock, Surviving Obligations and Why Warrants Outlive Membership
The Rome Statute regulates its own exits, and the text leaves no room for a same-day departure. Article 127, paragraph 1, provides, in the authentic English text published by the Court: Any State Party may withdraw by “written notification” to the UN Secretary-General, with the withdrawal taking effect “one year after” receipt unless the notification specifies a later date. Three consequences flow directly from that sentence. First, withdrawal is unilateral — no permission is needed — but it is never immediate. Second, the clock runs from receipt by the Secretary-General in New York, which is why announcements of intent, parliamentary votes and even press-conferenced notifications change nothing until the depositary records them. Third, a State may pick a later date, but never an earlier one. Any government answering the 22 September call today would therefore remain a full State Party, with every cooperation duty intact, until late September 2027 at the earliest.
Paragraph 2 then closes the door that matters most to suspects, fugitives and their advisers — the hope that leaving erases the file. It states: A withdrawing State “shall not be discharged” from obligations accrued while a Party, including financial ones; withdrawal leaves intact all cooperation in investigations and proceedings where “a duty to cooperate” arose before the exit date; and it never prejudices matters “already under consideration” by the Court. In plain terms: arrears stay due, investigations opened before the exit date keep the full cooperation regime, and matters already before the judges continue. The Duterte proceedings illustrate the rule in real time — the Philippines’ withdrawal took effect in 2019, yet the “war on drugs” case continued because the examination had begun while the State was still a Party.
That survival rule is reinforced by the cooperation architecture of Part 9 of the Statute. Article 86 states the general duty without qualification: States Parties must “cooperate fully” with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction. Article 89, paragraph 1, organises surrender — the ICC word for what extradition lawyers would call remise — in these terms: The Court may transmit an arrest-and-surrender request to any State where the person may be found, and States Parties must “comply with requests for arrest and surrender”. Note the breadth: the request may go to “any State” where the person is found, and every State Party “shall comply.” Paragraph 2 adds the safety valve that French defence lawyers actually litigate: Where the person sought raises “ne bis in idem” before the national court, the requested State must “immediately consult” the Court on admissibility; if the case is admissible, it proceeds with execution, and a pending admissibility ruling allows the State to “postpone the execution” until the Court decides. A ne bis in idem plea in Paris therefore does not kill the request by itself — it triggers an immediate consultation with The Hague, and only a pending admissibility decision allows postponement.
A further provision explains why objections based on rank have never stopped the warrants. Article 27, on the irrelevance of official capacity, provides that the Statute reaches every office “without any distinction based on official capacity”, so service as Head of State or Government, minister, parliamentarian or official never exempts from responsibility, and immunities attaching to that office “shall not bar the Court” from exercising its jurisdiction. Article 12, paragraph 2, sets the jurisdictional preconditions: the Court may act where the territorial State or the national State is a Party or has accepted jurisdiction. That is exactly the basis on which, on 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued the Gaza warrants. The United Nations’ record of the ICC press release records that on 21 November 2024, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court, in its composition for the Situation in the State of Palestine, unanimously issued two decisions rejecting challenges by the State of Israel brought under Articles 18 and 19 of the Rome Statute, together with warrants of arrest for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. The Chamber added the point Washington contests: the acceptance by Israel of the Court’s jurisdiction was not required, because the Court could exercise jurisdiction on the basis of Palestine’s territorial jurisdiction. The Prosecution’s applications in that case had been submitted on 20 May 2024. The Ukraine warrants rest on a different territorial base but the same logic: as Reuters reported from The Hague, the ICC’s first Ukraine warrant sought Putin’s arrest on suspicion of unlawful deportation of children and unlawful transfer of people from Ukrainian territory to the Russian Federation since 24 February 2022, with a parallel warrant on the same charges for children’s rights commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova. None of these warrants depends on the nationality State being a member — and none of them would evaporate if a third State answered the New York speech tomorrow.
II. Can France Still Arrest and Surrender You to The Hague After Trump’s Speech?
A. How Does a French ICC Surrender Work? From the Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor to the Chambre de l’Instruction Within Fifteen Days
France internalised the Rome Statute early and completely, and nothing in the 22 September speech suspends a single French statutory article. The gateway provision, Article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre. Les dispositions qui suivent sont applicables à toute personne poursuivie devant le Cour pénale internationale ou condamnée par celle-ci à raison des actes qui constituent, au sens des articles 6 à 8 et 25 du statut, un génocide, des crimes contre l’humanité ou des crimes de guerre.” The implementing articles then build a self-contained surrender track, separate from ordinary extradition. Under Article 627-1, “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives. Ces documents sont transmis au procureur de la République antiterroriste qui leur donne toutes suites utiles. En cas d’urgence, ces documents peuvent être transmis directement et par tout moyen à ce magistrat.” In practice, the file lands on the desk of the Paris anti-terrorism prosecutor, including in emergencies by any direct means. Provisional protective measures for the Court are covered by Article 627-3: “L’exécution sur le territoire français des mesures conservatoires mentionnées au k du paragraphe 1 de l’article 93 du statut est ordonnée, aux frais avancés du Trésor et selon les modalités prévues par le présent code, par le procureur de la République antiterroriste. La durée maximale de ces mesures est limitée à deux ans. Elles peuvent être renouvelées dans les mêmes conditions avant l’expiration de ce délai à la demande de la Cour pénale internationale.”
For the person arrested, the safeguards run fast and the deadlines are counted in hours and days, not weeks. Article 627-5 provides: “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent. Dans ce délai, les dispositions des articles 63-1 à 63-7 du présent code lui sont applicables. Après avoir vérifié l’identité de cette personne, ce magistrat l’informe, dans une langue qu’elle comprend, qu’elle fait l’objet d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise et qu’elle comparaîtra, dans un délai maximum de cinq jours, devant le procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris.” Custody rights apply from the first hours, identity is verified, notice is given in a language the person understands, counsel of choice or court-appointed counsel is available, and appearance before the Paris prosecutor general follows within five days at most. The decision itself belongs to the Paris chambre de l’instruction, and Article 627-8 frames its review in deliberately narrow terms: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin. Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles. La chambre de l’instruction statue dans les quinze jours de la comparution devant elle de la personne réclamée. En cas de pourvoi, la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation.” No “erreur évidente,” no block: the chamber orders surrender, and every other argument — admissibility, gravity, complementarity — is sent to The Hague, which “lui donne les suites utiles.” Fifteen days to decide, two months for the Cour de cassation on appeal.
Three structural differences with ordinary extradition matter enormously for defence strategy, and each is readable directly in the statutes. First, surrender to the ICC is not extradition: the classic extradition chapter opens with Article 696 — “En l’absence de convention internationale en stipulant autrement, les conditions, la procédure et les effets de l’extradition sont déterminés par les dispositions du présent chapitre” — while ICC surrender runs on its own Title under Article 627. Second, the famous French-nationality shield of Article 696-4 — “L’extradition n’est pas accordée : 1° Lorsque la personne réclamée a la nationalité française” — belongs to that extradition chapter and has no equivalent anywhere in Articles 627 to 627-20: a French passport is no bar to surrender to The Hague. Third, the political-offence exception of the same Article 696-4, the territoriality bars and the prescription bars are extradition defences, not ICC-surrender defences; before the chambre de l’instruction in an ICC file, the only door the statute leaves ajar is the absence of “erreur évidente,” plus the Article 89(2) ne bis in idem consultation described above. The substantive crimes behind the warrants are mirrored in French domestic law — Article 211-1 of the Penal Code defines genocide (“Constitue un génocide le fait, en exécution d’un plan concerté tendant à la destruction totale ou partielle d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, ou d’un groupe déterminé à partir de tout autre critère arbitraire, de commettre ou de faire commettre, à l’encontre de membres de ce groupe, l’un des actes suivants”), and Article 212-1 defines crimes against humanity (“Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”) — so French courts never face the conduct as something alien to their own legal order.
Recent Cour de cassation rulings show how seriously French judges police the neighbouring surrender tracks — European arrest warrants and extradition — and the same judicial reflexes govern ICC files. On 16 July 2026, in case no. 26-83.852 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR01136), the criminal chamber quashed in part a Paris surrender order to Spain, recalling on the visa of Articles 695-22, 695-24, 695-33 and 593 that “Le premier de ces textes prévoit un motif obligatoire de non-exécution du mandat d’arrêt européen lorsque la personne recherchée a fait l’objet, par les autorités judiciaires françaises ou par celles d’un autre État membre que l’État d’émission, d’une décision définitive pour les mêmes faits que ceux faisant l’objet de ce mandat.” and that “si la chambre de l’instruction estime que les informations communiquées par l’État membre d’émission dans le mandat d’arrêt européen sont insuffisantes pour lui permettre de statuer sur la remise, elle demande à l’autorité judiciaire dudit État la fourniture, dans le délai maximum de dix jours pour leur réception, des informations complémentaires nécessaires.” The lesson for ICC defence: ne bis in idem and insufficient-file arguments are live weapons in French surrender courts — under Article 695-22, execution of a European warrant “est refusée” where a final decision covers the same facts — but in an ICC file they must be channelled through the Statute’s own consultation mechanism, because only The Hague rules on admissibility. Five months earlier, on 16 December 2025, in case no. 25-86.688 (ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR01738), the chamber upheld an extradition to France from the United Arab Emirates organised through the Interpol channel, holding that “la transmission d’une décision d’extradition n’est pas exigée par la convention bilatérale d’extradition, seul un refus, même partiel, devant faire l’objet d’une décision motivée.” The practical warning is symmetrical: surrenders can be assembled quickly across borders on the strength of an Interpol diffusion plus central-authority notes, and contesting them demands immediate, documented challenges to identity, scope and speciality rather than waiting for a formal file that may never come in the expected form. For the distinct problem of trials held in your absence, see our analysis of this week’s Swiss-Italian in-absentia extradition ruling and the retrial guarantees France requires.
B. Are You Named, Arrested or Doing Business Near the Court? What to Do From France This Week
If your name sits anywhere near an ICC file — warrant, investigation, witness summons, or even a national file mirroring The Hague’s charges — the New York speech changes your risk assessment in one direction only: upward. American sanctions pressure and withdrawal rhetoric do not cancel warrants; they make travel, banking and cooperation more volatile while every warrant stays fully executable in every State Party, France first among them for anyone on French soil. The first operational step is therefore a map, not a prediction: which situations are open, whether an arrest-and-surrender request names you, whether an Interpol diffusion circulates your identifiers, and which borders you can still cross. The December 2025 UAE case is a cautionary tale for frequent travellers — Interpellation abroad on a diffused warrant, diplomatic-channel extradition, handover months later — and its mirror image applies in Paris: an ICC arrest request transmitted to the anti-terrorism prosecutor can put you before the Paris prosecutor general within five days of apprehension, with the chambre de l’instruction deciding within fifteen.
Arrested in France on an ICC request, the choreography is fixed and the defence must be ready before the file moves. Within twenty-four hours you are brought before the territorially competent prosecutor, with custody rights, interpretation in a language you understand, and counsel. Within five days maximum you appear before the Paris prosecutor general. The chambre de l’instruction then examines one threshold question — erreur évidente — and orders surrender where none is found, referring everything else to The Hague. Build the file around that threshold from the first hour: exact identity and homonymy risks, precise scope of the warrant against the facts alleged, any final French or foreign decision on the same facts for the Article 20/Article 89(2) consultation, and any admissibility argument (national proceedings, gravity) framed for immediate transmission to the Court rather than as a request for the Paris chamber to acquit.Parallel national exposure must be audited at the same time: French courts can prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity under their own Penal Code provisions, and an ICC-centred strategy that ignores the domestic file invites the ne bis in idem and concurrence traps the July 2026 Spanish-EAW ruling dissected. Where the underlying dispute is financial rather than custodial — frozen accounts, blocked property, delisting — the applicable playbook is the sanctions one: documented observations at each renewal and, where the listing is flawed, timely annulment litigation, as this desk explained in how EU delistings can succeed and why sanctions challenges fail.
For lawyers, banks, NGOs and contractors working with the Court from France, the risk is of a different nature but equally immediate: secondary exposure to the American sanctions wave. If broad institutional sanctions barring most transactions with the ICC after a grace period of several months do arrive, every euro of fees, every IT contract, every insurance policy and every salary payment touching the Court must be mapped now, licences and derogations prepared, and dollar-clearing touchpoints identified before the grace period expires — the exact over-compliance reflex banks already apply to EU and UN sanctions daily. French professionals remain fully bound by EU law and French criminal law while doing so: facilitating the violation of applicable sanctions, mishandling frozen funds, or tipping off a target can create domestic criminal exposure that no foreign sanctions licence cures. Document each payment chain, seek written guidance from the competent Treasury services where the regime allows it, and never move funds on the assumption that a political speech has changed a binding regulation. The speech made headlines; the statutes, the warrants and the fifteen-day clock in Paris did not move a millimetre.
Conclusion
The 22 September 2026 call for a formal withdrawal from what he labelled a rogue institution will be remembered as the loudest attack ever aimed at the International Criminal Court from the United Nations rostrum — but loud is not the same as legal. Withdrawal runs on Article 127’s written notification and one-year clock, never on applause in the Assembly Hall; paragraph 2 preserves every cooperation duty for investigations and matters already underway, from Gaza and Ukraine to the Duterte proceedings; and France’s Articles 627 to 627-8 keep the Paris surrender track — twenty-four hours, five days, fifteen days, two months — running exactly as before. The warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant, for Putin and Lvova-Belova, and every sealed warrant the public has not seen, remain executable on French territory tonight. Governments may well spend the coming year debating whether to answer the New York call; courts will spend it executing the law as written. Anyone named, anyone arrested, and anyone paid by or paying the Court should act on the law, not the noise: map the file, secure counsel within hours, frame every defence for the judges who actually decide — in Paris for surrender, in The Hague for everything else — and treat the sanctions grace period as a countdown, not a bluff.