Tax United Kingdom
Andrius Kazlauskas v The Commissioners for HMRC
Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01476 (TC)
Case Number: TC10064
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Determined on the papers
Appeal reference: TC/2024/04703
Procedure – Application for permission to make late appeal –Martland criteria considered and applied – Application dismissed
Determined on the Papers
Judgment date: 23 October 2026
Before
TRIBUNAL JUDGE BROOKS
Between
ANDRIUS KAZLAUSKAS
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
Determined on the Papers without a hearing
DECISION
Introduction
1. The Appellant, Mr Andrius Kazlauskas, applies for permission to bring a late appeal against an assessment to excise duty in the sum of £16,588 and an excise penalty in the sum of £6,386 issued by the Respondents (“HMRC”) under s 12(1A) Finance Act 1994 and schedule 41 to the Finance Act 2008 respectively (the “Application”). HMRC oppose the Application.
2. Unfortunately, timely consideration of the Application has been hindered as a result of the administrative failures described below, for which I can only offer the Tribunal’s sincere apology.
Background
3. The following summary of the background facts, which is taken from the documents provided, is to put the Application and my decision in context. Nothing below should be taken as a finding of fact for the purposes of any substantive appeal.
4. On 18 April 2018, Mr Kazlauskas came into the UK at the port of Dover. He was stopped by UK Border Force officers who found, and seized, 75kg of hand-rolling tobacco in his vehicle.
5. On 2 November 2018, HMRC wrote to Mr Kazlauskas to issue him with an assessment to excise duty of £16,588 and a penalty of £6,386. In response, in an email of 9 April 2019 to HMRC, Mr Kazlauskas explained that he had acted on the suggestion of a Polish driver that he “transit” 75kg of tobacco for €300 and that he had agreed to do so as he wanted to earn “easy money” and did not realise it was prohibited.
6. The deadline for Mr Kazlauskas to appeal to the Tribunal against the excise duty or the penalty was 30 days from the date of the assessment and penalty, ie 2 December 2018. However, it was not until 31 August 2024 that the Tribunal received documents from Mr Kazlauskas who had used the wrong form to bring an appeal (he had in fact used the form to close and enquiry rather than notify the Tribunal of an appeal against a decision of HMRC).
7. Notwithstanding the wrong form having been used, on 2 December 2024 the Tribunal registered an appeal from Mr Kazlauskas against the assessment to excise duty and penalty. That appeal was five years and nine months late.
8. Mr Kazlauskas had neither paid the excise duty nor made a “Hardship Application”, ie an application to HMRC for his appeal against the excise assessment to proceed without payment of the excise duty, in relation to the excise assessment.
9. On 14 April 2025, the Tribunal emailed Mr Kazlauskas to notify him that he had to pay the excise duty to HMRC or ask HMRC to agree that payment was not necessary before the appeal. Mr Kazlauskas was also informed that, if he did not pay or make a Hardship Application to HMRC, then his appeal against the excise duty assessment could not continue. He could, however, still pursue the appeal against the penalty.
10. Mr Kazlauskas responded to the Tribunal by email of 16 April 2025, however, by mistake, he did not copy this email to HMRC. On 18 April 2025, Mr Kazlauskas sent two more emails to the Tribunal which were not copied to HMRC. A further email from Mr Kazlauskas of 25 April 2025 to the Tribunal was also not copied to HMRC.
11. On 13 May 2025, the Tribunal paused the appeal to enable HMRC to consider Mr Kazlauskas’s email of 16 April 2025 (which the Tribunal considered to be a Hardship Application). However, on 4 August 2025, HMRC stated that they had not received an application, a copy of which, should have been but was not sent to HMRC by the Tribunal.
12. On 31 July 2025, Mr Kazlauskas sent the Tribunal another copy of his 25 April 2025 email. On 4 September 2025, Mr Kazlauskas sent another email to the Tribunal which was not added to its file.
13. On 21 November 2025, the Tribunal issued an Unless order to Mr Kazlauskas under which he was required to send his Hardship Application to HMRC by 28 November 2025, failing which his appeal against the excise assessment would be struck out.
14. On 26 November 2025 and again on 27 November 2025, Mr Kazlauskas emailed the Tribunal but these emails were not added to the Tribunal file. As a result, on 2 January 2026, Judge Blackwell, who was not aware of these emails, instructed that the appeal should be struck out. Additionally, Judge Blackwell was not made aware that Mr Kazlauskas had appealed against an excise duty assessment and a penalty, and there was no reason at all for the penalty part of the appeal to be struck out. Judge Blackwell’s instructions were carried out on 2 January 2026 and the appeal was struck out.
15. Having noted that Mr Kazlauskas emailed the Tribunal twice on 2 January 2026 to explain that his earlier emails had been lost, and that his emails of 26 and 27 November 2025 satisfied the unless order, on 26 January 2026, Judge Bailey directed that it was appropriate to reinstate the appeal in its entirety and directed accordingly.
16. However, as the appeal was late (see paragraph 7, above) it was necessary to consider whether it should be admitted out of time. Directions were issued under which Mr Kazlauskas was required to explain why he did not appeal against the excise assessment and penalty until August 2024.
17. In an email of 4 February 2026 to HMRC, Mr Kazlauskas explained that he was unfamiliar with UK legislation and did not have the means to obtain legal representation. He also requested that the excise duty be cancelled as the goods had been confiscated and that he did not understand why he was liable to excise duty as he no longer possessed the goods. Mr Kazlauskas accepted the penalty although stated that he was unaware that transporting the tobacco was prohibited. He also explained that he had a young son and that he supported his 71 year-old mother and because, as he was in low-paid employment, he was unable to pay the amounts due.
18. On 20 February 2026, Mr Kazlauskas’s Hardship Application was granted.
19. On 29 May 2026, Mr Kazlauskas notified the Tribunal by email that, because he lived in Lithuania and did not have the funds to travel to the UK, he was unable to attend an in-person hearing. He also explained that he had provided everything on which he intended to rely. Having referred the matter to Judge Bailey, the Tribunal responded, by letter of 26 July 2026:
“Judge Bailey has decided that, because Mr Kazlauskas cannot attend a hearing in the UK and because the Tribunal cannot list a video hearing, the hearing of Mr Kazlaukas’s application to make a late appeal will be decided as a paper hearing. That means that neither party will attend the hearing.
If either party would like to make any further written submissions, they have 14 days to do so. The application will then be referred to a judge to decide.”
20. Neither party made any further written submissions and the application was referred to me on 15 October 2026.
Law
21. Guidance on the approach to be adopted and legal principles to be applied when exercising a judicial discretion whether to admit a late appeal were given by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Martlandv HMRC [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) ("Martland") at [44] – [47]. In Martland the Upper Tribunal emphasised that in exercising its judicial discretion the starting point for the Tribunal was that permission should not be granted for a late appeal unless it was satisfied on balance that it should be and that in considering that question, the Tribunal can usefully follow the three-stage process (as set out in Denton v TH White Limited [2014] EWCA Civ 906):
(1) Establish the length of the delay;
(2) Establish the reason (or reasons) for the delay; and
(3) Evaluate ‘all the circumstances of the case’. This will involve a balancing exercise which will essentially assess the merits of the reason(s) given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.
22. The Upper Tribunal in Martland stated, at [45], that the balancing exercise should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected. This approach has recently been confirmed as correct by the Court of Appeal in HMRC v Medpro Healthcare Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 14. It was also noted by the Upper Tribunal, at [46], that the Tribunal could have regard to “any obvious strength or weakness of the applicant’s case” but that this should not descend into a “detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.”
Discussion and Conclusion
23. It is therefore necessary, in the present case, to consider whether, adopting the Martland three stage approach, Mr Kazlauskas’s appeal should be admitted out of time.
The length of the delay.
24. As noted above (at paragraph 7), the appeal was five years and nine months late. Given that a three month delay where there had been a one month time limit was described as “serious and significant” in Romasave (Property Services) Ltd v HMRC [2015] UKUT 254 (TCC), I find that this was also the case in regard to the appeal against the excise assessment and penalty in the present case.
Reason for Delay
25. The explanations for the delay given by Mr Kazlauskas were that he was unfamiliar with UK legislation and did not have the means to obtain legal representation (see paragraph 17, above).
Evaluation of “all the circumstances”
26. It is clear from Martland and Medpro that the starting point is that permission should not be granted for a late appeal unless the Tribunal is satisfied on balance that it should be, and that particular importance should be given to the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.
27. Having carefully considered all of the circumstances of the case, which includes the explanations given by Mr Kazlauskas for delay, the weakness in his underlying appeal (that he was paid to transport the tobacco which he saw as an opportunity to make “easy money” – see paragraph 5, above), and the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost as well as the need for statutory time limits to be respected, I have come to the conclusion that, on balance, given the significant and serious delay, Mr Kazlauskas should not be granted permission to proceed with his appeal out of time.
28. The Application is therefore dismissed.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
29. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date: 23rd OCTOBER 2026
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).