Administrative United Kingdom
RW v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: HU/00811/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
| Heard at Taylor House |
| On 13 October 2026 |
Before
JUDGE OF THE FIRST TIER TRIBUNAL MULREADY
Between
RW
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Fripp, counsel instructed by Duncan Lewis & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms K. Deering, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a 57 year old national of St. Lucia. He came to the UK as a visitor in 2003, and was granted indefinite leave to remain here in 2018.
2. On 21 August 2024 he was convicted of assault on a person (his former partner and the mother of three of his ten children) thereby occasioning actual bodily harm, making threats to kill, and intentional strangulation. He was acquitted of her attempted murder.
3. On 5 December 2024 he was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for threats to kill, 4 years to be served concurrently for intentional strangulation, and 4 years concurrent for the assault. He was ordered to pay a victim surcharge of £228 and made the subject of a Restraining Order.
4. On 15 January 2025 he was notified of the Respondent’s decision to make a Deportation Order against him. The Appellant made a human rights claim in response and on 7 May 2025 was informed of the Respondent’s decision refusing that claim. It is against that decision he now brings this appeal.
Background
5. It is not in dispute that the Appellant’s childhood was extremely difficult. He was conceived during the rape of his mother, by her stepfather. His mother left her home while pregnant because her own mother refused to accept that the Appellant’s mother had been raped by her partner, the stepfather of the Appellant’s mother. The Appellant’s mother went initially to her father’s house and then moved around with the Appellant and four other children born to her over time. The Appellant’s mother appeared to blame him as a child for her having been raped by his father, her stepfather.
6. When he was nine years old the Appellant ran away from the home of his mother and her then partner due to continued abuse. He suffered violence and sexual abuse at the hands of different people and was forced to work unpaid as a child rather than attend school. By age 15 he was street homeless. For a while around the age of 18 or 19 he lived with a grandfather. He was subjected to rape repeatedly by a number of different men.
7. In 2003 he met a woman living in the UK and travelled here to live with her. By the time of his departure from St Lucia he had two children who lived with their mothers in St Lucia. Having been deprived of basic education he was also illiterate. (To his credit he has started to learn to read and write in prison, though on his own evidence this is still at a very early stage and he remains unable to deal with correspondence without assistance from others.)
8. The relationship with his partner in the UK ended after approximately 4 years. In 2008 he met his most recent ex-partner. As the Appellant was illiterate his then partner took care of his income and financial decisions and administration. He did physical work and provided financially for them. They had three children.
9. In 2023 or 2024 his partner told the Appellant she wanted to end their relationship. He threatened to drink drain cleaner, damage her car and kill himself. She called the police and he was arrested. A Restraining Order was issued against him and he left the home.
10. Later his former partner fell ill with COVID-19, had to have surgery, and in January 2024 agreed to resume contact with the Appellant so that he could help with the children. On 4 March 2024, she asked him to collect one of the children from school, notwithstanding the Restraining Order which was still in force. The Appellant did so, and after arriving to the family home with the child, he assaulted his former partner there. He was arrested and charged with assault on a person thereby occasioning actual bodily harm, making threats to kill, intentional strangulation, and attempted murder.
Hearing
Vulnerable Witness Direction
11. I granted an unopposed application for the Appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness within the meaning of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010. This was on the basis of the unchallenged medical evidence of consultant forensic psychiatrist Dr Michael Shortt that the Appellant suffers with complex post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Dr Shortt’s view was that the Appellant’s welfare would be prejudiced were he required to provide evidence in court. The Appellant was not required by the Tribunal to give oral evidence, but did so voluntarily.
12. During cross-examination, Mr Fripp requested the questions be put to the Appellant more slowly than had been the case. Ms Deering responded appropriately, giving the Appellant sufficient time to respond to each question.
13. The Appellant was visibly upset at times during the hearing, and I made clear to him a number of times that we could stop and take a break whenever he wanted to. Mr Fripp did not raise any concerns for the Appellant’s welfare, and I am satisfied he was able to give oral evidence and was treated fairly and sensitively while he did so.
Evidence and Argument
14. The representatives agreed the following complete list of written evidence and argument before the Tribunal in this appeal:
a. Appellant’s bundle, 261 pages
b. Appellant’s skeleton argument, 28 September 2026, 22 pages
c. Respondent’s bundle, 61 pages
d. Police National Computer record printed on 14 October 2025, 6 pages
15. I have had regard to those documents; to the oral evidence of the Appellant and his daughter; and to the oral arguments of both representatives, whether or not I refer to them specifically in this Decision.
Issues in Dispute
16. The representatives agreed with me the following sole issue in dispute between the parties:
a. whether there are very compelling circumstances in this appeal, over and above those described in exceptions 1 and 2 in section 117C(4) and (5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, such that maintaining the Respondent’s decision would result in a disproportionate interference with rights protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”).
Exceptions 1 and 2
17. In order to establish whether the Appellant meets the “very compelling circumstances” threshold it is first necessary to consider his circumstances as regards exceptions 1 and 2 in section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
18. There is no suggestion the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child. He therefore cannot meet exception 2 in section 117C(5).
19. The Appellant has not been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, and so cannot meet exception 1 in section 117C(4).
20. It is relevant nonetheless to the “very compelling circumstances” threshold, to consider the disputed second and third limbs of exception 1, namely whether the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, and whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in St Lucia.
Social and Cultural Integration in the UK
21. The Respondent’s position is that any social and cultural integration in the UK has been broken by the Appellant’s criminal offences, and that there is no evidence before the Tribunal to establish he has made a positive contribution to the UK. The Respondent accepts the Appellant has worked in the UK, as set out in the evidence of his former employer, but argues there is no other evidence of his volunteering or having any other social ties here. The evidence as to his family is the witness statement and oral evidence of one of his children, and there is an Order of the Family Court prohibiting contact with three of his children.
22. The Appellant’s position is that he is integrated here, and despite his extremely traumatic early life in St Lucia, he maintained a relationship here for many years, has three children here, and has worked in a position of trust for his employer, and maintained good character in criminal law terms until the index offences, which were committed after many years here.
23. I remind myself as per CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 that I should not automatically consider that integrative links have been broken because of the offending behaviour irrespective of its nature, and that as per SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15, I must assess the Appellant’s individual circumstances.
24. The Appellant did not attend school in the UK, having arrived when he was 33 years old. I accept he has worked here as described in his evidence and that of his former employer and his former manager. I accept his former employer trusts him to such a degree that he is content for the Appellant to work in the employer’s own home, and has offered to assist the Appellant in securing accommodation and work on release from prison, which is a considerable vote of confidence in the Appellant.
25. I accept the Appellant has financially provided for some members of his family, and that he assisted his daughter and her minor child by using his professional skills to decorate their flat. His only extant family connections in the UK are with his daughter and her minor child. I accept his and his daughter’s evidence that prior to his incarceration they saw each other daily and whilst he has been in prison they have spoken on the telephone regularly.
26. There are three “supporting letters” in the Appellant’s bundle: from his ex-wife who now lives in New York, from his former work manager, and from the ministry leader at the church he claims to attend. None were the subject of any challenge from the Respondent. All three give positive opinions of the Appellant’s character, and in the case of the latter two, demonstrate the Appellant has some employment and religious links in the UK.
27. The Appellant has been in the UK since 2003, meaning he lived here for 20 years before he was convicted of any criminal offence. However, his offences were serious, as reflected by the length of prison sentence, and will have caused considerable and enduring fear as well as injury to a mother in her family home, with her children present.
28. The Appellant’s illiteracy will have hindered his ability to integrate. I do not count that against him because it is a consequence of his being abused and neglected as a child.
29. I have taken due account of the nature and seriousness of his offences, and the prohibition on his contacting some of his family members. I have taken due account also of his 20 years living here before being convicted of any offences, his stable employment here, the positive impression he made on two former employers / managers, his involvement in the church here, and his daily contact with his daughter and grandchild prior to his incarceration. In those circumstances notwithstanding the offences and the considerable custodial sentence, I am satisfied the Appellant has established he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.
Very Significant Obstacles to Integration in St Lucia
30. The Respondent’s position is that there would not be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in St Lucia, including because he has family members there, has visited as recently as 2023, and has professional skills which would assist him to secure employment there.
31. The Appellant’s position is that there would be such obstacles because of his traumatic past there, his mental state, and his wider vulnerability, and because he is no longer in contact with family members in St Lucia.
32. The Appellant’s evidence was that he has ten children in total, with three of them resident in St Lucia. His evidence was that his mother and two sisters live there also.
33. The Appellant’s evidence was that he took his three children in the UK to see his mother in St Lucia, at some point before 2023. He said that when he was there he saw his mother and his two sisters, but there was an incident and they had to leave. He said he last had contact with his three children in St Lucia when he went there, however he also said that one of his daughters in St Lucia is currently pregnant with twins, from which I infer there is at least some indirect contact ongoing between them; and Dr Shortt’s report records the Appellant telling him that he “has a very good relationship with all his children except the eldest.”
34. The Appellant said in oral evidence that if he returned to St Lucia he could contact his family, but his family never accepts him, and so if he went back he would have to go and live on the streets like he did when he was nine years old.
35. The Respondent argued that the Appellant’s GP records give more of an overall picture of the Appellant’s health than the report of Dr Shortt, conducted on 22 February 2026 over a period of time which has not been specified in the report. I am not persuaded that argument diminishes the weight that can be put on Dr Shortt’s report. His report makes clear he has understood his obligations to the Tribunal. There is no challenge to his qualifications, and as a consultant forensic psychiatrist he is clearly appropriately qualified to give medical evidence about this Appellant’s mental health symptoms and diagnoses. Dr Shortt has provided comprehensive reasoning in support of all of his conclusions and has been clear about his methodology and the information available to him in writing his report.
36. I accept the Appellant has the mental health difficulties identified in the evidence of Dr Shortt and that these would be a challenge for him in re-establishing himself in St Lucia. I accept Dr Shortt’s evidence that any deterioration in the Appellant’s PTSD will lead to worsening of his low mood and an increasing of the risk of his experiencing suicidal thoughts and acting upon them. However, the Appellant is now receiving the recommended treatment, and it was not argued before me that that treatment would not continue to be available to him in St Lucia.
37. I accept also Dr Shortt’s evidence that the Appellant’s prognosis if he is returned to St Lucia without any support from family and friends is poor. However, for the reasons set out in this Decision, I am not satisfied he would be without that support on return.
38. The Appellant’s evidence was that he was not sure he would be able to get work in the construction industry in St Lucia, and that people there would call you all sorts of names and he would get bullied because he cannot read or write. I accept that illiteracy would be something of a challenge for him in securing work and navigating any relevant bureaucracies without assistance. However he did manage to secure employment for himself in St Lucia previously, in arguably far more vulnerable circumstances than those in which he finds himself now, having now received mental health diagnoses, relevant treatment, and education assisting him towards literacy.
39. I accept the Appellant’s evidence that he and his brother previously worked in construction in St Lucia. The Appellant has further relevant work experience in the UK, including to the high standard as described in the evidence from the prison. I am satisfied this will assist him in securing work there.
40. I have taken account of his age, and the argument made on his behalf that at 57 many people are looking towards their pension, and not at further job opportunities. However, the Appellant is continuing to work, to a high standard, in prison, and was working renovating his daughter’s flat before then. There is nothing before me to establish he would not by reason of his age be able to resume that work after release from prison, whether in the UK or St Lucia.
41. The Appellant has clearly maintained social and cultural familiarity with St Lucia, through visits and through some contact with some family members there over the years. He was sufficiently confident about visiting that he took his three young children there with him, to stay in a rented guest house, and visited again with his church, most recently in 2023.
42. I am satisfied he retains some family links there, through some combination of his mother, sisters, and/or children, and that he could resume contact with them on return if he has not retained contact with them in recent years. I am satisfied that even without family relationships there, the Appellant has sufficient familiarity with St Lucia, and has sufficient transferable professional skills, to assist him in finding a home and a job there. There is no question of a language barrier.
43. Having considered the evidence in the round, including of his relatively recent visits there, his ability to rent accommodation there, his ability to work there previously and his since then improved professional skills, I am not satisfied he would be unable to establish himself there within a reasonable period of time. I am therefore not satisfied he would face in St Lucia very significant obstacles to his integration, as defined in Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813.
Very Compelling Circumstances
Legal Framework
44. In order to succeed on this issue, the Appellant must establish there are circumstances here which are “over and above” those described in exceptions 1 and 2 in section 117C of the 2002 Act, which are as follows:
(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
45. I remind myself of the correct approach to the unduly harsh threshold contained in exception 2, confirmed as authoritative by the Supreme Court in KO(Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53, and again in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, namely the direction in the Upper Tribunal case of MK (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] INLR 563 that: “… ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
46. I must consider whether the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation, based on the need to protect the public from further offending, and on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern, is outweighed by private and/or family life factors in his favour.
47. As set out in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, when considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above exceptions 1 and 2 in section 117C, all the relevant circumstances of the case must be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. Relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, summarised the relevant factors. I will consider each of those factors in turn, along with others I consider to be relevant in this case.
Length of Residence in the UK
48. The Appellant has lived in the UK for 23 years.
Nationalities
49. The Appellant is a national of St Lucia. The daughter who gave evidence is British. I have conducted this assessment on the basis her daughter is also British.
Family Life
50. The Appellant does not have a family life here with a partner, nor a subsisting parental relationship with any qualifying child. He is in contact with one of his adult children in the UK and I accept his and her evidence that their relationship is close, and contact between them is frequent, and that this applies also to his grandchild. The Appellant is prohibited from contacting his other children here. While I accept he hopes to improve himself and earn contact and forgiveness, it was not argued for the Appellant that he has a family life here with any of his relatives such as would attract the protection of Article 8, and I am not persuaded that he does.
Best Interests of the Child
51. I have taken account of the best interests of the Appellant’s grandchild, with whom he had regular contact before his incarceration. There is nothing before me to suggest her living circumstances would be impacted by his deportation – she will continue to live in the UK with her mother.
52. The Appellant’s daughter’s evidence was that the effect on her child of the Appellant’s deportation would be deep and long-lasting. I accept she will experience some distress if the Appellant is deported. However I note the Appellant’s daughter has been to St Lucia herself for holidays, and that her mother is St Lucian. I am satisfied that contact could be maintained by telephone, as it has been during the Appellant’s prison sentence, and by further visits by the Appellant’s daughter and grandchild to him in St Lucia.
53. I have taken account of the best interests of the Appellant’s minor children. Consistent with the extant prohibition on his contacting them, I consider his deportation to be of neutral impact on them, as whether he is in the UK or in St Lucia, he will not be in contact with them at all.
Social, Cultural and Family Ties
54. He has the social, cultural and family ties in the UK and St Lucia that I identify above in the analysis as to exception 1.
Financial Independence and English Language
55. The Appellant is not currently financially independent, but I accept that were he released from prison he would have paid work. He previously earned approximately £1900 per month, and I am satisfied he would be able to earn a similar amount on release from prison, sufficient to support himself without recourse to public funds. The Appellant speaks fluent English. These are both neutral factors in this assessment.
Nature and Seriousness of the Offences
56. The Appellant’s offences are described as follows in the Sentencing Remarks:
“On the 4 March 2024, you collected D2 from school and then remained at [ex-partner’s] address. At about 6.30 that evening, [she] returned from visiting her neighbours. D2 and D3 were upstairs with their headphones on, playing computer games. You were alone with [ex-partner] downstairs. You sat down at the kitchen table and demanded that [she] sit down as you wanted to talk.
She noticed your demeanour had changed and tried to busy herself in the kitchen. She told you there was nothing to talk about, it was just going around in circles. She asked you to leave. You asked her about a man who had been sending her flowers. You asked her whether she had told him that she had herpes and she responded with a casual, ‘Yeah’.
With that, you got up from the chair, approached her as she was by the sink and grabbed her phone from her pocket. You said, ‘Call the fucking police because I’m going to kill you’. And with that, you put your hands around her neck, pushed her back, and started strangling her.
You forced her to the floor, lunged on top of her and continued to strangle her. You kept repeating, ‘I’m going to fucking kill you’. [She] struggled and tried to fight you off. She managed to scream for her sons and her neighbour. D2 heard her cries for help, took his headphones off and rushed downstairs, followed by his younger brother. D2 saw his mother lying on the floor, with you crouched over her strangling her. He tried to pull you off. He managed to grab one of your hands and pull it away from his mother’s neck. You gave him a little push, you put your boots on and left the house. [Ex-partner] told D2 to go next door with the intention of getting help. D3 came and sat by his mother to see if she was okay. He was crying. She was in shock and trying to recover her breath.
[She] called 999. The aftermath was captured on the body worn video cameras of the officers who attended the scene. [Ex-partner] thought she had altered consciousness for about 20 seconds whilst being strangled. She had pain when breathing in. She had a frontal headache, felt dizzy, mild hoarse voice, and an episode of non-bloody vomit. She had pain to her left chest. And on examination at the hospital, she was found to have suffered a comminuted fracture of her left elbow joint, most likely caused when you forced her to the floor. Her abdomen and chin were tender. She had scratch marks and bruising to the front of her neck.
57. The impact of the offences was described as follows in the Sentencing Remarks:
“I turn to the impact. You have left [ex-partner] and your sons with mental and emotional trauma, beyond what any child or adult should go through. Both D2 and D3 gave evidence at trial. D2 told police that when he came downstairs, he felt sad because he did not want his mum to die. D3 said that he was scared, sad and traumatised. This incident has affected the child’s education. They remain fearful. D1 says you have destroyed his life; he feels guilty because he was not there to protect his mother and younger brothers. He wants nothing more to do with you.
[Ex-partner] underwent surgery to insert metal rods and mesh into her fractured, amputated arm. She has lost some of the range of movement and it may never be fully restored. She is no longer able to use that arm and as a result of this incident she suffers from anxiety, flashbacks and panic attacks. She has become withdrawn and isolated. She has been diagnosed with PTSD.”
58. The Appellant’s offences were described as follows in the OASys report of 22 April 2025:
“..the victim sustained a broken elbow as well as marking to her throat as a result of the strangulation. The victim was strangled by [the Appellant] whilst he told her that he was going to kill her. One can only imagine the level of fear that the victim must have felt, particularly when as stated on the CPS documentation, 'her airways started to close and her eyes rolled back' This is likely to have a significant impact upon her psychologically, particularly when reflecting upon how events could have been even worse if her children had not intervened. One should also not forget the level of trauma experienced by the children who witnessed their father strangling their mother.”
59. It was highlighted for the Appellant that the sentence, at five years, was just above the threshold of four years at which the heightened “very compelling circumstances” test became applicable. I have taken that into account.
60. It was argued for the Appellant that consideration of the nature and seriousness of the offences must include recognition of the Appellant’s own traumatic past and likely undiagnosed mental illness, notwithstanding which he maintained good character prior to conviction. Dr Shortt’s evidence is that the Appellant’s experience of complex PTSD due to the traumatic experiences in St Lucia and the UK should be considered to have contributed to his previous offending behaviours possibly in terms of excessive emotional arousal and poor interpersonal skills. I have taken that into account also.
61. The offences were, clearly, serious. They are in my view grotesque offences, of serious domestic violence, committed in a sustained attack, in the presence of children, against a woman in poor health, with a physical disability. They were committed in the context of the Appellant’s previously coercive behaviour towards the mother of his children, behaviour sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of a Restraining Order.
Conduct
62. The offences were committed in March 2024. There is no evidence before me that the Appellant has committed any criminal offences since then. The Appellant has been in prison since the date of his conviction and there is no evidence he has been the subject of any disciplinary matters whilst there.
63. I accept the evidence of the head of education, skills and work at HMP Maidstone that the Appellant has a strong work ethic and positive attitude. I accept also that he is part of a renovation team in the prison which prison staff note has made an “outstanding contribution” there. I accept the Appellant has been given a position of trust in the prison, as a worker permitted to access the tools required to renovate offices, cells and kitchens there. I accept this means he is considered by prison staff to have behaved well and to be at low risk of committing violence in prison. This is consistent with the OASys report which puts his risks to others in prison as low, but his risks to known adults outside of prison as high.
64. The Appellant has successfully completed a number of courses in prison, including literacy courses, a bible course, a course addressing emotional coping skills, and learning addressing victim awareness, self-awareness, and emotional management. The Appellant’s evidence, which I accept, is that with the benefit of these courses he was coming to understand himself better and had been able to use his learning to walk away from arguments in prison.
65. I accept the Appellant has also successfully accessed treatment for his mental health difficulties.
Risk of Re-Offending
66. The Sentencing Remarks record that the Appellant was arrested and taken to the police station, at which he produced a prepared statement claiming he and his ex-partner “had accidentally fallen over. You denied strangling, assaulting her and threatening her. You made no comment to all questions. You gave the same account to the jury, and more recently to the author of the presentence report.”
67. The OASys report provides the following as the Appellant’s version of events, given to the author of the report:
“[The Appellant] recounted taking the victims phone out of her back pocket as a joke. She was upset and asked for it back, as he was doing this he was walking backwards and she was coming towards him. It was at this point that she allegedly tripped and fell on top of him. He went on to say that as she was shouting he put his hand over her mouth, however accepted that his hand may have moved near to her neck, but this was accidental and not an attempt to strangle her. He denied making the threats to kill, and stated that his ex-wife had blatantly lied about this. In relation to the broken elbow he stated that this must have occurred when she fell on top of him.”
68. The OASys report author gives the following view:
“I gained the impression from interview that [the Appellant] was highly controlling and would have been unable to accept the ending of a relationship unless it was on his terms. He admitted to making threats to kill himself which would appear to have had little substance to it and was primarily used as a means of exerting control over his wife. [The Appellant] exhibited quite entrenched controlling attitudes and distinct elements of minimisation throughout interview. He maintained throughout interview that had not committed the offences for which he was convicted and that that whilst the victim did sustain injuries these were due to her accidentally falling on him as opposed to anything that he had done to facilitate this. He wholly denied strangling the victim, stating that he had tried to put his hand over her mouth to stop her screaming, which in itself would constitute abusive behaviour.
Ultimately he takes no responsibility for his actions and as such will continue to pose a risk to those females with whom he forms relationships. [The Appellant] exhibited a very male-centric attitude to his relationship with the victim, whereby he tended to portray himself in essence as the perfect husband/father whereas he portrayed the victim as unreasonable and fickle. In reality this offence appears to have been triggered by his residual anger at having no control over the relationship and possibly a degree of jealousy, hence him taking the victim’s phone.”
69. The report records the likelihood of serious reoffending within two years as 0.14%, the risk posed by the Appellant to children in the community as medium, to the public as high, and to known adults as high. The report records more than once that the Appellant is not at all motivated to address his offending behaviour, and identifies his misogynistic and derogatory attitudes to women.
70. In the Appellant’s witness statement of 28 September 2026 he described the circumstances of the offences as follows:
“I was helping my ex-wife in the kitchen. We were laughing and joking with each other when I saw her phone buzzing. I have never picked up her phone or checked it but that day as a joke I pulled it from her back pocket. She got very panicked and tried to snatch her phone so I playfully started getting it out of her reach. She started to get mad and I noticed that it was a man calling her. We somehow got into an altercation, which I don’t entirely remember how things escalated and what happened and how it how as everything happened so suddenly.
The altercation left my ex-wife with serious injuries and requiring an amputation[1] of her arm and reconstruction surgery. I believe that the incident did not happen entirely how she describes it but in either case, I feel extremely regretful for what happened and wish I could turn back time and avoid the whole situation so that she would not sustain any of the injuries.”
71. In oral evidence the Appellant said he did not agree with the OASys report author that he was in denial about his offences. His evidence was that there were things that were said that were not true, and he was just trying to explain himself to the report author. He said he was playing and took her phone. He said he did not say exactly that it was an accident, but he took her phone, and that is how it happened. He was asked if he accepted responsibility for the offences, and his answer was “yes I accept it.”
72. It is said in the Appellant’s skeleton argument that he accepts the offences were serious, and that he has made significant changes in his life since the offending behaviour. I am not persuaded he genuinely does accept the seriousness, because every time he has addressed the incident in which the offences took place– in the police station after arrest, in his evidence at trial, in his not-guilty plea, in his discussions with the OASys report author, in his witness statement, and in his oral evidence – he has wholly failed to demonstrate that he appreciates the gravity of the harm he caused, nor that it is entirely his fault, and not in any way the fault of his victim.
73. I am also not persuaded that any changes he has made in his life have generated a meaningful reduction in the risk he poses to known adults. More than two years after the offences, having been imprisoned for them, given appropriate treatment for the mental health difficulties including those which are said by Dr Shortt to have contributed to the offending behaviour, and having undertaken various courses in prison with the aim of reducing reoffending risk, the Appellant is still offering an account of these offences that includes the word “playing.” Nowhere in his evidence does he show any real empathy for his victim, or for the children who witnessed his violent assault on their mother. This is not the behaviour of a person who has accepted responsibility for his offences, and this is a worrying aspect of the evidence before me when considering his risk of reoffending.
Conclusion
74. The Appellant’s offending was serious, and the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation is very significant as a result, including as regards all elements of the public interest identified in HA (Iraq).
75. I have taken full account of the nature and seriousness of the offences as described in the sentencing remarks and the OASys report, and as made clear by the significant length of custodial sentence. I have taken full account also of the Appellant’s history of trauma, domestic violence as a child, sexual abuse as a child, neglect as a child, the challenges of illiteracy both in St Lucia and the UK, the challenges of his considerable mental health difficulties and the role played by all of this in his offending. I have considered the difficulties he would face on return to St Lucia, and the hardship of returning to live in the country in which his indisputably terrible childhood took place. I have considered also the admirable steps the Appellant has taken in prison to learn to read and write, and to address the underlying emotional and mental health difficulties which Dr Shortt’s evidence makes clear played a significant role in the reasons for his offending.
76. Having done so, and considered cumulatively both the factors against the Appellant and the factors in his favour, I am not satisfied to the required standard that there are sufficient factors in the Appellant’s favour to outweigh the public interest in his deportation, and justify a conclusion there are very compelling circumstances here over and above those in exceptions 1 and 2. On that basis the appeal is dismissed.
Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant, his ex-partners, his children, and his grandchildren, are granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent: Fee award
I do not make a fee award because I have dismissed the appeal.
Signed
M. Mulready
Judge Mulready
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
15 October 2026
Notes
[1] 1. Having considered the evidence as a whole, I have concluded there is a factual error in this part of the Appellant’s witness statement. His victim’s injuries did not require amputation of her arm. This had taken place before the incident.
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