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Four ICC Arrest Warrants for Afghanistan Unsealed: Arrest in France, Surrender to The Hague and What Exiled Victims Can Do

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Four ICC Arrest Warrants for Afghanistan Unsealed: Arrest in France, Surrender to The Hague and What Exiled Victims Can Do

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On 5 October 2026, the International Criminal Court did something it does only rarely: it unsealed four arrest warrants at once. The four men wanted are the core of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, and the charge is one of the gravest in international law, the crime against humanity of persecution, committed against girls and women and against anyone perceived as their ally. Two of the warrants had been public since July 2025. The two others, issued on 9 September 2025, had remained secret until last week. They are secret no longer, and that changes everything in practical terms: police forces, border guards, airlines and banks in the 125 States Parties to the Rome Statute, including France, must now treat these four names as arrest targets. For the Afghan diaspora in France, one of the largest in Europe, the news raises immediate questions. What happens if one of these men transits through Paris? Can Afghan women exiled in France file a complaint here? Can French courts try these crimes themselves, or must they hand any suspect to The Hague? This article answers those questions from the French lawyer’s point of view, with the official texts in hand: the ICC press release of 5 October 2026, the Rome Statute, the French Code of Criminal Procedure as verified on 12 October 2026, and two landmark rulings of the Cour de cassation that draw the exact boundary of what French judges can and cannot do.

I. Four unsealed warrants: who is wanted, for what, and why 5 October 2026 matters

The starting point is the official ICC press release of 5 October 2026. According to that release, Pre-Trial Chamber II unsealed four arrest warrants issued in the Afghanistan situation on 8 July 2025 and 9 September 2025 against Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and chief justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, as well as former education officials Habibullah Agha and Neda Mohammad Nadim. Every element of that announcement matters, and each deserves explanation, because readers often confuse an ICC arrest warrant with a conviction. It is not one. It is a judicial authorisation to arrest, issued on the basis of reasonable grounds, at the request of the Prosecutor, so that the suspect can be brought to The Hague and tried. The presumption of innocence applies in full to all four men unless and until a Trial Chamber convicts them.

A. Four Taliban leaders wanted for gender persecution as a crime against humanity

The four men named in the warrants sit at the very top of the Taliban power structure. Haibatullah Akhundzada is the supreme leader of the movement that retook Kabul on 15 August 2021. Abdul Hakim Haqqani is the Taliban’s chief justice, the head of its judiciary. Habibullah Agha served as education minister and Neda Mohammad Nadim as higher education minister, the two portfolios through which the bans on girls’ schooling and women’s university attendance were imposed. The choice of these four names is therefore not symbolic: it targets the chain of decision-making behind the decrees and edicts that, since August 2021, have progressively erased women and girls from Afghan public life, from classrooms to universities, from most employment to freedom of movement without a male guardian.

The legal qualification retained by Pre-Trial Chamber II is persecution as a crime against humanity under article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute. The English text of the Statute defines this crime as persecution of an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious or gender grounds, or on other grounds universally recognised as impermissible under international law, in connection with another act within the jurisdiction of the Court. According to the press release, the Chamber found reasonable grounds to believe that the four suspects were criminally responsible for having ordered, induced or solicited persecution as a crime against humanity: on gender grounds against girls, women and other persons not conforming to Taliban policy on gender, gender identity or expression, and on political grounds against persons perceived as allies of girls and women. Three features of this finding deserve emphasis for a non-specialist reader. First, the mode of liability is ordering, inducing or soliciting: the case is built on command responsibility for a State-like policy, not on any allegation that these men personally committed acts of violence. Second, the persecution is charged on two cumulative grounds, gender and political opinion, the second covering men and relatives punished for defending girls and women. Third, the time frame is continuous, from the seizure of power on 15 August 2021 until at least 20 January 2025, which means the alleged criminal conduct is presented as an ongoing governmental policy rather than a series of isolated episodes.

The decision also contains a significant development in international law that French readers should understand, because it will shape how French judges read their own criminal code. The Chamber held that the definition of gender in the Rome Statute requires an interpretation going beyond a purely biological conception of sex, acknowledging socially constructed roles, behaviours, expectations and hierarchies, the norms commonly referred to as gender norms, as part of the lens through which gender-based persecution is assessed. Concretely, the Chamber considered that the Taliban severely deprived girls and women, through decrees and edicts, of the rights to education, privacy and family life and the freedoms of movement, expression, thought, conscience and religion, and that other persons were targeted because certain expressions of sexuality or gender identity were regarded as inconsistent with the Taliban’s policy on gender. The underlying violent acts connected to the persecution include, according to the Chamber, conducts of murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and enforced disappearance. None of this is yet proven at trial; it is the Prosecutor’s case as accepted at the reasonable-grounds stage. But it is now the public, judicially endorsed narrative on the basis of which every State Party is expected to cooperate.

B. Why unsealing turns a secret warrant into a worldwide arrest obligation

Two of the four warrants, those against Akhundzada and Haqqani, had already been made public on 8 July 2025. The novelty of 5 October 2026 concerns the warrants against Agha and Nadim: the Court’s defendant page for Nadim records a warrant issued on 9 September 2025 and unsealed on 5 October 2026. Readers may wonder why a court issues warrants in secret at all. The answer is tactical and entirely legitimate: a sealed warrant allows investigators to prepare arrests, protect witnesses and avoid tipping off suspects while the Prosecutor gathers evidence. Unsealing happens when the Chamber considers that publicity now serves the interests of justice better than secrecy, typically because arrests will require the widest possible cooperation. From that moment, the names enter the operational systems of States Parties: border alerts, Interpol diffusion requests supporting the ICC warrants, airline passenger screening and financial sanctions compliance.

For France, the consequence is direct and binding. Article 89(1) of the Rome Statute allows the Court to send an arrest and surrender request, with supporting material, to any State on whose territory the person may be found, and it obliges States Parties to comply with arrest and surrender requests in accordance with the Statute and their national procedure. France, a founding State Party that has integrated the Statute into domestic law, has no discretion to ignore such a request on political grounds. The full text of the Statute is published by the Court itself, and the official English version of the Rome Statute is the reference practitioners use. The practical scenarios are easy to picture: a private aircraft refuelling at Le Bourget, a diplomatic passport presented at Roissy, a medical stay in a Paris clinic, or even simple airspace transit, a question examined in detail in our analysis of when a person wanted by the ICC crosses French airspace. In each case, French authorities are expected to arrest and surrender, not to try the person themselves and not to expel them discreetly.

It is worth adding a point of honesty that international lawyers owe their readers. ICC warrants against sitting power-holders are notoriously difficult to enforce: the Court has no police force of its own, some States have failed to arrest indictees in the past, and the broader political context, including the sanctions imposed on the Court itself by the United States, complicates cooperation, a subject covered in our study of what France must still do despite the American sanctions against the ICC. None of that diminishes the legal obligation, and none of it should discourage victims. An unsealed warrant restricts travel permanently, freezes assets wherever cooperation works, and creates the file on which a future arrest, perhaps years from now and in an unexpected airport, will be based. History shows that indictees who felt untouchable have ended up in The Hague long after their warrants were issued.

II. France at the crossroads: arresting a fugitive on French soil and judging crimes from exile

France is doubly concerned by these warrants. First as a territory where a wanted person might one day be found, which triggers the surrender machinery. Second as the home of a large Afghan exile community whose members are potential victims, witnesses and complainants. The two roles obey different rules, and confusing them is the most common error in public debate. France does not put ICC indictees on trial in Paris; it arrests them and sends them to The Hague. Conversely, France can in narrow circumstances prosecute international crimes itself, but the door is far narrower than most people imagine, and the Cour de cassation has drawn its frame with precision.

A. Arrested at Roissy, surrendered to The Hague: the French ICC pipeline step by step

French cooperation with the ICC is governed by a dedicated title of the Code of Criminal Procedure, introduced to apply the Rome Statute signed on 18 July 1998. Its opening provision, article 627 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, states: “Pour l’application du statut de la Cour pénale internationale signé le 18 juillet 1998, la France participe à la répression des infractions et coopère avec cette juridiction dans les conditions fixées par le présent titre.” It adds that the provisions that follow apply to any person prosecuted before the ICC or convicted by it for genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes within the meaning of the Statute. This is a surrender regime, not an extradition regime: the word used throughout is remise, surrender, and the logic differs fundamentally from extradition between States, where a government retains political discretion. Here, once the ICC request is formally regular, the French judge verifies identity and procedure, not guilt, and certainly not the political opportunity of the surrender.

The procedure that follows a sighting on French territory is fast and tightly timetabled. Under article 627-4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Les demandes d’arrestation aux fins de remise délivrées par la Cour pénale internationale sont adressées, en original et accompagnées de toutes pièces justificatives, aux autorités compétentes en vertu de l’article 87 du statut qui, après s’être assurées de leur régularité formelle, les transmettent au procureur général près la cour d’appel de Paris et, dans le même temps, les mettent à exécution dans toute l’étendue du territoire de la République.” In urgent cases the request can even be sent directly by any means to the locally competent public prosecutor. In plain terms, every police officer and gendarme in France is an enforcement arm of the ICC warrant from the moment the request is validated.

The arrested person is protected by strict safeguards and deadlines. Under article 627-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “Toute personne appréhendée en vertu d’une demande d’arrestation aux fins de remise doit être déférée dans les vingt-quatre heures au procureur de la République territorialement compétent.” Within that period the custody rights apply, the person’s identity is verified, and the prosecutor informs them, in a language they understand, of the surrender request and of their appearance before the prosecutor general at the Paris Court of Appeal within a maximum of five days, with the assistance of a lawyer of their choice or appointed ex officio. Under article 627-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “La personne réclamée est transférée, s’il y a lieu, et écrouée à la maison d’arrêt du ressort de la cour d’appel de Paris.” The transfer must occur within five days of presentation to the prosecutor, failing which “la personne réclamée est immédiatement libérée sur décision du président de la chambre de l’instruction de la cour d’appel de Paris, à moins que le transfèrement ait été retardé par des circonstances insurmontables”. These release valves matter: they show that surrender is a judicial procedure with real liberty protections, not an administrative handover.

The decision itself belongs to the chambre de l’instruction of the Paris Court of Appeal. Under article 627-7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “La chambre de l’instruction est immédiatement saisie de la procédure.” and the wanted person appears before it within eight days of presentation to the prosecutor general, with a possible additional eight days at the request of either side, followed by questioning, adversarial debate and a ruling delivered in public hearing unless publicity would harm the proceedings, third-party interests or the person’s dignity. Then comes the key provision, article 627-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: “Lorsque la chambre de l’instruction constate qu’il n’y a pas d’erreur évidente, elle ordonne la remise de la personne réclamée et, si celle-ci est libre, son incarcération à cette fin.” The standard is deliberately minimal, erreur évidente, manifest error, typically mistaken identity or a plainly irregular request. And the same article closes the door to dilatory defences: “Toute autre question soumise à la chambre de l’instruction est renvoyée à la Cour pénale internationale qui lui donne les suites utiles.” Arguments about the merits, the evidence, immunity or the fairness of The Hague proceedings belong to The Hague, not to Paris. The chambre de l’instruction rules within fifteen days of appearance, and on appeal “la chambre criminelle de la Cour de cassation statue dans un délai de deux mois suivant la réception du dossier à la Cour de cassation”. From street arrest to final surrender order, the whole pipeline is therefore designed to take weeks, not years, a striking contrast with classic extradition litigation, and a further illustration of the principles set out in our guide to how France handles competing extradition and ICC surrender requests.

B. Afghan victims exiled in France: asylum, criminal complaint and the narrow door of universal jurisdiction

The second French dimension concerns the victims living in France: Afghan women and girls who fled, journalists, judges, teachers, relatives of the persecuted, and members of associations documenting the decrees. Three avenues exist, with very different chances of success, and each must be assessed honestly.

The first avenue is asylum. Gender-based persecution of the kind described by Pre-Trial Chamber II is precisely the type of harm that founds international protection, and Afghan women in France can invoke the Taliban decrees, the loss of schooling or work, threats received and family reprisals in support of an application to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, with appeal to the National Court of Asylum. The ICC decision does not grant asylum by itself, but it constitutes a serious, judicially validated account of country conditions that protection officers and judges can rely on alongside country documentation. Families should preserve everything: decrees received, school expulsion letters, screenshots of threats, medical certificates, testimony of relatives still in Afghanistan. Evidence kept today is the asylum file of tomorrow and potentially the criminal file as well.

The second avenue is a criminal complaint in France. Complaints for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed abroad are centralised and can be filed with the specialised unit, but the applicable framework, article 689-11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sets cumulative conditions that must be read carefully. The text provides that “peut être poursuivie et jugée par les juridictions françaises toute personne soupçonnée d’avoir commis à l’étranger l’une des infractions suivantes : 1° Le crime de génocide défini au chapitre Ier du sous-titre Ier du titre Ier du livre II du code pénal ; 2° Les autres crimes contre l’humanité définis au chapitre II du même sous-titre Ier ; 3° Les crimes et les délits de guerre définis aux articles 461-1 à 461-31 du même code.” Three locks then apply. First, presence: “La personne soupçonnée doit avoir une résidence habituelle sur le territoire français”, habitual residence understood as a sufficient link with France assessed through duration of presence, conditions and reasons of that presence, willingness to settle, and family, social, material or professional ties. A suspect merely transiting through Roissy does not meet this test; only ICC surrender applies to them. Second, prosecutorial monopoly: “La poursuite de ces crimes ne peut être exercée qu’à la requête du procureur de la République antiterroriste”, meaning victims cannot force a trial by direct summons; they can file a complaint, including with civil-party constitution, but only the antiterrorist prosecutor decides to prosecute. Third, subsidiarity: prosecution is possible only “si aucune juridiction internationale ou nationale ne demande la remise ou l’extradition de la personne”, and the prosecutor must verify “l’absence de poursuite diligentée par la Cour pénale internationale”. Applied to the four Taliban indictees, this third lock is decisive in the most spectacular scenario: if the ICC files, or maintains, a surrender request for a suspect found in France, the French route yields to The Hague. The complaint in Paris then serves the ICC case rather than replacing it, by channelling testimony and evidence to the competent court. That is not a failure; it is the system working as designed.

The third point to understand is the double-criminality trap that the Cour de cassation has strictly enforced. Article 689-11 requires that the facts be punishable under the law of the State where they were committed, unless that State or the suspect’s State of nationality is party to the Rome Statute. Two rulings frame the analysis. In Criminal Chamber, 24 November 2021, no. 21-81.344, the Court quashed a Paris investigating chamber that had accepted jurisdiction over alleged crimes against humanity on the ground that Syrian law punished murder, torture and rape as ordinary offences. The Court held that “l’exigence posée par l’article 689-11 du code de procédure pénale, selon laquelle les faits doivent être punis par la législation de l’Etat où ils ont été commis, inclut nécessairement l’existence dans cette législation d’une infraction comportant un élément constitutif relatif à une attaque lancée contre une population civile en exécution d’un plan concerté”. In other words, punishing the underlying acts as ordinary crimes is not enough; the foreign law must criminalise the contextual element, the widespread or systematic attack pursuant to a concerted plan, that turns those acts into crimes against humanity. The ruling ended with the blunt device: “DÉCLARE INCOMPÉTENTES les juridictions françaises pour connaître des poursuites engagées contre le demandeur”. For Afghanistan, the alternative branch of the condition may prove easier, since Afghanistan acceded to the Rome Statute in 2003, but the lesson stands: universal jurisdiction in France is a technical obstacle course, not a political slogan.

A companion ruling widens the French toolkit in a way directly relevant to Taliban abuses. In Assemblée plénière, 12 May 2023, no. 22-82.468, published in the Bulletin, the full Court held on article 689-2, universal jurisdiction for torture, that “la notion de personne ayant agi à titre officiel, au sens du renvoi fait par le texte national à la Convention précitée, doit être comprise comme visant également une personne agissant pour le compte ou au nom d’une entité non gouvernementale, lorsque celle-ci occupe un territoire et exerce une autorité quasi gouvernementale sur ce territoire”. A movement that seizes a State, runs its ministries, staffs its courts and polices its streets is the textbook example of a non-governmental entity exercising quasi-governmental authority. Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment inflicted by such an apparatus can therefore, where the suspect is found in France, ground French proceedings for torture even outside the crimes-against-humanity framework. Finally, victims and counsel should know that French domestic law itself criminalises what the ICC charges: article 212-1 of the Penal Code provides that “Constitue également un crime contre l’humanité et est puni de la réclusion criminelle à perpétuité l’un des actes ci-après commis en exécution d’un plan concerté à l’encontre d’un groupe de population civile dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique”, including “8° La persécution de tout groupe ou de toute collectivité identifiable pour des motifs d’ordre politique, racial, national, ethnique, culturel, religieux ou sexiste ou en fonction d’autres critères universellement reconnus comme inadmissibles en droit international”. Gender persecution is therefore not a foreign concept imported from The Hague; it sits in the French Penal Code, punishable by life imprisonment, waiting for a suspect habitually resident in France against whom no ICC request competes.

Conclusion

The unsealing of 5 October 2026 turned four secret files into four public arrest obligations. The charges, gender and political persecution as a crime against humanity committed through an apparatus of decrees since August 2021, are now the judicially endorsed account that States Parties must act upon. For France, the roadmap is clear and twofold. Any of the four men found on French soil faces arrest by any police force in the country, presentation within twenty-four hours, transfer to Paris, adversarial debate before the chambre de l’instruction and surrender to The Hague on a manifest-error standard, with all substantive defences reserved to the ICC judges. Afghan victims exiled in France, for their part, hold three cards of unequal strength: asylum grounded in documented gender persecution, criminal complaints that feed the centralised French investigations and, through subsidiarity, the ICC case itself, and, in the rare configurations where a suspect settles durably in France without a competing international request, the narrow but real door of French universal jurisdiction as framed by the Cour de cassation. Preserving evidence, filing structured complaints and seeking protection early are the practical steps that convert a historic decision in The Hague into tangible protection in Paris. The warrants will not enforce themselves; they are an instruction to States, to lawyers and to victims to do their part, and France has given itself the legal tools to play its full role.

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