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MEPs Urge the EU to Turn Its Blocking Statute Against US Sanctions on the ICC: What Activation Would Require in France

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MEPs Urge the EU to Turn Its Blocking Statute Against US Sanctions on the ICC: What Activation Would Require in France

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On 14 October 2026, fifty-eight members of the European Parliament publicly urged the European Commission to activate the European Union Blocking Statute to shield the International Criminal Court from newly announced United States sanctions. The letter, sent the previous day to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and disclosed by Euronews, calls the American measures an attack by a foreign power on an entity located on EU territory and warns of devastating consequences for the Court seated in The Hague. Two days earlier, on 12 October, France issued its own condemnation through the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, denouncing American institutional sanctions that now target the Court itself after having struck its judges and staff, including French judge Nicolas Guillou. The sequence matters for anyone operating in France: if the Commission adds the American measures to the annex of the Blocking Statute, banks, insurers, employers and service providers in France will face a direct European prohibition on complying with them, layered on top of a French blocking law from 1968 that French courts already apply with criminal penalties attached. This article explains what happened in Brussels and Paris this week, and what activation of the statute would concretely require from operators in France.

I. MEPs demand an EU shield for the ICC after Washington targets the Court as an institution

A. The 14 October letter: 58 MEPs ask von der Leyen to activate the Blocking Statute

According to Euronews, which published the story on 14 October 2026, fifty-eight members of the European Parliament from across the political spectrum signed a letter calling on the Commission to defend the Netherlands-based court against what they described as an attack by a foreign power on an entity on EU territory. The letter was drafted by European People’s Party member Dirk Gotink and Socialists and Democrats member Aurore Lalucq, and it gathered signatures from the EPP, S&D, Renew Europe and Greens groups. Its timing is precise: it was sent on Tuesday 13 October, four days after the American administration announced a new sanctions package against the Court on Friday 9 October, and one day after France published its ministerial condemnation.

The factual warning in the letter is concrete. After an initial six-month grace period, the sanctions could bar American banks and companies from doing business with the Court, with exemptions envisaged only for some telecommunications, software and payment services. Given the weight of American firms in global finance and technology, the Court could struggle to pay its bills and to carry out routine financial transactions. European banks, insurance companies and other intermediaries with business interests in the United States could also be affected, because continuing to work with the Court might expose them to American secondary penalties. The signatories therefore asked for the use of all instruments available, and in particular for activation of the EU Blocking Statute, the mechanism built to protect European companies and individuals from the extraterritorial effects of foreign sanctions. As Euronews recalls, the statute can prevent foreign court rulings based on specified laws from being enforced inside the Union and allows European operators to claim compensation for losses caused by their extraterritorial application, while the Commission may add foreign laws to the list of covered measures subject to scrutiny by Parliament and the member states.

The political context reinforces the signal. In a statement the previous Saturday, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas called the threat of sanctions against the Court not acceptable and reaffirmed the bloc’s commitment to international law, while noting that the Union had yet to take concrete action. A joint statement of three European Parliament committees on 9 October had already described the American sanctions as an unacceptable assault on the foundations of international justice. The Court counts 125 member states, and the United States signed the Rome Statute without ever ratifying it. For readers in France, the practical question is therefore no longer abstract: if the Commission moves from words to a listing act, every compliance department in Paris will have to choose, within days, between American prohibitions and European commands.

B. Why the October 2026 package targets the institution itself, and why France reacted on 12 October

The American measures rest on Executive Order 14203 of 6 February 2025, whose opening finding presents the Court, established by the Rome Statute, as having engaged in illegitimate and baseless actions targeting America and its close ally Israel. The order criticises the Court for asserting jurisdiction over American and allied personnel, for opening preliminary examinations concerning Afghanistan, and for issuing arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant, recalling that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to the Rome Statute. Until this autumn, designations under that order struck individuals: judges, the prosecutor and staff members. The October 2026 step changes scale, because it aims at the institution as such, with the operational consequences described above for banking, insurance, technology and payment channels.

France reacted at ministerial level on 12 October 2026. The official statement condemns the American institutional sanctions against the Court. It notes that after several rounds adopted under the presidential order of 6 February 2025, which had so far targeted judges and staff including French judge Nicolas Guillou, the institution itself was now targeted. It calls on the United States to withdraw the measures and restates full support for the Court and its personnel. It recalls that the role of the Court is essential in fighting impunity and notes that France, with its European partners and the other States Parties to the Rome Statute, is working to let the Court continue its mission independently and impartially for the victims of the most serious crimes.

Three consequences follow for procedure in France. First, the surrender track is unaffected in principle: France’s duty to arrest and surrender persons sought by the Court continues, as analysed in our ICC surrender pillar on what France must do when an ICC suspect is on its soil, and the institutional sanctions do not suspend warrants. Second, the operational track becomes fragile: payments, detained-property management, witness logistics and counsel fees transiting through dollar channels or American providers may freeze, which our earlier analysis of the United States sanctions against the ICC as an institution and their effects on arrest and surrender in France already mapped. Third, the compliance track is about to invert: instead of asking whether French operators may keep working with the Court, the question becomes whether European law will forbid them to stop. Our September analysis of France’s cooperation duties, payments triage and prosecution fallback under American ICC sanctions set out the cooperation side; the present article completes the picture on the private-operator side if the Blocking Statute is switched on.

II. If Brussels lists the American measures: what French banks, companies and employers must do and not do

A. Regulation 2271/96 as a compliance reversal: non-compliance, non-recognition and damages recovery

Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country is built as a three-level shield, and each level speaks directly to operators in France. The first level is non-recognition. Article 4 bars the recognition or enforcement, in any form, of any foreign court judgment or administrative decision that gives effect, directly or indirectly, to the listed foreign laws or to actions based on them. If the American ICC measures were listed in the annex, no American judgment or administrative decision giving them effect could be recognised or enforced on French territory, and a French court seized of an enforcement request would have to refuse it.

The second level is the prohibition on compliance, and it is the one compliance officers fear most. Article 5 forbids any person covered by Article 11 from complying, directly or through subsidiaries or intermediaries, actively or by deliberate omission, with any requirement or prohibition, including foreign court requests, based on or resulting from the listed laws or actions under them. Article 11 covers any natural person resident in the Union who is a national of a member state, and any legal person incorporated in the Union, which includes French banks, insurers, subsidiaries of American groups established in France, and employers of ICC staff based in France. The prohibition bites both ways: actively terminating a contract with the Court to satisfy Washington, or deliberately omitting to process its payments, would each count as compliance with the listed foreign law. The same article allows the Commission to authorise full or partial compliance where non-compliance would seriously damage the operator’s interests or those of the Union, but that authorisation is individual, reasoned and granted through the committee procedure of Articles 7 and 8, never a blanket excuse.

The Court of Justice has already given this prohibition teeth. In Bank Melli Iran v Telekom Deutschland (C-124/20), the Court confirmed that Article 5 produces direct effects in disputes between private parties and that an operator which terminates a contract under pressure from American sanctions must be able to justify the termination on grounds unrelated to the listed foreign legislation. The practical lesson for Paris compliance teams is therefore sharp: a file note recording American risk as the reason for cutting ties with the Court or with its staff becomes, under an activated statute, evidence of the European violation itself. Internal instructions should instead document autonomous European reasons, or trigger the authorisation request to the Commission before any adverse measure.

The third level is the damages weapon. Article 6 entitles any covered person engaged in an activity falling under Article 1 to recover any damage, including legal costs, caused by the application of the listed laws or actions based on them. Recovery can be sought from the person causing the damage or any intermediary, before the courts of any member state where that person holds assets, and it may take the form of seizure and sale of assets located inside the Union, including shares. In plain terms, a French bank that debanks the Court or an insurer that cancels coverage at Washington’s request could face a clawback suit in Paris or Nanterre, with its own French assets as the target. The statute thus reverses the usual sanctions calculus: the greater risk sits on the side of over-compliance with the foreign measure, not under-compliance.

A June 2026 ruling of the Court of Justice sharpens the point for account closures. By press release No 84/26, the Court held that inclusion on a United States sanctions list is not sufficient, on its own, for a European bank to refuse to open an account, a finding widely reported by Reuters and analysed by practitioners as a brake on sanctions-driven debanking. The case concerned an American OFAC listing invoked to justify an account refusal, and the Court required an autonomous European justification. Transposed to the ICC scenario, the message is consistent: American designation alone neither authorises nor excuses a French bank that cuts banking ties, and under an activated Blocking Statute it would affirmatively forbid it. Banks keep their anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorist-financing duties under the French Monetary and Financial Code, including customer identification and vigilance obligations set out in Article L. 561-5 of the Monetary and Financial Code, but those duties must be performed on genuine risk grounds, documented file by file, not by invoking the foreign sanctions as a shortcut.

B. France already blocks foreign orders: the 1968 law before French judges and the right to an account

France does not need Brussels to assert the principle, because it has applied its own blocking law for nearly sixty years. The law of 26 July 1968 on the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents and information to foreign persons, available on Légifrance, completed by a 2022 implementing order organising the ministerial referral channel, prohibits transmitting such material abroad for use in foreign judicial or administrative proceedings where it would harm sovereignty, security, essential economic interests or public order, requires referral to the competent minister, and punishes violations with imprisonment and fines. French courts interpret it as a shield for proceedings conducted under French law, not as an obstacle to them.

The Paris Court of Appeal said so expressly in a 12 January 2023 ruling between Veolia Environnement and the Argentine company Bracap (RG 22/16847), where theyset aside an attempt to use the blocking law to freeze a French evidence order. The court recalled that the provision bars any person from requesting, seeking or communicating, in writing, orally or in any other form, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information aimed at building evidence for foreign judicial or administrative proceedings, and that breach of that prohibition carries six months of imprisonment and a fine of 18,000 euros, or either penalty alone. Yet it held that Article 1a of the 1968 law does not prevent seizing the French urgent-applications judge for evidence preservation under Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the provisions apply subject to laws in force and do not block French courts ruling under national law, that recourse to the Hague Convention mechanism is optional, and that Veolia had not shown that criminal liability of the company or its managers could actually be engaged. It therefore rejected the application by Veolia Environnement to stay provisional enforcement.

Three holdings of that decision translate directly to the ICC scenario. First, a French judge orders the parties to produce evidence, if necessary under penalty, and orders freezing or payment measures under French law even when a foreign sanctions regime purports to forbid them, because the blocking law yields to laws in force, and the European Blocking Statute, once the American measures are listed, becomes exactly such a law in force. Second, the protected channel for cross-border evidence remains the Hague Convention route, which the court called optional, so a French operator asked by an American authority to hand over ICC-related material should answer through its minister and its judge, not through direct transmission. Third, invoking criminal exposure in the abstract does not work: Veolia lost because it could not demonstrate a real risk of prosecution, which means operators must build concrete files, with dated requests, ministerial referrals and documented alternatives, rather than brandishing the foreign penalty as a slogan.

The procedural tools for that file-building already exist in the codes. Evidence preservation before any trial is available where a legitimate reason exists, since Article 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: “S’il existe un motif légitime de conserver ou d’établir avant tout procès la preuve de faits dont pourrait dépendre la solution d’un litige, les mesures d’instruction légalement admissibles peuvent être ordonnées à la demande de tout intéressé, sur requête ou en référé.” And provisional enforcement can be stopped on appeal only under strict conditions, because Article 514-3 of the Code of Civil Procedure states: “En cas d’appel, le premier président peut être saisi afin d’arrêter l’exécution provisoire de la décision lorsqu’il existe un moyen sérieux d’annulation ou de réformation et que l’exécution risque d’entraîner des conséquences manifestement excessives.” A bank or insurer that receives an American instruction to freeze ICC funds should therefore do three things the same day: seek interim protection before the French judge rather than executing the foreign order, refer the foreign request to the minister under the 1968 law, and request a Blocking Statute authorisation from the Commission if non-compliance with the American measure would seriously damage its interests.

The individual side is protected by the French right to an account. Article L. 312-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code opens with the principle: “A droit à l’ouverture d’un compte de dépôt dans l’établissement de crédit de son choix, sous réserve d’être dépourvu d’un tel compte en France : 1° Toute personne physique ou morale domiciliée en France”, a category that covers ICC staff members, counsel and witnesses residing in France, as well as French associations supporting the Court. The same article obliges a refusing bank to give written reasons: “Si l’établissement refuse l’ouverture du compte de dépôt, il fournit au demandeur gratuitement, sur support papier, et sur un autre support durable lorsque celui-ci en fait la demande expresse, les motifs de ce refus en mentionnant, le cas échéant, la procédure prévue au III.” And where refusal persists, the applicant may petition the Banque de France to designate a credit institution, which must then open the account with basic services. An ICC staff member debanked in Paris for American-sanctions reasons should therefore demand written reasons immediately, keep the refusal letter as evidence for both the designation procedure and a future Article 6 clawback claim, and file the Banque de France petition without waiting. Our guide to arrest, detention and release timetables in France after an international alert follows the same method of dated steps and written traces, which is the discipline French judges reward.

Finally, the criminal-law backdrop confirms that France keeps its own prosecutorial options. Cooperation requests from the Court are channelled to the anti-terrorism prosecutor, since Article 627-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states: “Les demandes d’entraide émanant de la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut en original ou en copie certifiée conforme accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives.” Beyond cooperation, the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a universal-jurisdiction fallback allowing French courts to try the gravest crimes themselves, set out in Article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the definition of genocide appears in Article 211-1 of the Criminal Code. Sanctions against the institution therefore do not create impunity on French soil: they redirect cases toward French courtrooms, where the blocking laws ensure that American prohibitions cannot dictate who is paid, who is heard or who is tried.

Conclusion

The week of 9 to 14 October 2026 moved the ICC sanctions fight from threats to institutional confrontation: an American package aimed at the Court itself, a 9 October parliamentary condemnation in Strasbourg, a 12 October ministerial condemnation in Paris, and a 13 October cross-party letter demanding that the Commission activate the Blocking Statute. If the Commission lists the American measures, the compliance map in France flips. Non-recognition will bar enforcement of American decisions giving them effect, non-compliance will forbid French operators from cutting ties with the Court at Washington’s request, and damages recovery will let victims of over-compliance sue where the assets sit. France already walks this path with its 1968 blocking law, which the Paris Court of Appeal applies as a shield for French proceedings rather than an obstacle to them, and with the right to an account, which gives every debanked resident a written-reasons procedure and a Banque de France designation. Banks, insurers and employers in France should therefore prepare now: freeze no account on the sole basis of an American designation, refer every foreign instruction to the minister, document autonomous European reasons for every adverse measure, and request Commission authorisation before acting where serious damage is genuinely at stake. The Court in The Hague cannot wait, and neither can its French counterparts.

📄 Official circular