Criminal European Court of Human Rights
CASE OF L. AND OTHERS v. FRANCE
FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF L. AND OTHERS v. FRANCE
(Applications nos. 46949/21 and 2 others –
see appended list)
JUDGMENT
Art 3 and Art 8 (substantive and procedural) • Positive obligations • Failure by respondent State to apply in practice a criminal-law system capable of punishing non-consensual sexual acts with minors • No concept of “consent” in relevant domestic law • Failure by domestic courts to duly assess impact of all surrounding circumstances • Failure by domestic courts to take sufficient account, in assessing applicants’ discernment and ability to give consent, of their particularly vulnerable situations, in view of their minor status at material time • Criminal proceedings not conducted promptly and expeditiously (applications nos. 46949/21 and 39759/22)
Art 14 ( Art 3 and Art 8) • “Secondary victimisation” of one minor through use by national authorities of guilt-inducing, judgmental comments conveying gender stereotypes (application no. 46949/21) • Disclosure of sex-based discrimination in reasoning of Investigation Division’s judgment • Gender stereotypes serving no purpose and prejudicial to applicant’s dignity
Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.
STRASBOURG
24 April 2025
FINAL
24/07/2025
This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
It may be subject to editorial revision.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION
THE FACTS
I. APPLICATION No. 46949/21 (L. v. FRANCE)
A. Criminal complaint
B. Opening of a judicial investigation
C. Committal of the accused for trial for sexual assault
D. Criminal complaint with application to join the proceedings as a civil party
II. APPLICATION No. 24989/22 (H.B. v. FRANCE)
A. Criminal complaint
B. Trial proceedings against the accused for sexual assault
III. APPLICATION No. 39759/22 (M.L. v. FRANCE)
A. The first criminal complaint
B. Criminal complaint with application to join the proceedings as a civil party
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Provisions of the Criminal Code
B. Case-law of the Court of Cassation
C. Other documents relating to the legislation and to the courts’ treatment of sexual violence
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. United Nations
B. Council of Europe
III. EUROPEAN UNION LAW
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW
A. States Parties to the Istanbul Convention
B. EU member States
THE LAW
I. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3, 8 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Admissibility
B. Merits
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
A. Damage
B. Costs and expenses
OPERATIVE PROVISIONS
APPENDIX – List of applications
In the case of L. and Others v. France,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Mattias Guyomar,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Gilberto Felici,
Andreas Zünd,
Kateřina Šimáčková,
Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 46949/21, 24989/22 and 39759/22) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three French nationals, L., H.B. and M.L. (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated in the appended table;
the decision to give notice to the French Government (“the Government”) of the complaint common to the three applications under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (shortcomings in the legislative framework and judicial practice; alleged failure to conduct an effective investigation), the complaint under the same Articles and Article 14 in conjunction with those Articles (application no. 46949/21; alleged secondary victimisation and discriminatory treatment) and the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (application no. 39759/22; excessive length of proceedings), and to declare the remainder of the complaints inadmissible;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed;
the parties’ observations;
the written comments received from the National Advisory Commission on Human Rights (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme – CNCDH), which was granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
Having deliberated in private on 1 April 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applications mainly concern the respondent State’s compliance with its positive obligations, under the substantive and procedural heads of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, to enact criminal-law provisions that effectively punished rape reported by adolescent minors, to apply those provisions in practice through an effective investigation and prosecution and, with regard to application no. 46949/21, to ensure that the applicant was not subjected to secondary victimisation during that investigation and prosecution.
THE FACTS
2. The applicants, L., H.B. and M.L., were born in 1995, 2005 and 1991 respectively. Details on their respective representatives are provided in the appended table.
3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Colas, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs.
4. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
I. APPLICATION No. 46949/21 (L. v. FRANCE)
A. Criminal complaint
5. On 31 August 2010 the applicant went with her mother to a police station in the Paris region to report that she had been raped in 2009, when she was 14 years old, by two men aged 21, P.C. and J.C., who were firefighters based in fire stations near her home. The investigation was assigned to the Family Protection Unit of the Val-de-Marne local police force. L. had been left psychologically fragile and socially isolated as a result of school bullying four years earlier. For that reason, she was on medication (antidepressants and anxiolytics) and had been hospitalised several times in a psychiatric unit for children, most recently for three weeks in July 2010.
6. On 6 and 7 September 2010 the applicant and her mother were interviewed again, at length. Over the course of the successive interviews, the applicant stated that she had regularly suffered from anxiety attacks since the age of 12, which had led to many calls by firefighters from the above-mentioned fire stations, including that of P.C. She said that from April 2009 onwards she had had sexual relations with P.C. on several occasions, in their respective homes, in a vehicle and in the woods, and that they met up solely for that purpose. She said that she refused anything other than vaginal or oral penetration.
7. She stated that while she had been in and out of hospital following suicide attempts between October and December 2009, two further sexual encounters had taken place at the home of P.C., who had contacted her to that end. In November 2009 she had had sexual relations with P.C. in the presence of two of his friends: J.C. and a man later identified as J.F. Approximately three weeks later she had had sexual relations with P.C. and his cousin, a certain F., in the context of heavy drinking and in the presence of a 17-year-old female friend whom she had met in hospital. That friend too had had sexual relations with each of the two men. Although the applicant said that she “[had] not [been] forced”, she mentioned that her discernment had been impaired by heavy medication, and she likened the sexual acts to episodes of self-harm (“For me at the time, sleeping with someone was like cutting myself”). She also mentioned her ability to “switch off” by “mentally disconnecting” because of a lack of “strength to defend herself physically”.
8. The applicant stated that in November 2009, after having vaginal intercourse with P.C., she had had to perform oral sex several times: twice on P.C., in front of his friends; and once on J.C., which she had initially refused. She said that on that occasion she had been verbally abused by P.C., who had insulted her and had told her, “You’re in my house, you do what I tell you”, and that she had been afraid that he would hit her. When she had remained “immobile”, J.C. had “grabbed her by the hair so she would move her head”. When J.F. had attempted to touch her genitals, she had resisted by squeezing her legs together. She explained that the three men had visited a pornography website and had wanted to do “the same things” with her. The police officer (“P.”) questioned L. about her inability to say no to the oral sex allegedly imposed on her by J.C., in the following terms:
“[P.:] You could have shouted, moaned, bit him, pushed him away with your arms before he put his penis in your mouth. Did you?
[L.:] I didn’t do anything.
[P.:] Did you pull your head back so he’d stop or because he was going a bit too far and choking you?
[L.:] Both. …
[P.:] Do you think a woman being raped fights back against her rapist a lot or a little?
[L.:] A lot.
[P.:] Why did you fight back a little and not a lot?
[L.:] It was the first time there were several guys. I thought it was normal for people to do that. …
[P.:] … Can you see a difference between what happened and rape?
[L.:] Yes.
[P.:] What’s the difference?
[L.:] I didn’t scream, I didn’t shout. …
[P.:] What would the three guys have understood if you’d put up a fight?
[L.:] That I didn’t want to.”
9. The applicant stated that she had not seen P.C. since those last events, but that her contact details had subsequently been “passed around” the firefighters at several fire stations, who would contact her via Facebook or text message and with whom she had had sexual relations, usually in vehicles in car parks. She gave the names of some 15 adult men who, in her opinion, knew that she was a minor, but she did not lodge a criminal complaint against them.
10. The investigation revealed that L. had a great interest in firefighters, as evidenced in particular by the search history, photographs and videos found on her computers. However, no files of a sexual nature were detected. A psychiatric assessment of L. by Dr F. on 10 September 2010 disclosed no psychiatric illness, but confirmed that she had a fragile, immature and easily influenced personality and was prone to recurring episodes of depression with suicide attempts, for which she had been hospitalised several times in specialist institutions and took anxiolytic medication. The expert noted that L.’s sexual conduct could be a form of self-punishment, as could her self-mutilation.
11. The investigation continued with the inclusion of evidence from the administrative and disciplinary inquiries conducted by the Paris and Yvelines Fire and Rescue Services. It showed that L. had been treated by emergency services on 130 occasions since 2008. Regarding P.C.’s and J.C.’s statements as part of the inquiries, P.C. acknowledged having engaged in consensual sexual activity with the applicant, including during the events of November 2009 in the presence of his friends; J.C. asserted that the young woman had performed oral sex on him on her own initiative.
12. On 22 February 2011 L. and her mother were again interviewed by the local Family Protection Unit and reaffirmed their respective previous statements. The applicant specified that P.C. had also asked her on several occasions during their relationship to undress and to touch herself in front of her computer’s webcam while he masturbated. On the same day as the interview, she was admitted to hospital after ingesting eight Valium tablets. She explained that she had felt “dirty” upon discussing the events.
13. On 2 March 2011 P.C., J.C. and J.F. were taken into police custody. P.C. summarised his relationship with L. according to the same timeline as she had, but asserted that she was a sexually forward person, who had first offered him oral sex at home in the spring of 2009. Regarding the events of November 2009 complained of by the applicant, he stated that she had consented to all the sexual acts both with himself and with J.C., and acknowledged that his two friends had come to his house for that purpose. J.C., for his part, maintained that the oral sex the young woman complained of had been on her initiative. J.F. reaffirmed that he had not had sexual contact with L. on the day of the events. J.C. and J.F. took part in a confrontation, during which they maintained their previous statements and denied having gone to P.C.’s house for the purpose of sex. The three protagonists again asserted that the applicant had been consenting, and denied any violence against her. P.C. stated that by the end of 2009 all the firefighters at the fire station had known about L.’s hospitalisations, suicide attempts and cutting.
B. Opening of a judicial investigation
14. On an application by the public prosecutor dated 4 March 2011, a judicial investigation was opened in respect of P.C., J.C. and J.F. The three men were charged with gang rape and aggravated sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 who was also a vulnerable person, committed between 1 February 2009 and 31 August 2010.
15. On 23 November 2011 the applicant gave evidence to the investigating judge at the Versailles tribunal de grande instance. She repeated her previous statements as to the events implicating the accused. She confirmed the sequence of sexual acts on the day of the events – that is to say, vaginal intercourse with P.C. just before the arrival of the other two men, followed by oral sex performed twice on P.C. and vaginal intercourse again in the presence of the two others, then oral sex performed without her consent on J.C., who had held her by the hair and the head. She stated that she had felt indebted to the firefighters at the time of the events and that P.C. sometimes used to tell her that she should “be nice” given the number of times they had given her emergency care. She said that in hindsight, she believed that she had not been in a position to give her consent to sexual activity with P.C., nor to that with the many firefighters she had met subsequently, on account of her medical treatment, which had reduced her to the state of a “vegetable”. She specified that the firefighters at P.C.’s fire station knew her age and the details of her medical treatment because of the many times they had been called to her home. The investigating judge repeated the remarks of other firefighters who had had sexual relations with the applicant and who had said that she had incited them to engage in those acts by her forward, sexualised behaviour towards them. The applicant denied that. She indicated that since she had lodged her criminal complaint on 31 August 2010, she had been able to stop all medical treatment, had gone back to school, was undergoing psychotherapy and had not had any boyfriends. The investigating judge asked the applicant about a prior criminal complaint lodged in June 2008, concerning an assault while she was in hospital, for which the charges had been dropped. L. denied having reported that situation as rape.
16. L.’s parents gave evidence to the investigating judge on 23 and 25 November 2011. They provided a long account of their daughter’s psychiatric history since 2007, including her violent anxiety attacks requiring very frequent calls from the firefighters in 2008 and 2009, and her many hospitalisations for suicide attempts, particularly in 2009. This had caused her to drop out of school and had left her socially isolated. The applicant’s medical files at various hospitals were seized in February and March 2012 and added to the investigation file.
17. In a supplementary application of 24 September 2012, the public prosecutor instructed the investigation to be expanded to include four other firefighters (A.F., D.M., J.M. and S.G.), on the charge of intentional failure to provide assistance to a person in danger in July 2010. The investigating judge’s remit was also extended to include a charge, against person or persons unknown, of gang rape of a particularly vulnerable minor under the age of 15 and incitement of a minor by means of an electronic communication network to engage in unlawful sexual activity in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
18. Dr S., a psychiatrist specialised in care for sexual-assault victims, who had been treating the applicant for two years, gave evidence as to the applicant’s significant psychosomatic problems since the events complained of.
19. On 5 November 2012 L.’s parents informed the investigating judge of a fresh suicide attempt by their daughter on 21 September 2012, followed by a stay in intensive care. On 5 November 2012 they also asked the public prosecutor to prosecute further acts of rape committed in 2010 by other firefighters, as alleged by their daughter.
20. On 21 June 2013 Dr B., a psychiatrist, submitted a report to the investigating judge comprising a medical and psychiatric assessment of L. and a review of the criminal and medical file. The expert described her personality as “frankly pathological”, “histrionic” and “borderline”, which served to explain both her behaviour involving “inappropriate sexual seduction” and her brutal decompensation with acts of self-harm, as well as her severe and debilitating panic disorder causing anxiety attacks. He specified that L. had thus “suffered from mental and psychological disorders between early 2009 and August 2010”, justifying medication (including the “exceptional” prescription of a neuroleptic) capable of sedating her. He described her as only superficially sexually mature; her many partners corresponded to a “need to debase herself” and she was “particularly easily influenced, impressionable and suggestible”. The expert indicated that her vulnerability was “noticeable by others”, including the firefighters who had met her. He was of the opinion that the applicant had been capable of giving her consent at that time, which she had acknowledged doing, but that “psychologically, it [could] not be denied that the consent of such a fragile, vulnerable and disturbed young woman [could] not be regarded as ‘informed’”. Lastly, he indicated that the applicant’s illness could affect the reliability of her statements. L.’s parents requested a second expert’s opinion. In particular, they asserted that the first expert had not given sufficient consideration to the post-traumatic stress suffered by the applicant on account of the events. They also contended that he had not carried out his assignment, because he had failed to conduct a proper assessment of the impact of their daughter’s particularly heavy psychotropic medication at the time of the events.
21. On 17 January 2014 the applicant, at her own request, again gave evidence to the investigating judge. Among other things, she complained of acts of violence against her by another firefighter, J.L., who had allegedly organised sexual acts with other men without her consent.
22. In a letter of 18 June 2014 addressed to the investigating judge and the public prosecutor’s office, the applicant stated that she had attempted to take her own life by throwing herself out of a window, explaining her actions by the psychological effects of the alleged rapes. She wrote that she had also suffered violent rape by anal penetration by P.C. and J.L., which she had been incapable of reporting previously as she found it humiliating.
23. Between 25 August 2014 and 6 May 2015 the four firefighters who were named in the supplementary application of 24 September 2012 (see paragraph 17 above) were charged with failure to provide assistance and were questioned on two occasions. They denied having noticed signs that the applicant was in danger or distress during their brief encounters, with some disputing that she had had actual anxiety attacks. Several other firefighters gave evidence to the investigating judge in the course of 2017. The firefighters’ incident reports relating to L. from 2008 and 2009 were added to the investigation file. They included the applicant’s age, namely 14 years at the material time, showing that P.C. had been aware of that fact.
24. On 11 October 2016 the applicant’s lawyers wrote to the investigating judge to stress the effects of the applicant’s medication on her conduct. They also requested additional investigative measures, in particular the questioning of several firefighters accused by L. and a confrontation between them and her. As a result, some confrontations were held in 2018. Eight of the witnesses summoned did not show up. Two others admitted to receiving oral sex from L., having vaginal intercourse on the premises of the hospital in which she had been staying in June 2010, and giving her number to other colleagues or having received her number in that manner, without suspecting how young she was.
25. On 14 March 2018 the applicant reported having been raped and held against her will by two unknown individuals. She subsequently admitted that this was a lie. A medical examination performed that day found recent cut wounds on the applicant’s genitals, and the expert found that she was in a state of shock. The proceedings were subsequently discontinued and the applicant was held not to be criminally liable. This report echoed another made by the applicant concerning rape and violence on the part of two individuals on 11 September 2011. The psychiatric expert had concluded that the applicant experienced episodes of intellectual and cognitive impairment, which were such as to weaken her perception of reality and her credibility. The investigation had ultimately found that threatening text messages received from the two individuals had in fact been sent by the applicant herself.
26. In an order of 3 May 2018, the investigating judge then in charge of the case refused the requests for measures that had not yet been carried out. He considered that in view of the applicant’s far-fetched reports of threats and instances of aggravated sexual assault in 2014, 2017 and 2018, it was clear that continuing the investigation any further would risk driving her to acts of self-harm. The judge accordingly issued notification that the investigation was closed on 15 June 2018.
C. Committal of the accused for trial for sexual assault
27. In an order of 19 July 2019, the investigating judge dismissed the applicant’s application seeking to have the investigation continued into the acts of rape by psychological coercion resulting from a significant age difference, as defined in Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code derived from the interpretative Law of 3 August 2018 (see paragraphs 94-95 below). In line with the public prosecutor’s final application of 28 June 2018 as to how to proceed with the case, the investigating judge reclassified the charges of gang rape and aggravated sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 committed in November 2009 as sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 without violence, threats, coercion or surprise, with the added circumstance that the acts had been committed by several people acting as perpetrators or accomplices with respect to P.C., J.C. and J.F.
28. The investigating judge noted that the actual occurrence of the sexual activity had not been disputed, even though the applicant had been under the age of 15 prior to 23 February 2010. He nonetheless found, first, that her statements as to her consent had varied significantly throughout the proceedings and that the expert psychiatric reports and her attempts to present fictitious assaults were reasons to take her words with caution. Second, he noted that the initial three firefighters to have been charged had consistently asserted that the applicant had not shown any reluctance and had even been forward with one of them. He concluded that no evidence of violence, threats, coercion or surprise had been established. He nevertheless held that there was sufficient evidence to make out the offence of sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 and ordered P.C., J.C. and J.F. to be committed for trial on that charge before a criminal court. He issued a discontinuance decision with respect to the other allegations, noting in particular that it had not been made out that the other accused firefighters, A.F., D.M., J.M. and S.G., whose statements were consistent, had known L.’s age at the time of the events. Finding that the same was true for the men who had exchanged sexually suggestive messages with the applicant, he also issued a discontinuance decision with respect to the offence of incitement of a minor under the age of 15 to engage in unlawful sexual activity.
29. The applicant and her parents appealed. In their statement of grounds of appeal, they disputed that the events could be regarded as consensual sexual activity with the many firefighters who had contacted the applicant for the purpose of sex while she was between 13 and 15 years old, because they had been aware of her physical and psychological fragility. They argued that such knowledge ruled out any informed, freely given consent on the young woman’s part, especially for the purposes of Article 36 of the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (opened for signature on 11 May 2011, came into force on 1 August 2014, CETS 210; “Istanbul Convention” – see paragraph 124 below). They also submitted that, for the applicant, the firefighters represented a moral authority, to whom she looked up and who had between 4 and 14 years’ difference in age with her, a situation referred to in Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 94-95 below). They requested that those men be committed for trial before an assize court on charges of rape.
30. In a judgment of 12 November 2020, the Investigation Division of the Versailles Court of Appeal upheld the investigating judge’s decision. It based its decision on the same reasoning as that judge (see paragraphs 27-28 above) with respect to the three main accused, stating as follows:
“[L.] explained that she had not said no to [P.C.] and to [J.C.] but had adopted a passive attitude towards her assailants, which is not compatible with the performance of oral sex. In addition, it can be seen from her own statements that she was able to refuse [J.F.]’s attempts to touch her body, which shows that her discernment was neither obscured nor even clouded by her age, or by the medication. This alleged rape is further made implausible by the four-way encounter that the complainant had at the home of [P.C.], with him, his cousin and [her friend D.] sometime later, regarding which all the protagonists agree that the sexual acts were consensual and for which [L.] had brought condoms and sex toys.
The imaginary assaults alleged by the complainant before and after her criminal complaint of 31 August 2010, and the many inconsistencies in her statements, strip them of much of their credibility and, in the absence of objective evidence, do not make it possible to establish that the complainant did not give her consent …”
31. The Investigation Division then went on to examine the charges against each of the firefighters accused of rape by L. It found that there was no objective evidence in favour of either those men’s or the applicant’s differing versions of events. The applicant’s “inconsistent statements”, however, had to be taken “with circumspection”, particularly in view of Dr B.’s findings in his expert report, where he emphasised “[L.’s] propensity to make up stories on account of her illness”. The Court of Appeal concluded as follows:
“… [T]he investigation has shown that [L.]’s initiatives to become acquainted with firefighters, whose profession fascinated her, and to engage in sexual activity with them in often public places that she had chosen, for which she often supplied the condoms, as well as her forward and provocative behaviour, her active participation in the act itself, particularly by performing oral sex, the fact that she hid her age, her morphology as established by photographs adduced by her mother, and her ability to refuse certain sexual acts, such as anal penetration and cunnilingus, and to rebuff certain partners, such as [J.F.], do not make it possible to establish the violence, physical or psychological coercion, threats or surprise that would be necessary to make out the offences of rape and aggravated sexual assault alleged in these proceedings, in spite of the difference in age between the complainant and the accused. …
With regard to the complainant’s vulnerability, the brief nature of the encounters between [L.] and her partners would not necessarily have enabled the men to notice it, as indicated by Dr [B.] in his expert report. Her cut scars did not show her fragility at the time of the encounters. And her active participation during the sexual activity, which she herself admitted, did not disclose that she was on heavy medication.
The complainant conceded – even when, influenced by her ongoing psychotherapy and driven by a desire to rebuild her image, she changed her version of events and asserted that all the sexual acts had been imposed on her – that since she had not said no to the sexual acts with the firefighters, they might have believed her to be consenting. Their usual success with the ladies (la gent féminine) and the sometimes uninhibited behaviour women show towards them meant that they did not think twice.
Dr [B.] observed in [L.] signs regularly seen in victims of sexual assault, which predated the alleged assaults in question. On the other hand, he did not note any pathognomonic symptoms of sexual assault, which led him to regard her sexual conduct as a form of high-risk behaviour and self-harm, related to her illness, which the young woman moreover confirmed. …”
32. The civil parties – that is, the applicant, her parents and her brother – appealed on points of law. In their statement of grounds of appeal on points of law, they submitted, inter alia, that the case raised the issue of “the place of consent in the assessment of the constituent elements of rape and aggravated sexual assault”, particularly with regard to a minor under the age of 15. That, they argued, was because Articles 222-22 and 222-23 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 91 below), which referred to a sexual act imposed on the victim by violence, coercion, threats or surprise, gave rise to the risk that the offence would not be made out where apparent consent “actually mask[ed] consent that [had been] extracted” by means of a “power play” stemming from an imbalance created by age, moral authority or state of health. Consequently, they disputed the assessment in their case of the concepts of coercion and surprise, which had not taken into account L.’s vulnerability and young age. They argued that her many sexual encounters reflected her illness, in line with the expert’s findings, which made her “easy sexual prey” for people whom she admired and trusted. In their supplementary statement of grounds of appeal on points of law, they added that the Investigation Division’s reasoning disclosed discriminatory gender stereotypes in breach of Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention, in that it referred to firefighters’ “success with the ladies (la gent féminine[1]) and the sometimes uninhibited behaviour women show[ed] towards them” and held that L.’s “flirtatious and forward” behaviour did not make it possible to establish psychological coercion resulting from the age difference with the alleged perpetrators. In that connection, they submitted that “the Investigation Division, which should have confined itself to seeking the coexistence of strong and concordant inferences and making a balanced assessment of the credibility of the protagonists’ contradictory statements, [had] not satisf[ied] the obligations inherent in the right to respect for private life and the physical integrity of the individual [for the purposes of the Convention] and all the provisions, especially Articles 12, 18, 29, 36 and 49, of the [Istanbul Convention], which [had] been ratified by France …” (see paragraph 124 below).
33. The Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation issued an opinion advising against finding the grounds of appeal inadmissible – as recommended by the reporting judge – in relation to whether the rape of a minor under the age of 15 had been established. Citing the “indisputable evidence of [L.’s] great psychological fragility” referred to by the Court of Appeal, the Advocate-General noted that the conclusions of the judgment (see paragraph 31 above) were “indicative of the Investigation Division’s line of reasoning”, which sought to determine whether, in view of the applicant’s conduct, the firefighters “could have believed she was consenting”. The Advocate-General continued as follows:
“… [T]he question of vulnerability is addressed only superficially – with most of the Investigation Division’s examination similarly concerning whether [L.] was consenting or not – by comparing the versions of events and assessing the credibility of the victim’s statements, as is typical in rape cases. …
With regard to the acts attributed to [P.C., J.C. and J.F.], committed in November 2009, the Investigation Division thus notes, in particular, that the perpetrators’ statements concurred as to her active participation, and even provocation, and that she lacks credibility (because her alleged passive attitude was not compatible with oral sex, her story changed and, moreover, she had reported imaginary assaults and had a tendency to make up stories on account of her illness as noted by the expert).
With regard to the acts previously committed by [P.C.], the Investigation Division’s reasoning … is based solely on factual and personality-related aspects, from which it infers consent (especially the changes in her statements – [L.] presented the encounters as consensual at the start of the investigation). Nowhere is [L.]’s age mentioned (13 then 14 years old), nor is her illness.
A mere allusion is made to the concept of discernment, to which it can be assumed the last paragraph of Article 222-22-1 makes reference (especially since it appears from the particulars of the judgment that child protection organisations and the civil parties raised the issue of the application of that paragraph), in these terms: ‘it can be seen from her own statements that she was able to refuse [J.F.]’s attempts to touch her body, which shows that her discernment was neither obscured nor even clouded by her age, or by the medication’. …
It is my view … that that Article can be read as establishing an evidential rule, a guideline for seeking evidence, that does not amount to a presumption but is binding on the courts, which do not have the option to apply it or not. …
It would thus be for the court, where a minor is under the age of 15, to ascertain first whether he or she was able to give informed consent, in view of his or her vulnerability as determined in relation to his or her age as well as his or her personality, personal history, and psychological and social situation. This interpretation of a lack of discernment would make it possible to take account of recourse to the concept of vulnerability, which would appear to be broader than that of lack of discernment, and of the fact that, as can be seen from the debates, parliament did not intend this legislation to cover only a very young age but also what might be called the intermediate years of a young person, from ages 13 to 15, for whom the situation must be examined on a case-by-case basis. In this connection, to give full meaning to the word vulnerability, capacity for discernment should not be assessed solely from the standpoint of sexual maturity (understood as knowledge of sex), but also, with regard to young people whose personality is still under development and who accordingly deserve special protection, from that of the maturity to adopt a sexuality with which they are comfortable and which does not involve self-destructive behaviour. Indeed, according to the dictionary of the Académie française, the feminine noun ‘vulnérabilité’ (vulnerability) is defined as the quality of being vulnerable, and the adjective vulnérable (vulnerable) as ‘that which can be harmed; figuratively, that which can be attacked, which is at risk’. Thus, if a lack of discernment were not presumed and had to be ascertained, the ‘necessary’ discernment could not be deduced from the mere fact that the minor had given objective signs of consent, since this provision is intended precisely to examine whether informed consent was possible. In other words, the young person may have consented to the acts without having had the necessary discernment to do so.
Where vulnerability was established and the young person therefore did not have the necessary discernment to consent, it would then have to be ascertained whether the accused was aware of those elements of vulnerability and, if so, whether he or she knowingly took advantage of them, which would make it possible to establish surprise or coercion.
In the present case, the Investigation Division did not follow this evidential approach, since it did not truly examine whether consent had been given with discernment, but rather whether there were objective signs of consent, as it might have done for a minor over the age of 15 – as can be seen, moreover, in the general nature of its conclusions.
… Clearly, a 14-year-old who has dropped out of school, who has had several stays in psychiatric hospitals, has made several suicide attempts, ‘some of which were serious’ according to the expert (see p. 20 of the judgment), and has had several anxiety attacks, who cuts herself and takes heavy psychiatric medication and who engages in sexual conduct which, according to the Investigation Division, relying on the expert’s findings, could be regarded as ‘a form of high-risk behaviour and self-harm, related to her illness’ (see p. 40), does not have the kind [of sexual maturity] that the legislature had in mind.
It appears to me that by failing to focus its assessment, first of all, on the question of discernment and, second, on what specifically each of the accused knew about [L.]’s psychological fragility, the Investigation Division did not follow the evidential guidelines imposed by the legislature.
The most telling example of this insufficient reasoning would be the final remark cited above about the ‘heavy medication’. It matters little whether it knocked the girl out to the point that she could not perform oral sex in a car park, on the hood of a car or in public toilets; the only question is whether the firefighters knew that that 14‑year-old girl was taking such medication.
… At each [call by the accused firefighters], the victim’s age – 14 – was stated … and … according to the submissions of the civil parties, [the emergency-incident] reports also indicated what medication she was taking.
I therefore feel that you could quash the judgment, in respect of the first four grounds and within the above-mentioned limits, for insufficient reasoning, as the Investigation Division did not follow the evidential guidelines imposed by the legislature and, in particular, did not examine whether the civil party had the discernment necessary to consent to a sexual act.
It is true that the second stage of the analysis (as to what exactly the firefighters knew, depending in particular on whether or not they took part in the calls to her house and had access to the incident reports, for example) that will have to be performed by the court back to which the matter is referred – should it accept that [L.], in view of her mental vulnerability, did not have the necessary discernment to give informed consent –might not enable it to commit the accused for trial before an assize court. …
At the very least, if you choose not to follow this recommendation [to quash the judgment], I believe that a reasoned dismissal, rather than an inadmissibility decision, would be preferable, given that the Court [of Cassation] has not yet ruled on the interpretation of this provision [the above-mentioned Article 222‑22‑1]. This would have the virtue of signalling to the legislature that this provision, as it is worded, can have only a very limited scope in practice and that this right will have to be reformed – as is now being envisaged – if the goal of providing greater protection to children and young people, to which society seems to aspire, were to be confirmed.”
34. The Advocate-General also very briefly referred to the civil parties’ additional ground of appeal, based on a violation of Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention. She concluded that it was inadmissible for the following reasons:
“Although the reference to ‘la gent féminine’ with respect to a deeply troubled and fragile 14-year-old girl may seem inappropriate, as the expression is characterised as ‘ironic’ by the Larousse online dictionary and as ‘informal’ by the Littré dictionary when used in this way, there is no basis in law for this ground of appeal. Substantively, it adds nothing to the first four, which are, moreover, sufficiently developed.”
35. In a decision of 17 March 2021, the Court of Cassation found, firstly, that the new provisions of paragraph 3 of Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code – concerning the definition of the psychological coercion establishing rape of a minor under the age of 15 – were interpretative and therefore applied immediately to acts committed before the Law of 3 August 2018 entered into force (see paragraph 95 below). It then held that the reasons given by the Investigation Division – to the effect that the applicant had had the necessary discernment to consent to the acts complained of, particularly once she had reached the age of 14 –, fell within the unfettered discretion of the courts below to assess the facts and evidence gathered during the investigation, and found that those reasons were “neither insufficient nor contradictory”. In accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the dismissal of that ground of appeal rendered final the refusal to classify the acts complained of by the applicant as rape.
36. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation quashed the Investigation Division’s judgment, first, in respect of the provisions concerning the offence of incitement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, finding that that Division had not ascertained whether the accused had known that the applicant was a minor, and, second, in so far as the judgment had limited P.C.’s committal for trial solely to the acts committed in November 2009, whereas the sexual activity with the applicant had begun in spring 2009 and had continued in full knowledge of her age (14 years old). To the extent that it had quashed the judgment, it sent the parties back to the Investigation Division of the same Court of Appeal, with a differently constituted bench.
37. On 25 May 2021 the public prosecutor’s office applied for a discontinuance decision in respect of the offence of incitement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, and for P.C.’s committal for trial for the remainder. In a judgment of 1 February 2022, the Versailles Court of Appeal, to which the case had been remitted, granted those applications after dismissing the civil parties’ request for further investigations, and issued a partial discontinuance decision.
38. The civil parties appealed on points of law, relying on similar grounds of appeal as those presented in their previous appeals on points of law (see paragraph 32 above).
39. In a judgment of 18 May 2022, the Court of Cassation declared the civil parties’ joined appeals inadmissible.
40. In a judgment of 27 November 2024, the Versailles Criminal Court sentenced P.C. to a four-year suspended prison term and J.C. to a 15-month suspended prison term. It also ordered their inclusion in the FIJAIS violent and sex offender register. J.F. was acquitted.
D. Criminal complaint with application to join the proceedings as a civil party
41. In the meantime, on 14 October 2021, L. had lodged a criminal complaint, together with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party, with the Versailles investigating judge against 17 firefighters who had had sexual relations with her, two of whom had been included in the first judicial investigation (see paragraph 17 above). She alleged incitement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity and rape of a minor under the age of 15 who was also a vulnerable person, committed as an organised group between 1 March 2008 and 31 August 2010.
II. APPLICATION No. 24989/22 (H.B. v. FRANCE)
A. Criminal complaint
42. On 27 May 2020, at about 1.30 a.m., the parents of H.B., an adolescent girl aged 14 years and 10 months, went to Forbach gendarmerie station to report that their daughter had gone missing on the evening of 26 May. Shortly afterwards, the gendarmerie recorded that H.B. and her 17‑year-old friend N.K., who was accompanying her, had returned home. According to a report by the gendarmes on 5 June 2020, the applicant was “in a state of clear intoxication” and unable to answer their questions. They therefore asked H.B. and N.K. to return in the afternoon of 27 May. On that date the gendarmes indicated that “during an unofficial interview” in the station, H.B. had told them that she had “spent the evening with three Kosovars” and “while completely out of it”, she had “agreed” to “have sex with the three men” but that she “would never have done that if she had not drunk alcohol”.
43. On 30 May 2020 H.B. gave her statement to the gendarmes. She said that on 26 May 2020, at about 8.30 p.m., she had met up with her friend N.K. They had then agreed to get into the vehicle of three men: a minor aged (according to H.B.) 16 or 17 whom N.K. knew, and two adults whom neither of the girls knew and whom H.B. had told that she was 14 years old. She had suggested buying alcohol in Germany (including bottles of vodka) and had drunk a large quantity of it at the three men’s instigation. The vehicle was then parked in a secluded car park and they all played “truth or dare”. Under the influence of alcohol, she had had to kiss the accused, show her breasts, lower her trousers and let them touch her buttocks. Her friend had then gone off with the minor and had performed oral sex at his request. She had thus found herself alone in the vehicle with one of the adults, identified as the driver, with whom she had had vaginal intercourse. Then, outside the vehicle, she had performed oral sex on each of the three men at their request.
44. When asked by the investigating officer whether she had “wanted” those sexual acts, the applicant stated, “I’m not the one who wanted them, they took advantage”. She would have “refused” those acts if she had been “thinking straight”, and she had wanted only “to go for a walk, drink a little and go home”. She then stated that, as her brother had been looking for her and had spotted the vehicle she was in, the group had sped off together and then the three men had abandoned her and N.K. in a location unknown to her. She had been highly intoxicated and her friend had had to support her so that she could walk. Her brother had found them and had brought them back to their house at about 3 a.m.
45. The applicant’s account of the events concurred with that of her friend N.K., as given to the gendarmes on 27 May 2020. N.K. confirmed that the applicant had been intoxicated the entire evening and stated that when H.B. had returned from the woods, where the three men had taken her alone to have sex, H.B. had been unresponsive, rolling around on the ground and drinking vodka uninterruptedly.
46. In the light of the statements made by the applicant and by witnesses, and of the investigation’s findings, the public prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against the two adults, aged 21 and 29 and identified as I.B. and I.H., for sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 by an adult without violence, coercion, threats or surprise. No charges were laid against the minor.
B. Trial proceedings against the accused for sexual assault
47. In a judgment of 9 November 2020, the Sarreguemines Criminal Court held that the acts had to be regarded as serious crimes (crimes) and be classified as aggravated rape for the reasons set out below (see paragraphs 48-52 below). It accordingly held that it lacked jurisdiction and remitted the case to the public prosecutor’s office for further action.
48. In addition to the aforementioned concurring statements made by the applicant and her friend (see paragraphs 43-45 above) as to the sequence of events, the court took note of the other evidence. It noted the statements made on 27 May 2020 by the applicant’s mother, who had said that when her daughter had returned home, she (her daughter) had been vomiting, had smelt very strongly of alcohol and had been having “a breakdown”, and that she (the mother) had found blood in her daughter’s underwear while changing her clothes. The following morning, her daughter had taken two showers before telling her that she had had sex with the two adult men in various positions while the minor was having N.K. perform oral sex on him. She had also told her that, as she had been drunk, she had not known what she was doing but that she had said that she did not want to have sex.
49. The court referred to the medical certificate from the Metz forensic-medical consultation unit, drafted by Dr L. on 28 May 2020. The certificate stated that H.B. had said that she had been subjected to digital and penile penetration of the vagina. She had presented with a contusion on her left forearm, a bluish mark on her left thigh, an abrasion on her right arm, three abrasion marks on her right forearm and two petechiae on her neck. The expert had described recent traumatic injuries and a torn hymen that appeared not to have healed with an erythema of less than a centimetre on the inner right edge of one of the labia minora. He had identified recent genital injuries affecting the vulva and hymen areas and a tear that was in the process of healing. Based on those observations, he had found that the minor’s clinical condition was compatible with her statements.
50. The court noted that during the psychological assessment conducted by V.K. on 7 June 2020, H.B. had stated that she had had sexual intercourse for the first time on the afternoon of the events in question with a certain M., before recounting the successive sexual acts with the three accused. The expert had indicated that the minor felt shame, disgust and even guilt, continued to have flashbacks about the events and, in all, appeared not really to realise that she had been abused.
51. The court also noted the findings of the psychiatric assessment of the accused, including I.B., who displayed “a tendency towards perversion and an ability to objectify others for his own pleasure”. It noted the statements of three witnesses, namely H.B.’s brother, who had been driving around looking for his sister on the night of the events, and two friends who had been with him. One of those friends had recognised the applicant in a vehicle that had sped off as they had approached and which they had been unable to follow along a track through the woods.
52. The court also took into account the statements made to the gendarmes on 8 June 2020 by the minor accused, R.T., and the two adult accused, I.B., who was R.T.’s cousin, and I.H., an acquaintance. Their account of the evening aligned with that of the applicant and her friend, including the part where they had sped off in the vehicle with one of the adult accused (I.B.) at the wheel, and the fact that the applicant had been so intoxicated that she had attempted to vomit, notably after drinking straight vodka, before playing “truth or dare” in a sexually suggestive manner and had sex with each of them in turn, either in the vehicle or at a distance in the woods. One of the accused, I.H., further indicated that he had immediately understood that the applicant was not of full age despite her claims that she was 19 years old. The three accused contended that the applicant had not been forced to drink the alcohol or to agree to having sex several times. I.B. and I.H. repeated their statements at the hearing before the Criminal Court.
53. In declining jurisdiction, the Criminal Court gave the following reasons:
“… [T]he decisions of both the legislature and the courts have been guided by a European trend towards making rape an offence punishing a breach of the consent of others. … [S]wedish legislation provides an excellent example of this, as [the] Swedish Criminal Code defines rape as the act of engaging in sexual activity with a person who is not participating voluntarily, [and] … since 1 July 2018 has criminalised the act of engaging in sexual activity without having obtained the other person’s consent, which the Swedish legislature defines as negligent rape.
… [I]n the present case, … the only question that arises is that of [H.B.]’s consent.
… [T]he Criminal Court finds the public prosecutor’s assumption that [H.B.] was consenting highly dubious, as considerable evidence points to there being no consent. … [H.B.]’s state of extreme, acute intoxication, which rendered her ill as shown by her repeated vomiting just after the sexual activity and again on returning home, is sufficient evidence for the court to find that the 14-year-old minor was not in any state to consent to sexual activity that evening. … [I.H.]’s statements that [H.B.] already wanted to vomit after drinking straight vodka before playing truth or dare and [I.B.]’s statements that [H.B.] was drunk when they played truth or dare show that the two accused were perfectly aware of the civil party’s condition, as she was clearly in a state of manifest intoxication.
… [T]he two accused may still assert that the minor was consenting and even that she wanted the sexual activity – which, in passing, is not necessarily inconsistent with the civil party’s statements. The fact remains, however, that the minor was in no physical or mental state to be freely giving informed consent. … [C]omparative law has the benefit of enabling the courts to come to a better understanding of domestic law. … [I]f the Swedish legislature introduced negligent rape into its legislation, it was in response to feminist criticism of national legislation that punished rape only when the victim had been subjected to violence, coercion or threats.
… [I]n defining rape as any act of sexual penetration obtained by surprise, French law enables the punishment of forms of rape that exhibit no violence, coercion or threats. … [R]ape by surprise is ultimately nothing more than the equivalent of negligent rape, that is, rape committed without the perpetrator having ensured that his or her partner was consenting and that such consent was given validly. … [T]he present case is thus no less than the epitome of rape by surprise, in that even though the civil party was able to give a verbal or physical indication that appeared to be consent, it has been clearly established that such consent was nothing of the sort. … [T]there is nothing groundbreaking about this legal analysis; it is in keeping with a line of legal theory that seeks to protect freedom and therefore, ultimately, the individual.
… [T]he Criminal Court thus finds that a mere verbal or physical expression of consent is not enough to establish its existence, and that any person who engages in sexual activity with another person has a duty to ask himself or herself whether his or her partner’s consent has not been obtained by surprise owing to an objective factor such as manifest intoxication, a psychological disorder or drug addiction. … [H]olding that criminal law should protect the requirement for a person to give informed consent before engaging in sexual activity is a modern approach to such law, which no longer seeks to punish illegal activity but rather to achieve a fundamental goal, namely protecting the individual.
[B]eyond the issue of consent that is uninformed because it has been obtained by surprise, the present case also raises questions as to potential coerced consent obtained through physical violence. …
… [T]he acts being prosecuted by the public prosecutor’s office as the offence of sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 should actually be regarded as the offence of rape of a minor under the age of 15. This is because [H.B.] obviously had no capacity whatsoever to express the least informed consent to sexual activity in view of her state of manifest intoxication. Any sexual act obtained from her by another individual that evening could only have been accomplished by violating her consent by surprise on account of her state of intoxication. Furthermore, there is other evidence to suggest that the civil party’s consent was extracted through physical violence.
… [T]his reclassification as aggravated rape is necessary in the light of the above legal analysis, according to which the offence of rape is designed to protect the informed consent of the individual. It is also necessary because the Criminal Court … has a duty to apply an obiter dictum made by the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation in a judgment of 18 December 1991, stating that an individual’s state of intoxication was sufficient to establish that consent had been obtained by surprise in the event of sexual activity (Crim., 18 December 1991). …
In consequence, this court lacks jurisdiction to try the matter because the acts amount to serious crimes (crimes), and the case should accordingly be remitted to the public prosecutor’s office for further action.”
54. The two accused appealed. In her submissions to the Court of Appeal as a civil party, the minor applicant, represented by her parents, sought to have the judgment of the Criminal Court upheld on the grounds that the established facts showed that the accused had “[taken] advantage of [her] vulnerability … by forcing her to have sex” while she was extremely intoxicated. In the alternative, she asked the Court of Appeal to order further investigations so that her friend N.K. could give evidence confirming that the accused had been aware of the fact that she was a minor from the moment they had met.
55. At the hearing before the Metz Court of Appeal, the accused repeated their earlier statements. They also denied having been aware that H.B. was a minor. Their counsel sought their acquittal, on the grounds that H.B. had, according to them, freely given her consent to the sexual activity and that “the young woman’s state of intoxication at the time of the events [was] far from meeting the criteria for surprise laid down in the case-law”. The public prosecutor’s office disputed that argument as the evidence stood. It sought to have the first-instance judgment upheld and a judicial investigation opened so that additional evidence it deemed necessary for trial could be gathered.
56. In a judgment of 18 March 2021, the Court of Appeal first reiterated that the issue of reclassifying the acts as the serious crime (crime) of rape should have been risen in the proceedings, which had not been the case at first instance. It subsequently dismissed the civil parties’ application for further investigations, holding that it had sufficient information, in view of what it regarded as a comprehensive investigation. On the merits, it set aside the judgment and acquitted the accused. Concerning the criminal classification of the acts, it provided the following reasoning for its decision:
“In her unofficial statements to the gendarmes, as recorded in an information report, and when giving evidence, [H.B.] never claimed to have been subjected to violence, coercion or threats by [the accused I.H. and I.B.] or by the minor [R.T.] at any time during the evening. Nor did [the applicant’s friend, N.K.,] ever report any factual circumstances that would have amounted to any violence, coercion or threat on the part of the accused, in terms either of the two girls’ decision to follow the men or of what led them, especially [H.B.], to engage in sexual activity with them.
However, [H.B.] mentioned several times that she was extremely intoxicated, repeating that she would not have consented to sexual activity with the accused if she had not drunk so much that evening.
It thus falls to the court to assess whether such intoxication constitutes surprise within the meaning of Article 222-23 [of the Criminal Code], which is defined as a strategy used by a perpetrator to obtain someone’s consent by surprise and thereby secure an act of sexual penetration with him or her, or as a situation in which the perpetrator knowingly takes advantage of a person’s unconsciousness or incapacitation in order to engage in an act of sexual penetration with him or her.
In the present case, however, the accounts of all the protagonists present that evening are consistent in saying that [H.B.] and [N.K.] agreed of their own free will to get into the car with the three boys, and that [H.B.] voluntarily, under no pressure whatsoever, drank heavily for the entire evening.
The defendants cannot therefore be accused of any strategy to get [H.B.] drunk.
It should additionally be recalled that under Article 121-3 [of the Criminal Code], there can be no serious crime or other major offence (crime ou délit) without criminal intent. It follows from the principle laid down in that text that rape by surprise may be established even without there being any strategy, provided that the accused was clearly unable to mistake the person’s lack of consent.
It appears, however, that the protagonists began playing sexually suggestive games at a time when there is nothing to suggest that [H.B.], who continued drinking heavily thereafter, was in a state of impaired consciousness under the influence of alcohol.
What is more, the photographs of [H.B.] in the boys’ company posted on social media show a smiling young woman whose appearance does not suggest a loss of capacity.
Admittedly, the gendarmes noticed that [H.B.] was clearly intoxicated when she returned home and, in their view, unable to answer their questions so, under the circumstances, they decided to question the young woman at a later date. But that observation was made at the end of the two young women’s outing, that is to say, after the sexual activity had taken place. Furthermore, [H.B.]’s impromptu statements to the gendarmes, as recorded in the gendarmerie report – specifically, ‘Shit, what have I done, I was a virgin as well’ – are an expression of remorse for an act performed voluntarily, without outside pressure, of which the young woman was perfectly aware and which she remembered.
…
When questioned on 27 May 2020, [H.B.] attributed her conduct to alcohol but made no mention of a loss of consciousness or incapacitation …
[H.B.]’s repeated references to her intoxication and how that influenced her decision to engage in sexual acts with [the accused I.H. and I.B.] (see extracts from [H.B.]’s interview of 27 May 2020 …) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as anything other than an illustration of the disinhibiting effects of alcohol frequently described in medical literature and also by the expert in his examinations [of the accused I.H. and I.B.] (see extract from the findings of the report on [I.B.]: ‘the intoxicating substance is then likely to lower inhibitions, including sexual ones …’) and as an attempt by the young woman retrospectively to justify conduct that may be looked down on by her family and friends.
This observation is confirmed by [her friend N.K.]’s statements as to [H.B.]’s behaviour during the game of truth or dare: ‘She was talking, laughing, doing everything he asked her to. And even when he didn’t ask, she did it.’
Moreover, [H.B.] told the expert that she had already been drinking in the afternoon of 26 May 2020 and had on that occasion had an initial sexual encounter with a young man [M.], in the following terms: ‘… I drank two cans of vodka, whisky and… we did it. In my mind I had no desire to do it… We hadn’t known each other for long but he was in the mood, he wanted to do it. As for me… I was out of it, I was wasted! …’ And yet, the young woman made no mention of potentially lodging a criminal complaint in that regard and spoke of the boy without animosity or any real blame.
…
Lowered inhibitions, leading a person to have sex under the influence of alcohol, cannot constitute surprise within the meaning of Article 222-23 [of the Criminal Code].
It should be recalled that the two young women agreed to play ‘truth or dare’ relatively early in the evening, which led to dares in the form of sexually suggestive practices with the boys. After this game, one of the girls, [N.K.], who acknowledged at most having been moderately under the influence of alcohol, had a sexual encounter with the minor boy, whom she already knew.
In addition, [H.B.]’s behaviour during the game of truth or dare, as described by [N.K.] [statements reproduced below] … are indicative of active, not passive, behaviour by the young woman.
The boys’ feeling of being swept up in the moment, as noted by the expert psychiatrist, apparently also affected the girls, one of whom was slightly older than the other, had more sexual experience and had a sexual encounter with one of them after the game of truth or dare, thereby paving the way for her friend.
In such circumstances, [the accused I.H. and I.B.] could legitimately have believed that [H.B.] was consenting.
It follows from all of the above that although [I.H. and I.B.] did commit the act of sexual penetration with respect to [H.B.], there is nothing to prove that they made use of violence, coercion, threats or surprise. In any event, under the circumstances, it is not possible to find that [the accused] could not have mistaken [H.B.]’s lack of consent.
In consequence, the judgment will be set aside in so far as it states that the acts could amount to serious crimes (crimes), namely rape, and that the case should accordingly be remitted to the public prosecutor’s office for further action.”
57. The Court of Appeal accordingly dismissed the applications made by H.B.’s parents to join the proceedings as civil parties on their own behalf and in their capacity as their daughter’s legal representatives.
58. The applicant’s father appealed on points of law. In his statement of grounds of appeal to the Court of Cassation, lodged by his lawyer on his behalf and on that of his wife and daughter, he argued that his daughter’s consent could not be inferred from her voluntary intoxication. He submitted that rape, within the meaning of that term under French criminal law, could also be made out where consent was only “apparent” and that “surprise” within the meaning of Article 222-23 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 91 below) could result from a “lack of lucidity” on the part of “a victim who [was] not fully aware of the acts to which he or she [was] being subjected”.
59. In her opinion to the Court of Cassation, the Advocate-General recommended that the Court of Appeal’s judgment be quashed for the following reasons:
“I. 1. … Admittedly, as stated in the report, it is primarily through conduct attributed to the perpetrator that the victim’s lack of consent becomes apparent. But it is accepted opinion that ‘rape can only be made out in so far as the perpetrator was aware of imposing unwanted sexual acts on the victim’ [M.-L. Rassat, Jurisclasseur pénal, code, art. 222-22 à 222-33-1 fasc. 20, “agressions sexuelles, viol”]. It is preferable to call these acts ‘non-consensual’, as this term is less loaded with psychological considerations. With that caveat, this definition has the benefit of restoring consent to its central place while strictly respecting the burden of proof. Thus, rape requires proof that the victim did not consent to a sexual act, which is one of the material elements of the crime, and that the perpetrator was aware of that fact at the time he or she nevertheless committed the act, which is the mental element. It brings to mind an old yet foundational judgment defining rape … (Crim., 25 June 1857, Bull. no. 240 …).
2. The standard of proof is obviously even higher where the complainant has not clearly expressed his or her opposition or where there is no objective prima facie evidence of his or her incapacity to consent. These are precisely the situations where the courts below have recourse to the concept of psychological coercion suffered by the victim, and above all of consent by surprise. This concept is understood in the now little-used sense of the verb ‘surprendre’ (to surprise), which is that of taking advantage or lying: it is not the person who is surprised; it is his or her consent that is taken advantage of (Crim., 25 April 2001, no. 00-85.467, …).
Understood in this way, and as the judgment under appeal moreover mentions in order to rule it out, surprise may result from the fact that the perpetrator has developed a strategy to trick his or her partner, particularly as to the perpetrator’s identity … But it may also result from a particular state of the victim which, at the time of the events, has rendered him or her incapable of consenting. The perpetrator did not create this situation, but took advantage of it to engage in acts of a sexual nature with the victim.
It will be recalled that the hypothesis was first adopted in respect of people suffering from physical disorders and then extended to those suffering from mental disorders, it being considered that their particular affliction did not allow them to consent to such an act (Crim., 8 June 1994, 94-81.376), including in cases of a temporary episode manifesting itself during the events as a ‘psychological disturbance’, a ‘state of depression and mental weakness’ (Crim., 27 Nov. 1996, 96-83.954) or the ‘fragile mind’ of the victim (Crim., 12 Nov. 1997, 94-83.726). In this connection, it is of little importance whether the victim’s condition was characterised as the product of psychological coercion or of surprise, these decisions in any event share the same approach centred on seeking out the consent to the sexual act, which may have been lacking regardless of whether the victim acted passively or indeed actively.
From an evidential point of view, the victim’s state of extreme intoxication – which again did not have to be caused or imposed by the perpetrator for rape or aggravated sexual assault to be made out – is comparable to those situations of a lack of discernment of which the perpetrator takes advantage. This is also true from a criminological point of view: it is the accused’s opportunism that is punished when, without ‘any other trickery’, he slips into the bedroom of a woman who is so intoxicated that she thinks she is with her partner, in order to engage in sexual activity with her (Crim., 11 Jan. 2017, no. 15‑86.680); likewise when he takes action while an evening companion is dozing (Crim., 9 Jan. 2019, no. 18-82.829).
3. This approach to sex, based on a person’s full capacity to consent to it, can be understood as part of a larger perceptible shift in society, with which your Division has been confronted in several recent cases. Supported by some legal writers [J. Portier and F. Sobry, “L’importance d’être consentant : les enjeux d’une exigence de consentement sexuel explicite en droit pénal français”, AJ Penal, 2019, p. 431], this shift seems to be driven by the need to redefine the characterisation of rape and aggravated sexual assault on the basis not only of the means used by the perpetrator to commit an act of that nature, but also, above all, of a lack of sufficiently informed consent on the victim’s part to engage in sexual activity. This approach, which already informs the legislation of neighbouring States, could, according to some, more directly meet European requirements as set out in particular in the Istanbul Convention … and developed by the European Court of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [with reference to Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, § 166, ECHR 2003-XII]. Lastly, as Christian Guéry has explained, this definition, with its greater focus on freely given individual consent, would align far more closely with today’s aspirations in terms of the value attached to the autonomy of will, and would significantly detoxify the standard of proof and judges’ reasoning [C. Guéry, “On crée le crime en le nommant. Pour une redéfinition du viol”, RSC, 2020 p. 255].
Accordingly, although the quality of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning can be assessed only in the light of the wording of Article 222-23 of the Criminal Code, which continues to require it to be established that the perpetrator used improper means to commit an act of sexual penetration, it is proposed that you place this dual question of consent and of the awareness that the accused may have had of the potential lack thereof, at the centre of this assessment.
II. In this connection, the Court [of Appeal] did indeed examine, firstly, the influence of alcohol on [H.B.]’s ability to engage in the described sexual acts with the accused – which were compatible with the forensic medical findings and whose actual occurrence was not disputed – and, secondly, the accused’s knowledge of that influence and their awareness of the effect it may have had on the young woman’s consent. …
However, in ruling [as it did] …, the Court [of Appeal] gave partly contradictory reasons and did not draw the appropriate conclusions from its own findings with regard to H.B.’s state of extreme intoxication, the effects of which on her discernment [the accused] could not have overlooked. …
First, the Court [of Appeal] could not infer from the young woman’s participation – even active participation – in sexually suggestive games, her consent to engage in sexual activity later that evening with any of the other players. It especially cannot draw such a conclusion from the fact that she had had sexual intercourse earlier in the day with a young man whom she knew without complaining about it – even if she had also been drinking.
You have long held that freely given consent – in particular consent that has not been obtained by surprise – to sexual activity is to be understood throughout the duration of such activity, regardless, for example, of whether a young woman voluntarily agreed to get into a car where the events subsequently took place and allowed herself to be kissed (Crim., 10 July 1973, cited above). Similarly, in a recent judgment, you acknowledged that a woman might not have consented to sexual activity even though she had been aware of the flirtatious nature of the encounter with the accused from the outset, had gone to his house voluntarily, had taken off her shoes and had even undressed (Crim., 13 January 2021, no. 19-86.624). …
Second, although the judgment established that the young [H.B.] had been drinking all throughout the evening and that, as a result, her inebriation had only increased until she had been found, it also mentioned that she had already been drinking in the afternoon and had then consumed vodka as soon as it had been bought and even before she had started the sex games, while in a state in which her capacity appeared seriously impaired. This was borne out by her friend, for example, in unequivocal terms quoted in the judgment (‘drunk’, ‘she did everything he said because she didn’t know what to do’). On the question of heavy alcohol consumption, the Court [of Appeal] made no mention of any evidence to the contrary, repeating the statements of the accused to the effect that she was ‘not feeling well’. It should also be pointed out that the complainant’s counsel, quoted in the judgment, referred to her nauseous state, which corresponds to the following description of the beginning of the evening given by [I.H.] to the investigators and quoted in the judgment of the trial court: ‘[H.B.] had then drunk straight vodka, refusing to mix it with anything, which had made her nauseous so she had felt like vomiting, but even though he had put two fingers down her throat, she had not been able to vomit, and they had then started to play truth or dare while continuing to drink alcohol’.
In these circumstances, the Court [of Appeal] could not simply state that this was merely a case of lowered inhibitions owing to alcohol intoxication without providing a better explanation of how the young woman had maintained her discernment and her capacity to consent to the sexual activity in which she subsequently engaged, despite that intoxication. Nor could the appellate judges, without contradicting themselves, infer the young woman’s informed consent from her spontaneous remark several hours later as to the loss of her virginity, given that the gendarmes had noted her manifest state of intoxication at that time.
Lastly, it should be added that although it has not been established that the accused were aware that [H.B.] was a minor under the age of 15, which rules out the classification of sexual assault …, it seems impossible that the Court [of Appeal] could not have taken account, in its assessment of their awareness of the young woman’s state of drunkenness, of their considerably greater age. That court thus extensively reproduced the expert psychiatrist’s findings in respect of these men, aged nearly 30 and 21, whose specific personality traits exclude any mitigating factors for their own discernment, referring at most to the disinhibitory effects of the group and of alcohol consumption without, however, establishing the excessive nature thereof. In particular, the judgment quotes the initial statements of [I.H.], who had drunk only a few sips and had immediately noticed that [H.B.], who was accompanying [her friend N.K.] – whom the group had known was 17 years old – was not of full age as she had claimed. It also quotes those of [I.B.] who, in order to emphasise the fact that the girl had been drinking of her own free will, stated that ‘she [had] not want[ed] to stop’. In view of this excessive consumption, the court could not simply note that the young [H.B.]’s behaviour was not resistant, or was even willing, and conclude that the accused ‘could legitimately have believed that [she] was consenting’. On this question whether the perpetrators were aware of the complainant’s state and took it into account, it is useful to cite a judgment whose reasoning you have endorsed, in a case where the victim had admittedly expressed her opposition, but where, in finding aggravated sexual assault, the first-instance court had noted that ‘the complainant’s lack of consent [had] resulted from the fact that he [the perpetrator] [had taken] her to a secluded place, [had] hit her in the face and [had been] aware of her state of intoxication, which [had] made her more fragile’, which you expressly noted (Crim., 6 October 2021, appeal no. 21‑84.318).”
60. In a decision of 16 February 2022, the Court of Cassation declared that appeal inadmissible.
III. APPLICATION No. 39759/22 (M.L. v. FRANCE)
A. The first criminal complaint
61. On 13 August 2013 the applicant, who was aged 22, went to the police station of the 10th arrondissement of Paris to lodge a criminal complaint against A.H. She alleged that he had committed repeated acts of non‑consensual sexual penetration during the night of 10 to 11 January 2008, at the end of a party she had organised at her home, when she was 16 and the accused was 18. The investigation was assigned to the Paris Child Protection Unit that same day.
62. The applicant stated that she had met A.H. in 2007 through friends and that he had already tried to have sex with her at a party where she had drunk alcohol. On the evening of 10 January 2008 she had invited some 15 people to her home while her parents were away and she had consumed cannabis and alcohol with her guests, including A.H. Six people had slept over at her house. A.H. had led her to her parents’ room, as hers was already occupied, and had started undressing her. She had told him that she was a virgin and that she did not want to have sex.
63. She stated that when the young man had insisted, she had “not struggled but [had] said no [to him]” and that, as the vaginal penetration he had been attempting “[had] not [been] working”, A.H. had forced her to submit to digital penetration, to perform oral sex and to endure anal penetration several times during the night. With regard to the anal penetration, she stated: “Even when I started falling asleep, he sodomised me anyway.” As regards the oral sex, she said that he had “forced” her by holding her head. In reply to a question from the police officer, M.L. stated that she had expressed verbal refusals but that she had “felt unable” to react or to put up opposition to the sexual acts allegedly imposed by A.H., without being able to explain why.
64. The applicant stated that the following morning she had got up at about 7 a.m. and had tried unsuccessfully to vomit, and then had left her flat to go for a walk. Upon returning at noon, she had asked A.H. to leave her home, which he had done. The next day at school, she had “[been] feeling unwell”, had been crying and had talked about it to her best friend, L.T., who had been present on the night of the events. She had bought an emergency contraceptive pill and had seen a nurse at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital to get information about HIV testing. She had told her parents about the events and her father had asked her to call A.H. to get him to take an HIV test, which had come back negative, as had that of M.L. She stated that she had subsequently been treated by a psychologist until July 2008, then from January to May 2009 and again starting in June 2013, which had led her to consider lodging a criminal complaint. The incident had not been reported to the authorities by the applicant’s parents, the hospital unit or the psychologist. The applicant explained the delay in lodging her complaint by the fact that the non-consensual sexual acts of 10 January 2008 had not prompted any reaction from the adults she had told, who “[had] not classifie[d] it as rape”. She had then focused on her higher education, including abroad.
65. On 12 September 2013 the investigators took a statement from the applicant’s friend, L.T. She said that she had not seen or heard anything on the evening of the events, although she had been sleeping in an adjoining room at M.L.’s home. She stated that M.L. and A.H. had had a flirtatious relationship, but that she had never seen them kiss. She said that M.L. had been “different” the next day and had not said anything, and that she had then confided in her in tears the following day. She confirmed that A.H. and another boy had attempted to lead M.L. to a bedroom on another evening and she had refused. Another friend of M.L.’s also made a statement.
66. On 13 September 2013 the public prosecutor’s office requested a psychological report on the applicant. The report, which was submitted on 30 September 2013, noted that she had been emotionally fragile since adolescence and had no tendency to make up stories. M.L. had told the expert about the influence of alcohol and drug consumption which, according to her, had prevented her from reacting to unwanted acts, and about the subsequent occurrence of somatic disorders in the form of diarrhoea, migraines and hyperactivity.
67. On 18 September 2013 the applicant’s father also gave a statement, indicating that two days after the events, his daughter had told him that she had had unprotected and “unwanted” anal intercourse and that she had requested his permission to take an HIV test. He stated that he had not received a clear answer from M.L. when he had asked her whether it had been rape and that he had considered it to be a “borderline situation regarding her consent” during a first sexual experience. Now, having talked about it again with his daughter, he considered it to be rape. M.L.’s mother gave a statement on 25 September 2013. Like her ex-husband, she regretted that she had not shown their daughter sufficient support at the relevant time. She stated that the applicant had told her about the incident, describing anal penetration after a failed attempt at vaginal penetration. She said that M.L. had long been talking about lodging a criminal complaint in order to free herself from the events in question and that, although she herself continued to have doubts as to the coercion experienced by her daughter, her daughter had nevertheless told her that she had said “no” to A.H.
68. On 28 April 2014 the psychologist at Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital whom M.L. had consulted after the events told the investigators by telephone that the question about whether or not the applicant had consented “[had been] put to her and [that] it [had been] complicated for her to answer – especially since the encounter [had been] with someone she [had] liked”.
69. On 2 May 2014 A.B., another close school friend of the applicant, gave a statement. She said that M.L. and A.H. had had a flirtatious relationship and had kissed two or three times at parties. She had been absent on the evening in question, but stated that when she had seen M.L. at school, M.L. had “not [been] like usual” and had been “terribly shocked”. Her account of the events, as told to her by M.L., was consistent with the acts complained of. She confirmed that M.L. had not at that time planned to lodge a complaint of rape.
70. Between May and August 2014 the investigators also took statements from M.L.’s partner, to whom she had described the rape, and the friends of A.H. and M.L. One of M.L.’s friends, P.B., described the evening as “chaotic” because those attending had been drinking heavily.
71. On 9 December 2014 A.H. was taken into police custody. Speaking to the investigators, he confirmed that they had both been drunk and stated that, in his opinion, if M.L. had “not been drunk, she would not have dragged [him] into the bedroom” after they had, according to him, kissed on the couch. He stated that when they had arrived in the bedroom they had fondled each other, undressed and started to engage in foreplay. While they had been “glued” to the bed, she had told him, “No, I’m a virgin”, which he said he had not known. After initially giving up on having sex with her as he had wanted, he had urged her to have her “first time with him”, but she had repeated her refusal. He had been “lying on top of her” and “at some point [without knowing] really how”, he had “penetrated her with his penis at the level of her anus”, “without forcing”, because he had “slipped” by rubbing his penis back and forth against her. As she had not pushed him off, he had not “questioned it, it was a natural progression”. He acknowledged that there had been digital, anal and then oral penetration, which he believed to be consensual since M.L. had “let [it] happen”. He stated that alcohol could have “played a role” in his behaviour, as in that of M.L., and that when she had first refused vaginal penetration, he had thought only of himself by penetrating her anally without asking her for “permission”, as M.L. “[had] not move[d]” and “[had] not [said] anything”. As regards the oral sex, he stated that M.L. had initially refused it and then had relented at his insistence.
72. A.H. underwent a psychiatric assessment, which did not disclose any mental illness and found him to be an emotionally fragile person characterised by low self-esteem, feelings of shame and guilt and an expression of regret and empathy towards the victim.
73. On 10 December 2014 a confrontation took place, during which M.L. and A.H. confirmed their statements. The applicant repeated that she had drunk and smoked cannabis without being “out of it” and that after “saying no several times” to A.H. and putting her underwear back on, in vain, after he had taken them off, she had had “the feeling that she couldn’t do anything else”, and that from the moment A.H. had tried to penetrate her, she had “[seen] the whole thing from the outside [without] experiencing it”, that she had wanted “it to stop [without knowing] what to say or what to do”. She indicated that she had woken up in a lot of pain and had wanted to vomit. A.H., for his part, stated that before he had been questioned by the police, he had regarded the incident as a “mistake” made by two people who had been drinking. He acknowledged, however, that he had used M.L.’s intoxication and her lack of sexual experience to “take advantage” of her. He did not admit to rape, since M.L. had not protested, and he asserted that he would have been “able to stop” had she done so.
74. On 6 January 2015 the Paris public prosecutor decided not to prosecute with regard to the applicant’s complaint, on the grounds that a constituent element of the offence – intent – had not been sufficiently made out. He noted that there had been no direct witnesses to the events and that the accused denied having forced M.L. to consent, whereas she had, according to her own statements, been “unable …, because of the use of intoxicating substances or out of fear, to show [her] opposition in any way” to the acts complained of.
B. Criminal complaint with application to join the proceedings as a civil party
75. On 3 November 2016 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with an investigating judge, together with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party. On 3 July 2017 a judicial investigation was opened into the rape charge. On 11 January 2018 the applicant applied to the investigating judge to give evidence. On 30 May 2018 her counsel submitted an expert psychological report prepared in 2016 in Canada, where the applicant was continuing her studies. The purpose of the report was to “shed light on [her] post-traumatic state”, as noted by the expert in relation to the matters complained of, which affected the sexual, relational and emotional spheres and was classified as being of “moderate” intensity.
76. On 6 June 2018 the applicant gave evidence to the investigating judge at the Paris tribunal de grande instance. She repeated her previous statements, explaining that her intention had been to go to bed and sleep because she had been very tired. She specified that the events had been her first sexual experience with a man and that at the material time she “[had] not underst[ood] what was happening” during the events because she had felt as if she had “not [been] inside [her] body”. She stated that she had felt “a very strong pain” during the anal penetration and that she remembered waking up at least once on her stomach in the bed while A.H. was on top of her and penetrating her while holding her still, which she argued was a form of physical coercion. Similarly, she stated that, at A.H.’s insistence and despite her refusal, she had felt obliged to perform oral sex on him while he had held her head and had said “You owe me that much”, without her knowing what that meant. She referred to what A.H. had said at the relevant time about the fact that virginity and “the first time” were not that important. The applicant stated that those circumstances showed a form of violence against her, given that A.H. had heard her say “no” at least three times (when undressing her, when penetrating her with his fingers and before the oral sex) and had known that she had been drinking and could not react.
77. On 11 December 2018, after being questioned by the investigating judge, A.H. was given the status of “legally assisted witness” (témoin assisté). He did not admit to the rapes complained of by the applicant because, as she had not pushed him away, screamed or sought help from the other people in the flat, he had believed her to be consenting. He described the events as “a first time that [had gone] wrong” because of alcohol, the “sodomy” and the fact that M.L. “didn’t like him”. He repeated his previous statements as to the sequence of events but denied any form of physical or psychological coercion in the applicant’s respect after she had refused vaginal penetration. He also retracted some of his statement made during his questioning by the police, in particular when he had said that he had thought only of himself during the sexual acts and had taken advantage of M.L.
78. On 20 December 2018 the investigating judge organised a confrontation between the parties. M.L. stated that her initial “no” was valid for any act of sexual penetration and that the rape had begun when A.H. had continued fondling her and had carried out the digital and then anal penetration without her having the capacity to oppose it, reducing her to a “sex object”. A.H. contended that the first “no” expressed by the young woman could only apply to the first attempt at vaginal penetration and that his insistence on receiving oral sex could not be interpreted as a form of coercion.
79. On 27 May 2019 an expert psychiatric and forensic psychological report on the applicant, ordered by the investigating judge on 26 November 2018, was added to the case file. It found post-traumatic stress resulting from an initial shock suffered by a subject who was “completely inexperienced in sexual matters”.
80. On 19 June 2019 the investigating judge sent the parties notice of the closing of the judicial investigation. On 19 September 2019 the applicant’s counsel sent submissions calling for A.H. to be committed for trial before an assize court.
81. In his final application of 22 January 2020, the public prosecutor concluded that the judicial investigation had not gathered sufficient evidence that A.H. had committed the offence of rape against the applicant. The public prosecutor noted that A.H.’s questioning as to his partner’s consent had taken place in police custody and could not serve to establish the offence, as “the question of consent [had to] arise at the time of the events, not subsequent to them”.
82. On 26 February 2020 the applicant’s counsel filed submissions with the investigating judge, calling for A.H. to be committed for trial before an assize court. He argued that his client had not given her consent, because she had been in a state of psychological shock during the events. This had consisted in involuntary paralysis due to a mental disconnect from an “unthinkable” violent event, following several explicit refusals of sexual activity on her part, which A.H. had ignored.
83. On 29 May 2020 the investigating judge issued a discontinuance decision owing to insufficient evidence. He held, in particular, that while the civil party had undeniably suffered trauma, the judicial investigation had been unable to establish either the acts of violence, coercion, threats or surprise constitutive of rape within the meaning of Article 222-23 of the Criminal Code, or A.H.’s intent to obtain the applicant’s consent by coercion. The decision read:
“… In the present case, [M.L.] has consistently stated that she did not consent to sexual activity with [A.H.], but it must still be established that these acts of penetration were imposed by means of violence, coercion, threats or surprise.
As regards physical coercion, although [M.L.] explained that [A.H.] was lying on top of her at the time of the anal penetration and was holding her by the head at the time of the oral sex, [A.H.] has denied exerting any physical pressure and explained those actions as merely the manner in which the two sexual acts were performed. [M.L.]’s statements concerning the use of physical coercion were thus disputed by [A.H.], and such physical coercion could not be corroborated by other evidence in the case file.
With regard to psychological coercion, it must be based on objective factors and not on the victim’s subjective assessment alone. In the present case, there was no objective evidence of the use of psychological coercion. [A.H.] had no particular influence over [M.L.] and it has not been shown that he exerted any psychological pressure on her.
It appears from the case file that [ML.] and [A.H.] went to the bedroom of their own free will and that no evidence of coercion was observed by the witnesses present on that account. Although [M.L.] expressed her refusal of vaginal intercourse, that refusal was taken into account by [A.H.]. Subsequently, [M.L.]’s and [A.H.]’s versions of events diverge: according to [M.L.], she expressed her refusal by remaining passive; [A.H.], on the contrary, explained that he received no refusal and that, if he had received one, he would have stopped.
Although [A.H.] became aware that [M.L.] had not given her consent, this realisation came only after the fact. He explained that he had not been aware of [M.L.’s] lack of consent at the time the acts were committed.
No act of violence has been established and no threats have been alleged in the present case. Surprise may be ruled out here in view of the definition of that concept.”
84. The applicant appealed. In her statement of grounds of appeal, she again disputed that there was insufficient evidence to establish the offence of rape complained of. Referring to Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 124 below), she argued, inter alia, that consent had to be given voluntarily and that the “surrounding circumstances” had to be taken into account in assessing whether consent had been given validly. She submitted that she had been subjected to physical and psychological coercion during the acts of anal and oral penetration, the occurrence of which had been established, and that such coercion had resulted both from A.H.’s physically and verbally insistent behaviour, despite her explicit refusals, and from her minor status, her sexual inexperience – as opposed to the accused – and her intoxication. For the same reasons, she also submitted that the criterion of surprise could be made out because she had been subjected to the acts in her own home, where she believed herself to be safe. She repeated how violent the anal penetration had been, causing a state of psychological shock, as mentioned during her interviews, and, in her view, establishing the element of intent behind the rape.
85. In a judgment of 18 May 2021, the Investigation Division of the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the discontinuance decision. After noting that the parties were in agreement as to the acts of penetration, it gave the following reasons for its finding:
“Whether there was surprise
Surprise implies that the perpetrator employed an unpredictable strategy or that he or she took advantage of the victim’s incapability of consenting, owing to the latter’s unconsciousness or vulnerability, in order to impose a sexual act on him or her.
None of the witnesses described [M.L.] as being in such a state during the evening, in particular on account of her consumption of intoxicating substances, the extent of which remains unknown. Moreover, [A.H.] claimed, with nothing found to the contrary during the investigations, that he had not smoked cannabis that evening, while [M.L.] herself stated on several occasions when she lodged the complaint that she had remained lucid during the events.
It is also apparent from the witness statements and the statements of the civil party and the legally assisted witness that in the preceding months the individuals in question had had a flirtatious relationship which had not gone beyond a few instances of kissing and hugging … [M.L.] also stated that [A.H.] had tried unsuccessfully to get her alone with him in a room during a previous party.
There is insufficient evidence to suggest that [A.H.] dragged [M.L.] into the bedroom by force or deceit. None of the witnesses appear to have felt any concern, and some seem to have thought that they had gone off alone together in order to ‘make love’.
While none of the party attendants could positively assert that they had kissed on 10 January 2008 before going to the bedroom, [M.L.] herself mentioned to the investigating judge that she and [A.H.] had got close during the evening.
This may not rule out the commission of rape, but it cannot be considered that [M.L.] was necessarily surprised by the boy’s wish to have sex once they were alone in the bedroom, as those various signs were such as to alert her.
Nor can it be established from the above that [M.L.] was, on account of her sexual inexperience, incapable of understanding [A.H.’s] intentions and of resisting his actions; her virginity was not in itself incompatible with sufficient knowledge of sexual matters, as is usually observed with teenage girls of her age.
[M.L.]’s vulnerability at the material time on account of the circumstances cannot therefore be regarded as sufficiently established to constitute surprise.
Whether there was violence or coercion
With regard to violence, [M.L.] has never accused [A.H.] of hitting her or manhandling her.
She did not dispute that she could have left the room at any time, explaining that she had not done so for reasons relating to her state and not to the actions of the legally assisted witness.
She has never mentioned any physical injuries, even superficial ones. The witnesses did not observe any the following day and no medical certificate was drawn up to that effect.
On the other hand, she did describe a rough and painful anal penetration, without mentioning any violent acts committed to facilitate and enable such penetration.
Similarly, she referred to physical coercion, explaining that [A.H.] had been lying on top of her and holding her still at the time of the anal penetration. During the first confrontation, however, she indicated that he had not physically held her down. It has accordingly not been sufficiently established that he used deliberate coercion by holding her in that position by force – something that he has, moreover, consistently denied.
She likewise stated that he had pulled her by the head during the oral sex. During the confrontation held as part of the preliminary investigation, however, she said that he had held her head but that there had been no violence. [A.H.], for his part, explained that it was merely an action to accompany the movement back and forth. It cannot therefore be inferred from this action that there was intentional physical coercion.
The 15-month age difference between the civil party and the legally assisted witness is not sufficient in itself to amount to psychological coercion, and there is no evidence that [A.H.] had any particular influence over [M.L.] in the time they knew each other.
[M.L.] has never described any attitude, behaviour, actions or words that [A.H.] used, either during their acquaintance or on the night of the events, to make such an impression on her as to instil in her either fear or mere apprehensiveness of him. The third-party statements make no reference to any behavioural trait in [A.H.] that might have prompted such feelings. …
Lastly, [A.H.]’s insistence on receiving oral sex and the words he allegedly used at the time [“You owe me that much”, according to M.L.] are not sufficient to establish psychological coercion such as to deprive the civil party of her free will.
Since psychological coercion, which is a constituent element of rape, cannot be based on the victim’s subjective assessment alone, it does not appear to be arguable.
Whether there was the element of intent of the offence
[M.L.] stated that she had twice expressed her refusal of any sexual activity.
[A.H.], on the contrary, submitted that she had verbally opposed vaginal penetration but that they had continued to fondle each other, that she had not objected to the anal penetration and that she had voluntarily performed oral sex after an initial refusal.
The intent element of rape must be established at the time of the act in question and cannot be made out solely on the basis of [A.H.]’s retrospective judgment of his conduct.
Although he described the events as rape in the statements he made in police custody, he did so without ever admitting that he had intentionally ignored a lack of consent, regretting nevertheless that he had not shown greater concern as he had been anxious at the time to take advantage of the opportunity. In fact, he has always maintained that he took account of [M.L.]’s refusal of vaginal penetration and obtained her agreement for the oral sex, and that he did not hear or notice any refusal shown by way of protests or unease during the anal intercourse. [M.L.], for her part, did not dispute that [A.H.] had taken account of her refusal of vaginal penetration or that he had asked for the oral sex.
While he acknowledged noticing a change in [M.L.’s] attitude after the anal intercourse, it must be noted that he then sought the civil party’s agreement for the oral sex.
It follows that he did not at the time interpret this change in attitude as a refusal of consent to all sexual activity.
The criminal intent required for rape has not therefore been made out.
After pursuing many leads, the judicial investigation was thus not able to establish the existence of intentional acts of coercion, violence or surprise such as to constitute rape or aggravated sexual assault.”
86. The applicant appealed on points of law. In her statement of grounds of appeal, she challenged the Court of Appeal’s reasoning as to the lack of sufficient evidence to establish rape by surprise or coercion, despite her drug and alcohol consumption. She also argued that sexual acts had been imposed by the accused without any consideration for her explicit refusal of “any sexual activity because of her virginity”. She submitted, in consequence, that A.H. had had criminal intent for the purposes of Articles 222-22 and 222-23 of the Criminal Code (as applicable to the facts of the case, prior to the Law of 21 April 2021 – see paragraph 91 below).
87. In his opinion recommending that the appeal be declared inadmissible, the reporting judge at the Court of Cassation found that the applicant’s arguments merely called into question the unfettered discretion of the Investigation Division to rule that there was insufficient evidence against the accused, in the following terms:
“It follows from [the] findings [of] the Investigation Division that [it] sought to analyse the statements of the complainant and the accused in a precise and detailed manner, and that it compared them with the evidence collected and the psychiatric reports drawn up. It took into account the parties’ state of intoxication, the forward, insistent behaviour and the context of the flirtatious relationship that had developed between the young people, pointing out that [A.H.] had been able to respect [M.L.]’s wishes when she had opposed penile-vaginal penetration and that [M.L.], for her part, could not have been mistaken about his intentions when they had gone to the parents’ bedroom.
It highlighted certain contradictions and inaccuracies in [M.L.]’s statements, the absence of threats, physical injuries, attempts by her to leave the room while she still could, or shouts to alert her friends who were still in the house, and the succession of sexual acts, in order to conclude that in the absence of any other explicit sign, [A.H.] had been unable to notice her refusal of the sexual acts engaged in and could have at the very least been mistaken as to her consent.”
The same opinion was reflected in the submissions of the Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation, who noted that “the court, having examined all the constituent elements of the offence being prosecuted, and having sought out any possible lack of consent at every stage of the events and not only at the time of the move to the bedroom, justified its decision”.
88. In a judgment of 6 April 2022, the Court of Cassation declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
I. DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Provisions of the Criminal Code
89. The Criminal Code makes a distinction between three types of offences against the person in sexual matters, namely, in their order of presentation in the Criminal Code, aggravated sexual assault, rape and sexual assault. Specific provisions apply to the protection of minors against sexual violence. For aggravated sexual assault, the relevant provisions are those of Article 222-22-1, which flow from Law no. 2010-121 of 8 February 2010 (see paragraph 91 below). This protection was subsequently reinforced by Law no. 2018-703 of 3 August 2018 on strengthening action against sexual and gender-based violence (known as the “Schiappa Law” – see paragraph 94 below), and then by Law no. 2021-478 of 21 April 2021 on protecting minors from sexual crimes and incest, with the aim, in particular, of better protecting young people against sexual violence committed by adults[2] (see paragraphs 99-100 below).
90. The relevant provisions of criminal law are set out below, it being specified that in the present case the applicable legislation is that prior to the Law of 3 August 2018, or any immediately applicable legislation resulting from that Law (see paragraph 95 below).
1. Relevant provisions of the Criminal Code prior to the Law of 3 August 2018 on strengthening action against sexual and gender-based violence
91. The relevant provisions on aggravated sexual assault and rape provide:
Article 222-22
“An aggravated sexual assault (agression sexuelle) is any sexual assault committed with violence, coercion, threats or surprise.
Rape and other aggravated sexual assault shall be constituted where they have been imposed on the victim in the circumstances provided for in this section, regardless of the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim, including if they are married.
…”
Article 222-22-1
“The coercion contemplated in the first paragraph of Article 222-22 may be physical or psychological. Psychological coercion may result from a difference in age between a minor victim and the perpetrator and from the latter’s authority in law or in fact over such victim.”
Article 222-23
“Any act of sexual penetration, whatever its nature, committed against another person by violence, coercion, threats or surprise shall constitute rape.
Rape shall be punishable by 15 years’ imprisonment.”
Article 222-24
“The rape defined in Article 222-23 shall be punishable by 20 years’ imprisonment:
…
2o Where it is committed against a minor under the age of 15;
3o Where it is committed against a person whose particular vulnerability, due to age, illness, infirmity, physical or mental deficiency or pregnancy, is apparent or is known to the perpetrator; …”
Article 222-27
“Aggravated sexual assault other than rape shall be punishable by five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 euros.”
Article 222-29
“Aggravated sexual assault other than rape shall be punishable by seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 euros where it is imposed on a person whose particular vulnerability due to age, illness, infirmity, physical or mental deficiency or pregnancy is apparent or is known to the perpetrator.”
Article 222-29-1 (inserted by Law no. 2013-711 of 5 August 2013)
“Aggravated sexual assault other than rape shall be punishable by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 euros where it is imposed on a minor under the age of 15.”
92. Sexual assault is defined in the Criminal Code as sexual activity between a minor and an adult, occurring without violence, coercion, threats or surprise. Depending on whether the victim is under or over the age of 15 and whether or not there are aggravating circumstances, the applicable sentence under Articles 222-25, 222‑26 and 222-27 ranges from two years’ imprisonment (three years’ imprisonment as of the entry into force on 7 August 2013 of Law no. 2013-711 of 5 August 2013) to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of between 30,000 euros (EUR) and EUR 150,000.
2. Provisions of the Criminal Code introduced by the Law of 3 August 2018 on strengthening action against sexual and gender-based violence
93. The aim of the reform, which came into force on 6 August 2018, was to “lay down stricter rules for establishing the offences of rape and aggravated sexual assault of minors” (see the evaluation report on the Law of 3 August 2018, quoted in paragraph 98 below).
94. First, the Law amended and supplemented the above-mentioned Article 222-22-1 (see paragraph 91 above) by inserting “a threshold age of 15 years in the definition of coercion and surprise for the purposes of classifying rape or aggravated sexual assault” where certain conditions are met (see the evaluation report cited in paragraph 93 above, p. 120), as follows:
Article 222-22-1 introduced by the Law of 3 August 2018
“The coercion contemplated in the first paragraph of Article 222-22 may be physical or psychological.
Where the acts are committed against a minor, the psychological coercion referred to in the first paragraph of the present Article or the surprise referred to in the first paragraph of Article 222-22 may result from a difference in age between the victim and the perpetrator and from the latter’s authority in law or in fact over the victim, such authority in fact being established by a significant age difference between the minor victim and the adult perpetrator.
Where the acts are committed against a minor under the age of 15, psychological coercion or surprise shall be established by the exploitation of the vulnerability of a victim who does not have the necessary discernment for such acts.”
95. The Ministry of Justice’s implementing circular (no. 2018-00014) for the Law of 3 August 2018 specified that the new provisions of Article 222‑22‑1 were interpretative and therefore applied immediately to acts committed before the entry into force of the Law (see, for an immediate application of those provisions by the Court of Cassation, paragraph 35 above).
96. That circular contains the following considerations:
“The main criterion to be taken into account by the courts in assessing whether there has been psychological coercion or surprise when the acts were committed against a minor under the age of 15 is that of the victim’s discernment and his or her capacity to consent or not to a sexual assault.
Accordingly, the fact that a minor under the age of 15 may physically appear or behave like an older minor or an adult should not lead to the conclusion that the minor may validly consent to a sexual act, if he or she does not have sufficient discernment to do so.
It should be noted that it is the necessary discernment to engage in a sexual act which should be assessed, and not the minor’s discernment in general or with regard to other aspects of life in society. …
In practice, owing to this reference to the concept of necessary discernment, the classifications of rape or aggravated sexual assault should typically be used whenever the youngest minors are victims of sexual assault.”
97. Second, the Law of 3 August 2018 removed, from the definition of sexual assault of a minor under the age of 15 (see paragraph 92 above), the reference to acts of violence, coercion, threats or surprise (see, to similar effect in the case of minors over the age of 15, Article 227-27, paragraph 102 below).
98. On 4 December 2020 a report by the task force set up to evaluate the Law of 3 August 2018 was submitted to the Prime Minister by A. Louis, a member of parliament (MP) on assignment to the Minister of Justice, concerning the provisions of the Law on rape and aggravated sexual assault of minors under the age of 15. The relevant parts read (executive summary, pp. 11-12)[3]:
“Special attention has been paid to section 2 of the Law concerning the inclusion of a threshold age of 15 years when classifying the offences of rape and aggravated sexual assault. This provision was the subject of debate when the legislation was put to the vote, and it must be noted that opinions are still very divided.
As a reminder, the aim of this provision was to make it easier for the courts to classify sexual activity between an adult and a minor under the age of 15 as rape or aggravated sexual assault, on the basis that so young a minor does not have the necessary discernment.
Classifying acts as rape or aggravated sexual assault entails demonstrating a lack of consent through the concepts of violence, threats, coercion or surprise. For minors under the age of 15, the Law has given a specific definition of coercion and surprise: ‘Where the acts are committed against a minor under the age of 15, psychological coercion or surprise shall be established by the exploitation of the vulnerability of a victim who does not have the necessary discernment for such acts.’ This addition was made for interpretive purposes so that, in particular, it could be applied to pending cases, providing guidance to the courts while leaving them interpretive discretion. However, some legal experts interpret it as a plain presumption, which raises legal difficulties.
Many legal professionals are satisfied with this amendment which, while leaving some discretion to the courts, particularly to take into account adolescent couples, lends greater certainty to judicial practice. However, from a societal point of view, this section is regarded as lacking, in that it does not embed a sufficiently strong prohibition in criminal law and still leaves too much room for debate around consent.
Numerous proposed amendments were studied during the present evaluation. The idea of creating an indisputable presumption of coercion and surprise for sexual activity between adults and minors under the age of 15 ran counter to the constitutional safeguards that are so essential to the rule of law in this country. Other amendment pathways inspired by foreign practice were therefore considered.
The proposal outlined in the present report is to create two independent offences separate from those of rape and aggravated sexual assault.”
3. Provisions of the Criminal Code introduced by the Law of 21 April 2021
99. In line with some of the recommendations in the aforementioned report (see paragraph 98 above), Law no. 2021-478 of 21 April 2021 on protecting minors from sexual crimes and incest, which came into force on 23 April 2021, established a presumption of aggravated assault, subject – except in the cases provided for by law – to a minimum age difference between the two protagonists, set at five years. In so doing, it broke with the prevailing logic under the Law of 3 August 2018, according to which sexual offences against minors were punished only on the basis of evidence.
100. The reform introduced two new, independent offences – aggravated sexual assault and rape of a minor by an adult – by amending the first paragraph of the aforementioned Article 222-22 (see paragraph 91 above) and inserting Articles 222-23-1 and 222-23-3. Those provisions read:
Article 222-22, first paragraph
“An aggravated sexual assault is any sexual assault committed with violence, coercion, threats or surprise or, in the cases provided for by law, against a minor by an adult. …”
Article 222-23-1, first paragraph
“Except in the case provided for in Article 222-23, rape shall also include any act of sexual penetration of any kind, or any oral-genital act performed by an adult on a minor under the age of 15 or performed on the perpetrator by the minor, where the age difference between the adult and the minor is at least five years. …”
Article 222-23-3
“The rape defined in Articles 222-23-1 and 222-23-2 [incestuous rape committed by an adult who is an ascendant or authority figure against a minor of any age] shall be punishable by 20 years’ imprisonment.”
101. The Law also amended the substantive definition of rape in the above-mentioned Article 222-23 (see paragraph 91 above) to include “any oral-genital act performed on others or on the perpetrator by means of violence, coercion, threats or surprise”.
102. In addition, as regards the offence of sexual assault of a minor over the age of 15 by an adult, the Law removed the reference to acts of violence, coercion, threats or surprise from the provisions of Article 227-27 (thereby aligning it with the offence applicable to minors under the age of 15 – see paragraph 97 above).
B. Case-law of the Court of Cassation
103. The Court of Cassation reviews the application by the courts below of the aforementioned Article 222-23 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 91 and 101 above). Under that Article, rape is established by the combination of a material element, namely an act of sexual or oral-genital penetration committed against the victim with the use of violence, coercion, threats or surprise, and the element of intent, namely the perpetrator’s intent to commit the act in question by imposing it on a non-consenting victim.
104. Although the concept of consent is not explicitly mentioned in the definition of rape in the Criminal Code, it has been established in the case-law of the Court of Cassation as a criterion for the offence. For example, in an oft-cited judgment of 25 June 1857 (Bull. crim., no. 240, and also, more recently, Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 10 July 1973, no. 73-90.104, Bull. crim., no. 322), rape was defined as follows in the context of a sexual act obtained by a man who had slipped into the victim’s bed pretending to be her husband:
“the serious crime (crime) of rape … consists in the act of taking advantage of a person against his or her will, whether the lack of consent results from the physical or psychological violence against him or her, or from any other means of coercion or surprise in order to achieve, contrary to the will of the victim, the aim sought by the perpetrator of the action.”
105. With regard, first, to the material element, leaving aside the concepts of physical or psychological “violence” and “threats”, “coercion” is defined as physical or psychological pressure exerted on a person. Thus, holding a victim’s head in order to receive oral sex amounts to physical coercion (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 8 June 1994, no. 94-81-376). Psychological coercion is the exploitation of a person’s weakness or vulnerability in order to force him or her to engage in a sexual act (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 8 February 1995, no. 94-85.202). The concept is to be assessed in a concrete manner, having regard to the victim’s capacity to resist (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 8 June 1994, cited above). It presupposes objective factors and cannot be based on the victim’s subjective assessment alone (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 21 February 2007, no. 06‑88.735).
106. The concept of “surprise”, which was introduced in the Criminal Code by Law no. 80-1041 of 23 December 1980, corresponds, in particular, to the situation of a victim who is unconscious because he or she is asleep or intoxicated (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 1 October 1993, no. 13‑84.944, and Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 11 January 2017, no. 15-86.680) or is mentally ill. Rape thus includes not only situations where consent is lacking but also those where consent is only apparent, as the victim was not given an opportunity to understand properly what was happening. “Surprised consent” is consent that is not given lucidly or in full knowledge of the facts. Surprise may therefore be the result of a strategy designed to obtain the victim’s consent by “surprise” using deceit, such as in a situation of mistaken identity (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 22 January 1997, no. 96‑80.353, and Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 23 January 2019, no. 18-82.833).
107. In the context of aggravated sexual assault, the Court of Cassation accepted in a recent case that surprise may consist in causing a state of shock by fondling a victim who was asleep and continuing to do so when he or she woke up, even though that state of shock had been noticed by the perpetrator himself or herself, “which shows that he or she acted with full knowledge of the lack of consent”, a circumstance which also establishes the element of intent (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 11 September 2024, no. 23‑86‑657, Bull. crim., no. 9, p. 13). In that particular case, the victim, a young adult woman who was sleeping in her uncle’s bed, where he had joined her, described her state of lethargy when she had woken up, while her uncle was touching her genitals, which had prevented her from shouting, moving or saying no to her assailant, “as if her body [had] no longer belonged to her and had stopped responding” (ibid.).
108. As to, second, the element of intent provided for in Article 121-3 of the Criminal Code, according to which “there shall be no serious crime or other major offence (crime ou délit) without criminal intent”, it can be inferred from the circumstances of the acts carried out by the perpetrator. Where the perpetrator may have been mistaken as to the victim’s lack of consent and may have believed in good faith that the victim consented to the sexual activity, the element of intent is not established and the offence cannot be made out. In this context, the Court of Cassation takes into account, inter alia, the victim’s conduct (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 11 October 1978, Dalloz 1979, IR 120; see also M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 95) and the perpetrator’s statements. Accordingly, in the above-cited case (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 11 September 2024 – see paragraph 107 above), the perpetrator could not claim that the victim was “sexually active”, as he had described her to a third party as “a rag doll” at the time of the events.
C. Other documents relating to the legislation and to the courts’ treatment of sexual violence
1. Figures from the report by the task force set up to evaluate the Law of 3 August 2018
109. According to the above-mentioned evaluation report (see paragraph 98 above), sexual violence is “a widespread and multifaceted phenomenon that affects all members of society” (p. 17). The report notes that more than 200,000 people are victims of sexual violence every year in France and that fewer than 1,000 people were convicted of rape in 2018. It further describes the extent of the “dark figure” of sexual violence (pp. 21‑22), as follows:
“… [A]ccording to figures from the Ministerial Internal Security Statistics Service (Service statistique ministériel de la sécurité intérieure – SSMSI) from the 2017 Community and Security survey, only 1 in 12 victims, or 8%, lodges a formal complaint, and 86% of victims of sexual violence do not report the incident. Of the victims who initiate legal action, 40% ultimately discontinue proceedings. …
If the figure of 8% of victims who lodge a complaint is compared with the 220,000 people aged 18 to 75 living in France purported to be victims of sexual violence every year, this means that the dark figure of sexual violence in France amounts to approximately 202,000 people (or 92% of victims of sexual and gender-based violence). After a rape or attempted rape, 47% of victims nonetheless consult a psychiatrist or psychologist, see a doctor, talk to social services, call a victim-support service or meet with members of a victim-support organisation. …
Statistics from the [Ministry of Justice’s] Department of Criminal Affairs and Pardons (Direction des affaires criminelles et des grâces – DACG), … further show that between 2014 and 2018, 70% of complaints of rape of a minor were non-prosecutable [discontinuance by the public prosecutor’s office], which may reinforce the idea that society is relatively indifferent to sexual violence against minors. The figures are similar for aggravated sexual assault.”
110. The report also highlights the specific effects of sexual violence on children due to their particular vulnerability (p. 17), and cites the following view held by some psychiatrists:
“[S]exual violence is, together with torture, one of the worst traumas. Children’s brains are particularly vulnerable to violence and almost all child rape victims, that is to say, 80%-100% of them, go on to develop severe problems relating to psychological trauma in the short, medium or long term.”
2. Parliamentary proceedings with a view to amending the criminal-law definition of rape
111. On 22 February 2018 the National Assembly’s Delegation on the Rights of Women and Equal Opportunities (“the Delegation”) issued an information report (no. 721) on rape[4], in which it noted “the extreme gravity” and “the worrying prevalence of rape in France”. It referred to the opinion of the High Council for Gender Equality of 5 October 2016 on a fairer condemnation of rape by society and the courts, which denounced the trivialisation of such violence in France (pp. 13-15). The report’s final recommendations include improved training for judges, prosecutors and lawyers on sexual violence, training for law-enforcement officers on how to engage with victims, their specialisation in these areas, systematic psychological and social support for victims, especially minors, regulation of the time-limits and follow-up measures of investigations, and the inclusion of the principle of non-consent in the Criminal Code, particularly below certain age thresholds for minors (see paragraphs 93-102 above for developments in domestic law in this last aspect).
112. While being questioned by the Senate’s Delegation on Women’s Rights on 1 February 2024, the Minister of Justice expressed reservations about an amendment to the Criminal Code concerning sexual violence, including rape, echoing other analyses to the same effect (see, for example, Delegation report no. 721, cited in paragraph 111 above). He argued that the inclusion of the concept of consent in the definition of rape would not enable harsher punishment and would also entail the risk of placing the primary burden of proof on the victims[5].
113. The above-mentioned Delegation (see paragraph 111 above) was also entrusted in 2022, under the chairmanship of V. Riotton, MP, with a fact-finding mission on the criminal-law definition of rape, in preparation for a reading of legislation on the matter. The resulting report was filed on 21 January 2025 (information report no. 792)[6]. It notes that the case-law on rape “struggles to fill the law’s silence on the concept of consent” and that the criminal-law definition of rape in France is incompatible with the country’s international commitments (see paragraphs 121 and 124 below). It concludes that it is necessary to introduce lack of consent expressly as a criterion constituting rape and aggravated sexual assault – making the necessary clarifications as to shock and vulnerability (particularly psychological vulnerability induced by alcohol and psychotropic substances) – while maintaining the current criteria of violence, coercion, threats and surprise used by the perpetrator (Articles 222-22 and 222-23 of the Criminal Code – see paragraphs 91 and 101 above). According to the report, such a reform would serve to “embed in the law the need for the courts to look into how the accused went about obtaining consent” and thereby to “prevent the concept from being exploited by the perpetrators” (p. 73), taking care to avoid the “consent traps” mentioned above (see paragraph 112 in fine above) for victims (p. 79).
114. In 2023 and 2024 bills were tabled with the Presidencies of the Senate (no. 124)[7] and the National Assembly (no. 2170)[8] with a view to having lack of consent explicitly recognised as a constituent element of aggravated sexual assault and rape. In line with the above-mentioned report of 21 January 2025 (see paragraph 113 above), a new bill to the same effect was introduced in the National Assembly[9]. On 6 March 2025 the Conseil d’État issued an opinion on the bill, with recommendations including the immediate application of the new definition of rape and aggravated sexual assault to pending cases[10].
3. CNCDH opinion on combating sexual violence
115. In an opinion of 20 November 2018 entitled “Sexual violence: a social and public-health emergency, a fundamental-rights imperative” (Official Gazette no. 0273 of 25 November 2018), the National Advisory Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) observed that minors were the age group most at risk of sexual violence and called for stronger protection in consequence, in the following terms:
“The CNCDH recommends that criminal trials be made part of a more comprehensive system for dealing with sexual violence and that various measures be improved in order to support victims through the recovery process. This would involve strengthening psychological, medical and social care of victims of sexual violence, and considering the proposals made in February 2018 by the Senate Law Committee working group on sexual offences against minors.”
116. The CNCDH also advocated making lack of consent central to the legal definition of sexual offences, as follows:
“In keeping with the expressive and educative function of criminal law, and in order to bring sexual-assault legislation into line with international standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, the CNCDH recommends defining rape and other forms of sexual assault with reference to lack of consent to the sexual act. Beyond that, it asks the legislature to consider the approach taken in some countries, such as Canada, where the law requires that consent be explicit and never be presumed.”
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
A. United Nations
117. The Court refers to the judgment in X and Others v. Bulgaria ([GC], no. 22457/16, §§ 123-26, 2 February 2021) with regard to the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted on 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3), in particular Articles 3, 19 and 34. These provisions emphasise the need for the national legislative, administrative and judicial authorities to ensure the best interests of the child are a primary consideration and to protect the child “from all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse”.
118. The Committee on the Rights of the Child is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In its General Comment No. 13 (2011) on the right of the child to freedom from all forms of violence (18 April 2011, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/13), it emphasises, inter alia, the need for investigations into instances of violence reported by the child to be undertaken by “qualified professionals who have received role-specific and comprehensive training [and who take] a child rights-based and child-sensitive approach”. It further asserts that rigorous investigation procedures must be adopted in such matters to gather evidence of the reported violence and to avoid subjecting the child to further harm through the process of the investigation (ibid.).
119. The Court also refers to the judgment in X v. Greece (no. 38588/21, § 32, 13 February 2024) with regard to the relevant provisions of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (adopted by United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 40/34, 29 November 1985, 40th session, UN Doc. A/RES/40/34). In particular, those provisions reiterate that the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the specific needs of victims should be facilitated.
120. The Court further refers to X v. Greece (cited above, § 33) in relation to the relevant provisions of UN General Assembly Resolution 76/304 on international cooperation for access to justice, remedies and assistance for survivors of sexual violence (2 September 2022, 76th session, Supplement No. 49, UN Doc. A/RES/76/304), which condemns all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and urges States to take effective action in that area.
121. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued its concluding observations on the ninth periodic report of France on 14 November 2023 (UN Doc. CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/9). While welcoming the 2019 and 2020 legislative developments and the most recent government measures to tackle violence against women and domestic violence, it noted with concern the persistence of discriminatory stereotypes, including with regard to women victims of sexual assault. Consequently, it recommended that France take the following measures (pp. 6-8 of the report)[11]:
“…
(b) Ensure adequate victim support services, including a sufficient number of adequately funded shelters providing legal, medical and psychological assistance, as well as skills training and education to women and girls who are victims of gender-based violence;
(c) Amend the [Criminal] Code to ensure that the definition of rape is based on the absence of consent, covers any non-consensual sexual act and takes into account all coercive circumstances, in line with international human rights standards;
(d) Amend the ‘Romeo and Juliet’ clause [according to which sexual relations between an adult and a minor are permissible as long as the age gap does not exceed five years] to prohibit sexual relations between an adult and a minor below the age of sexual consent.
…”
B. Council of Europe
1. Lanzarote Convention
122. The relevant provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on the protection of children against sexual exploitation and sexual abuse (opened for signature on 25 October 2007, CETS 201 – “Lanzarote Convention”), as adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 July 2007, are presented in the judgments in A and B v. Croatia (no. 7144/15, §§ 78-80, 20 June 2019); X and Others v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 127-31); and D.K. v. Italy (no. 14260/17, §§ 37‑38, 1 December 2022).
123. The Lanzarote Convention entered into force with respect to France on 1 January 2011. It sets out, inter alia, the requirements to be met by investigations and criminal proceedings instituted in respect of sexual abuse of children. According to the related explanatory report, with regard to Articles 28 and 30, the States Parties should, in particular, ensure that those proceedings are not excessively long so as not to exacerbate the victim’s trauma. It further states that an aggravating circumstance of the offence – if not one of the constituent elements – is where it was committed “against a particularly vulnerable victim [such as] children of a very young age [or] children in a state of intoxication due to the influence of drugs or alcohol”.
2. Istanbul Convention
124. On 7 April 2011 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (opened for signature on 11 May 2011, CETS 210 – “the Istanbul Convention”). It was ratified by France on 4 July 2014 and came into force in respect of the country on 1 November 2014. The relevant provisions of the Istanbul Convention read:
Chapter III – Prevention
Article 12 – General obligations
“…
3 Any measures taken pursuant to this chapter shall take into account and address the specific needs of persons made vulnerable by particular circumstances and shall place the human rights of all victims at their centre.
…”
Chapter IV – Protection and support
Article 18 – General obligations
“…
3 Parties shall ensure that measures taken pursuant to this chapter shall:
…
– aim at avoiding secondary victimisation;
…
– address the specific needs of vulnerable persons, including child victims, and be made available to them.
…”
Article 36 – Sexual violence, including rape
“1 Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following intentional conducts are criminalised:
a engaging in non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;
b engaging in other non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a person;
…
2 Consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
…”
Article 46 – Aggravating circumstances
“Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that the following circumstances, insofar as they do not already form part of the constituent elements of the offence, may, in conformity with the relevant provisions of internal law, be taken into consideration as aggravating circumstances in the determination of the sentence in relation to the offences established in accordance with this Convention:
…
c the offence was committed against a person made vulnerable by particular circumstances;
d the offence was committed against or in the presence of a child;
…”
125. The explanatory report to the Istanbul Convention points out that the third paragraph of the above-mentioned Article 12 (see paragraph 124 above) contains the following recommendations:
“… [T]his paragraph requires positive action to ensure that any preventive measures specifically address and take into account the needs of vulnerable persons. Perpetrators often choose to target such persons because they know that they are less likely to be able to defend themselves, or seek prosecution of the perpetrator and other forms of reparation, because of their situation. For the purpose of [the Istanbul Convention], persons made vulnerable by particular circumstances include: … persons with disabilities, including those with mental or cognitive impairments, … substance abusers, … children and the elderly.”
126. As regards the above-mentioned Article 36 (see paragraph 124 above), the explanatory report includes the following considerations:
“191. When assessing the constituent elements of offences, the Parties should have regard to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In this respect, the drafters wished to recall, subject to the interpretation that may be made thereof, the M.C. v. Bulgaria judgment of 4 December 2003 [§§ 161 and 166] …
192. Prosecution of [the] offence [of sexual violence, including rape] will require a context-sensitive assessment of the evidence in order to establish on a case-by-case basis whether the victim has freely consented to the sexual act performed. Such an assessment must recognise the wide range of behavioural responses to sexual violence and rape which victims exhibit and shall not be based on assumptions of typical behaviour in such situations. It is equally important to ensure that interpretations of rape legislation and the prosecution of rape cases are not influenced by gender stereotypes and myths about male and female sexuality.
193. In implementing this provision, Parties to the [Istanbul] Convention are required to provide for criminal legislation which encompasses the notion of lack of freely given consent to any of the sexual acts listed in lit.a to lit.c. It is, however, left to the Parties to decide on the specific wording of the legislation and the factors that they consider to preclude freely given consent. Paragraph 2 only specifies that consent must be given voluntarily as the result of the person’s free will, as assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.”
127. The explanatory report also states, with regard to the above-mentioned Article 46, sub-paragraph (d) (see paragraph 124 in fine above), that “[t]he drafters wished to highlight the particularly culpable behaviour if any of the offences established by [the Istanbul Convention] are committed against a child”.
128. The Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (GREVIO), which is responsible for monitoring the implementation by the Parties of the Istanbul Convention, published its first baseline evaluation report on France on 19 November 2019. While welcoming the significant developments in French legislation since 1980 in terms of combating sexual violence (see paragraph 190 of the report), the report notes that the legislator has not revisited the definition of sexual assault and rape as acts solely qualified by the use of violence, coercion, threat or surprise (see paragraph 191 of the report). The relevant parts of the report read as follows (footnotes omitted):
“192. … While it is true that ‘the drafters [of Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention] left it to the Parties to decide on the specific wording of the legislation and the factors that they consider to preclude freely given consent’, the wording adopted by the French legislator places the emphasis on the elements of proof evidencing the lack of consent, to the detriment of the centrality of the absence of consent. In line with the approach taken by [the Istanbul Convention], a definition of sexual violence based on the absence of freely given consent would, in GREVIO’s opinion, make it possible to overcome the shortcomings that emerge from the current situation: on the one hand, legal uncertainty generated by fluctuating interpretations of the constituent elements of violence, coercion, threat and surprise; on the other hand, the inability of such elements of proof to cover the situation of all non-consenting victims, particularly when they are in a state of shock. Above all, such a definition would make it possible to operate the necessary paradigm shift to recognise the centrality of the victim’s will, and would enable France to side with those countries that have already taken this important step. GREVIO’s position on this matter is consistent, in line with the case law of other international human rights bodies such as the CEDAW Committee. The authorities should therefore launch a thorough discussion on the issue, taking into account the concerns that currently stand in the way of such a debate, namely the fear expressed by some of placing an even greater burden of proof on the victim, and the need to uphold firmly the presumption of innocence.
…
196. GREVIO urges the French authorities to review their legislation and judicial practices, in particular the current practice of ‘correctionnalisation’ [the trial of crimes as less serious offences] regarding sexual violence, including sexual violence against children, in order to:
a. base the definition of sexual violence on the absence of the victim’s freely given consent, in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Istanbul Convention; and
b. ensure an effective judicial response to sexual violence, focusing on the respect for the human rights of victims and appropriate assistance and support for victims.”
129. The 4th general report on GREVIO’s activities covering the period from January to December 2022 was issued on 21 September 2023. The relevant passages, concerning Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 124 above; pp. 27-29 of the report), read as follows (footnotes omitted):
“The central legal element of [the Istanbul Convention]’s definition of sexual violence, as articulated under Article 36, is the lack of consent given voluntarily as a result of the person’s free will. This provision recognises the risks of leaving certain types of rape and sexual violence unpunished if the relevant criminal offences are based on force, threat or coercion rather than lack of consent. Article 36 of [the Istanbul Convention] builds on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which stresses that such rigid approaches jeopardise the effective protection of the individual’s sexual autonomy. For this reason, Article 36 sets out the obligation to criminalise all forms of non-consensual sexual acts, including rape. This definition, therefore, does not require the offender’s use of force or threat, or proof of the victim’s physical or verbal resistance. The Istanbul Convention’s emphasis on ‘consent’ is elaborated on in paragraph 2 of Article 36, which requires that the prosecution of sexual offences shall be based on a context-sensitive assessment of the evidence in order to establish, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not the victim has freely consented to the sexual act. …
In recent years there has been a succession of positive developments in many states parties to [the Istanbul Convention] in the area of sexual violence, resulting in improvements for victims. Many states are embracing definitions of rape based on the lack of consent, improving investigation, prosecution, procedural and protective measures and establishing rape crisis and/or sexual assault referral centres to offer specialist support services for victims of sexual violence. …”
130. The report identifies four different approaches to the criminalisation of sexual violence, including rape, taken to date by the States Parties to the Istanbul Convention (p. 30), stating:
“This includes one that requires the use of force, coercion or vulnerability. Another approach is based on a two-tiered approach, with a legal provision that requires the use of force, threat or coercion and adding another offence that is based entirely on lack of consent. A third approach, otherwise known as the ‘no means no’ model, does not require the use of force, threat or coercion but, rather requires proof that the sexual act was committed against the will of a person. In the fourth approach, also informally called the ‘only yes is yes’ model, or ‘affirmative consent’, the voluntary participation of both or all parties is required for sexual acts not to be criminalised.”
131. The report refers to France as one of the “States [P]arties that have adopted a force-based approach”, in the following terms (pp. 31-32 – footnotes omitted):
“A significant number of parties – Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, France, Georgia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Switzerland – continue to require as constituent elements of sexual offences the use of violence, coercion, compulsion, threat, intimidation or a state or situation of the victim which makes them incapable of resisting. GREVIO did, however, welcome the law reform efforts being discussed in the Netherlands, Norway, Serbia and Switzerland at the time of GREVIO’s respective evaluations.
The majority of force-based definitions make reference to using violence or threat of violence (such as France, Italy and the Netherlands) or going against the person’s will by using force (such as Estonia) or by constraint (Romania). That said, it should be noted that in all jurisdictions, including those where the legal definition is force-based, situations which invalidate consent are also recognised in the criminal law or introduced by case law. Some forms of annulment of consent refer to the helpless state of the victim, with formulations such as ‘taking advantage’ or ‘abusing the vulnerability’. This ‘helpless’ state is connected in most cases to some kind of unconsciousness due to alcohol or drugs or the particular situation of the victim, for example illness or mental disability or detention of some form. Italy describes this act of taking advantage as ‘abusing the conditions of physical or mental inferiority of the injured person’. In France, besides the use of force, reference is also made to penetration achieved by ‘coercion and surprise’, and it is left to the judge to determine its meaning on a case-by-case basis. Hence, references to the inability of victims to consent are present in all definitions, regardless of whether they are force or consent based. These result in the alleviation of the need for the victim to demonstrate their resistance. However, national experts reported that courts do not interpret these ‘non-consensual’ elements consistently and the threshold of proof remains high, often resulting in secondary victimisation.”
3. Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
132. In Recommendation CM/Rec(2002)5 to member States on the protection of women against violence, adopted on 30 April 2002, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers asked member States to adopt and implement a series of measures to combat violence against women. Paragraph 35 of the Appendix to the Recommendation specifies that member States should do as follows, in particular:
“– penalise any sexual act committed against non-consenting persons, even if they do not show signs of resistance;
– penalise sexual penetration of any nature whatsoever or by any means whatsoever of a non-consenting person;
– penalise any abuse of the vulnerability of a pregnant, defenceless, ill, physically or mentally handicapped or dependent victim;
– penalise any abuse of the position of a perpetrator, and in particular of an adult vis‑à‑vis a child.”
133. Recommendation CM/Rec(2019)1 of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to member States on preventing and combating sexism, adopted on 27 March 2019, notes that sexism and gender stereotyping within the civil, administrative and criminal justice and law-enforcement systems are barriers to the administration of justice. This can result in decision-makers making misinformed or discriminatory judgments based on preconceived beliefs and inherent biases rather than on relevant facts.
134. On 15 March 2023 Recommendation CM/Rec(2023)2 of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to member States on rights, services and support for victims of crime was adopted, updating and replacing Recommendation Rec(2006)8 on assistance to crime victims. The relevant provisions of the new Recommendation read:
Article 2 – Principles
“… Member States should ensure that in the application of this recommendation, where the victim is a child, the best interest of the child should be a primary consideration. Such a child-sensitive approach, taking due account of the child’s age, disability, maturity, views, needs and concerns, should be assessed on an individual basis. …”
Article 15 – Right to protection
“1. Member States are encouraged to ensure that measures are available to protect, as far as possible, victims and their family members from secondary and repeat victimisation, from intimidation and retaliation and from violations of their privacy and dignity.
…”
III. EUROPEAN UNION LAW
135. The Court refers to the considerations in M.G.C. v. Romania (no. 61495/11, § 43, 15 March 2016); X and Others v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 135-36); and R.B. v. Estonia (no. 22597/16, § 47, 22 June 2021) concerning Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography. On 6 February 2024 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (EU) reached an agreement on the European Commission’s proposal for a new directive to revise the above-mentioned Directive 2011/93/EU and to update the criminal-law rules on sexual abuse of children.
136. The Court also refers to J.L. v. Italy (no. 5671/16, § 69, 27 May 2021), and X v. Greece (cited above, § 23) concerning Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime. In particular, that directive emphasises that women victims of gender-based violence often require special support and protection because of the high risk of secondary victimisation. It was transposed into French law by Law no. 2015-993 of 17 August 2015.
137. In addition, the Court refers to X v. Greece (cited above, §§ 24-26) in relation to the results of a survey by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on violence against women, published in a 2015 report and based on interviews with 42,000 women across the EU member States.
138. In particular, the report revealed the extent and the under-reporting of violence experienced in childhood. For example, 1 in 10 women reported having experienced some form of sexual violence since the age of 15, and 1 in 20 having been raped. Just over 1 in 5 women declared having experienced physical or sexual violence from either a current or previous partner, and just over 1 in 10 women having experienced some form of sexual violence by an adult before they were 15 years old. Yet only 14% of women had reported a serious incident of intimate partner violence to the police, and 13% a serious incident of non-partner violence.
139. On 1 June 2023 the European Union acceded to the Istanbul Convention[12].
140. In this context, on 6 February 2024 the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union reached a political agreement on the European Commission’s proposal of 8 March 2022 for a directive on combating violence against women and domestic violence. The proposal recommended a common definition of rape containing a reference to the requirement of positive consent. Article 5 § 2 of the proposal defined a non‑consensual act as “an act which [was] performed without the woman’s consent given voluntarily or where the woman [was] unable to form a free will due to her physical or mental condition, thereby exploiting her incapacity to form a free will, such as in a state of unconsciousness, intoxication, sleep, illness, bodily injury or disability”.
141. Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, contains no common definition of rape[13].
IV. COMPARATIVE LAW
142. An update on the information provided in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 88-100), concerning the criteria under which the various European legal systems criminalise rape and sexual assault, can be found in the Council of Europe (GREVIO) and EU reports referred to below (see paragraphs 144‑147), and in certain national reports presenting comparative-law studies in this area (see, in particular, information report no. 193 of the Senate Delegation on Women’s Rights of 6 December 2024[14], and information report no. 792 of the National Assembly Delegation on Women’s Rights of 21 January 2025, cited in paragraph 113 above, which reproduces at length relevant examples of national legislation, pp. 143-47).
143. These reports show that in many States Parties to the Convention and in a majority of EU member States (Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden), as well as in the United Kingdom and Switzerland (Article 190 of the Swiss Criminal Code refers to a victim’s state of shock), rape legislation explicitly includes the concept of lack of freely given consent to a sexual act in the definition of rape, without any reference to a means of coercion used against the victim, although this criterion may exist elsewhere.
A. States Parties to the Istanbul Convention
144. According to the 4th general report on GREVIO’s activities of 21 September 2023 (cited in paragraph 129 above, p. 30), among the 37 States Parties to the Istanbul Convention, the criminalisation of sexual violence, including rape, “is characterised by different definitions and scopes of protection, and various behaviours, different sanctions and aggravating and mitigating circumstances”.
145. Referring to the four approaches taken in the various States’ national legislation (see paragraph 130 above), the report notes that a significant number of Parties to the Istanbul Convention take the first (that is, force-based) approach by continuing “to require as constituent elements of sexual offences the use of violence, coercion, compulsion, threat, intimidation or a state or situation of the victim which makes them incapable of resisting” (namely Albania, Andorra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, France, Georgia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, San Marino, Serbia and Switzerland[15]). A second group of States (Austria, Georgia, Norway and Serbia) “rather have tiers of sexual offences with different constituent elements”. Austria and Germany are cited as having adopted the third approach (known as “no means no”), which presumes consent, unless it is withdrawn – explicitly or implicitly – by the victim. Belgium, Iceland, Malta, Slovenia and Sweden, meanwhile, have opted for the fourth approach (“only yes is yes”), which requires affirmative and freely given consent to a sexual act.
B. EU member States
146. In January 2024 the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published a comparative report on the definitions of rape in the legislation of EU member States[16]. The report starts by reviewing the “arguments for a change of paradigm” in addressing sexual violence and rape and a shift to a consent-based approach (pp. 1-2). It notes that the traditional approach in European legislation of basing the definition of rape on violence and threats towards the victim has seen many perpetrators escape prosecution, because they have taken advantage of the most common response among rape victims, known as “frozen fright” or “tonic immobility” – rather than active physical resistance – to impose a non-consensual sexual act.
147. According to the report (pp. 7-8 and 24-30), 11 EU countries had not, at the time of publication, taken any steps to include consent in their criminal-law definitions of rape, including five States Parties to the Istanbul Convention (Estonia, France, Italy, Poland and Romania) and six States that had not ratified the Istanbul Convention (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia). The report also states that four EU countries included the notion of consent as a constituent element of the crime of rape prior to the entry into force of the Istanbul Convention in 2014, and that those countries have since reformed their legislation to make the notion of consent more explicit (Cyprus, Belgium and Luxembourg) or are in the process of doing so (Ireland). Eleven other EU countries that ratified the Istanbul Convention have amended their legislation since 2014 to bring it into line with the relevant provisions of that treaty, in particular regarding rape (Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden). The report concludes by noting that “in 15 Member States lack of consent features as a constitutive element of the crime of rape”, while the Netherlands is carrying out a legislative reform.
THE LAW
- JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
148. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 3, 8 AND 14 OF THE CONVENTION
149. The applicants complained that French law and practice did not provide effective protection against rape and that their status as minors and their vulnerable situations at the time of the events had not been adequately taken into account. The first and third applicants (L. and M.L.) further alleged that the authorities had not promptly complied with their obligation to investigate and punish the perpetrators of the offences complained of. Lastly, the first applicant submitted that she had been subjected to secondary victimisation and discriminatory treatment during the criminal proceedings. The applicants relied on Article 3, Article 8 and (in the case of the first applicant) Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8, which read as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private … life …”
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex …”
A. Admissibility
1. Objection to admissibility on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the promptness of the criminal proceedings
150. The Government submitted that the first and third applicants, L. and M.L., had not sought damages in respect of the lack of promptness in the criminal proceedings of which they complained before the Court, as had been open to them under Article L. 141-1 of the Code of Judicial Organisation concerning the defective operation of the public justice system, even though that remedy had been found to be effective by the Court.
151. While the first applicant accepted that there was, in principle, an effective domestic remedy to be used under the aforementioned Article L. 141-1, she argued that this would not apply in the present case until a final decision had been given in the criminal proceedings. The third applicant did not comment on this point.
152. However, the Court would point out that the requirement of promptness in the conduct of domestic proceedings concerning a rape complaint is, for the purposes of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, one of the conditions for compliance by the respondent State with its positive obligation to carry out an effective investigation in order to prosecute and, where appropriate, punish the alleged perpetrators of such acts (see paragraph 199 below).
153. In this connection, the Court notes that the first applicant expressly raised this complaint under Articles 3 and 8, while the third applicant raised it in substance in the context of her complaint concerning the breach by the domestic courts of their positive obligations for the purposes of the aforementioned Articles 3 and 8, which, as has just been pointed out, include a procedural aspect. Furthermore, the Court has already had occasion to hold that civil proceedings for damages are not capable of redressing a complaint as to the ineffectiveness of proceedings under Article 3 of the Convention, as such a complaint calls into question the existence of efficient criminal-law mechanisms ensuring adequate protection against serious attacks on the physical integrity of a person (see, mutatis mutandis, Vučković v. Croatia, no. 15798/20, § 41, 12 December 2023, and the cases cited therein).
154. It follows that the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the complaints raised by the applicants L. and M.L. (nos. 46949/21 and 39759/22), concerning the domestic authorities’ lack of expedition and promptness in conducting the criminal proceedings in breach of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, must be rejected.
2. Other objections on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies
155. The Government raised other objections on the ground of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of each of the three applications. They will be examined in turn.
(a) Application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France)
156. The Government acknowledged that domestic remedies had been exhausted in respect of the substantive limb of the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention, as the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 17 March 2021 had had the effect of rendering final the refusal to classify the acts complained of as rape in that case (see paragraph 35 above). With regard to the procedural aspect of those same complaints, the Government no longer maintained that they were premature, as initially submitted, since the criminal investigation was now closed. However, they contended that there had nevertheless been a failure to exhaust domestic remedies for two reasons. First, the applicant had not argued before the Court of Cassation that the proceedings had been ineffective. Second, fresh criminal proceedings in respect of the acts complained of were now pending, as the applicant had lodged a criminal complaint with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party on 14 October 2021. In the context of those proceedings, she also had the possibility of asserting her rights as a civil party before the criminal court dealing with the sexual-assault allegations against three accused (see paragraphs 40-41 above).
157. The applicant replied that the criminal proceedings which were the subject of her application to the Court had ended and that she had duly exhausted domestic remedies by raising, at least in substance and in accordance with the Court’s case-law, her complaints that both the criminal legislation on rape and the investigation had been inadequate to punish the acts complained of.
158. First of all, the Court refers to the general principles relating to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and to the distribution of the burden of proof in such matters, as reiterated in particular in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014; see also Guzzardi v. Italy, 6 November 1980, § 72, Series A no. 39; Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, §§ 144-46, ECHR 2010; and Hanan v. Germany [GC], no. 4871/16, § 148, 16 February 2021). The Court has frequently pointed out that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies has to be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism, and that in reviewing whether it has been observed it is essential to have regard to the particular circumstances of each individual case (see Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, § 87, 9 July 2015).
159. The Court also reiterates that it accepts that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached after the application has been lodged but before its admissibility has been determined (see Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 90, 19 December 2018), which is the case in the present application. It further observes – and the Government does not dispute – that the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention concern, in both their substantive and procedural aspects, the criminal proceedings that came to an end with the Court of Cassation’s decisions of 17 March 2021 and 18 May 2022 (see paragraphs 35 and 39 above). In this connection, it notes that the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s grounds of appeal that were based on a violation of those Articles of the Convention and upheld the reasoning of the Court of Appeal as to the discontinuance decision for the offence of rape (see paragraphs 32 and 35 above).
160. With regard to the first limb of the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see paragraph 156 above), the Court reiterates that where an applicant complains of the lack of an effective criminal investigation under the procedural limb of Article 2 or 3 of the Convention, it is sufficient, in order to comply with Article 35 § 1, including with regard to arguments not explicitly raised at the domestic level, if the applicant has challenged the effectiveness of that investigation before the competent domestic court and, by describing the course and duration of the investigation and subsequent court proceedings in detail, referred to the relevant factual elements for that court to assess the investigation’s effectiveness (see Hanan, cited above, § 149). In the present application, the Court notes that the applicant requested additional investigative measures at various stages of the proceedings and that her submissions referred to alleged shortcomings in the proceedings in punishing the alleged acts of rape (see paragraphs 24, 27, 29, 32 and 38 above).
161. In these circumstances, the Court dismisses the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies as regards the complaint alleging the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation, which was raised, in substance, before the domestic courts.
162. Turning to the second limb of the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see paragraph 156 above), the Court notes that the accused were committed for trial on the charge of sexual assault for the acts complained of by the applicant. They were tried at first instance by the Criminal Court, which convicted two of the three accused on 27 November 2024 (see paragraph 40 above). The outcome of the applicant’s second complaint, which is currently pending before an investigating judge, has not yet been determined. The Court considers that the question whether those proceedings are capable of remedying the violations alleged before the Court is closely linked to the examination of the facts of the case and the assessment of the implementation of the applicable legal framework by the domestic authorities during and after the first investigation proceedings, which ended with the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 18 May 2022. This limb of the Government’s objection must therefore be joined to the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention.
(b) Application no. 24989/22 (H.B. v. France)
163. The Government submitted that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies, since her father had lodged the appeal on points of law on his own behalf alone and not as the representative of his daughter, who was a minor at that time. In support of their objection, they cited the provisions of Article 388-1-1 of the Civil Code, which provided that the statutory representative of a minor represented him or her in all cases except where the law authorised the minor to act alone. Such, they submitted, was the case at the Court of Cassation, before which any ground of appeal made in the interest of a minor was inadmissible where the minor had not appealed or been represented himself or herself (Court of Cassation, Second Civil Division, 11 January 2001, 00-50.006). In any event, the Government argued that at no stage in the proceedings, including before the Court of Cassation, had the applicant raised, at least in substance, a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
164. The applicant submitted that, under the provisions of Article 382 of the Civil Code, according to which the parents exercising parental responsibility were the statutory representatives of their minor child, her father had duly represented her before the Court of Cassation. Their lawyer, who had a right of audience in the Conseil d’État and Court of Cassation, had also lodged submissions on behalf of her parents and herself. Referring to her submissions before the domestic courts, she contended that she had duly exhausted domestic remedies by raising in substance the complaint that she had made in her application. The interest of that complaint in protecting fundamental rights justified interpreting Article 35 § 1 of the Convention without excessive formalism.
165. The Court refers to the above-mentioned general principles (see paragraph 158 above) and reiterates that while the applicant must have exhausted effective remedies, complying with the applicable rules of domestic procedure (see Vučković and Others, cited above, §§ 72 and 80), the Court’s assessment of this requirement takes into account the special circumstances of the case. The Court has also held that an available remedy was made use of for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention where the applicant had sufficiently raised the substance of a complaint concerning an alleged infringement of Convention rights (see Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary [GC], no. 201/17, §§ 53 and 56-57, 20 January 2020, and the cases cited therein). It has held likewise where the forms prescribed by domestic law had not been observed but the substance of the claim had nevertheless been examined by the competent authority (see Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, no. 41461/02, § 52, 24 July 2008).
166. In the present case, the Court notes that throughout the domestic proceedings, the applicant, a minor represented by her parents, challenged, as a civil party, what she argued was the national authorities’ excessively limited assessment of the offence of rape in the light of her allegations. While it is true that only H.B.’s father lodged an appeal on points of law, the grounds of appeal were set out in submissions which also cited the applicant and raised in substance the same complaint as that made before the Court of Appeal – a complaint in which the applicant was the direct victim (see paragraphs 54 and 57 above). The principal purpose of the opinion of the Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation, which contained a lengthy analysis, was thus to determine whether the Court of Appeal’s judgment should be quashed by the Criminal Division in view of the content of that complaint, which called into question whether the applicant was able to give sufficiently informed consent to sexual activity on account of her age and vulnerability (see paragraph 59 above). Accordingly, while it is true that the applicant did not lodge an appeal on points of law on her own behalf and was not represented by her father before the Court of Cassation, the fact remains that, given the particular circumstances of the case, and without exhibiting excessive formalism, H.B.’s father must be regarded as having acted in agreement with his daughter, who was 16 years old at the time, and in her interests, as her parent (see, mutatis mutandis, concerning spouses, Schmidt v. France, no. 35109/02, § 53, 26 July 2007). Furthermore, it is apparent from the submissions lodged with the domestic courts that the applicant did indeed raise in substance, at all levels of jurisdiction, the complaint that she subsequently made in her application to the Court.
167. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the Government’s objection that the minor applicant failed to exhaust domestic remedies must be rejected.
(c) Application no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France)
168. The Government pleaded failure to exhaust domestic remedies on the ground that the applicant had relied on the Istanbul Convention before the domestic courts and not on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
169. The applicant replied that her complaint had been raised at least in substance before the domestic courts, since she had challenged before them the manner in which her consent had been assessed, namely without regard to the “surrounding circumstances” and her alleged state of shock at the material time. She argued that in so doing, she had given the national authorities the opportunity to remedy the breaches complained of.
170. The Court observes that the applicant challenged the wording of the legislation and its interpretation with regard to the offence of rape throughout the investigation proceedings and criticised the domestic courts for failing to take sufficient account of the requirement of freely given consent for the purposes of the Istanbul Convention (see paragraphs 84 and 86 above). She thereby brought before the domestic courts a matter that was inextricably linked to the question whether the investigation had been sufficiently effective to protect her as a minor who had been the victim of the sexual acts complained of.
171. In so doing, the applicant raised in substance the complaints that she subsequently submitted to the Court and gave the competent authorities an opportunity to remedy the alleged breaches. The Court concludes that the Government’s objection to admissibility must therefore be rejected.
3. Conclusion on the admissibility of the applications
172. The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention and, with respect to the first applicant L. (no. 46949/21), these Articles in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, are neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
(a) The applicants
(i) Application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France)
173. The applicant, who is now 30 years old, submitted that French law and the case-law of the Court of Cassation were inadequate to punish rape effectively and to protect, in particular, minors under the age of 15 against rape on account of the meaning given to the criteria of violence, coercion, threats and surprise. In her view, the existence of the offence of sexual assault made it possible to try serious crimes (crimes) as lesser offences and protected the perpetrators. The courts had not objectively assessed whether her consent had been given freely in the light of her age and vulnerability, as no account had been taken of current knowledge of the psychology of victims, who would in all appearances submit voluntarily to an assailant whom they admired and trusted, to the point of initially convincing themselves that they were genuinely consenting.
174. According to the applicant, the reasoning of the Investigation Division had thus focused on the description of her behaviour as a victim (in particular, the fact that she had supplied condoms and had been “active” during oral sex) in order to establish the existence of an appearance of consent exonerating the defendants. A reform in 2021 and the new offence of rape of a minor under the age of 15 by an adult (Article 222-23-1 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 100 above) demonstrated, in the view of the applicant, the inability of criminal law as it previously stood to protect all young victims of sexual abuse.
175. She also submitted that she had not had the benefit of an effective investigation. In that regard, the proceedings had not been conducted with the requisite promptness; the investigation into both the facts and the accused had been flawed despite her counsel’s requests; she had received inadequate support during the preliminary inquiries and the investigation in view of her psychological profile; and the context-sensitive assessment conducted during Dr B.’s psychiatric assessment had not been genuine. The shortcomings in the preliminary inquiries and the investigation had subjected her to secondary victimisation, as some of the questions asked by the police officers had been shameful, humiliating and degrading, and the psychiatric expert, whom she alleged was known for his “misogynistic opinions”, had not taken her specific needs into account over many appointments. Lastly, the psychiatric assessment and the reasoning in the Paris Court of Appeal’s judgment of 12 November 2020 were “sexist” and disclosed a discriminatory assessment of her conduct on grounds of her gender.
(ii) Application no. 24989/22 (H.B. v. France)
176. The applicant, who is now 19 years old, complained of the domestic courts’ refusal to classify the alleged acts as rape and submitted that the respondent State had had an obligation to punish the perpetrators of such acts committed against her when she was a minor. The national authorities had not drawn the proper conclusions from her consistent statements that she would not have consented to the sexual activity – the occurrence of which had not been disputed by the accused – if she had not been highly intoxicated. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently sought to ascertain whether the accused had been aware of her young age, despite the circumstances of the case.
(iii) Application no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France)
177. The applicant, who is now 33 years old, relied on the Court’s case-law (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, no. 39272/98, ECHR 2003-XII, and J.L. v. Italy, no. 5671/16, 27 May 2021) to argue that the respondent State had failed to comply with its positive obligation to protect her physical, mental and moral integrity, as it had failed to carry out an effective investigation enabling the perpetrator of the alleged rape to be punished. In particular, the perpetrator had not been committed for trial before a court, despite the fact that he had, in her view, admitted to rape while being questioned in police custody. The domestic courts had inadequately applied the requirement that the perpetrator’s use of force or coercion be demonstrated in order to establish lack of consent. In particular, they had not taken into consideration either her vulnerability on account of her minor status at the material time or the “surrounding circumstances” of the alleged acts within the meaning of Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 124 above), namely, in her case, a state of shock which had prevented her from reacting to the acts of penetration to which she had been subjected despite her refusal.
(b) The Government
(i) Submissions relevant to all three applications
178. The Government submitted that the legal framework and its application by the domestic courts had complied with the positive obligations incumbent on the national authorities to protect the applicants from acts as serious as the alleged rapes. They referred to the Court’s judgment in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 88-100) in relation to the existence of different approaches to the criminalisation of rape in European States, and to J.L. v. Italy (cited above) with regard to the Italian legal framework for the protection of the rights of victims of sexual assault.
179. The Government pointed to the criminal-law provisions resulting from the Law of 3 August 2018, which were immediately applicable, and to the improvements made by the Law of 21 April 2021 (see paragraphs 89 and 93-102 above). Those provisions protected victims under the age of 15 in sexual matters, in particular by differentiating between the scope of consent of a minor under the age of 15 and that of an adult, in line with the Court’s findings in N.Ç. v. Turkey (no. 40591/11, § 114, 9 February 2021 – see paragraph 202 below).
180. The Government also pointed out that the offence of sexual assault made it possible to criminalise acts of sexual abuse committed against a minor under the age of 15, including where that minor had given his or her consent. Other forms of conduct were also criminalised, such as incitement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity (Article 227-22 of the Criminal Code) and proposals by an adult to a minor by electronic means of communication (Article 227‑22‑1 of the Criminal Code).
181. They further argued that the consent of all rape victims was a constituent element of the offence under French criminal law, without reference necessarily being required to the use of force or to resistance by the victim. Beyond the circumstances of violence and threats, the concepts of surprise and psychological coercion thus made it possible to take into account the situations of all sexually assaulted minors whose consent had been invalidly given.
182. The Government next emphasised the need for the domestic courts, first, to establish the element of intent where rape had been committed, that is to say, the accused’s intent to engage in sexual activity despite his or her awareness of the victim’s lack of consent, and, second, to safeguard the accused’s presumption of innocence.
(ii) Submissions relating to application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France)
183. In the present application, the Government emphasised that the Court of Cassation, in its judgment of 17 March 2021, had ruled for the first time on the interpretation of the third paragraph of Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 35 and 94 above) as an evidential rule in order to confirm, in the light of the Court of Appeal’s reasoning, that the applicant had had the necessary discernment to consent to the sexual acts subsequently complained of in her criminal complaint. The protection of the youngest minors had been further strengthened by the Law of 21 April 2021 and the provisions of the new Article 222-23-1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 100 above). The Court of Cassation reviewed the application of those provisions by the courts below.
184. According to the Government, the domestic courts had based their findings in the present application on an in-depth investigation by a specialist unit and numerous contextual factors surrounding the events. They had thereby assessed in detail the applicant’s consent to the acts complained of and had ultimately ordered a partial discontinuance, without relying on any gender-based reasoning whatsoever. The issue of consent had been central to the reasoning behind the decisions of the courts, which had been confronted with contradictory versions of the events. With regard to the promptness of the proceedings, the Government disputed that the criminal investigation had remained dormant for any period, as numerous investigative measures, including many interviews with the accused, had been carried out successively over time.
185. The Government further submitted that the investigating judge had taken into account the risk of secondary victimisation of the applicant by deciding to close the judicial investigation despite the requests of the civil parties for further confrontations with the accused. As to the complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the decisive reasons given in the Investigation Division’s judgment, which were criticised by the applicant, were in no way discriminatory against her and were intended solely to describe the conduct of the accused.
(iii) Submissions relating to application no. 24989/22 (H.B. v. France)
186. With regard to the effectiveness of the investigation, the Government submitted that in the instant application the investigation had been conducted promptly and thoroughly, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, despite the existence of two irreconcilable versions of the facts. The courts had examined whether the applicant’s consent might have been obtained by the accused by means of violence, threats, coercion or surprise, and had ultimately ruled out those hypotheses, even after considering the combination of the complainant’s intoxication and young age. In that connection, the Court of Cassation could not substitute its assessment of the facts for that of the courts below, which had given sufficient reasons in their judgment for finding that neither the accused’s ability to perceive the applicant’s lack of consent nor their awareness of her real age had been demonstrated.
(iv) Submissions relating to application no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France)
187. The Government began by submitting that in the instant application the applicant had been 16 years old at the material time and that the age difference with the accused, who had been 18 years old, was only 15 months.
188. Next, with regard to the domestic courts’ assessment as to whether the element of intent to commit rape could be made out, the Government submitted that, without calling into question the applicant’s trauma, they had legitimately found that there was insufficient evidence to establish such intent. In that connection, by relying on an investigation that had been conducted fully and thoroughly despite the fact that M.L. had lodged her complaint more than five years after the events, thereby precluding immediate medical and expert examinations, the investigating judges had been able to note validly that there were discrepancies between the parties’ accounts as to the refusal expressed by the applicant, to draw the necessary conclusions from her passive attitude, which had not been disputed, and to find that the accused had complied with the applicant’s initial refusal of vaginal intercourse. The Government concluded that the applicant’s complaint amounted to dissatisfaction with the unfavourable outcome of the criminal proceedings she had brought.
189. Furthermore, with reference to the CNCDH’s third-party submissions (see paragraph 190 below), the Government maintained that the definition of rape in French criminal law satisfied the requirements of international law – and the Istanbul Convention in particular – in such matters.
(c) The third-party intervener (application no. 39759/22 – M.L. v. France)
190. The National Advisory Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) referred to its opinion of 20 November 2018 (see paragraphs 115-116 above). Figures published by the Government themselves through the Ministry of Gender Equality, Diversity and Equal Opportunities and the Ministry of Justice demonstrated the weakness of the French criminal-law response to rape offences. Only 16% of rape complaints had resulted in a conviction in 2019, while 81% of victims of sexual violence in 2021 had reported not lodging a complaint, which could be attributed either to a belief that the acts would go unpunished or to the difficulty of criminal proceedings for complainants. The reasons for that phenomenon essentially stemmed from the current definition of rape, which made it difficult for any victim who could not demonstrate the use of force against him or her to prove that there had been coercion, threats or surprise, in a context where 51% of such victims knew their assailant and 35% had been assaulted in their home. The shock and anguish experienced by victims were thus rarely taken into account by the courts, and the passivity to which such reactions gave rise was often used against them. Impaired states of consciousness (on account of drugs or alcohol), mental, physical or psychological vulnerability, hierarchical subordination and age were not the focus of criminal investigations. By concentrating on the victim’s behaviour and on how the accused might have interpreted it, the courts perpetuated gender bias in the interpretation of the facts. Neither the circumstances surrounding the expression of consent nor the concept of the victim’s freely given consent was taken into account satisfactorily.
191. However, the CNCDH submitted, with reference to M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 153, 166 and 181-82), that the European and international legal framework showed support for a clear reference to the concept of freely given consent in criminalising rape and sexual assault. In that connection, it also referred to the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations (see paragraph 121 above) adopted in 2010 (Communication no. 18/2008, 22 September 2010, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/46/D/18/2008), to Article 36 of the Istanbul Convention (see paragraph 124 above) and to the GREVIO baseline evaluation report on France published in 2019 (see paragraph 128 above). The reservations as to the current definition of rape in France expressed in the GREVIO report echoed those of the CNCDH. The CNCDH further referred to comparative law, which attested to the growing number of States that had made the requirement of consent central to their rape legislation, including Belgium, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Canada (regarding comparative law, see paragraphs 142-147 above).
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Applicable principles
192. The Court first reiterates that rape and serious sexual assault amount to treatment falling within the ambit of Article 3 of the Convention and implicate fundamental values and essential aspects of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 (see, in particular, Y v. Bulgaria, no. 41990/18, §§ 63‑65, 20 February 2020, and the cases cited therein; Vučković, cited above, § 49; and X v. Greece, no. 38588/21, §§ 65-66, 13 February 2024).
193. The Court further notes that the general principles applicable in the area were set out, in particular, in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, §§ 149-52). It reiterates that the States’ positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention include the obligation to enact criminal-law provisions for the criminalisation and effective punishment of any non-consensual sexual act (see M.G.C. v. Romania, no. 61495/11, § 59, 15 March 2016; Z v. Bulgaria, no. 39257/17, § 67, 28 May 2020; and J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 117), and to apply those provisions through effective investigation and prosecution (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 153 and 166, and B.V. v. Belgium, no. 61030/08, § 55, 2 May 2017). These positive obligations must be interpreted in the light of the relevant international instruments and in particular the Istanbul Convention, which provides a comprehensive framework for preventing, prosecuting and eliminating violence against women and protecting victims (see J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 120, and Vučković, cited above, § 57).
194. The positive obligations inherent in Articles 3 and 8 require, in the first place, the introduction of a legislative and regulatory framework that affords individuals adequate protection against physical and psychological harm, including acts as serious as rape (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 150, and J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 118).
195. With regard to this substantive obligation, the Court held in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, § 154) that the States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the choice of means to guarantee adequate protection against rape. In this context, it noted that a requirement that the victim must resist physically was no longer present in the statutes of European countries. While in many of those countries the definition of rape still contained references to the use of violence or threats of violence by the perpetrator, in case‑law and legal theory lack of consent, not force, was seen as the constituent element of the offence of rape. In the light of those factors, the Court was persuaded that any rigid approach to the prosecution of sexual offences, such as requiring proof of physical resistance in all circumstances, risked leaving certain types of rape unpunished and thus jeopardising the effective protection of the individual’s sexual autonomy. In accordance with contemporary standards and trends in that area, including regarding lack of consent as the essential element of rape and sexual abuse, the Court concluded that the States had an obligation to criminalise and effectively punish any non-consensual sexual act, including in the absence of physical resistance by the victim (ibid., §§ 157-66; see also Z v. the Czech Republic, no. 37782/21, § 52, 20 June 2024, and Y v. the Czech Republic, no. 10145/22, § 58, 12 December 2024).
196. Secondly, the Court reiterates that Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention also impose a positive procedural obligation on States. Thus, where an individual has an arguable claim that he or she has been the victim of acts contrary to those provisions, the national authorities must conduct an effective official investigation to establish the facts of the case and to identify and, if appropriate, punish those responsible. This obligation is not one of result, but one of means. While this requirement does not impose an obligation for all prosecutions to result in conviction, or indeed in a particular sentence, the national courts must not, under any circumstances, be prepared to allow physical or psychological suffering to go unpunished, for the sake of maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and to prevent any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts (see, among other authorities, J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 118; N.Ç. v. Turkey, cited above, § 96; Z v. the Czech Republic, cited above, § 53; and Y v. the Czech Republic, cited above, § 59).
197. Although in practice it may sometimes be difficult to prove lack of consent without “direct” evidence of rape, such as traces of violence or direct witnesses, the authorities are nevertheless under an obligation to examine all the facts and to give a ruling after making an assessment of all the circumstances. The investigation and its findings must above all focus on the issue of lack of consent (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, § 181, and M.G.C. v. Romania, § 72, both cited above).
198. In order to be effective, the investigation must be sufficiently thorough and objective. The authorities must take the reasonable measures available to them to obtain evidence relating to the offence in question such as by taking witness statements, obtaining expert reports and gathering forensic evidence (see, among other authorities, M.N. v. Bulgaria, no. 3832/06, § 39, 27 November 2012; W. v. Slovenia, no. 24125/06, § 64, 23 January 2014; and X v. Greece, cited above, § 69).
199. A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is also implicit in the guarantee of effectiveness in this context (see M.N. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 46; Y v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 81; X v. Greece, cited above, § 69; and, concerning allegations of sexual abuse of a child, M.G. v. Lithuania, no. 6406/21, §§ 96 and 98, 20 February 2024). The Court also reiterates that compliance with the procedural requirements of Article 3 is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters. These elements are inter-related and each of them, taken separately, does not amount to an end in itself but, taken jointly, they enable the degree of effectiveness of the investigation to be assessed (see, for example, M.B. and Others v. Slovakia (no. 2), no. 63962/19, § 55, 7 February 2023, and Panayotopoulos and Others v. Greece, no. 44758/20, § 104, 21 January 2025).
200. In assessing the State’s compliance with its positive obligations, the Court takes into account the importance of protecting the rights of victims. Criminal proceedings concerning sexual offences are often conceived of as an ordeal by the victim, in particular when the latter is unwillingly confronted with the defendant (see Y. v. Slovenia, no. 41107/10, § 103, 28 May 2015, and X v. Greece, cited above, § 70). In the conduct of the proceedings, in parallel with effective respect for defence rights, the judicial authorities also have a duty to protect the image, dignity and private life of victims of sexual violence, including through the non-disclosure of personal data and information that are unrelated to the facts. In the Court’s view, it is therefore essential that judicial authorities do not reproduce sexist stereotypes in court decisions, do not play down gender-based violence and do not expose women to secondary victimisation by making guilt-inducing and judgmental comments that are capable of undermining victims’ trust in the justice system (see Y. v. Slovenia, cited above, §§ 97 and 101-04, and J.L. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 137-41).
201. The principles established by the Court and reiterated above apply especially to children, as provided for in other international provisions such as Articles 18 to 24 of the Lanzarote Convention (see paragraph 122 above; see also X and Others v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 179, and M.G. v. Lithuania, cited above, § 98). In order to protect children against sexual abuse while taking their vulnerability into account (see the above-cited cases of A and B v. Croatia, § 111; M.C. v. Bulgaria, §§ 150 and 183; and M.G.C. v. Romania, § 56), the Court has extended the scope of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention by requiring that their best interests be made a primary consideration (see Z v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 69-70; N.Ç. v. Turkey, cited above, § 113; and M.G. v. Lithuania, cited above, § 98) and that their rights be effectively implemented (see A, B and C v. Latvia, no. 30808/11, §§ 148-49, 31 March 2016). Such protection, which implies the adoption of appropriate support measures to facilitate the recovery and social reintegration of young victims of sexual abuse (see, mutatis mutandis, C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania, no. 26692/05, §§ 72, 82 and 83, 20 March 2012, and M.N. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 40), must also be extended to young people, who have not yet reached the full maturity of an adult.
202. The Court has also previously emphasised that the evolving understanding of the manner in which rape is experienced by victims, in particular by girls below the age of majority, has shown that they often provide no physical resistance because of a variety of psychological factors or because they fear violence on the part of the perpetrator (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 164, and Z v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 68). Furthermore, in N.Ç. v. Turkey (cited above, § 115, concerning forced prostitution), the Court held that under no circumstances could consent given by a minor under the age of 15 be treated as equivalent to that given by an adult.
(b) Application of these principles to the present case
(i) Preliminary considerations
203. The Court would note, first, that the three applicants, in their applications to it, called into question the applicable legal framework, especially the definition of the offence of rape, and the manner in which it had been applied to them. In particular, they submitted that their lack of consent had not been given due consideration by the authorities.
204. In the Court’s view, the issue in the present case is whether the national authorities acted in compliance with their positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to provide the applicants with effective protection against the non-consensual sexual acts to which they were allegedly subjected. It must therefore examine whether, as the applicants submitted, the legal framework applicable at the material time and the authorities’ approach to assessing the facts and applying that legal framework in the present case, including through the conduct of the investigations, were so significantly flawed as to amount to a breach of those obligations (see X. v. Greece, cited above, § 71; Z v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 56; and Y. v. Slovenia, cited above, § 61).
205. The Court reiterates, second, that in so doing it cannot replace the domestic authorities in the assessment of the facts of the case; nor can it decide on the alleged perpetrators’ criminal responsibility (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 168, and J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 122).
(ii) Whether the respondent State complied with its positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention (in conjunction with Article 14 with respect to application no. 46949/21)
(α) Considerations relevant to all three applications
‒ Applicable legal framework
206. The Court notes that the offence of rape under Article 222-23 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 91 above) does not contain any express reference to the concept of “consent”. The same is true of the provisions relating to aggravated sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault of minors (Articles 222-22 and 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code – see paragraphs 91 and 94 above). However, lack of consent has long been taken into consideration by the Court of Cassation in its case-law (see paragraph 104 above). The domestic courts have thus endeavoured to establish the existence or lack of consent, while respecting the defence rights of the accused (see paragraphs 105-108 above) and in a context where the court sometimes has scant information other than conflicting statements from each party. The present applications exemplify these difficulties.
207. In this connection, the Court notes that, according to GREVIO’s report on France of 19 November 2019, the definition of rape in French law creates “legal uncertainty generated by fluctuating interpretations of the constituent elements” of the offence (violence, coercion, threat and surprise) and does not allow “such elements of proof to cover the situation of all non‑consenting victims, particularly when they are in a state of shock”, whereas “such a definition would make it possible to operate the necessary paradigm shift to recognise the centrality of the victim’s will, and would enable France to side with those countries that have already taken this important step” (see paragraph 128 above; see also the 4th general report on GREVIO’s activities of 21 September 2023, quoted in paragraphs 129-131 above).
208. The Court notes, in this connection, that there is now a growing consensus among the States Parties to expressly include, in the definition of rape, the concept of informed consent and to enshrine the lack of such consent as a constituent element of the offence (see paragraphs 142-147 above). Moreover, France’s international commitments, in particular the ratification of the Istanbul Convention in 2014, call for such a development, even if the respondent State retains a certain latitude to define, in its legislation, the criteria of freely given consent (see paragraphs 126 and 128 above). In this connection, the Court, after noting the existing lacunae in the legal framework (see paragraphs 89-102 above) protecting the rights of sexual victims, takes note of the significant changes that have taken place in French legislation in this area since 1980 (ibid.), the recent reforms of domestic law concerning minors subjected to such violence (see paragraphs 91-102 above), the tabling of several bills to amend the criminal-law definition of rape (see paragraph 114 above) and the findings and proposals in a number of opinions and reports (see paragraphs 109-116 above) calling for stronger victims’ rights.
209. The foregoing considerations will be taken into account by the Court in its analysis of the implementation by the national authorities of the applicable legal framework in each of the three applications submitted to it for examination.
‒ Implementation of the legal framework in the present case
210. The Court would begin by first pointing out that the national authorities cannot be criticised for the fact that the inquiries and investigations ended in an acquittal (application no. 24989/22) and decisions not to commit the accused for trial for the serious crime (crime) of rape (applications nos. 46949/21 and 39759/22). A decision to discontinue proceedings in whole or in part does not, in itself, entail a breach by the national authorities of their positive obligations as described above (see, mutatis mutandis, J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 118).
211. Second, the Court must, on the other hand, satisfy itself that domestic authorities dealing with a rape complaint have effectively analysed the circumstances of the case from the perspective of gender-based violence and have explored the available possibilities for establishing all the surrounding circumstances (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, §§ 177-82, and, mutatis mutandis, X v. Greece, cited above, § 87). To do that, the Court focuses, in particular, on verifying whether they have taken account of the particular psychological factors involved in rape cases, have made a context-sensitive assessment of the credibility of the various statements, and have demonstrated that there was a serious attempt to clarify the discrepancies or to assess the applicants’ state of mind and personal circumstances, including in their assessment of the experts’ findings (see, mutatis mutandis, X v. Greece, cited above, § 87).
212. In the present case, the Court notes that as soon as the applicants lodged their complaints, a criminal investigation was conducted and the matters complained of were referred to an investigating judge or a trial court. In this connection, in each case the national authorities reached out to the parties and took their statements, including as part of confrontations, and did likewise with the main witnesses. They also ordered investigations so as to reach a better understanding of the personalities of the accused and the victims, including by means of interviews and questioning, medical examinations and psychiatric and psychological assessments.
213. Third, the Court reiterates that in order to ensure adequate protection against rape and other sexual offences, the authorities must take into account, where applicable, the vulnerability of victims, especially where they are minors, in accordance with the relevant standards set out in national and international instruments (see paragraphs 115, 118, 119, 122 and 125 above).
214. In the present case, the Court emphasises the applicants’ particular vulnerability, given their minor status at the material time and several other factors, such as their health or the fact that they had consumed alcohol and intoxicating substances. Furthermore, the authorities were aware of that particular vulnerability, either because it had long been on the records or because it had been established at the outset or in the course of the investigations (see paragraphs 5-6, 18-20, 42, 50 and 66 above).
215. It is now for the Court to examine, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the specific circumstances of each of the three applications in order to determine whether or not the respondent State complied with its positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. With regard to application no. 46949/21, it must also ascertain whether the applicant was subjected to discriminatory treatment for the purposes of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention.
(β) Application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France)
216. As the applicant was a minor under the age of 15 at the material time, the applicable legal framework was defined by the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code, as worded following the Law of 3 August 2018, which was immediately applicable (see paragraph 95 above). Under those provisions, where the offence is committed against a minor under the age of 15, psychological coercion or surprise is “established by the exploitation of the vulnerability of a victim who does not have the necessary discernment for such acts”. It was therefore for the French criminal courts to determine, both in their assessment of the facts and in their application of domestic law, whether or not violence, physical or psychological coercion or surprise had been used. In this connection, they had a special duty, having regard to the victim’s age, to ascertain whether or not she had the necessary discernment and, if not, whether or not the perpetrators had exploited her vulnerability in such a way as to amount to psychological coercion or surprise.
217. The Court notes that the Investigation Division of the Court of Appeal, in refusing to classify the acts complained of as rape and in upholding the investigating judge’s decision, first cited the lack of credibility of the applicant’s statements, which “in the absence of objective evidence, [did] not make it possible to establish that the complainant [had] not give[n] her consent” (see paragraph 30 above). Second, it took into account, as the investigating judge had done (see paragraphs 27-28 above), the description of the applicant’s conduct given by the accused – despite her denials –, noting her “forward and provocative” behaviour, her “initiatives to become acquainted with firefighters, whose profession fascinated her, and to engage in sexual activity with them in often public places that she had chosen, for which she often supplied the condoms”, her “active participation in the act itself, particularly by performing oral sex”, and “her ability to refuse certain sexual acts, such as anal penetration and cunnilingus, and to rebuff certain partners” (see paragraph 31 above). The Court of Appeal concluded that, despite the age difference between the applicant and the accused – the latter all adults –, the circumstances of the case did not make it possible to establish violence, physical or psychological coercion or surprise.
218. With regard to the applicant’s vulnerability, the Court of Appeal found that the accused were not necessarily in a position to notice it, pointing, in particular, to “the fact that she hid her age, her morphology”, “the brief nature of the encounters” and the fact that “[h]er cut scars did not show her fragility”. It further found that “her active participation during the sexual activity … did not disclose that she was on heavy medication”. Lastly, the Court of Appeal stated, with regard to the accused firefighters, that “[t]heir usual success with the ladies (la gent féminine) and the sometimes uninhibited behaviour women show[ed] towards them meant that they did not think twice” (ibid.).
219. Although the Court of Cassation quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment in respect of the offence of incitement of a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, it upheld the ruling in so far as it had found that the applicant had been consenting, after noting that the reasons given for that finding were “neither insufficient nor contradictory” (see paragraph 35 above).
220. The Court emphasises, first, the extremely vulnerable situation of the applicant, who was 13 years old at the time of the first acts complained of. It also takes note of her psychological fragility, which was the reason for the many emergency calls by firefighters to her home – more than 100 starting in 2008. It further observes that the applicant stated that, prior to the events complained of, she had been the victim of school bullying, which had had serious psychological effects, resulting in her dropping out of school, finding herself extremely socially isolated and taking heavy medication to treat her recurring panic and anxiety attacks. When she first met the accused, she had already been hospitalised in a psychiatric unit for cutting herself and attempting suicide, and she had continued to have such hospital stays throughout the period in issue, including during the criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 5-7, 16 and 22 above). Lastly, the Court considers that the applicant’s well-known fascination, bordering on obsession, with firefighters made her particularly vulnerable to their shows of affection and sexual solicitations.
221. However, the Court notes that in analysing the applicant’s conduct and consent, the domestic courts failed to carry out a context-sensitive assessment of the circumstances surrounding the case, particularly in terms of the imbalance in the relationship between the applicant and the individuals with whom she had engaged in sexual activity. For example, although the investigation had established that some of the accused were aware of her medical history and very young age (see paragraphs 5 and 23 above), the domestic courts did not duly analyse either those factors or the applicant’s statements that the sexual acts with P.C. were systematically at his request, despite the fact that he had gained her trust and that of her parents during previous emergency calls. Nor did they take any account of the evidence that could have supported the applicant’s allegations that she had been regarded as “easy sexual prey” because her name had been passed around in the accused’s fire station and in other fire stations (see paragraphs 5, 13, 24 and 32 above). The Court also notes a failure to adequately weigh the applicant’s conduct against the impact on her of the surrounding circumstances and the factors rendering her particularly vulnerable, whether her health – which had been mentioned when her complaints had been lodged (see paragraphs 5, 7-8 and 16 above) – or the findings in the expert psychiatric reports submitted in 2010 and 2013. Yet those reports state that L.’s illness could explain “self-punishment” for “inappropriate sexual seduction” and a “need to debase herself” rendering her “particularly easily influenced, impressionable and suggestible” – a situation of vulnerability that did not permit informed consent and was “noticeable by others” (see paragraphs 10 and 20 above).
222. In these circumstances, and in line with the opinion expressed by the Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 33 above), it is the Court’s view that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning was seriously flawed in its assessment of whether L. – in view of her extreme vulnerability, resulting from her very young age and her state of health – had sufficient discernment to give valid consent to repeated sexual acts with several partners.
223. The Court notes, moreover, that even if all the other circumstances were to remain the same as those of the present case, the reform effected by the Law of 21 April 2021 – which introduced the independent offence of rape of a minor under the age of 15 by an adult into Article 222-23-1 of the Criminal Code – would likely result in the committal for trial before an assize court, without any further examination, of the individuals who committed an act of penetration against the applicant, solely because they were at least five years older than she was (see paragraph 100 above).
224. Turning to the requirement of an effective investigation, which encompasses the promptness of the criminal proceedings (see paragraph 199 above), the Court emphasises the need to ascertain in this connection whether the domestic authorities conducted their examination of the applicant’s rape allegations with the requisite promptness. In the present case, it notes that the main investigative measures were taken over a period of more than ten and a half years, starting when the applicant lodged her complaint on 31 August 2010 and terminating with the Court of Cassation’s first partial quashing order on 17 March 2021. This period must be extended to 11 years and nearly 9 months to take into account the Court of Cassation’s judgment of 18 May 2022 upholding with final effect the discontinuance decision for all the charges of rape of a minor under the age of 15. The Court acknowledges that the investigation presented certain difficulties, in particular on account of the large number of people accused by the applicant and the significant amount of diverse medical evidence adduced. It would emphasise, however, that the applicant’s particular vulnerability, as attested by her suicide attempts before and during the proceedings, meant that special expedition was required in dealing with the case. These observations are sufficient for the Court to find that, in the circumstances of the case and given the applicant’s particularly traumatic medical history – of which the authorities were fully aware –, criminal proceedings lasting more than 11 years and culminating, inter alia, in dismissal of the rape charges cannot be regarded as satisfying the expedition requirement applicable in such matters.
225. Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s alleged secondary victimisation, the Court notes, first, that her health deteriorated over the course of the inquiries (see paragraphs 22 and 25 above), which prompted the investigating judge to close the judicial investigation (see paragraph 26 above).
226. The Court considers, second, that on at least two occasions the national authorities failed in their duty to protect the applicant’s dignity, by exposing her to guilt-inducing, judgmental comments that conveyed gender stereotypes capable of undermining victims’ trust in the justice system (see J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 141).
227. It observes, on the one hand, that from the beginning of the investigation, during the applicant’s second interview on 7 September 2010 – by a specialist unit no less –, she was confronted with questions from a police officer who indirectly accused her of not showing her lack of consent by shouting or physically defending herself (see paragraph 8 above). Those exchanges led the applicant to acknowledge that she had not adopted appropriate conduct, of the type supposedly expected of a rape victim when confronted with her assailant. The Court notes the inappropriate nature of such comments, which were guilt-inducing and such as to discredit the applicant’s statements, and which were used when she was first lodging her criminal complaint, a decisive stage in the proceedings during which the authorities have a duty to provide special support to victims. It further emphasises that the tenor of those comments is at odds with the present-day understanding of the constituent elements of rape, according to which evidence of the victim’s physical resistance is no longer required for the offence to be made out, as pointed out in M.C. v. Bulgaria (cited above, § 166 – see paragraph 195 above).
228. On the other hand, the Court notes the gender stereotypes in the reasoning concluding the Investigation Division’s judgment of 12 November 2020, which described the acts complained of by the applicant in a caricatural, derogatory manner, referring to “[the firefighters’] usual success with the ladies (la gent féminine) and [to] the sometimes uninhibited behaviour women show towards them” which had meant that “they did not think twice” (see paragraph 31 above). Far from merely reproducing the accused’s point of view, as argued by the Government, that reasoning sought to absolve the perpetrators of responsibility for those acts. The terms employed and the meaning conveyed were, in the view of the Court, wholly inappropriate (see, mutatis mutandis, J.L. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 136 and 141).
229. The Court reiterates that, as part of the institutional response to gender-based violence and in the fight against gender inequality, it is essential that judicial authorities do not reproduce sexist stereotypes in court decisions and do not play down gender-based violence. In the present case, the Court considers that the gender stereotypes used by the Investigation Division of the Court of Appeal in its judgment of 12 November 2020 served no purpose and were prejudicial to the applicant’s dignity (see, mutatis mutandis, J.L. v. Italy, cited above, §§ 141-42).
230. With regard to the complaint under Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the Court considered that its findings above, concerning the secondary victimisation suffered by L., are sufficient to enable it also to find that the reasoning in the Investigation Division’s judgment discloses discrimination on grounds of sex (compare, regarding domestic violence classified as gender-based violence constituting in itself a form of discrimination against women, Opuz v. Turkey, no. 33401/02, §§ 184-91 and 200, ECHR 2009; Halime Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 63034/11, § 113, 28 June 2016; Tkhelidze v. Georgia, no. 33056/17, § 51, 8 July 2021; and A.E. v. Bulgaria, no. 53891/20, § 116, 23 May 2023).
231. Lastly, the Court notes that the Court of Cassation did not comment on this point, despite the fact that Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention, and the Istanbul Convention, were relied on before it (see paragraphs 32 and 35 above).
232. In view of all the foregoing, the Court concludes that given the legal framework in force at the material time and its application in the present case, the national authorities’ shortcomings – relating both to the lack of expedition and promptness of the proceedings and to the manner in which the validity of the applicant’s consent was assessed – not only deprived her of appropriate protection but also exposed her to secondary victimisation, amounting to discrimination.
233. It follows that the Government’s objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, joined by the Court to the merits of the applicant’s complaints under Articles 3, 8 and 14 of the Convention (see paragraphs 156 and 162 above), must be dismissed. The Court observes to this end that in the pending proceedings, the courts are not dealing with the same rape offences, on which they may not rule, but with separate offences of sexual assault.
(γ) Application no. 24989/22 (H.B. v. France)
234. As H.B. was a minor under the age of 15 at the material time, the applicable legal framework was, as in the first application (see paragraph 216 above), defined by the provisions of the final paragraph of Article 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 94 above).
235. The Court notes that, in assessing whether the applicant had given her consent, the Court of Appeal – whose interpretation was not called into question by the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 56-57 and 60 above) – considered, first, that in view of the applicant’s conduct, the accused could legitimately have believed that she had been consenting and, second, that there was no evidence that they had acted using violence, coercion, threats or surprise. In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeal considered that H.B.’s discernment had not been impaired by alcohol at the time of the sexually suggestive games, since she had never mentioned a loss of consciousness or incapacitation, but only feelings of remorse. It also noted that she had initially had sexual intercourse earlier the same day with another individual and that she had played an “active” role in the game of “truth or dare” suggested by the three men. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted the applicant’s disinhibition under the influence of alcohol and a “feeling of being swept up in the moment” with her friend, who was 17 years old and who had engaged in sexual acts with one of the accused (a minor) that same evening.
236. The Court notes that the Court of Appeal, in so doing, chose not to assess the effect of the applicant’s extreme intoxication on her state of awareness and conduct. This was despite the fact that she had stated throughout the criminal proceedings that she “would never have done that if she had not drunk alcohol”, that she had no precise recollection of the sequence of events, that she had agreed “while completely out of it” and that her agreement had been “[taken] advantage [of]”, from her very first statements to the investigators on the day of the events. There had also been signs of violence on her body (see paragraphs 42-44 and 49 above). It is noteworthy that the applicant’s intoxication was taken into consideration by the Court of Appeal only in order to establish her disinhibition and to rule out any opportunism on the part of the accused. The Court further observes that the Court of Appeal did not conduct any context-sensitive assessment of the particularly vulnerable situation of the applicant, who at the material time was a very young girl who had had sex for the first time that very afternoon with another individual, and who had been facing strong pressure from two adults aged 21 and nearly 30 respectively. The Court of Appeal also failed to take into consideration the conduct of these two adults, who had sped off and parked in a secluded car park when the applicant’s brother had spotted their car, and then abandoned the two minor girls on the side of the motorway in the middle of the night.
237. However, the Court points out that both the Criminal Court at first instance and the Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation assessed the facts and interpreted the existing legal framework differently. The Criminal Court had held that it did not have jurisdiction to try the case because it concerned a serious crime (crime), a conclusion it had reached after finding the applicant’s consent “uninformed because it ha[d] been obtained by surprise” and questioning whether there was “potential coerced consent obtained through physical violence” (see paragraph 53 above). In the same vein, the Advocate-General at the Court of Cassation recommended in her opinion (see paragraph 59 above) that rape should no longer be characterised solely by the means used by the perpetrator but primarily by the victim’s lack of sufficiently informed consent to engage in sexual activity. She concluded by recommending that the Court of Appeal’s judgment be quashed on the ground that the lower courts had not adequately explained how the applicant’s consent and her capacity to consent to sexual activity had been preserved despite her intoxication. The Court points out that this recommendation was not followed by the Court of Cassation, which declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, even though she had asked it to consider the possibility that her consent had been only “apparent” and not given of her own free will (see paragraphs 58 and 60 above).
238. From all the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that, having regard both to the legal framework in force at the material time and to its application in the present case, the approach adopted in the instant case by the domestic courts, which did not take adequate account of the applicant’s particular vulnerability and the effects of the surrounding circumstances in assessing the validity of her consent, was not capable of securing her appropriate protection.
(δ) Application no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France)
239. As M.L. was a minor over the age of 15 at the material time, the applicable legal framework was laid down in Articles 222‑23 and 222-22-1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 91 and 94 above). According to those provisions, psychological coercion or surprise can be established by a significant age difference between the adult perpetrator and the minor victim. In the present application, the domestic courts ruled out that hypothesis because of the narrow age difference between the applicant (16 years old) and the accused (only just 18 years old).
240. The Court points out that in the present application, the Court of Appeal found that none of the constituent elements of the offence of rape had been made out, before upholding the discontinuance decision issued at first instance (see paragraph 85 above). In so doing, it first found that the applicant’s vulnerability had not been sufficiently established to constitute surprise. It thus noted that the applicant, who had said she had remained lucid, had not been forced to follow A.H. into the bedroom where the alleged events had taken place and that it had not been established that she was unable to understand his intentions, because “her virginity was not in itself incompatible with sufficient knowledge of sexual matters, as [was] usually observed with teenage girls of her age”. The Court of Appeal then ruled out any coercion or violence against the applicant. Firstly, it excluded any form of violence or physical coercion, noting that although the applicant had described “a rough and painful anal penetration” while the boy was lying on top of her and holding her still on the bed, and she had specified that he had pulled her by the head during the oral sex, the boy, for his part, had denied any intentional coercion. Secondly, the Court of Appeal dismissed any form of psychological coercion, observing that it could not be based on the victim’s subjective assessment alone. Lastly, the Court of Appeal found that there had been no criminal intent to rape, because A.H. had taken account of the applicant’s refusal of vaginal penetration and had not interpreted her attitude as a refusal of consent to all sexual activity (ibid.).
241. The Court observes, first, that the Court of Appeal based its appraisal of the acts complained of mainly on the accused’s statements but did not attach the same weight to those of the applicant or conduct any context-sensitive assessment of them. The only issue discussed was the consistency of the applicant’s account, without any regard being had to the consistency of A.H.’s statements in order to corroborate the fact that he had ignored the applicant’s refusals of the sexual acts imposed on her. The Court of Appeal thus did not carry out any detailed analysis of the words “No, I’m a virgin” spoken by the applicant to refuse the first attempt at vaginal penetration, or of the expression “You owe me that much” allegedly used by the accused to obtain oral sex (see paragraphs 71 and 76 above). Nor did the domestic courts duly analyse the circumstances of the anal intercourse as reported by A.H., who had alleged that he “[did] not know really how” it had happened, and that while he was rubbing against the applicant despite her initial refusal of penetration, his penis had “slipped” into her anus “without forcing” (see paragraph 71 above). In particular, they did not compare his statements with those of M.L., who had referred to the violence of the first anal penetration and her state of shock.
242. Second, the Court notes that although the two parties were in agreement that alcohol and other intoxicating substances had been taken, and the accused had acknowledged that their behaviour might have been explained by that circumstance, it was not taken into account by the domestic courts as a factor which, combined with the applicant’s minor status and virginity, had placed her in a particularly vulnerable situation. Nor had such an analysis of the effect of the surrounding circumstances been carried out during the applicant’s psychiatric assessment, which should have led to a proper understanding of the mental mechanisms at work during the events in issue and her passive behaviour during the alleged acts.
243. In the light of all the above, having noted that the gender stereotypes used by the Court of Appeal served no purpose and were moreover inappropriate, the Court concludes that that court established the applicant’s consent mainly on the basis of her passive behaviour and the fact that she had not shown physical resistance, without duly taking into consideration either her particular vulnerability or her psychological state, contrary to current knowledge about the behaviour of rape victims, particularly young ones (see, mutatis mutandis, M.C. v. Bulgaria, §§ 164-66; see also paragraph 202 above).
244. The Court notes that the Court of Cassation did not remedy those shortcomings, since it declared the appeal on points of law before it inadmissible as recommended by the reporting judge (see paragraphs 87-88 above). The Court notes, moreover, that the Court of Cassation reached a different conclusion as to a rape victim’s state of lethargy or shock in a subsequent decision in order to establish the perpetrator’s intent (Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 11 September 2024 – see paragraphs 107-108 above).
245. With respect to the part of the complaint alleging the ineffectiveness of the judicial proceedings, the Court notes, as pointed out above with respect to the first applicant (see paragraph 224 above), that it must be ascertained whether the domestic authorities conducted their examination of the applicant’s rape allegations with the requisite promptness over the course of the criminal proceedings, which lasted a total of eight years and eight months and ended with a decision not to commit the accused for trial.
246. The Court notes in this connection that basic, essential investigative measures were carried out within time frames that appear incompatible with the seriousness of the acts complained of. For example, A.H. was first taken into police custody on 9 December 2014, almost one year and four months after the applicant’s initial complaint of 13 August 2013. Admittedly, one year and almost ten months elapsed between the public prosecutor’s decision of 6 January 2015 not to prosecute and the applicant’s lodging of a criminal complaint with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party on 3 November 2016 (see paragraphs 74-75 above). It nevertheless subsequently took eight months to open the judicial investigation, then almost another year to take evidence from the civil party, and nearly two years to refer the applicant to a psychiatric expert for examination on 26 November 2018. A period of approximately one year then elapsed between each level of jurisdiction (May 2020, May 2021 and April 2022). Taking the proceedings as a whole and having regard to the expedition required in this type of case (see paragraph 199 above), the Court considers that these delays show a lack of expedition in the conduct of the criminal proceedings in issue, despite the fact that the case was not particularly complex.
247. From all the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that, having regard both to the legal framework in force at the material time and to its application in the present case, the national authorities’ failings with regard both to the lack of promptness of the proceedings and to the manner in which the validity of the applicant’s consent was assessed, deprived her of appropriate protection.
(iii) Conclusion
248. In conclusion, the Court finds that in all three applications, the investigating authorities and domestic courts failed to provide adequate protection to the applicants, who had complained of rape and had been aged only 13, 14 and 16 at the relevant times.
249. Having noted, in two of the applications, that the criminal proceedings were not conducted promptly and expeditiously, the Court is of the view that, in all three applications, the domestic courts did not duly assess the impact of all the surrounding circumstances. Nor did they take sufficient account, in assessing the applicants’ discernment and ability to give their consent, of their particularly vulnerable situations, especially in view of their minor status at the material time.
250. Reiterating that consent must reflect a person’s free will to engage in the sexual activity in question, at the material time and as assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances (see H.W. v. France, no. 13805/21, § 91, 23 January 2025), the Court finds that, having regard to the legal framework in force at the material time and to its application in the present case, the respondent State failed to fulfil its positive obligations, in view of the requirements of the Court’s case-law and in the light of international standards, to apply, in practice, a criminal-law system capable of punishing non-consensual sexual acts. In this connection, it reiterates that it is not called upon to decide on the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of the acts in issue (see M.C. v. Bulgaria, cited above, § 168) and that the above findings cannot therefore be interpreted as an opinion on the guilt of the accused in the respective applications.
251. The Court concludes that the respondent State failed to comply with its positive obligations in respect of the three applicants and, accordingly, that there has been a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention in all three applications.
252. It further finds, with regard to L.’s application (no. 46949/21) (see paragraph 230 above), that there has been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
253. The third applicant, M.L. (application no. 39759/22) complained that the investigation proceedings had been excessively long. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] …. tribunal …”
254. In that connection, the Government raised an objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, arguing that the applicant should have sought damages for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings alleged before the Court, on the basis of Article L. 141-1 (former Article L. 781-1) of the Code of Judicial Organisation concerning the defective operation of the public justice system.
255. Having regard to its observations above and to its findings in the present case, the Court considers that it has dealt with the main issues raised in the case and that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the excessive length of the proceedings (see, mutatis mutandis, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 154, ECHR 2014).
IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
256. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
257. The applicants claimed the following sums in respect of damage:
- L. (no. 46949/21): 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
- H.B. (no. 24989/22): EUR 20,000 in respect of “physical” (psychological and other health problems) and non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 23,291.88 in respect of pecuniary damage (medical expenses not covered by social security or insurance, expenses related to the applicant’s “running away” and “additional rent and insurance”);
- M.L. (no. 39759/22): EUR 18,000 in respect of “all heads of damage”, including non-pecuniary damage and costs and expenses, which will be examined below (see paragraphs 260-262 below).
258. The Government contested the applicants’ claims and requested, primarily, that the finding of a violation by the Court be regarded as sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by each of the applicants or, in the alternative, that the maximum amount awarded be EUR 10,000 in respect of L. and EUR 2,000 in respect of H.B.
259. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged with respect to H.B.’s application (no. 24989/22) (see J.L. v. Italy, cited above, § 151); it therefore rejects this claim. It also considers that the applicants undoubtedly sustained non‑pecuniary damage on account of the violation of their rights secured by Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and, for the same reasons, by Article 14 in conjunction with those Articles in the case of L. (no. 46949/21). Ruling on an equitable basis, and having taken into account the circumstances of each application and the applicants’ quantified claims, it finds it appropriate to award the sum of EUR 25,000 to L. on account of the dual finding of a violation in respect of her and EUR 15,000 each to H.B. and M.L. for non‑pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
260. The applicants respectively claimed the following sums for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court, for which they produced supporting documents: (i) EUR 25,620 (L.), comprising EUR 16,020 in respect of the present proceedings stemming from the applicant’s initial complaint of 31 August 2010 and EUR 9,600 in respect of her second criminal complaint with an application to join the proceedings as a civil party (see paragraph 41 above); (ii) EUR 1,000 (H.B.); and (iii) an amount to be determined by the Court in the light of the total claim of EUR 18,000 in respect of “all heads of damage” (M.L.).
261. The Government contested the claims of the applicants L. and M.L. as excessive and inherent in the situation of any civil party to criminal proceedings. They asked the Court to limit in any event the amounts awarded to those two applicants in respect of costs and expenses to EUR 4,800 (L.) and EUR 1,800 (M.L.). With regard to H.B., the Government considered that the claimed amount of EUR 1,000 was reasonable.
262. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums of EUR 16,020 to L., EUR 1,000 to H.B. and EUR 3,000 to M.L. for the costs and expenses incurred by each of the applicants in the domestic proceedings and for the proceedings before the Court.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
- Decides to join the applications;
- Decides, with regard to application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France), to join the second limb of the non-exhaustion objection concerning the complaints under Articles 3 and 8, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, to the merits of those complaints and, after examination, dismisses it;
- Declares the applications admissible with regard to the three applicants’ complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, as well as Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 with respect to application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France);
- Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention as well as Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8 with respect to application no. 46949/21 (L. v. France);
- Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention with respect to applications no. 24989/22 (H.B. v. France) and no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France);
- Holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility or the merits of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (length of proceedings) with respect to application no. 39759/22 (M.L. v. France);
- Holds,
- that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
- EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros) to L., EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros) to H.B. and EUR 15,000 (fifteen thousand euros) to M.L., plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
- EUR 16,020 (sixteen thousand and twenty euros) to L., EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros) to H.B. and EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to M.L., plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
- that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts:
- Dismisses the remainder of the claims for just satisfaction.
Done in French, and notified in writing on 24 April 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Victor Soloveytchik María Elósegui
Registrar President
APPENDIX – List of applications
|
No. |
Application no. |
Case name |
Lodged on |
Year of birth |
Represented by |
|
1. |
46949/21 |
L. v. France |
17/09/2021 |
1995 |
Emmanuel Daoud |
|
2. |
24989/22 |
H.B. v. France |
12/05/2022 |
2005 |
Manuela de Ravel d’Esclapon |
|
3. |
39759/22 |
M.L. v. France |
06/08/2022 |
1991 |
Anaë Perez-Ainciart |
[1] According to the Larousse dictionary, the dated French term gent (from Latin gentem, accusative of gens, -entis, race) is now used only for literary effect or, jocularly, in the expression la gent féminine (= the “race” of women).
[2] “L’essentiel sur la proposition de loi visant à protéger les jeunes mineurs des crimes sexuels”, meeting of the Senate Law Committee of 13 January 2021, https://www.senat.fr/lessentiel/ppl20-158_1.pdf, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[3] https://www.vie-publique.fr/rapport/277610-evaluation-de-la-loi-la-lutte-contre-les-violences-sexuelles-sexistes, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[4] Information report no. 721, 15th Legislature, National Assembly, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/rapports/ega/l15b0721_rapport-information, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[5] Delegation on Women’s Rights: report on the week of 29 January 2024, https://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20240129/ddf_01_02_2024.html, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[6] Information report no. 792, 17th Legislature, National Assembly, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/rapports/ega/l17b0792_rapport-information, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[7] “Un texte déposé au Sénat pour définir l’absence de consentement comme l’élément constitutif du viol”, Public Sénat, https://www.publicsenat.fr/actualites/societe/un-texte-depose-au-senat-pour-definir-labsence-de-consentement-comme-lelement-constitutif-du-viol, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[8] Bill no. 2170, 16th Legislature, National Assembly, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/16/textes/l16b2170_proposition-loi, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[9] Bill no. 842, 17th Legislature, National Assembly, https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/17/textes/l17b0842_proposition-loi, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[10] “Avis sur une proposition de loi visant à modifier la définition pénale du viol et des agressions sexuelles”, Conseil d’État, https://www.conseil-etat.fr/avis-consultatifs/derniers-avis-rendus/a-l-assemblee-nationale-et-au-senat/avis-sur-une-proposition-de-loi-visant-a-modifier-la-definition-penale-du-viol-et-des-agressions-sexuelles#:~:text=La proposition de loi fait,femmes de l’Assemblée nationale., last accessed 14 March 2025.
[11] https://docs.un.org/CEDAW/C/FRA/CO/9, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[12] “EU accession to the Istanbul Convention”, EUR-Lex, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/eu-accession-to-the-istanbul-convention.html, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[13] “Combating violence against women and domestic violence”, Think Tank, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2023)739392; Directive (EU) 2024/1385 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, EUR-Lex, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1385/oj/eng; both last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[14] “Consentement et définition pénale du viol – Actes du colloque du 21 novembre 2024”, Senate, https://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2024/r24-193-notice.html, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
[15] The Court notes that the Swiss legislation was amended on 1 April 2024.
[16] “Definitions of rape in the legislation of EU Member States”, Think Tank, European Parliament, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_IDA(2024)757618, last accessed on 14 March 2025.
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