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Surrogacy in Ontario, Parentage in France: What the 3 July 2026 Plenary Rulings Change for Foreign Intended Parents

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Source: French Court of Cassation – Judilibre and Légifrance open data

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Surrogacy in Ontario, Parentage in France: What the 3 July 2026 Plenary Rulings Change for Foreign Intended Parents

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On 3 July 2026, the Assemblée plénière of the French Cour de cassation, the most solemn formation of the highest civil court in France, handed down two landmark rulings on children born through surrogacy abroad. In both cases, two men domiciled in Canada had a child through a surrogacy arrangement in the province of Ontario, obtained a judgment from the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declaring them the parents, and then asked the French courts to enforce that judgment in France. The Paris Court of Appeal had granted exequatur in both cases on 4 June 2024, but added that the Canadian decisions would produce, in France, the effects of a plenary adoption of the child by one spouse. The procureure générale near the Paris Court of Appeal appealed to the Cour de cassation. The plenary assembly set aside the Paris reasoning, granted exequatur itself without remanding the cases, recognised the two paternal filiations as such, and held that the foreign decisions could be transcribed onto French civil-status registers. For English-speaking intended parents, in Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and beyond, who plan a surrogacy in a jurisdiction where it is lawful and later need France to recognise the resulting parentage, these twin rulings of 3 July 2026, published in the Bulletin and the annual Report, now form the complete operating manual: what France still prohibits, what it must nevertheless recognise, which documents prove that the surrogate consented, and why the recognised bond is filiation rather than adoption. This article explains each step, using only the language of the rulings and the statutes they apply.

I. Can a Canadian surrogacy judgment be enforced in France despite the French ban?

A. Does the French ban on surrogacy automatically block a foreign parentage judgment?

The starting point is a prohibition that has not moved. The Civil Code provides that “Toute convention portant sur la procréation ou la gestation pour le compte d’autrui est nulle.” (Article 16-7 of the Civil Code) The same chapter adds that “Les dispositions du présent chapitre sont d’ordre public.” (Article 16-9 of the Civil Code) Surrogacy agreements are therefore void in France, and the ban carries criminal penalties as well. In the two cases decided on 3 July 2026, the public prosecutor argued that this ban alone should have led the Paris Court of Appeal to refuse exequatur, and invited the Cour de cassation to raise that objection of its own motion. The plenary assembly examined that invitation first, before even looking at the prosecutor’s written grounds, and declined it. Understanding why it declined is the key to the whole 2026 framework.

The facts were parallel. In the first case (Assemblée plénière, 3 July 2026, appeal no. Z 24-50.028, ruling no. 692 B+R), a child conceived with the gametes of one of the two intended fathers and the oocytes of a third-party donor was born on 28 February 2011 in Ontario, Canada, following a surrogacy agreement concluded on 12 February 2010 between the two men and the surrogate. By an order of 29 March 2011, the Superior Court of Justice of the province of Ontario declared the two men the parents of the child by operation of law, held that the surrogate was not the mother, and ordered a birth certificate consistent with its decision. In the second case (Assemblée plénière, 3 July 2026, appeal no. A 24-50.029, ruling no. 691 B+R), twins were born on 26 June 2013 in Canada under a comparable arrangement, and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice made a corresponding parentage order on 1 August 2013. In both cases the two men, acting in their own names and as the children’s legal representatives, applied to the French courts for exequatur of the Canadian judgment, asking in addition that it be given the effects of a plenary adoption. The Paris Court of Appeal, by two judgments of 4 June 2024, granted exequatur and declared that the Canadian orders would produce in France the effects of a plenary adoption. The full text of the first ruling is also available on the official Legifrance database (Assemblée plénière, 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2026:PL00692).

French readers who follow this firm in French will find a parallel French-language analysis of the same plenary session (GPA devant l’Assemblée plénière du 3 juillet 2026); the present article gives the English-speaking intended parent the same rulings with the practical consequences for files built abroad.

Exequatur in France is governed by a short text with a long case law. The Code of Civil Procedure states that “Les jugements rendus par les tribunaux étrangers et les actes reçus par les officiers étrangers sont exécutoires sur le territoire de la République de la manière et dans les cas prévus par la loi.” (Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure) Where no international convention applies, the French judge verifies three conditions without reviewing the merits of the foreign decision: “la compétence indirecte du juge étranger, fondée sur le rattachement du litige au juge saisi, la conformité à l’ordre public international de fond et de procédure, ainsi que l’absence de fraude” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028). Only the second condition, conformity with French international public policy, was seriously debated in these two cases, and within it the question was whether the surrogacy ban belongs to that public policy at all.

The plenary assembly answers in two movements. First, it confirms that the ban does belong there: the prohibition of surrogacy agreements, also punished under criminal law and founded on the constitutional principle of safeguarding human dignity against any form of enslavement and degradation, is an essential principle of French law and therefore forms part of French international public policy. Second, it holds that French international public policy also includes the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, which France undertook to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction, including the child’s right to respect for private life under Article 8. The decisive sentence follows: “la conformité à l’ordre public international de fond d’une décision étrangère qui établit une filiation à l’issue d’une gestation pour autrui ne saurait être appréciée au seul regard de la prohibition des conventions de gestation pour autrui mais doit l’être en considération de la nécessaire conciliation de cet interdit d’ordre public avec le droit de l’enfant au respect de sa vie privée garanti par l’article 8 précité, l’un et l’autre participant de l’ordre public international français” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028). In other words, the ban does not disappear, but it cannot be applied alone; it must be reconciled with the child’s Convention rights, and both participate in the same international public policy. That reconciliation exercise, conducted file by file, is what the rest of the rulings organise.

B. How does the child’s right to private life reshape the public-policy test?

The second movement of the rulings is built entirely on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which the plenary assembly reviews at length before drawing its own conclusions. The starting point is that the right to identity forms an integral part of private life, and that respect for private life requires everyone to be able to establish the details of their identity as a human being, including filiation. That proposition comes from the well-known judgments delivered on 26 June 2014 against France in the Mennesson and Labassée cases. The advisory opinion given on 10 April 2019 at France’s own request added that the best interests of the child include the identification in law of the persons responsible for raising the child, meeting the child’s needs and ensuring the child’s welfare, together with the possibility of living and developing in a stable environment. Later judgments refined the States’ obligations: on 22 November 2022, in proceedings against Switzerland, the European court held that a State’s public-policy prohibition of surrogacy is not decisive in itself to prevent the establishment of a parental link between the child and the intended parents; on 16 July 2020, in a case against France, it required domestic law to offer a possibility of recognition of a filiation link between the child and the intended father and between the child and the intended mother, whether or not she is the genetic mother; and on 31 August 2023, in a case against Italy, it condemned the general and absolute impossibility, for a significant period, of obtaining recognition of the link between the child and the intended father as a disproportionate interference with the child’s right to respect for private life, while insisting that decision-making processes must avoid excessive formalism and conducted with exceptional diligence so that the child is not kept in prolonged legal uncertainty.

French domestic law had already begun to absorb that momentum. After requesting the 2019 advisory opinion, the Cour de cassation held, in plenary session on 4 October 2019, that it followed from Article 8 of the Convention that, in view of the best interests of the child, the fact that a child born abroad originated in a surrogacy agreement prohibited by French law could not, on its own, disproportionately interfere with the child’s private life so as to block transcription of the foreign birth certificate as regards the biological father. The exact formula used in 2019 was that such an origin “ne pouvait, à elle seule, sans porter une atteinte disproportionnée au droit au respect de la vie privée de l’enfant, faire obstacle à la transcription de l’acte de naissance établi par les autorités de l’État étranger, en ce qui concerne le père biologique de l’enfant” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028). A few months later, the First Civil Chamber extended the logic to the transcription of a foreign birth certificate designating both the biological father and a second man as father: neither the surrogacy origin nor the designation of two fathers blocks transcription where the certificate is probative within the meaning of Article 47 of the Civil Code (First Civil Chamber, 18 December 2019, no. 18-11.815). That 2019 decision is worth reading in full by any parent holding a foreign birth certificate, because it already separates the transcription action, which is a publicity measure and not a filiation suit, from the question of how filiation was created abroad. The rulings of 3 July 2026 take the next step: they move from transcription of a birth certificate to exequatur of the foreign judgment itself, which is the stronger remedy, because a transcribed judgment travels with its reasoning and its evidentiary base, while a birth certificate alone can always be challenged as irregular, forged or disconnected from reality.

The practical consequence for the public-policy test is therefore the following. The judge hearing an exequatur application for a foreign surrogacy judgment must first acknowledge that the French ban is part of international public policy, then add the child’s Article 8 rights as an equally ranked component of that same public policy, and finally ask whether refusing enforcement would leave the child without any effective and swift avenue to a recognised filiation with both intended parents. If the answer is yes, the ban alone cannot justify refusal. The plenary assembly verified this concretely: where exequatur is refused, neither the biological parent nor the intended parent could obtain even partial transcription of the foreign birth certificate drawn up on the basis of that judgment, since any civil-status act based on a foreign judgment is inseparable from it; adoption of the spouse’s child by the intended parent would then be impossible, because the filiation with the biological parent would by hypothesis not be recognised; adoption by the biological parent would collide with the principle that a child is not adopted by their own ascendant; and neither recognition nor possession of status could be recorded on a French birth certificate in the absence of transcription. A partial exequatur limited to the biological father would, in addition, distort a foreign judgment that established filiation on the basis of a shared parental project after an overall assessment of the situation. None of these alternative routes, the Court concludes, guarantees the effectiveness and speed required by the best interests of a child who already holds a legally established filiation abroad. Only where Parliament creates a dedicated judicial procedure that rebuilds filiation in France with equivalent guarantees of security, effectiveness and speed could the balance tip the other way; the bioethics statute of 2 August 2021, which amended Article 47 of the Civil Code on the probative force of foreign civil-status acts, created no such procedure for exequatur. That is why the plenary assembly refused to raise the ban-based objection of its own motion and moved to the prosecutor’s actual grounds.

II. What must foreign intended parents prove, and what does exequatur give them?

A. Which documents satisfy the French judge that the surrogate consented?

Once the ban is neutralised as an automatic objection, the real battle moves to procedural public policy: was the foreign decision reasoned, and does the file show that everyone involved, above all the surrogate, consented to the arrangement and to its effects on parental rights? The rule is strict and the parents carry the burden of proof. The Court restates it in these terms: “Il résulte de ce texte qu’est contraire à la conception française de l’ordre public international de procédure la reconnaissance d’une décision étrangère non motivée lorsque ne sont pas produits des documents de nature à servir d’équivalent à la motivation défaillante.” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028) The text in question is Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Article 509 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and the final sentence matters most in practice: it is for the applicant to produce those equivalent documents. A bare foreign order that simply declares two people the parents, with no reasoning, no description of the surrogacy agreement and no account of who consented to what, will not be enforced on its face; it can only be saved by the surrounding file.

For surrogacy cases, the plenary assembly confirms and generalises a test first stated by the First Civil Chamber on 2 October 2024 (First Civil Chamber, 2 October 2024, no. 22-20.883): “le juge de l’exequatur doit être en mesure, à travers la motivation de la décision ou les documents de nature à servir d’équivalent qui lui sont fournis, d’identifier la qualité des personnes mentionnées qui ont participé au projet parental d’autrui et de s’assurer qu’il a été constaté que les parties à la convention de gestation pour autrui, en premier lieu la mère porteuse, ont consenti à cette convention, dans ses modalités comme dans ses effets sur leurs droits parentaux”. Three things must therefore be visible in the judgment or its supporting documents: who each participant is, surrogate, intended parents, any donor; that the surrogate consented to the agreement itself and to its practical terms; and that she consented to the loss of her own parental rights over the child to be born. The assessment is calibrated, the Court explains, by weighing on one side the vulnerability risks inherent in surrogacy arrangements and on the other the privacy rights of the child and of everyone involved, with the best interests of the child as the primary consideration.

Applied to the two Ontario files, that test produced a subtle outcome that practitioners should study closely. The Paris Court of Appeal had granted exequatur on the strength of the petition filed before the Canadian judge, which described the surrogate’s role, the legal basis invoked and the factual context culminating in the child’s birth, and treated those materials as curing the thin reasoning of the Ontario orders. The Cour de cassation held that this was not enough as reasoned: by granting enforcement without verifying, if necessary of its own motion, that the foreign judgment, supplemented by the petition, established that the parties to the surrogacy agreement, first among them the surrogate, had consented to that agreement in its terms and in its effects on their parental rights, the Court of Appeal deprived its decision of a legal basis. In plain terms, describing the factual context is not the same as establishing consent, and the French judge must check consent even where the parties do not dispute it.

Yet the story does not end with that criticism, because the plenary assembly then used its power to decide the merits itself rather than send the cases back to another court of appeal. At the cassation stage, the intended parents produced the surrogacy agreement itself, concluded on 12 February 2010, and that document allowed the Court to satisfy itself that the Canadian judge had been in a position to find the required consent: the agreement specified that the surrogate “n’aura aucun droit ou devoir parental à l’égard de l’enfant” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028), that she would not seek custody or contact, and that she would not attempt to build a parental relationship with the child. Combined with the petition already noted by the Court of Appeal, these materials constituted an equivalent to the defective reasoning of the Canadian decision alone, so the Court set aside the Paris judgments, reversed the first-instance ruling of the Paris judicial court of 22 March 2023 that had rejected all claims, and declared the Ontario order of 29 March 2011 enforceable in France, with an identical solution the same day for the 1 August 2013 Ontario order concerning the twins. Four lessons follow for any English-speaking family building a file abroad. First, keep the surrogacy agreement and file it: a signed agreement recording the surrogate’s informed consent to the arrangement and to the surrender of parental rights is the single most valuable exhibit. Second, keep the petition or originating application presented to the foreign court, because it identifies each participant and the legal basis of the order. Third, prefer a foreign judgment that itself recites those elements, since equivalent documents are a repair mechanism, not a comfort zone, and the French judge reviews consent where needed on their own initiative. Fourth, expect the French court to examine trafficking and child-welfare risks in the adversarial debate: the plenary assembly stresses that exequatur review also covers any other substantive public-policy violation, such as human trafficking, apparent from the materials, and serves the concern, expressed during the parliamentary debates preceding the 2021 bioethics statute, to verify the absence of child trafficking, to guard against intercountry-adoption fraud, and to preserve the child’s access to information about their origins.

B. Why is the recognised bond filiation rather than an adoption?

The second ground of the prosecutor’s appeal attacked the Paris solution from the opposite direction: even if exequatur was properly granted, the Court of Appeal had no right to convert the Canadian parentage orders into French plenary adoptions. The prosecutor argued that reshaping a foreign filiation judgment into an adoption re-writes the foreign decision and therefore amounts to the prohibited review of its merits. The plenary assembly agreed, and its answer clarifies what exequatur actually delivers. The governing principle is stated without ambiguity: “le juge de l’exequatur, lorsqu’il se prononce sur la régularité internationale de la décision étrangère, ne peut procéder à la révision au fond de celle-ci” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028). Once the foreign decision carries exequatur, it cannot be modified either, except for strictly limited adaptation needed to integrate it into the French legal order, and any adaptation excludes distortion. The positive rule follows immediately: “Lorsque, sans prononcer d’adoption, une décision étrangère établissant la filiation d’un enfant né d’une gestation pour autrui est revêtue de l’exequatur, cette filiation est reconnue en tant que telle en France et produit les effets qui lui sont attachés conformément à la loi applicable à chacun d’eux.” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028) Because the Ontario orders of 29 March 2011 and 1 August 2013 established filiation and pronounced no adoption, the Paris court violated Article 509 by declaring that they would produce the effects of a plenary adoption by one spouse of the child. The operative part of the 3 July 2026 rulings therefore rejects the couples’ own request to have the Canadian orders produce the effects of a plenary adoption with effect against everyone, declares the Ontario decisions enforceable, states that the filiation between each child and both intended fathers is recognised as such in France and produces the effects attached to it under the law applicable to each effect, and adds the sentence every practitioner was waiting for: “Rappelle que la décision étrangère ainsi exequaturée pourra être transcrite sur les registres de l’état civil français” (Ass. plen., 3 July 2026, no. 24-50.028).

Three practical consequences deserve emphasis for foreign families. First, transcription is now available for two paternal filiations at once. The birth certificate drawn up on the basis of the Canadian judgment can be transcribed as regards both fathers onto French civil-status registers, since the foreign judgment establishing the double paternal bond is itself enforceable. This goes beyond the earlier stage of the case law, where transcription alone was secured certificate by certificate. Second, the applicable-law analysis is done effect by effect. Recognition of the filiation as such does not mean that every consequence is governed by French law or by Canadian law wholesale; each effect, name, parental authority, maintenance, succession, follows the law designated for it by French conflict rules, starting with the probative-force regime of Article 47 of the Civil Code, which provides that “Tout acte de l’état civil des Français et des étrangers fait en pays étranger et rédigé dans les formes usitées dans ce pays fait foi, sauf si d’autres actes ou pièces détenus, des données extérieures ou des éléments tirés de l’acte lui-même établissent, le cas échéant après toutes vérifications utiles, que cet acte est irrégulier, falsifié ou que les faits qui y sont déclarés ne correspondent pas à la réalité.” (Article 47 of the Civil Code) Families should therefore expect downstream questions, particularly around parental authority and travel documents, to be handled under their own applicable laws rather than assumed from the exequatur alone. Third, the procedure ends at the Cour de cassation itself. Because the Court quashed without remand and decided the merits in the interests of the proper administration of justice, the mechanism used was the familiar one of Article 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which “La Cour de cassation peut casser sans renvoyer l’affaire dans les cas et conditions prévues par l’article L. 411-3 du code de l’organisation judiciaire.” (Article 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure) That article in turn provides that “Elle peut aussi, en matière civile, statuer au fond lorsque l’intérêt d’une bonne administration de la justice le justifie.” (Article L. 411-3 of the Code of Judicial Organisation) For the two families, fifteen years after the first Ontario order, that procedural choice meant an immediately enforceable outcome instead of a third round before a new court of appeal.

Conclusion

The twin plenary rulings of 3 July 2026 redraw the map for cross-border surrogacy files with a French connection. The French ban on surrogacy agreements remains an essential principle of domestic law, but it no longer operates as an automatic veto on foreign parentage judgments: it must be reconciled, case by case, with the child’s right to respect for private life, and both belong to the same French international public policy. Enforcement turns instead on verifiable consent, established through the reasoning of the foreign judgment or through equivalent documents that the parents must produce, identifying each participant and showing that the surrogate agreed to the arrangement and to the loss of her parental rights. Where that proof exists, the foreign filiation is recognised as filiation, transcribed onto French registers as regards both parents, and given effect under the law applicable to each consequence, without being re-labelled as an adoption. Foreign intended parents considering Ontario, California or any other jurisdiction where surrogacy is lawful should therefore build their file from day one with the French judge in mind: a reasoned foreign order, a complete petition, a signed and explicit surrogacy agreement, and documentary proof of informed consent are the four exhibits that turn a lawful foreign birth into a parentage recognised in France.

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