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Europol’s SIRIUS Report: Can French Investigators Obtain Cross-Border Cloud Evidence Faster Under the New EU e-Evidence Rules?

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Europol’s SIRIUS Report: Can French Investigators Obtain Cross-Border Cloud Evidence Faster Under the New EU e-Evidence Rules?

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Europol and Eurojust have put a practical warning on the desk of every prosecutor, defence lawyer and cloud platform handling a cross-border criminal case. Their SIRIUS Electronic Evidence Situation Report 2025, released on 27 August 2026, records a system under pressure: more than half of criminal investigations now involve a request for electronic evidence across a border, while the volume of requests is 3.5 times higher than in 2018. Emergency requests are also increasing. The report is news, but it is not itself a warrant and it does not replace a French judge’s proportionality review. Its importance lies elsewhere. It shows why the European e-Evidence package, applicable since 18 August 2026, will be tested immediately by the volume, speed and technical fragility of real investigations. For a French file, the decisive question is no longer whether data sit in a foreign data centre. It is whether the request identifies the correct category of data, reaches the correct legal representative, preserves the material before deletion and leaves a defence path that a court can actually use.

I. Can French investigators obtain cross-border cloud evidence faster under the new EU e-Evidence rules?

A. What the SIRIUS report shows about the evidence bottleneck

The SIRIUS publication gives the current story a sharper legal meaning than a generic announcement that digital evidence is becoming important. The Europol summary of the report states that more than half of criminal investigations include a request for cross-border access to texts, emails or messages in applications. It also identifies three reasons why a conventional request can fail even when investigators know the account, the suspect and the platform. The evidence may be held at an unknown location, the technical infrastructure may be distributed across several countries, and providers have not operated under harmonised preservation and response deadlines. That combination turns time into an evidential issue rather than a mere administrative inconvenience.

The report also says that requests are now 3.5 times more numerous than in 2018 and that emergency requests are rising. Cryptocurrency exchanges have entered the three provider categories most frequently approached. This matters for French investigations that combine fraud, laundering, cybercrime, sanctions evasion or organised crime. A case may involve a messaging account, a cloud drive, an exchange wallet, a domain registrar and a collaboration platform, all governed by different retention policies and possibly represented in different Member States. A single broad request can therefore be less useful than a short sequence of legally classified requests: first preserve the relevant account and time window, then produce the defined data set, then authenticate and exploit it.

Europol and Eurojust describe judicial cooperation mechanisms as slow and procedurally complex in practice, sometimes allowing critical evidence to disappear. They also identify a training gap: law-enforcement personnel are not sufficiently familiar with the incoming rules, while service providers must adapt both internal procedures and information systems. The news is therefore operational. The report is not a finding that every cross-border request is unlawful or that every provider has failed. It is evidence that the old habit of treating the location of a server as the central legal fact is no longer adequate. The relevant questions are control of the data, the service offered in the Union, the provider’s designated establishment or legal representative, the category requested and the safeguards attached to the issuing decision.

That distinction protects the value of the report. A report prepared by an EU law-enforcement and judicial-cooperation project cannot create a power to search an account, compel a platform to decrypt material or cure an unlawful domestic measure. It can, however, identify where the new system will either save time or produce a new dispute. The first dispute will often concern scope. Subscriber data and data used solely to identify a user do not carry the same intrusion as traffic data or content. A prosecutor who describes a request as “account information” while actually seeking message content has created a classification problem before the provider has even opened the file.

For an international audience, the French angle is especially important because France has two regimes in the same practical landscape. The European Production Order and European Preservation Order now provide a direct route to an eligible service provider in another Member State. The older European Investigation Order remains central for measures executed through judicial cooperation, for evidence already held by authorities and for situations outside the Regulation’s scope. France’s broad explainer on the EU e-Evidence Regulation and cross-border digital evidence sets out the architecture. The newsworthy point today is what the SIRIUS findings require practitioners to do with that architecture under pressure.

The report’s warning about retention deserves particular attention. Neither the existence of a European order nor the fact that an investigation is urgent guarantees that historical data still exist. An account can be closed, a log can roll off, an encrypted backup can be overwritten, or a platform can move a service between technical environments. The first action in a serious case should therefore be a defensible preservation decision: identify the account, identifier, time range and data category, record the reason for urgency and send the appropriate preservation instrument without asking for an unlimited archive. A preservation order is not a substitute for the later production request; it is the bridge that keeps the later request meaningful.

There is also a defence-side implication. When a request is described too broadly, the problem is not limited to privacy. It can compromise the ability to test authenticity, completeness and relevance. The defence should ask what the provider actually returned, what it did not retain, which time zone and account identifier were used, whether the export includes system metadata, whether the material was filtered before transmission and which authority certified the request. These are not technical objections detached from law. They determine whether the court can understand the evidential path from a foreign platform to a French file.

B. What changes on 18 August 2026—and what does not

The date must be stated precisely. Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 is not merely a future proposal: its Article 34 provides that it “shall apply from 18 August 2026.” The official EUR-Lex text of Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 creates European Production Orders for production and European Preservation Orders for preservation of electronic evidence in criminal proceedings. The Regulation is directly applicable, but the decentralised IT system has its own implementation timetable. That means a legal framework can be in force while the operational channel used for every exchange is still being rolled out. A practitioner should not confuse the legal applicability date with a promise that every technical interface is already uniform.

The Regulation is addressed to a service provider offering services in the Union where the designated establishment or legal representative is in another Member State. Article 7 requires the order to be addressed directly to that designated establishment or representative, with an exceptional route to another establishment in an emergency if the designated addressee has not reacted within the prescribed time. The companion Directive (EU) 2023/1544 requires providers offering services in the Union on 18 February 2026 to designate an establishment or appoint a legal representative by 18 August 2026. A platform cannot treat the date as a symbolic compliance deadline. The designated point of contact is the legal doorway through which a production certificate, a preservation certificate, a request for clarification and a later enforcement step will pass.

The new route is not a general licence to demand any data for any offence. For traffic data and content data, Article 4 of the Regulation reserves issuance to a judge, a court or an investigating judge, or requires validation by such a judicial authority when national law gives the initial power to another investigating authority. Article 5 requires necessity and proportionality and permits a production order only where a similar order could have been issued in a similar domestic case. For traffic and content, the ordinary criminal-offence threshold is a maximum custodial sentence of at least three years, subject to the Regulation’s listed categories of offences committed wholly or partly through an information system and other specific provisions. The order must identify the user or unique identifier, the data category, the relevant time range, the applicable criminal provisions, any emergency and the reasons establishing necessity and proportionality.

That formal discipline is not cosmetic. It is what allows the provider, the enforcing authority and the later court to determine whether the demand concerns subscriber data, user-identification data, traffic data or content. It also determines who must review it. A request for a user name may follow a different path from a request for the contents of a mailbox. A demand for a full historical account may be impossible to defend as proportionate when a defined date range and a defined event would answer the investigative question. The SIRIUS report’s description of increasing volumes makes this precision more, not less, important.

The response clocks are the most visible change. Under Article 10, an addressee must preserve the requested data expeditiously on receipt of a European Production Order Certificate, or EPOC. Where notification to the enforcing authority is not required, production must occur as soon as possible and no later than ten days after receipt. Where notification is required for traffic or content, the provider normally transmits at the end of the ten-day period if no refusal ground has been raised. In an emergency, production must occur without undue delay and no later than eight hours after receipt. If the enforcing authority is notified in an emergency, it can raise an objection within 96 hours. These are legal deadlines, not service-level targets that can be silently reset by an internal ticketing system.

Preservation has a separate clock. Article 11 requires the provider to preserve the data without undue delay after receiving an EPOC-PR. The obligation ceases after 60 days unless the issuing authority confirms that a subsequent production request has been issued. During that period, the issuing authority can extend preservation by an additional 30 days when needed to issue the production request. The instrument therefore supports a “preserve first, produce on a defined request” sequence. It does not create an open-ended obligation to keep every user’s data or a general European retention regime.

The provider is not left without safeguards. Article 12 permits refusal in defined situations, including privileges or immunities, a manifest breach of a relevant fundamental right based on specific and objective evidence, ne bis in idem, or absence of dual criminality outside the Regulation’s listed categories and thresholds. Article 13 requires information to the person whose data are requested without undue delay, subject to national-law limits that protect the investigation, and it requires confidentiality and integrity measures for the certificate and the data. Article 15 requires effective, proportionate and dissuasive financial penalties and allows penalties of up to 2% of the provider’s total worldwide annual turnover for specified infringements. Speed therefore comes with an auditable compliance burden.

Electronic transmission also does not erase French procedural law. The current French provisions on the European Investigation Order remain in force during the transition, with the Code of Criminal Procedure showing their scheduled repeal from 1 January 2029 under the 2025 ordinance. Article 694-15 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure states that requests for mutual assistance between France and other EU Member States are made through European Investigation Orders unless the Code provides otherwise. This coexistence is likely to matter for a file that involves both a direct provider request and a judicial measure in the enforcing State. A practitioner must choose the instrument by asking what is being obtained and who legally controls it, not by selecting the fastest label.

The Regulation also does not turn every third-country cloud into an EU provider. If a platform has no eligible designated establishment or legal representative in the Union, a French authority may still need mutual legal assistance, the Budapest Convention channels, a bilateral instrument or another lawful route. The fact that data are technically accessible from Europe is not by itself a complete answer. The new instrument is strongest where the provider offers services in the Union and is within the Regulation’s addressee structure. Its limits are part of the legal analysis and should be recorded in the file before a deadline is promised.

II. What should a French prosecutor, defence lawyer, or platform do now?

A. How to issue, preserve, and execute a request

The first step is to frame the investigative question in a way that survives an adversarial review. “Obtain everything connected to the suspect” is not a defensible description. The file should state the suspected offence, the person or account, the relevant event, the requested data category, the time range, the reason the data are likely to be held by the provider and the reason the request is necessary and proportionate. If the concern is imminent deletion, that fact should support an EPOC-PR or an emergency request; it should not be used to avoid identifying the material sought.

French issuing authorities already have a close domestic discipline. Article 694-20 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure allows the prosecutor, investigating judge and relevant courts to issue a European Investigation Order when it is necessary and proportionate, and it requires prior judicial authorisation where the domestic measure would require authorisation by the liberty and custody judge. The text describes the condition as a measure “nécessaire à la constatation, à la poursuite ou au jugement d’une infraction” and proportionate to the rights of the person concerned. That French control is a useful drafting checklist even when the new Regulation supplies the direct provider route.

The second step is to select production or preservation. A production order is appropriate when the provider can deliver defined data and the authority can state the relevant category and period. A preservation order is appropriate when the immediate risk is deletion, alteration or loss and the production instrument will follow. Using preservation as a substitute for description creates a dispute later. The certificate must still identify the account or unique identifier, the data and the reason for the order. If the provider receives a certificate that is incomplete or contains manifest errors, Article 10 allows it to seek clarification; the issuing authority must react expeditiously and no later than five days after receiving the clarification form.

The third step is to complete the French and European forms as if the defence will read them. Article 694-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the European Investigation Order to use a form that is completed, signed and certified as accurate and correct by the issuing judicial authority. It calls for the identity and quality of the magistrate or court, the object and reasons, available information about the persons concerned, the offence and applicable provisions, the measures and evidence requested, and any urgency or deadline. The exact French formulation begins: “Toute décision d’enquête européenne est rédigée en utilisant un formulaire complété, signé”. The underlying principle carries into the new EPOC process: a vague email to a platform is not a substitute for a legally intelligible order.

Language and transmission are part of validity and execution. Article 694-22 requires the European Investigation Order to be translated into an official language of the executing State or an accepted official EU language. Its concise rule is: “La décision d’enquête européenne fait l’objet d’une traduction”. Article 694-23 requires direct transmission to the competent authorities by a means that leaves a written record and establishes authenticity. In a cloud case, the equivalent practical record should include the certificate, transmission time, recipient, acknowledgement, response time, provider ticket or reference, any clarification exchange and the exact export received.

The fourth step is to identify the French authority when France is the enforcing State. Article 694-29 provides that an incoming European Investigation Order must be issued or validated by a judicial authority. Article 694-30 sends the measure to the prosecutor or investigating judge of the territorially competent judicial court, depending on the measure. If a request asks French authorities to take a measure requiring an investigating judge or prior liberty-and-custody-judge authorisation, it should not be routed as an ordinary administrative request. The correct authority is part of the evidence chain.

The fifth step is to distinguish a provider’s possession from an authority’s possession. The European Investigation Order is designed for a specific investigative measure in another Member State. The new production order is designed to reach an eligible provider directly through its designated establishment or legal representative. If French investigators already hold an extraction, a forensic image or a database and another Member State seeks transmission, the question changes. The request should describe the evidence that is already held and the legal route for its transmission. It should not be dressed up as a request for a fresh search at the provider.

For the provider, execution starts with an internal legal triage that mirrors the certificate. The team should record whether it is the designated addressee, whether the service falls within the Regulation, whether the order identifies the controller or lawfully addresses a processor, what data category is requested, whether the date range is technically available, whether there is a privilege or third-country conflict and whether the emergency rationale is sufficiently stated. The team should preserve the responsive data immediately, isolate the production set from routine deletion and ensure that an employee cannot accidentally amend metadata while preparing the export. This is where the SIRIUS report’s warning about IT adaptation becomes a concrete legal task.

The provider should also separate “unable to comply” from “does not want to comply.” A de facto impossibility, a missing identifier, an unavailable historical period, encryption or a technical incompatibility must be explained through the prescribed channel. Encryption does not necessarily mean that a platform can produce plaintext, and the Regulation does not impose a general obligation to decrypt. At the same time, a provider should not discard an order merely because data are encrypted. It should state what data exist, what format can be produced, what cannot be produced and why, while preserving the available material. A precise impossibility notice gives the issuing authority a chance to correct the request and gives the later court a record of what happened.

Finally, the file should preserve authenticity as carefully as content. The authority should retain the original certificate and the provider’s response, not only a screenshot or a copied conversation. The production should be stored in the format received, with its account identifiers, timestamps, time zone, headers, audit information and integrity values where supplied. Any conversion for courtroom use should be documented. A court cannot assess a cross-border cloud export solely by its volume. It needs to know who extracted it, under what order, from which account, for which period, through which recipient, and whether the material was altered between receipt and disclosure.

B. How to challenge the request and protect the evidence

The new framework gives the defence a more precise map, but it does not create a single universal appeal in one country. Article 18 of Regulation (EU) 2023/1543 grants the person whose data were requested effective remedies against the European Production Order. The remedy is exercised before a court in the issuing State under its national law and must include the possibility of challenging legality, necessity and proportionality, without prejudice to fundamental-rights guarantees in the enforcing State. A French resident whose data are sought by an authority in another Member State therefore needs to identify the issuing State’s remedy as soon as information is given. Waiting until the data have been used in a French hearing may lose the most useful procedural moment.

There are two distinct challenges. The first attacks the decision to issue the order: the offence threshold, the data category, the necessity, the time range, the identity of the account, the emergency reasoning or the proportionality of the measure. Under Article 18, that challenge belongs principally before the issuing State’s court. The second attacks the execution of a measure carried out in France. It may concern the judicial authority competent in France, the domestic authorisation, the way the measure was executed, a protected privilege, the preservation of integrity or the disclosure of information that French law protects. Treating the two challenges as one is a common way to file in the wrong forum.

French law states the boundary directly. Article 694-41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows interested persons to challenge, seek nullity of or otherwise appeal measures executed in France under a European Investigation Order in the same conditions and through the same procedures as a national measure. It also says that the grounds underlying the European Investigation Order may be contested only through an action in the issuing State. The text provides: “Ne peuvent être invoqués à l’appui de ces recours les motifs de fond à l’origine de la décision d’enquête européenne”. For a defence team, the practical task is to label each ground before filing: execution in France, or merits of the foreign order.

The consequence of a successful objection is not always automatic exclusion of every downstream item. Article 694-24 states that a successful challenge in the executing State does not, by itself, produce nullity of evidence sent to French judicial authorities, although that evidence cannot be the sole basis for conviction. It also states that failure to respect the execution deadlines cannot itself be a ground of nullity. The French text is explicit: “Le non-respect des délais d’exécution de la demande d’enquête européenne ne peut constituer une cause de nullité des actes accomplis.” That rule does not make deadlines irrelevant. It means that the defence should connect delay to a concrete procedural breach, prejudice, reliability problem or violation of a safeguard instead of relying on lateness alone.

A recent decision gives the competence issue a concrete cross-border shape. In its judgment of 31 March 2026, no. 25-81.854, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:CR00404, the Criminal Chamber annulled a decision from the Douai investigating chamber and held that a challenge to the execution in France of Lithuanian European Investigation Orders belonged to the Paris investigating chamber because a Paris investigating judge had been entrusted with execution. The official Légifrance decision, Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, 31 March 2026, no. 25-81.854, records the operative reasoning and the annulment without remand. It quotes the principle that “Les règles de compétence en matière répressive sont d’ordre public”. For future cloud disputes, the lesson is practical: find the French judge who actually carried the EIO into effect before choosing the reviewing chamber.

The Court’s judgment of 4 November 2025, no. 22-82.952, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2025:CR01385, supplies a second limit on the instrument. Spanish authorities had asked France to notify a person of an indictment and collect her observations. The Criminal Chamber, applying Articles 694-16 and 694-18, held that notification of an indictment and observations limited to that procedure were not an investigative measure for obtaining evidence through a European Investigation Order. The published Bulletin decision on Légifrance records that those acts “ne pouvaient faire l’objet d’une décision d’enquête européenne”. For an international case, this is a reminder that the form, the box selected and the actual purpose must match. A certificate cannot acquire a wider legal power merely because it is sent through a familiar cooperation channel.

The incoming French refusal grounds must also be read before execution. Article 694-31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the magistrate to refuse recognition or execution in defined cases, including privilege or immunity, serious reasons to believe that execution would be incompatible with rights and freedoms protected by the European Convention and the Charter, and measures not authorised by the Code, subject to the statutory exceptions. The opening rule is: “Le magistrat saisi refuse de reconnaître ou d’exécuter une décision d’enquête européenne dans l’un des cas suivants”. Before refusing in several listed situations, the magistrate must consult the issuing authority and request the information needed. That consultation is not a formality to be skipped when a provider or defence lawyer raises a specific rights concern.

The defence should therefore request disclosure of the order, certificate, attachments, translations, notification history and provider response as early as national procedure allows. It should compare the requested category with the material actually produced. It should test whether subscriber information has silently become content, whether the time range expanded, whether an account identifier was shared by several users, whether the export contains only selected messages, whether the provider preserved the original records and whether the issuing authority told the person about available remedies. If the answer is no, the objection should identify the legal consequence sought: clarification, exclusion of a portion, expert review, nullity of a French execution measure, or an application before the issuing State.

Platforms have an equivalent interest in getting the route right. A good-faith response to a valid certificate should not be delayed by an internal debate about the physical location of a server. A flawed certificate should not be answered by a silent refusal. The compliance record should show receipt, preservation, legal classification, reviewer, escalation, response, disclosure and deletion or release of the preservation hold. The provider should also maintain confidentiality where the order permits it, because notifying a suspect at the wrong time can undermine the investigation, while withholding information without a recorded legal basis can undermine the person’s remedy. The new system is built around speed, but speed that cannot later be explained is a litigation risk.

There is a final limit that matters for global counsel. A European order may solve the route to a provider’s Union representative, but it does not decide every conflict between EU law and the law of a third country. Article 17 of the Regulation provides a review procedure where compliance would conflict with an obligation under third-country law. A provider should make a reasoned objection within the stated period and preserve the data while the issuing authority and competent court assess the conflict. The fact that data are stored in a third country is not, by itself, the whole objection. The analysis must address the applicable foreign law, whether it actually prohibits disclosure and the competing interests of the jurisdictions involved.

French counsel should also watch the interaction with domestic access to a computer system. Where investigators lawfully possess a device and can access a remote cloud service from it, a domestic search or seizure question may arise instead of a direct provider order. That route has its own authorisations, scope and integrity requirements. It should not be used to bypass the safeguards applicable to a remote request, and a remote-access fact pattern should not automatically be described as a provider production. The legal classification should follow the act actually performed, the data actually accessed and the authority that controlled it.

The same discipline applies to emergency requests. An eight-hour clock can be justified by an imminent threat to life, an immediate risk of serious harm or an equally urgent investigative situation recognised by the Regulation, but the certificate must say why the emergency exists and why ordinary validation cannot be obtained in time. The French authority must still respect the applicable domestic conditions. If ex post validation is required and not granted, the order must be withdrawn and the use of obtained data restricted or deleted as the applicable rules require. “Urgent” is a legal reason to accelerate a defined measure, not a reason to remove the description of the measure.

Conclusion

The SIRIUS report published on 27 August 2026 is a timely stress test for the EU’s new electronic-evidence system. Its figures show a demand problem: cross-border requests are normal, volumes have multiplied, emergency work is increasing and providers must respond across legal and technical boundaries. The legal answer is not a server-location shortcut. A French prosecutor should identify the data category, account, period, offence, urgency and proportionality, select an EPOC or EPOC-PR when the Regulation applies, and preserve the material before it disappears. A provider should route the certificate to the correct Union representative, preserve immediately, meet the ten-day or eight-hour clock, document any impossibility and protect integrity. A defence lawyer should separate a challenge to the issuing decision from a challenge to execution in France, use Article 18 in the issuing State where appropriate and invoke the French remedies that apply to the executed measure. The report’s real message is simple: faster access is now legally possible, but only a precise, traceable and reviewable request will make the evidence usable in court.

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