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Kohen Avocats, shareholders' agreement lawyers in Paris
Shareholders' agreement lawyer in Paris: governance, exit, funding
A fund or business angels entering the capital of a SAS, a funding round, preference shares, committees and reserved matters, pre-emption, drag along and tag along, anti-dilution protection, leaver clauses, then enforcement of the agreement before the court: as a shareholders' agreement lawyer in Paris, the firm drafts, negotiates and enforces shareholders' agreements (pactes d'actionnaires) for companies limited by shares, acting for founders and investors alike. Each clause is read together with the articles of association (statuts), which alone bind all shareholders.
The firm can be reached 24/7. In a SAS, any transfer made in breach of the clauses of the articles of association is void (Article L. 227-15 of the French Commercial Code, the Code de commerce); in an unlisted public limited company (société anonyme, SA), if the company fails to reply within three months of the request for approval, approval is deemed given (Article L. 228-24). A share transfer or funding round under way is prepared before signing, not after.
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Hassan Kohen
Lawyer at the Paris Bar, company law, shareholders' agreements, funding rounds and shareholder disputes.
Official profile in the directory of French lawyers (CNB) · 4.9/5 on Google (270 reviews)
Page updated on 1 November 2026.
Quick answer
A shareholders' agreement (pacte d'actionnaires) is a contract concluded between all or some of the shareholders of a company limited by shares, alongside the articles of association. It has the force of law for those who signed it (Article 1103 of the French Civil Code, Code civil), but it creates obligations only between them (Article 1199). The articles of association of a SAS, for their part, set how the company is managed and which decisions are taken collectively, subject to those the law reserves to the shareholders (Articles L. 227-5 and L. 227-9 of the French Commercial Code); they may make shares non-transferable for no more than ten years, require approval of transfers and provide for compulsory transfer (Articles L. 227-13, L. 227-14 and L. 227-16), and create preference shares carrying special rights (Article L. 228-11). A breach of the agreement is sanctioned first under contract law: specific performance (Article 1221 of the Civil Code), forced formation of the promised contract despite the promisor's withdrawal (Article 1124), damages or, where the third party acted in bad faith, nullity of a transfer made in disregard of a right of first refusal (Article 1123), and a contractual penalty (Article 1231-5). An agreement concluded before 1 October 2016 with no express term is, absent evidence to the contrary, deemed concluded for the remaining life of the company (Cass. com., 11 March 2026, No. 24-21.896). Kohen Avocats, in Paris 16th arrondissement, acts for founders, investors and minority shareholders. Contact: +33 6 89 11 34 45.
A funding round to sign, an agreement to negotiate, a clause to enforce?
Understanding your situation
The shareholders' agreement in Paris, explained
The agreement binds only those who signed it (Article 1199 of the French Civil Code). What must go in the articles of association and what can stay in the agreement, how to organise control, liquidity and investor protection, and what the court can order when a clause is not complied with.
Key points
Shareholders' agreement or articles of association: four rules before drafting
A clause does not carry the same weight depending on the document that contains it.
The agreement is a contract: it has the force of law for those who made it (Article 1103 of the French Civil Code), but “A contract creates obligations only between the parties” (Article 1199). A shareholder who did not sign, a buyer or the company itself are not bound, unless they accede to it.
The articles of association of a SAS bind all present and future shareholders. They may make shares non-transferable “for a period not exceeding ten years”, require prior approval of any transfer and provide for the compulsory transfer of a shareholder's shares (Articles L. 227-13, L. 227-14 and L. 227-16 of the French Commercial Code). A non-transferability clause can only be adopted or amended unanimously (Article L. 227-19), and these clauses do not apply in a single-shareholder SAS (Article L. 227-20).
An investor's special financial or voting rights are carried by preference shares, “with special rights of any kind, on a temporary or permanent basis”, defined by the articles of association (Article L. 228-11). Their issue is decided by the extraordinary general meeting, on the basis of a special report by the statutory auditors (Article L. 228-12).
The collective decisions of a SAS are those set by the articles of association, subject to the decisions the law reserves to the shareholders: share capital, merger, demerger, dissolution, conversion, annual accounts and profits, among others (Article L. 227-9). Since 1 October 2025, “Unless the law provides otherwise, a breach of the articles of association is not a ground for nullity” (Article 1844-10 of the French Civil Code), but the articles of association of a SAS may provide that decisions taken in breach of the rules they lay down are void (Article L. 227-20-1 of the French Commercial Code). A provision found only in the shareholders' agreement does not benefit from this option.
The sanction for an irregular transfer depends on where the clause sits. “Any transfer made in breach of the clauses of the articles of association is void” (Article L. 227-15), and the Cour de cassation holds that this annulment, for a pre-emption right set out in the articles, “is not subject to proof of fraudulent collusion between the transferor and the transferee” (our translation) (Cass. com., 8 July 2026, No. 25-11.354). The same Court limits this provision: the nullity it provides for “is intended solely to sanction the breach of any clause of the articles of association concerning the transfer of shares freely agreed to by their holder” (our translation), so that an exclusion clause in the articles does not prevent the performance of a cross put and call option set out in the shareholders' agreement where a shareholder is in breach (Cass. com., 21 June 2023, Nos. 21-25.952 and 22-12.045). In an unlisted public limited company, an approval clause in the articles requires registered shares, does not apply in the event of an inheritance, the winding-up of a matrimonial property regime or a transfer to a spouse, an ascendant or a descendant, and a transfer that disregards it is void (Article L. 228-23).
In practice, the firm places in the articles of association whatever must be enforceable against any buyer and sanctioned by nullity: non-transferability, approval, pre-emption, compulsory transfer, rights attached to preference shares, list of collective decisions. The shareholders' agreement keeps what concerns only some shareholders: allocation of board seats, investor information rights, founders' personal undertakings, liquidity timetable. For an SME or a SARL between partners, our page on the partners' agreement (pacte d'associés) sets out the same clauses in that context.
Control
Governance: committees, reserved matters, veto and information rights
The minority investor provides the funding; in return, the agreement gives it oversight and a brake.
Bodies
In a SAS, the articles of association set the conditions under which the company is managed (Article L. 227-5): a strategic committee, supervisory board or board may be created there, and the shareholders' agreement allocates the seats. In an SA, the board of directors has from three to eighteen members (Article L. 225-17).
Reserved matters
The agreement lists the decisions that require the prior consent of the investor or of a committee: budget, borrowing, disposal of assets, issue of securities, hiring of senior managers. Written into the articles of association, the rule can carry a contractual nullity (Article L. 227-20-1); left in the agreement, a breach is compensated between the signatories.
Information
In an SA, the chair or the chief executive officer provides each director with all the documents and information needed to carry out their duties (Article L. 225-35). The shareholders' agreement adds investor reporting: monthly accounts, budget, cash position, delivery deadlines.
Voting undertakings
The agreement may organise how its signatories vote, without depriving a shareholder of the right to take part in collective decisions (Article 1844 of the French Civil Code). The undertaking is negotiated and performed in good faith (Article 1104).
Veto
A veto set out in the agreement must be exercised in good faith (Article 1104 of the French Civil Code); a refusal to vote at a general meeting that blocks an essential transaction solely in the interest of the person refusing may amount to abuse of minority, and the burden of proving both elements lies with the party relying on it.
Deadlock
An exit clause, such as the alternative offer known as the “American clause” (shotgun clause), makes it possible to resolve a serious disagreement by organising the buyout of one shareholder by the other, on objective trigger conditions.
The court sanctions the abusive ousting of the investor, without making the agreement untouchable. In a case concerning a shareholders' agreement that gave the investors a veto over the main decisions, the Versailles Court of Appeal first recognised that each party had a right of unilateral termination, since the agreement was perpetual; it set aside the termination only because it was abusive, recalling that “The absence of any obligation to give reasons for using the right of termination reserved to them does not prevent abuse in the exercise of that right” (our translation) and that “A shareholders' agreement by its nature implies stability, and forms a contractual whole with the articles of association as regards their part relating to relations between shareholders” (our translation). The agreement continues to apply “subject to the possibility of exit open to the parties under conditions that exclude abuse” (our translation), and the investors' application for a penalty payment (astreinte) was dismissed (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296). Voting at a general meeting has its own limit: in the case of a SARL member, the Cour de cassation holds that “The refusal of a minority shareholder to change the corporate purpose may be contrary to the general interest of the company” (our translation), abuse also requiring proof that the minority shareholder's conduct stems from the sole aim of favouring its own interests; it quashed the judgment that had treated this proof as established on the change of corporate purpose (Cass. com., 13 March 2024, No. 22-13.764).
Against deadlock, the Cour de cassation upheld an alternative offer clause set out in a shareholders' agreement, since the mechanism “did not leave the setting of the price to the will of one party alone” (our translation) and the sale became binding through performance of the undertakings in the agreement (Cass. com., 12 February 2025, No. 23-16.290). See our articles on voting agreements, the Texas shoot-out or buy-or-sell clause and the deadlock clause.
Liquidity
Pre-emption, lock-up, tag along and drag along rights
Who can sell, to whom, when and at what price: the economic core of the agreement.
Pre-emption
Written into the articles of association of a SAS, it is sanctioned by nullity of the transfer (Article L. 227-15). Set out only in the shareholders' agreement, it is a right of first refusal (pacte de préférence): damages, and nullity or substitution only if the third party knew of the agreement and of the beneficiary's intention to rely on it (Article 1123 of the French Civil Code).
Lock-up
In the articles of association of a SAS, ten years at most, adopted unanimously (Articles L. 227-13 and L. 227-19). In the shareholders' agreement, its duration and exceptions (permitted transfers, transfer to a holding company) are set in writing.
Approval
The articles of association of a SAS may make any transfer subject to approval by the company (Article L. 227-14); in an unlisted SA, the request is notified and the absence of a reply within three months amounts to approval (Article L. 228-24).
Tag along
The tag-along right (sortie conjointe) allows the minority shareholder to sell its shares on the same terms as the selling majority shareholder. It is an obligation of the seller, not of the buyer, who has not signed the agreement (Article 1199).
Drag along
The drag-along right (sortie forcée) requires minority shareholders to sell when a buyer's offer reaches the agreed threshold. It rests on promises to sell, whose withdrawal does not prevent the formation of the promised contract (Article 1124), or on a compulsory-transfer clause in the articles of association (Article L. 227-16).
Price
Where the articles of association set no pricing terms, the price of a transfer imposed by an approval or compulsory-transfer clause is fixed by agreement or by the expert under Article 1843-4 of the French Civil Code (Article L. 227-18). That expert applies the valuation rules set out in the articles of association or in any agreement binding the parties (Article 1843-4).
On these points, the agreement is read to the letter. Concerning a transfer price clause, in a dispute between managers holding preference shares and a fund, the Paris Court of Appeal held that the obligations in the agreement relating to the transfer of securities “do not rest on the beneficiary of the Transfer” (our translation), “but on the holders of the securities due to be transferred” (our translation), and that a reduction of the share capital to zero by cancelling the shares was not a transfer within the meaning of the agreement: the agreed price therefore did not apply, and the managers' claims were dismissed (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 29 November 2022, No. 20/15845). Conversely, a promise to transfer set out in the agreement can be enforced: the Cour de cassation quashed the judgment that refused to enforce a cross put and call option provided for in the agreement where a shareholder was in breach, on the ground that it conflicted with an exclusion clause in the articles of association (Cass. com., 21 June 2023, Nos. 21-25.952 and 22-12.045). A drag-along based on promises to sell should therefore be drafted so that it can be enforced in the same way.
The firm drafts these clauses by setting the trigger, the threshold, the price or its formula, the notification procedure and the exercise period, then checks that they fit with the pre-emption and approval clauses of the articles of association. See our articles on enforcing a drag-along clause, share lock-up clauses, the Article 1843-4 expert and the interrogatory action (action interrogatoire), and our page on the share transfer approval clause.
Both sides
Whether you are an investor or a founder
The same clauses are negotiated in opposite directions depending on your position in the funding round.
If you are an investor
- Place special rights in preference shares created by the articles of association, and provide how those rights may be amended.
- Secure reserved matters, a committee seat and dated reporting, with a sanction in the event of breach.
- Protect yourself against dilution and organise liquidity: tag along, drag along, exit timetable.
If you are a founder
- Limit the veto to a closed list of decisions, with figures-based thresholds and a response deadline.
- Frame the leaver cases, the buy-back price of your shares and the duration of your commitments.
- Set a term for the agreement and check the drag-along threshold before signing anything.
Anti-dilution protection rests on specific provisions. Shareholders have, in proportion to the amount of their shares, a preferential right to subscribe for cash shares issued in a capital increase (Article L. 225-132). The general meeting that reserves an increase to named persons may cancel this right, but the beneficiaries do not vote (Article L. 225-138), and the company may issue securities giving access to the capital, such as share warrants (Article L. 228-91). An anti-dilution clause in the shareholders' agreement is not enough, on its own, to set aside a resolution: the Paris Court of Appeal held that the breach of the agreement, “assuming it is established, which is disputed, is not such as to entail the nullity of the resolutions” (our translation), then annulled the reduction of the share capital to zero followed by an increase, which constituted, “even though the preferential subscription right was maintained, an unfair device amounting to fraud on the rights of the minority shareholder” (our translation) (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 13 February 2024, No. 21/06518).
Preference shares protect the investor even when they are amended. Ruling under former Article 1134 of the French Civil Code, whose binding force is carried over by Article 1103, the Cour de cassation holds that, where the articles of association of a SAS do not provide how the rights attached to them may be amended, “the individual consent of the holders of those shares is required to make such an amendment” (our translation), and the reduction of a priority dividend voted without that consent was struck down (Cass. com., 10 July 2024, No. 22-15.836). On the founder's side, a buy-back of shares at the subscription price on departure is not a leonine clause: “The only clause prohibited by this provision is one that undermines the company agreement in the terms it lays down” (our translation) (Article 1844-1 of the French Civil Code; Cass. com., 21 June 2023, No. 21-21.875). The same decision rules out basing a dismissal for misconduct, which triggered the promise at a discount, solely on the fact that the manager had brought legal proceedings against the company.
The points the firm checks in every funding round:
Litigation
Enforcing the shareholders' agreement: performance, sanctions and duration
A well-drafted agreement can be specifically enforced; an agreement with no proper term can be terminated.
After a formal notice, the creditor may seek specific performance, unless performance is impossible or there is a manifest disproportion between its cost to the debtor acting in good faith and its benefit to the creditor (Article 1221 of the French Civil Code).
“The withdrawal of the promise during the time allowed to the beneficiary to exercise the option does not prevent the formation of the promised contract”, and a contract concluded with a third party who knew of its existence is void (Article 1124).
The penalty provided for in the agreement is payable, but the court may reduce or increase it if it is manifestly excessive or derisory, and it is incurred only after formal notice, unless non-performance is definitive (Article 1231-5).
“Perpetual undertakings are prohibited”: each party may end them as it would a contract of indefinite duration (Article 1210), with the agreed notice period or a reasonable period (Article 1211).
A fixed-term agreement is performed until its term, and no one can demand its renewal (Article 1212). The life of a company may not exceed ninety-nine years (Article 1838).
A shareholder's commitments cannot be increased without its consent (Article 1836): a new funding obligation has to be signed, it cannot be voted through.
Duration is the point that most weakens older agreements. The Cour de cassation holds that “the prohibition of perpetual undertakings does not prevent a shareholders' agreement from being concluded for the life of the company” (our translation) (Cass. 1re civ., 25 January 2023, No. 19-25.478), and that an agreement with no express term is, absent evidence to the contrary, “deemed to have been concluded for the remaining life of the company in which the parties are shareholders” (our translation), so that the parties cannot end it unilaterally (Cass. com., 11 March 2026, No. 24-21.896). These two judgments combine former Article 1134 of the French Civil Code and Article 1838, still in force; for an agreement signed on or after 1 October 2016, Articles 1210 to 1212 apply, and the decisions cited do not say whether the same solution holds under those provisions. An agreement renewable with no limit other than a unanimous termination is treated differently: the Versailles Court of Appeal held that “The prohibition of perpetual undertakings requires it to be considered that each of the parties to the agreement in question has a right of unilateral termination” (our translation), while setting aside the termination, held to be abusive towards the investors (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296).
Abusive resistance to the performance of the agreement is sanctioned. The Cour de cassation upheld an order against a shareholder to pay damages for abusive resistance, separate from legal costs, and confirmed that its counterclaim for annulment of the agreement for fraudulent misrepresentation (dol), together with an expert assessment and the return of its shares, was time-barred, the court of appeal having taken the date the agreement was signed as the starting point in that case, given an experienced investor and an audited valuation (Cass. com., 12 March 2025, No. 23-10.883). The firm sends a formal notice and brings the matter before the urgent applications judge or the trial judge, or before the arbitrator where the agreement contains an arbitration clause. See our article on arbitration clauses in shareholders’ agreements, and our page on shareholder disputes.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions
Fourteen detailed answers, based on the provisions in force and on verified decisions.
What does a shareholders' agreement lawyer do in a funding round?
Together with the articles of association, the lawyer builds the contractual framework that will organise control and exit throughout the life of the investment. A funding round often starts with a letter of intent or a term sheet; the lawyer checks that this document does not already contain commitments the founders could no longer renegotiate, then turns its principles into precise clauses. The investor's special rights sit in preference shares created by the articles of association (Article L. 228-11 of the French Commercial Code), whose issue is decided by the extraordinary general meeting (Article L. 228-12). Collective decisions and their majority are set by the articles of association of the SAS, subject to those the law reserves to the shareholders, such as share capital, mergers, annual accounts and the allocation of profits (Article L. 227-9), with the shareholders' agreement completing the list of reserved matters, the composition of committees and reporting.
What matters is consistency. The agreement binds only its signatories (Article 1199 of the French Civil Code); anything that must bind a future buyer has to appear in the articles of association. The Versailles Court of Appeal recalled that the agreement “forms a contractual whole with the articles of association as regards their part relating to relations between shareholders” (our translation); it recognised that the majority shareholders had a right of unilateral termination of that agreement, held to be perpetual, and set aside the termination as against the investors holding a veto only because it was abusive (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296).
The firm acts for founders, who want to keep control of the business, as well as for investors, who want real oversight in return for their funding. It drafts or reviews the agreement, negotiates clause by clause and prepares the signing. For the transaction as a whole, see our page on startup fundraising.
Shareholders' agreement or partners' agreement: what is the difference?
Both are contracts of the same nature, concluded between all or some of a company's members alongside the articles of association: they have the force of law for those who made them (Article 1103 of the French Civil Code) and “A contract creates obligations only between the parties” (Article 1199). French law speaks of a shareholders' agreement (pacte d'actionnaires) in companies whose capital is divided into shares, the simplified joint-stock company (SAS) and the public limited company (SA), and of a partners' agreement (pacte d'associés) in SARLs and civil companies, whose capital is divided into partnership shares (parts sociales).
The practical difference lies in the legal framework and the parties. In a SAS, the law gives the articles of association wide freedom to organise share transfers: non-transferability, approval, compulsory transfer (Articles L. 227-13, L. 227-14 and L. 227-16 of the French Commercial Code). In an unlisted SA, approval under the articles follows a precise statutory procedure (Articles L. 228-23 and L. 228-24). A shareholders' agreement most often accompanies the entry of investors: preference shares, reserved matters, anti-dilution protection, tag along and drag along.
For a company between partners with no investor, in particular a SARL, our page on the partners' agreement (pacte d'associés) covers the usual clauses in that context. This page focuses on the funding round, governance shared with an investor and the liquidity of the investment.
Funding round: which investor rights should go in the articles of association of a SAS?
Those that must bind every future shareholder and be capable of being sanctioned by nullity. The agreement binds only its signatories (Article 1199 of the French Civil Code); the articles of association bind all shareholders, present and future. The investor's special financial or voting rights therefore sit in preference shares, for which the law specifies that “These rights are defined by the articles of association” (Article L. 228-11 of the French Commercial Code), their issue being decided by the extraordinary general meeting on the basis of a special report by the statutory auditors (Article L. 228-12). The articles must also say how these rights may change: failing that, the Cour de cassation requires the individual consent of each holder to amend them (Cass. com., 10 July 2024, No. 22-15.836).
Reserved matters follow the same logic since the reform that came into force on 1 October 2025. A breach of the articles of association is not a ground for nullity, unless the law provides otherwise (Article 1844-10 of the French Civil Code); but the articles of association of a SAS may provide that decisions taken in breach of the rules they lay down are void (Article L. 227-20-1 of the French Commercial Code). A veto that appears only in the shareholders' agreement is a matter of liability between the signatories, save in case of fraud.
The investor's liquidity is protected in the same way. In a SAS, “Any transfer made in breach of the clauses of the articles of association is void” (Article L. 227-15): a pre-emption right or approval clause in the articles (Article L. 227-14) is enforceable against the transferee, whereas a pre-emption right left in the shareholders' agreement gives rise only to damages, unless the third party acted in bad faith (Article 1123 of the French Civil Code). The articles may also provide that a shareholder is required to sell its shares, for example when a founder leaves, and suspend its non-financial rights until the transfer (Article L. 227-16). The shareholders' agreement keeps what concerns only some shareholders: board seats, reporting, founders' personal undertakings, exit timetable. The firm allocates the clauses between the two documents and checks that they do not contradict each other.
What is a drag-along clause (obligation de sortie)?
It is the clause that requires minority shareholders to sell their shares when shareholders holding a threshold set by the agreement accept a buyer's offer for the entire share capital. It serves the investor or the majority shareholder who wants to be able to sell the whole share capital to a buyer who insists on it.
Its strength depends on how it is structured. Most often, each signatory grants a unilateral promise to sell: “The withdrawal of the promise during the time allowed to the beneficiary to exercise the option does not prevent the formation of the promised contract”, and a contract concluded in breach of the promise with a third party who knew of its existence is void (Article 1124 of the French Civil Code). The clause may also appear in the articles of association of a SAS, which may provide that a shareholder is required to sell its shares and suspend its non-financial rights until the transfer (Article L. 227-16 of the French Commercial Code); if the articles do not specify the price, it is fixed by agreement or by the expert under Article 1843-4 of the French Civil Code (Article L. 227-18). None of the decisions cited rules on the enforcement of a drag-along; the Cour de cassation did, however, quash the judgment that refused specific performance of a cross put and call option set out in the agreement where a shareholder was in breach, on the ground of an exclusion clause in the articles unrelated to the transfer (Cass. com., 21 June 2023, Nos. 21-25.952 and 22-12.045).
The founder negotiates the trigger threshold, a floor price or a price formula, equal treatment with the sellers and the nature of the consideration. The firm drafts the clause so that it is enforceable, and challenges it when it is implemented outside its conditions. See our article on enforcing a drag-along clause.
What is a tag-along clause (sortie conjointe)?
It is the right of a minority shareholder to sell its shares at the same time and on the same terms as the shareholder who sells all or part of its stake. A tag-along is full when it covers all the minority shareholder's shares, often on a change of control, and proportional when it follows the percentage sold by the majority shareholder.
The decisive point is who owes the obligation. The buyer has not signed the agreement, and “A contract creates obligations only between the parties” (Article 1199 of the French Civil Code). It is therefore the seller who undertakes not to sell without having the beneficiary's shares bought, or to buy them itself. The Paris Court of Appeal applied this reasoning to a transfer price clause: the obligations in the agreement relating to the transfer of securities “do not rest on the beneficiary of the Transfer” (our translation), “but on the holders of the securities due to be transferred” (our translation), and the clause could not impose a price on the buyer, “the privity of contract preventing it” (our translation). The managers holding preference shares, with no tag-along having been exercised, saw their claims dismissed (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 29 November 2022, No. 20/15845).
The drafting therefore sets the events that trigger the right, the notification, the exercise period, the identical terms and the seller's obligation to have the buyer take over the commitment. A contract has the force of law for those who made it (Article 1103): a narrow definition of transfer lets through transactions that nonetheless change the value of the stake. The firm checks these definitions before signing, and brings an action for performance or damages where a sale has been completed without the minority shareholder.
What governance rights can an investor obtain?
A seat, information and a brake. In a SAS, the articles of association set the conditions under which the company is managed (Article L. 227-5 of the French Commercial Code) and may establish a strategic or supervisory committee, whose seats the shareholders' agreement allocates between founders and investors. In an SA, the board of directors has from three to eighteen members (Article L. 225-17), and the chair or the chief executive officer must provide each director with all the documents and information needed to carry out their duties (Article L. 225-35).
The agreement adds the list of reserved matters, subject to the consent of the investor or of a qualified majority of the committee, and periodic reporting. The court sanctions the abusive removal of these rights, without making them untouchable. In an agreement that gave the investors a veto over the main decisions, the Versailles Court of Appeal recognised that each party had a right of unilateral termination, since the agreement was perpetual, then set aside the termination decided by the majority shareholders because it was abusive, holding that “The absence of any obligation to give reasons for using the right of termination reserved to them does not prevent abuse in the exercise of that right” (our translation) (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296).
So that these rights carry a sanction, the firm places in the articles of association the decisions whose disregard must be capable of annulment (Article L. 227-20-1 of the French Commercial Code), and provides in the agreement for a dated consultation procedure, a response deadline and a proportionate penalty (Article 1231-5 of the French Civil Code). A vague list of important decisions proves unworkable on the day of the dispute; a closed list, with figures-based thresholds, holds up before the court.
How can an investor be protected against dilution?
First, through the statutory rules on capital increases. Shareholders have, in proportion to the amount of their shares, a preferential right to subscribe for cash shares issued to carry out a capital increase (Article L. 225-132 of the French Commercial Code). The general meeting that reserves the increase to named persons may cancel this right, but those persons do not take part in the vote, and the issue price or the conditions for setting it are determined by the extraordinary general meeting, on a report from the board of directors or the management board and a special report from the statutory auditor (Article L. 225-138). Beware of preference shares whose share in dividends, reserves or liquidation surplus is limited: they carry no preferential subscription right, unless the articles of association provide otherwise (Article L. 228-11).
Second, through the contract. The agreement may prohibit any capital increase with cancellation of the preferential subscription right, or any capital reduction that would reduce the investor's stake, or grant the investor share warrants, securities giving access to the capital (Article L. 228-91), to be exercised if a new round is priced lower. The firm checks how this is reflected in the articles of association and in the issue resolutions.
The sanction remains the weak point. The Paris Court of Appeal held that the breach of an anti-dilution clause in a shareholders' agreement, “assuming it is established, which is disputed, is not such as to entail the nullity of the resolutions” (our translation); it nevertheless annulled the reduction of the share capital to zero followed by an increase, described, “even though the preferential subscription right was maintained, as an unfair device amounting to fraud on the rights of the minority shareholder” (our translation), and restored the shareholders to their previous position (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 13 February 2024, No. 21/06518). Hence the value of writing the essential protections into the articles of association.
Can the rights attached to preference shares be changed without the investor's consent?
No, unless the articles of association have provided for it. Preference shares carry special rights of any kind, defined by the articles of association, and the voting right may be adjusted, suspended or removed (Article L. 228-11 of the French Commercial Code). Their issue and conversion are decided by the extraordinary general meeting, on the basis of a special report by the statutory auditors (Article L. 228-12).
The Cour de cassation protects their holder. Ruling under former Article 1134 of the French Civil Code, whose binding force is carried over by Article 1103, it holds that, where the articles of association of a SAS do not set out how these rights may be amended, “the individual consent of the holders of those shares is required to make such an amendment” (our translation). In the same case, it held that any transaction changing the rights attached to the converted shares is a conversion, so that the holders of the shares to be converted could not vote on the class to be created: the reduction of the priority dividend voted by all the shareholders was struck down (Cass. com., 10 July 2024, No. 22-15.836). The provision in force indeed states that these holders may not, on pain of nullity of the resolution, take part in the vote on the creation of the class (Article L. 228-15).
For the investor, this rule is a safeguard; for the founders, it is a constraint to anticipate. The firm provides in the articles of association for a special meeting or a class majority to change the rights in later rounds, rather than depending on the consent of each holder, while respecting the prohibition, under Article L. 228-15, on the holders concerned voting on the creation of the class. It also challenges, on the investor's behalf, any amendment decided without its consent.
Can a minority shareholder's veto be abusive?
It can be, on two separate grounds. Every shareholder has the right to take part in collective decisions (Article 1844 of the French Civil Code), and a shareholders' agreement may give a minority investor a veto over certain decisions. A veto set out in the agreement must be exercised in good faith (Article 1104); a refusal to vote at a general meeting that blocks an essential transaction solely in the interest of the person refusing may amount to abuse of minority, and the burden of proving both elements lies with the party relying on it.
The Cour de cassation made this point concerning the vote of a minority member of a SARL who refused, at a general meeting, to change the corporate purpose of a company whose franchise agreements had been terminated: “The refusal of a minority shareholder to change the corporate purpose may be contrary to the general interest of the company” (our translation). Abuse of minority requires twofold proof: that the minority shareholder's conduct prevents a transaction essential to the company, and “that it stems from the sole aim of favouring its own interests to the detriment of the other shareholders” (our translation) (Cass. com., 13 March 2024, No. 22-13.764). The Court nevertheless quashed the judgment on this second element: the court of appeal had not established, on a proper legal basis, that the refusal to change the corporate purpose stemmed from the sole aim of favouring the minority member's interests, since the termination of the franchise agreements fell outside the managers' powers, and the case was sent back to the Rouen Court of Appeal. The decision concerns a vote at a general meeting, not a contractual veto.
This does not make a contractual veto fragile. Where the majority shareholders had terminated an agreement to escape the investors' control, the Versailles Court of Appeal, after recognising that each party had a right of unilateral termination of this perpetual agreement, set aside the termination as abusive, noting that they did not accuse the investors of any reckless use of their veto (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296). The firm drafts targeted vetoes, for which reasons can be given and which come with a procedure, protecting the investor against a claim of abuse and the founders against a general deadlock. See our article on the deadlock clause.
How do you break a deadlock between shareholders?
Through a clause agreed before the dispute. The agreement may provide for mediation, then an exit clause that requires one shareholder to buy out the other. Under the alternative offer clause, known as the American clause or buy-or-sell clause, either party may offer to sell its stake to the other at a price it sets; the recipient must either buy at that price or sell its own securities at the same price.
The Cour de cassation upheld this mechanism, set out in an agreement between two shareholders: it “did not leave the setting of the price to the will of one party alone” (our translation), so that the sale became binding through performance of the undertakings in the agreement. The court of appeal had found that the trigger was subject to objective conditions, a serious and persistent disagreement likely to paralyse the company, and that the bad faith of the party who had triggered it was not proven (Cass. com., 12 February 2025, No. 23-16.290). A contract has the force of law for those who made it (Article 1103 of the French Civil Code), and its specific performance may be sought after formal notice (Article 1221).
In a company where a fund is a minority shareholder, these clauses are combined with the liquidity timetable: an undertaking to seek a sale by a given date, tag along, drag along. The firm defines the deadlock, the procedure, the time limits and the price precisely, and handles the enforcement or the challenge of the clause. See our articles on the Texas shoot-out clause and on voting agreements.
Is a departing founder's promise to sell back shares at the subscription price a leonine clause?
In principle, no. Article 1844-1 of the French Civil Code deems unwritten any provision that gives a shareholder all the profit or exempts it from all the losses, or that excludes it entirely from the profit or makes it bear all the losses (Article 1844-1 of the French Civil Code). The Cour de cassation specifies that “The only clause prohibited by this provision is one that undermines the company agreement in the terms it lays down” (our translation), and that an agreement whose purpose is, save in case of fraud, to ensure, “for a freely agreed price, the transfer of company shares, is unrelated to the company agreement” (our translation). A promise to sell at the subscription price if the manager left was therefore not leonine (Cass. com., 21 June 2023, No. 21-21.875).
The same decision frames the trigger. The promise applied, at a discount, in the event of dismissal for serious misconduct; yet “the dismissal for misconduct of a company's manager or director cannot, without infringing that fundamental freedom, be based on the fact that the manager or director brought legal proceedings against the company” (our translation). The judgment that had upheld the dismissal and enforced the promise was quashed.
Good leaver and bad leaver clauses must therefore be drafted with care: a closed list of departure cases, a price or formula for each, and a penalty that the court can still reduce if it is manifestly excessive (Article 1231-5). See our articles on the bad leaver clause and on the promise to buy at a floor price.
Can a shareholders' agreement last until the investor exits?
Yes, provided the term is set. An agreement concluded for a fixed term is performed until that term, and no one can demand its renewal (Article 1212 of the French Civil Code). “Perpetual undertakings are prohibited”: without a term, each party may end it as it would a contract of indefinite duration (Article 1210), with the agreed notice period or, failing that, a reasonable period (Article 1211). In a funding round, the term is often tied to the investor's exit: a fixed duration, or the sale of the whole share capital if it occurs earlier.
Renewal calls for the same care. In the case decided by the Versailles Court of Appeal, the shareholders' agreement had been concluded for fifteen years or until a full exit, then renewed for two-year periods unless terminated by all the parties. The court held that “The prohibition of perpetual undertakings requires it to be considered that each of the parties to the agreement in question has a right of unilateral termination” (our translation), without waiting for the end of the fifteen years, then set aside the termination as abusive towards the investors holding a veto: the agreement continues to apply “subject to the possibility of exit open to the parties under conditions that exclude abuse” (our translation) (CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296). A poorly designed renewal clause therefore weakens the whole agreement, not only its extension.
For an agreement concluded before 1 October 2016 with no express term, the Cour de cassation holds, under former Article 1134, that it is deemed concluded for the remaining life of the company, which may not exceed ninety-nine years (Article 1838; Cass. com., 11 March 2026, No. 24-21.896). Our page on the partners' agreement (pacte d'associés) develops this question. The firm sets a term linked to the exit, early termination events such as a change of control or an IPO, and what happens to a shareholder who leaves the capital.
A founder is in breach of the shareholders' agreement: what remedies does the investor have?
Specific performance, first. After a formal notice, the creditor may seek performance, unless it is impossible or there is a manifest disproportion between its cost to the debtor acting in good faith and its benefit to the creditor (Article 1221 of the French Civil Code). For a promise to transfer granted by the founder, the withdrawal of the promise during the option period does not prevent the formation of the promised contract (Article 1124). The Cour de cassation thus quashed the judgment that refused a financial shareholder specific performance of a cross put and call option, set out in the agreement for the case where a shareholder fails to remedy a breach within thirty days of a formal notice, and sent the case back (Cass. com., 21 June 2023, Nos. 21-25.952 and 22-12.045).
The agreed penalty stands in for damages for the non-performance it covers: no greater or lesser sum may be awarded, unless the court reduces or increases it because it is manifestly excessive or derisory, and it is incurred only after formal notice, unless non-performance is definitive (Article 1231-5). A decision taken in disregard of a reserved matter can be annulled on that ground alone only if the rule appears in the articles of association of a SAS that provide for this sanction (Article L. 227-20-1 of the French Commercial Code); left in the agreement, it is dealt with through liability, save in case of fraud.
Abusive resistance is sanctioned. A company that had taken a stake in another to recapitalise it had obtained specific performance of the promise to sell set out in the agreement; the Cour de cassation upheld the order against the shareholder to pay damages for abusive resistance, separate from legal costs, and held time-barred its counterclaim for annulment of the agreement for fraudulent misrepresentation, together with an expert assessment and the return of its shares, the limitation period running from the signing of the agreement (Cass. com., 12 March 2025, No. 23-10.883). The firm sends the formal notice, applies to the urgent applications judge for urgent measures, then brings the case before the trial judge or the arbitrator. For breach of a pre-emption right and the enforcement of promises between shareholders, see our page on the partners' agreement (pacte d'associés).
How much does a shareholders' agreement lawyer charge?
Fees are set out in a written fee agreement, in accordance with Article 10 of the Law of 31 December 1971: before committing, you know what the engagement covers and what it costs.
The fee agreement specifies, in particular, the amount or the method of calculating the fees covering the foreseeable work, as well as the expected costs and disbursements. For a funding round, it generally distinguishes the negotiation phase of the shareholders' agreement and the articles of association, whose length depends on the number of investors and their advisers, from the signing and formalities phase.
The firm favours fixed fees per stage: review of a letter of intent or term sheet, drafting or review of the shareholders' agreement and articles of association, negotiation with the investor or the founders, accession of a new shareholder, exercise of a pre-emption, tag-along or drag-along clause, formal notice, urgent application, proceedings on the merits, appeal. Any new engagement is covered by an amendment, with no unexpected billing.
For a first opinion on your documents, the preliminary case review at €80 incl. VAT, through the form on this page, leads to a written analysis within 24 working hours. First contact on +33 6 89 11 34 45.
References
Official texts and related pages
The sources for this page, checked on 1 November 2026, and the firm's related areas of practice.
Official texts
- Articles 1103, 1104 and 1199 of the French Civil Code: binding force, good faith, privity of the agreement
- Articles 1123 and 1124 of the French Civil Code: right of first refusal, unilateral promise
- Articles 1210, 1211, 1212 and 1838 of the French Civil Code: perpetual undertakings, duration of the agreement and of the company
- Articles 1221 and 1231-5 of the French Civil Code: specific performance, penalty clause
- Articles 1836, 1843-4, 1844, 1844-1 and 1844-10 of the French Civil Code: shareholders' commitments, expert, participation in decisions, leonine clause, nullities
- Articles L. 227-1, L. 227-5, L. 227-9 and L. 227-20-1 of the French Commercial Code: SAS, management, collective decisions, nullity under the articles
- Articles L. 227-13, L. 227-14, L. 227-15, L. 227-16, L. 227-17, L. 227-18, L. 227-19 and L. 227-20 of the French Commercial Code: non-transferability, approval, compulsory transfer, price
- Articles L. 228-11, L. 228-12 and L. 228-15 of the French Commercial Code: preference shares
- Articles L. 228-23 and L. 228-24 of the French Commercial Code: approval in an unlisted public limited company
- Articles L. 225-17 and L. 225-35 of the French Commercial Code: board of directors, information of directors
- Articles L. 225-132, L. 225-138 and L. 228-91 of the French Commercial Code: preferential subscription right, reserved capital increase, securities
- Article 10 of Law No. 71-1130 of 31 December 1971: fee agreement
Decisions cited
- Cass. com., 11 March 2026, No. 24-21.896: agreement with no express term and life of the company
- Cass. com., 8 July 2026, No. 25-11.354: nullity of a transfer in breach of a pre-emption right in the articles of association
- Cass. com., 12 February 2025, No. 23-16.290: validity of the alternative offer clause
- Cass. com., 12 March 2025, No. 23-10.883: abusive resistance to the performance of the agreement
- Cass. com., 13 March 2024, No. 22-13.764: abuse of minority in the vote of a SARL member
- Cass. com., 10 July 2024, No. 22-15.836: amendment of the rights attached to preference shares
- Cass. com., 21 June 2023, Nos. 21-25.952 and 22-12.045: scope of Article L. 227-15 and enforcement of a cross option set out in the agreement
- Cass. com., 21 June 2023, No. 21-21.875: promise at the subscription price and leonine clause
- Cass. 1re civ., 25 January 2023, No. 19-25.478: agreement concluded for the life of the company
- CA Versailles, ch. com. 3-2, 9 June 2026, No. 25/00296: right to terminate a perpetual agreement and abusive termination towards investors holding a veto
- CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 13 February 2024, No. 21/06518: anti-dilution clause and fraud on the minority shareholder’s rights
- CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 8, 29 November 2022, No. 20/15845: transfer price clause and privity of the agreement
A shareholders' agreement to negotiate, a funding round to sign, a clause to enforce?
The firm can be reached 24/7. Send the articles of association, the draft or signed shareholders' agreement, the investor's letter of intent, the capitalisation table and any relevant correspondence: Hassan Kohen reviews how the articles and the agreement fit together, the rights of each class of shares and the time limits, then tells you the appropriate route: negotiation, formal notice, urgent application, action on the merits or arbitration.