Administrative United Kingdom

Przemyslaw Pawel Jaicki v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: EA/01894/24

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

on 21st October, 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE jepson

Between

Przemyslaw Pawel Jaicki

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Not represented.

For the Respondent Mr.Payne, Home Office Presenting Officer.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a citizen of Poland, appeals the decision made on 4th September, 2024 to refuse their human rights claim. Such claim was lodged on 18th August, 2022 in response to a stage one deportation notice made 11th August of the same year. The stage two deportation order coincides with the date of refusal.

BACKGROUND

2. The Appellant describes entering the UK around 2005. A chronology at the start of the Respondent’s bundle describes what is referred to as EEA registration being sought and then granted in April 2007. That was granted to both the Appellant and his wife. An EUSS application was lodged, though the date of that is missed from the bundle. Such application was refused alongside the stage two deportation order.

3. A number of criminal convictions followed. All but one (driving with excess alcohol, for which a community order was imposed in January 2021,) involved the Appellant’s wife. A committal to custody for seven days took place in November of 2021, for breach of domestic violence protection order. A deportation warning was issued. Four months custody was imposed by the Magistrates Court in January 2022 for assault by beating. A further deportation warning was made. The offences for which the deportation order was made resulted in a total of sixteen months imprisonment. That was broken down into three counts of breaching a restraining order (impose from the assault conviction) and a related possession of bladed article. As will be discussed in the main body of the judgment, the Appellant was recalled twice after release.

4. The human rights application raises several issues. It is said by virtue of engagement with a charity (Wellspring,) the Appellant is integrated within the UK community. He suggests very significant obstacles to re-integration would arise on return to Poland. Length of time in this country and lack of ties are cited among other factors. Health issues are also raised. The Appellant accepts there is no continuing relationship with his wife. He does, however, speak of ongoing contact with his two children and a wish to increase that.

5. The Respondent does not accept either exception to deportation is met. Dispute arises as to whether the Appellant is integrated, if sufficient obstacles to re-integration exist. Though conceding the Appellant’s two children are under eighteen and settled in the UK, the Respondent argues there is no genuine and subsisting relationship. As such, whilst agreeing it would be unduly harsh for either child to move to Poland the Respondent argues that is not so were they to remain and the Appellant depart. Very compelling circumstances beyond the two exceptions are not accepted to arise.

6. The EUSS application was refused on the basis a deportation order had been made. It therefore stands or falls with the human rights appeal.

HEARING

7. The hearing was recorded. That shall stand as the record of proceedings.

8. The Appellant is unrepresented. His witness (Dr.Paul Cornwall – who works at the charity which has assisted the Appellant called Wellspring) said during his evidence efforts to find a solicitor had been unsuccessful. No adjournment was sought for that purpose.

9. An interpreter appeared remotely. Understanding was confirmed. The Appellant indicated he has some English, though opted to use the interpreter throughout. Evidence was heard from both him and Dr.Cornwall.

10. After closing submissions from Mr.Payne, the Appellant said he did not wish to say anything in response. He expressed the belief a decision had already been made in the proceedings. I explained that was not the case, stressing my independence from the Home Office.

11. Bearing in mind the lack of representation, I asked the Appellant whether he wished to step out of court to confer with Dr.Cornwall. Though not acting as an advocate, it is clear from the papers (as will be discussed below) Dr.Cornwall and Wellspring have provided considerable support to the Appellant. Whilst the Appellant declined to speak with Dr.Cornwall, the latter suggested it might be helpful to do so. The two then left the courtroom briefly to speak. On their return, the Appellant again said he did not wish to add anything. I am satisfied he was given sufficient opportunity to do so throughout the hearing. Judgment was reserved.

Preliminary issues

12. There was a previous substantive hearing in these proceedings (Judge McQuillan, around 4th June this year.) After judgment was reserved but before a determination was issued the Tribunal received a message via Wellspring from the Appellant. He asked when the Respondent’s evidence might be received. It seems there may have been a misunderstanding, the Appellant having suggested during the hearing he had seen the Respondent’s bundle.

13. Judge McQuillan took the view it would be unfair to continue on that basis. A fresh hearing was directed, before a different judge. The Respondent’s bundle was sent by post. The Appellant confirmed in court he had received it. I explained the position to him in relation to the previous hearing. He confirmed understanding.

14. A few hours before the hearing commenced, Mr.Payne had submitted some additional evidence[1]. That comprises UK government information about life in Poland. The intention was to show availability of, for example, health care and benefits. I refused an application to adduce such evidence. Though not a criticism of Mr.Payne (who will have been given the appeal to prepare only a day or two prior,) there was ample opportunity for the Respondent to provide further material. Particularly given the Appellant is unrepresented, it would have been unfair to allow in evidence served at the very last moment.

Issues in dispute

15. The parties agree the issues for resolution are as follows:

(i) If either exception to deportation is met.

(ii) If very compelling circumstances arise beyond the two exceptions.

The Crown Court sentence – 3rd June, 2022 Leeds Crown Court

16. Though not something which makes a significant difference, the transcript of sentencing remarks refers to both His Honour Judge Bayliss and His Honour Judge Clarke as passing sentence.

17. The Judge noted the first breach of restraining order occurred within a few days of release from custody for the earlier assault. Texts were sent, threatening to attend the home of the Appellant’s wife (the victim) and kill her. Thiry-six calls followed over a few hours along with Facebook messages. They were abusive. The Appellant then went to the victim’s home the next day. He had a knife, which the police found on arrest. The victim in her statement expressed a fear she would be killed. He was aggressive towards officers when they attended. Guilty pleas were entered, though the stage at which that took place is not clear.

18. Applying the sentencing guidelines for breach of restraining order, the Judge placed things in category A1. That was based on persistent breaches of the order and very serious distress caused. The start point was two years with a range of one to four. The bladed article was put at category A culpability. No start point or range was stated in relation to that. There was no indication as to greater or lesser harm.

19. The only mitigating factors identified were credit for guilty pleas and note the Appellant was a hard-working man. That led to a total of twelve months for the breach offences and four months consecutive for the bladed article.

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

20. I am conscious the Appellant is not represented. For that reason, I will set out the relevant law. As noted at the start of the judgment, there are two exceptions to deportation per S.117C Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 –

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

Per S.117C (1) and (2) the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. The more serious the offence, the greater that interest becomes. For the Appellant’s benefit, ‘foreign criminal’ is defined as someone sentence to twelve months’ custody or more.

21. If neither exception is met, consideration must then be given per S.117C (6) to whether very compelling circumstances exist beyond those contained within the two exceptions.

22. Before applying the relevant law, I will consider the extent of public interest and balancing factors relied on by the Appellant. He provides two statements – 2nd December, 2025 and 15th July, 2026 along with a handwritten letter at page seven of the Respondent’s bundle. The Appellant confirmed in court his statements are accurate and reflect what he wished to say.

23. Starting with the letter, the Appellant refers to his sons (born July 2009 and September 2010) being born in the UK. He describes a lengthy work history, marriage and paying off a mortgage. Various jobs are listed. Criminal activity began due to the stress from the Appellant’s father passing away. One of the children fell ill. That meant the Appellant’s wife ceased work, he being the sole wage earner in the household. His wife was unfaithful, leading to alcohol abuse on the Appellant’s part. He recognises having done wrong in committing crimes, expresses worry if removed there may be no contact with the children.

24. Via the first witness statement, the Appellant says he sends £30 per month from his benefits to support his children. Removal would cause emotional and financial damage to them. Mention is made of being ‘ready to begin’ work at a Christmas tree company, though there is no suggestion that job started. At the time of the statement, the Appellant had been volunteering at Wellspring for eighteen months. Various duties are performed, including fundraising (paragraph 4.3 of the statement.) Wellspring also support the Appellant. He speaks of complying with Probation, an ankle monitor and immigration bail. The Appellant says his entire life revolves around family and friends in the UK (8.1.) No ties remain in Poland.

25. Regret is expressed for domestic violence (paragraph 7.1,) though at 7.3 the Appellant asserts the bladed article conviction was a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ He also talks of being sentenced to five years’ custody and release on the order of a judge after four months due to arrest being deemed unlawful.

26. Without engaging in cross-examination, I asked the Appellant to expand on that last point in court. Nowhere in the chronology is five years otherwise mentioned or release on the order of a judge. He explained the reference to five years was advice given by his criminal solicitors about the likely penalty for breach. Without speculating unduly, that may mean the maximum penalty for the offence. As to being let out of prison on a judge’s order, though not a central aspect the account in court was not clear. As to why the arrest was unlawful, the Appellant said there was an error. He spoke of being unable to ‘turn the clock back’ (my note of the translated reply.) The Judge had believed the Appellant’s wife was lying, following submissions from a barrister. The Appellant confirmed that took place at Leeds Crown Court in 2022.

27. I sought clarity on that, noting the sentencing remarks made no reference to such events. Though again not entirely clear, the Appellant suggested because he was released after four months (rather than the eight he expected to serve,) the Judge must have believed his wife was not telling the truth. He then appeared in court to conflate the sentence with a period of recall, to which I will turn later in this section. I make plain the possible confusion has no significant impact on my overall judgment. That said, nor is there anything within the papers before me to show any court found the Appellant’s wife was a liar or that early release was ordered.

28. The second statement (July 2026) contains similar content though expands upon it. The Appellant describes having no accommodation on release, which made finding work hard (paragraph 3.3.) His physical and mental health suffered as a result. There were financial problems, particularly amassing the funds to report as required as part of immigration bail and probation appointments (3.4.) Similar difficulty arose keeping a GPS ankle monitor charged (likely imposed as part of licence conditions – discussed again later in my judgment.) Work was offered, though not taken due to uncertainty over these proceedings (3.8.) No rehabilitation was offered by the Probation Service (7.3) but taken via Wellspring. The Appellant asserts simply being homeless does not mean someone cannot be a positive member of society (8.14.)

29. At paragraph 7.9 of the statement, the Appellant speaks of a miscarriage of justice. He was recalled for breach of licence (going to his wife’s address.) A solicitor showed the allegation was untrue, via the GPS tag showing presence elsewhere. In court, the Appellant said he was proven to be at a hotel at the time of the alleged offence. The statement suggests given his wife was shown to be a liar, the other allegations she made were not properly scrutinised (12.7.) The Appellant argues he was deemed a low-risk of serious or violent re-offending by Probation (11.5.) The latter point is not entirely correct, as I will discuss.

30. A series of emails are produced by the Appellant. They appear to be from someone at a solicitor’s firm and relate to a period of recall. One email – 22nd March, 2023 – describes a return to custody of four months and refusal of release by a parole board. From the same email, the board is said to have found the Appellant a danger despite proceedings for further breach of the restraining order (going back to the wife’s house on release) being withdrawn.

31. In court, the Appellant denied there had ever been a parole board hearing. He believed release came about through a combination of his probation officer refusing to reply to correspondence and proof being served he had not been to his wife’s home. There was also reference to a case being dropped at court. I caution myself against speculation but that may refer to a further charge for breach of the restraining order. If so, it would fit with mention in the emails provided of the Crown Prosecution withdrawing a case. I also make plain any apparent inconsistency on this topic has not been held against the Appellant. In terms of the competing factors to be assessed, whether (for example) a parole board hearing has no real relevance. What perhaps matters more is that no further charge resulted from recall.

32. In terms of family life and very compelling circumstances, the Appellant expresses continuing affection for his children. He has, however, respected their wishes and stayed away from them (10.4.) At 10.21 of the statement, the Appellant lists lengthy of time in the UK, employment history, financial contribution towards family, wanting to rebuild things with his children voluntary work and close friends in the UK. Combined, they are said to demonstrate very compelling circumstances.

33. A document titled ‘mitigating circumstances interview’ is found at page 78 of the Respondent’s bundle. It is dated 10th February, 2025. The Appellant mentions therein having stomach pain from kidney stones. Pain killers were taken for that. At the time of the interview, the Appellant had not contacted his children since a Family Court hearing two years prior. The interview suggests that was as ordered by the Court. Contrary to what is suggested in the Appellant’s two witness statements, the interview says he was not financially supporting anyone. He refers to a partner, staying with them one night per week. There has been no talk of them since, as one of two Respondent’s reviews (29th July, 2026) notes. The partner – a different person to the Appellant’s wife – receives no mention in either statement submitted. There is no statement from them. In court, the Appellant confirmed he lives alone in shared accommodation.

34. Several documents are provided relating to work history. Although employment was disputed in the refusal, the July 2026 review concedes both that and the Appellant’s voluntary work. For that reason, I need not set out the material relating to work in any detail. I accept the Appellant was employed for most of his time in this country.

35. A number of letters are presented from staff at Wellspring. In an email dated 4th August, 2026 Lily Richards (a project worker) refers to visiting the Appellant at his home address with the witness Dr.Cornwall. Also present was Melanie Dane, a nurse practitioner. Concerns had been raised about the Appellant’s mental and physical health. Both are said to have declined during the course of these proceedings. In her letter (31st July, 2026,) Ms.Dane talks of the Appellant having developed ties and support networks in the UK. There is reference to the challenge homelessness represents. The Appellant had engaged with Wellspring in addressing that, now has his own accommodation. Worry is expressed about the impact removal might have on health.

36. In his statement (13th July, 2026,) Dr.Cornwall says much the same. That continues in a document titled ‘executive summary’ attached to the statement. As with Ms.Dane, he speaks well of the Appellant’s character. During his live evidence, Dr.Cornwall described the Appellant as until recently being one of the main volunteers at Wellspring. The organisation is dependent on such people, having only a small contingent of paid staff. Despite being homeless initially, the Appellant had managed with help from Wellspring to keep his ankle monitor charged and attend required probation appointments. Dr.Cornwall concurs with the Appellant’s description of work done for Wellspring – such as fundraising. He is portrayed as having made a significant contribution.

37. From what was said in court, engagement of late has reduced. The Appellant was unwilling to leave his home. There had been problems rousing him when welfare checks took place. Dr.Cornwall raised concern there could be a return to alcohol use, though had not detected any as yet. The intention is to continue offering support to the Appellant. Several photographs are submitted. They show the Appellant involved with various activities relating to Wellspring.

38. As to health, the executive summary lists hydronephrosis, renal colic and bleeding as having been documented by a GP. No medical records are provided. The Appellant confirmed in court he is not currently prescribed medication. He sees his doctor periodically about the problems listed.

39. A series of further letters of support are presented. Most appear to be from people linked to Wellspring. I have taken each into account, though there is no need to rehearse their contents in detail here. All of the letters describe the Appellant in positive terms. One, from Rebecca Trimble at a housing organisation, notes that on being given accommodation the Appellant helped other residents and tidied the property.

40. An OASys report is included in the Respondent’s bundle, dated 10th August, 2022. By that point, the Appellant had been charged with a further breach of the restraining order (which I take to be the one that was ultimately withdrawn at court) and recalled/remanded. A number of features arise from the report which cause concern. At paragraph 2.8, note was made the Appellant minimised his offending behaviour. His view was the family home belonged to him. He wanted access to it. Mention was made of many domestic violence call-outs back to 2009 (2.2 and 6.11.) I am careful not to apply too much weight there, given a lack of detail about their nature. The Appellant had prior to recall been of no fixed abode, though staying with a friend (3.6.) Alcohol problems were reported (5.6.) The Appellant was said at the time not to consider that an issue (9.5.) A clear link between alcohol abuse and offending was nevertheless identified by the report writer.

41. The Appellant’s children had been classed as in need, there being an ongoing social services assessment (6.11.) The restraining order terms were said to prevent contact with them, except where authorised via a third party by social services or the Family Court. Nothing suggests permission was given for that per the terms of the order. The report deems the Appellant a medium risk to know adults and children (10.6.)

Findings

42. In my view, a strong public interest in removal exists. Whilst not ignored, limited weight has been placed on the excess alcohol conviction. Nothing before me suggests that involved an element of domestic violence. That said, misuse of alcohol was on the Appellant’s present-day account a factor in his offending behaviour. The driving matter could therefore be said to form part of an overall pattern. Nor can it be said prior to the convictions for domestic violence the Appellant had not appeared before the criminal courts.

43. It appears he was subject to a community order which resulted from the excess alcohol offence when at least some of the further offences committed took place. It is not suggested the order was otherwise breached, though equally that did not stop further offences from taking place. Per a chronology set out at the start of the Respondent’s bundle, more than one warning was given about the possible consequence of criminal behaviour. Despite that, more offences were committed.

44. The Crown Court Judge placed the breaches in the top sentencing category. Although the overall sentence imposed was not perhaps the lengthiest of terms, a start point of two years indicates offending of a serious nature. The bladed article offence is comparatively less serious, though must be viewed in the context of the Appellant being armed when he attended the victim’s home. It is clear from what was said at the Crown Court the impact on her was substantial.

45. There is a pattern of breaching court orders. That began with the domestic violence prevention order (DVPO,) albeit a relatively modest penalty was imposed. Per the OASys report, the Appellant had at the time been arrested for making a threat to kill his wife (paragraph 10.3.) It seems that was withdrawn, the DVPO issued as a result. The report describes the Appellant having attended the address in breach of the order.

46. Within a short period, the Appellant was then convicted of the assault on his wife. The restraining order which stemmed from that was breached very soon after release ; repeatedly so.

47. The Appellant said in court he had also broken the order whilst a serving prisoner. Calls had taken place with his children and wife, until the latter cut contact. It was suggested the prison knew of such communication. Without speculating unduly, given the presence of an order prohibiting contact it is difficult to accept a prison would permit criminal offences to occur. When asked in court if he accepted the calls broke the order, the Appellant accepted it did. He explained his wife had consented. Even if so, that still means even after a relatively lengthy term was imposed for breaches the Appellant continued to behave in such a manner.

48. The above elements suggest a disregard for court orders. I temper the weight applied to that by a small extent. The breaches which resulted in conviction were some years ago. As were those either alleged and then withdraw or, on the Appellant’s account, committed after the sixteen-month sentence was imposed. The index offences involved threats and repeated, unwelcome contact. There is also the question of recall – potentially for further breaches – addressed elsewhere in this part of the determination.

49. Whilst reminding myself it dates from 2022, the OASys report indicates some minimisation. That applies both in terms of offending itself and alcohol abuse. I acknowledge on the Appellant’s account drink has since been recognised as a problem and addressed. I will return to that. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier in this section of the judgment the evidence given in court suggests the Appellant still struggles to understand the seriousness of breaching court orders or fully accept his behaviour.

50. Mr.Payne put to the Appellant that within the OASys report is reference to the his children being afraid of him. He denied that, referred to a ‘story’ (the translated word used) being created by a social worker. Taking care not to cross-examine, I asked the Appellant if he wished to expand on that. The Appellant replied the social worker told him they would ‘fit him up.’ Though not entirely clear, it was implied the worker had something to do with the Appellant being recalled for the breach of restraining order that was later dropped. Also said during cross-examination was that the Appellant’s wife had engaged in ‘histrionics.’ When invited to give more detail, he spoke again of the allegation – which led to recall – being untrue.

51. As addressed elsewhere in this section, some evidence is presented relating to recall. The Appellant confirmed that had happened twice. Though any information about one instance is limited to the Appellant’s account in court, he accepted having gone to his wife’s home. His intention was to ‘reach agreement.’ No charge or conviction arose from that, meaning I give the issue less weight. However, even on his own version there was clear disregard for the restraining order.

52. It is fair to say per his first statement the Appellant expresses regret about domestic violence (paragraph 7.1.) I do not simply ignore that. The picture becomes more mixed, however, when one also takes into account repeated breaches of the restraining order and the apparent attitude towards that. Though some time ago, on what was said in court the Appellant wilfully broke the order whilst in custody. He accepts one of the two recalls also arose from doing so. The OASys report suggests an inability to accept the seriousness of such actions.

53. Turning to the second recall, the evidence provided is mixed. I acknowledge the Appellant is unrepresented. It might therefore be more difficult to obtain paperwork, albeit in saying that is likely something would have been received relating to both recall and subsequent release. Corroboration is not required but equally the information presented on this subject is quite limited. There is some indication within the solicitor’s emails submitted to a criminal case being withdrawn as a result of GPS data showing presence elsewhere. Nothing indicates the Appellant was convicted of a further breach of the order.

54. On the other hand, the emails as discussed talk of a parole board refusing to release given worry the Appellant posed a danger. I have taken a very cautious approach to that. There is no material from a parole board and little from the Probation Service about that recall. The OASys report seems to have been written during such recall but cites only the further (later withdrawn) criminal charge as the basis for it. I caution myself against undue speculation. Then again, if what is said in the emails is correct nor can the Appellant say upon submitting evidence showing he was elsewhere at the time of the alleged breach he was immediately released. The situation appears to have been more nuanced.

55. Even if one were to place less weight on the disputed recall, there remains the other return to custody. It is more difficult to argue integration within UK society as a result. The Appellant makes reference to having complied with, for example, an ankle monitor imposed as part of his immigration bail. That is not ignored. However, there being at least one accepted recall balances against that. I make such comment bearing in mind as with the other period of recall no criminal conviction resulted. Whilst dates are not provided, each recall must logically have been no sooner than 2023 given the custodial term imposed. Not particularly long ago but nor especially recent. There have been no further convictions.

56. Alongside what I consider a mixed attitude towards breaches of the restraining order, in his first statement the Appellant deems the bladed article conviction a miscarriage of justice (paragraph 7.1.) He had the knife with him for work purposes, meaning the arrest was wrongful. I struggle with that for two reasons. No apparent challenge has been made to the conviction. Per the Crown Court sentencing remarks, the Appellant pleaded guilty. Moreover, given the related breaches of restraining order it is difficult to see how the arrest was in any way illegitimate. I make plain none of that determines any aspect of the appeal of itself. It is nonetheless a source of some concern and feeds into an overall pattern of minimisation.

57. It was put to the Appellant in court that he had not engaged with any form of rehabilitation, either in custody or since release. The response was none had been offered to him. Although no evidence of that is submitted, I recognise the potential difficulty in proving a negative. In fairness, the OASys report makes no clear reference to planned programmes either during the period of recall or on release. The Appellant said, in any event, that the problems he faced – primarily alcohol misuse – had been dealt with through engagement with Wellspring. Helping others as a volunteer for the group had been his rehab.

58. There is evidence to show work done with Wellspring. Dr.Cornwall in particular paints a picture of someone who started out as a client seeking food and somewhere to charge their ankle monitor and later became a valued volunteer member of staff. Without over-emphasising the point, it may be no coincidence that since beginning work with (and for) Wellspring there is no suggestion of further offending. That is relevant in an assessment of integration. This is not a case where – at least from around 2023 onwards – the Appellant simply says he has not been in trouble. There is material which shows efforts made to both integrate and deal with the issues faced.

59. The other letters of support speak well of the Appellant. He is presented as someone who has changed. I have given weight to those aspects, though they are balanced by what I find to be a continuing struggle to recognise in particular the seriousness of breaching court orders. To address a concern the Appellant raises in his second statement (paragraph 8.14,) I agree simply being homeless does not necessarily mean someone is a burden on society. As a broad point, I accept lack of accommodation is not always of a person’s making.

60. It could be said reference to a recent decline in weakens any argument the Appellant is integrated within society. There is no direct medical evidence available, though I remind myself both Dr.Cornwall and Ms.Dane are physicians of one sort or another. Each puts the Appellant’s lack of recent interaction with Wellspring down to the stress of these proceedings. I generally accept awaiting a decision about deportation could be difficult for someone to face. The suggestion is that forms the reason for a relative drop in attendance at Wellspring – both as a service user and volunteer – rather than a sudden refusal to engage. I can in my view place some weight on what Dr.Cornwall and Ms.Dane say about that. They are in a position to comment, both as individuals with medical qualifications but also people who have worked with the Appellant for some time. I do not therefore hold the apparent fall in attendance at Wellspring against the Appellant when considering the question of integration.

61. Nor is any weight placed on lack of paid employment since release from custody. At paragraph 3.3 of his second statement, the Appellant suggests it was difficult to find work whilst homeless. Per both his account and that from Dr.Cornwall, there were multiple additional problems – such issues around alcohol, having to keep a GPS tag charged whilst homeless and having to report to probation in another area. I accept when combined those elements could pose significant obstacles to gaining employment.

62. Whether the argument now continues to carry the same weight is debatable, however. The Appellant has accommodation, indicates his problem with drink is resolved. Greater ability to find work arguably exists. That said, I bear in mind a number of factors. Though employment can be a sign of societal integration, its absence is not necessarily significant. It might also be said that volunteering with Wellspring is the equivalent of a paid position. Each staff member from Wellspring who gives a letter talk of the Appellant helping with wide variety of activities. The photographs produced support that. On that basis, I give no weight to lack of paid employment since release from custody. The Respondent concedes a lengthy work history prior to that point.

63. A number of questions were asked in court around ties to Poland. The Appellant confirmed his mother and three siblings remain there. He had not contacted any of them for many years. That stemmed from a dispute about inheritance. The mother and two siblings remain in the same family home with the Appellant have been raised in. He did not believe any relatives would help him if returned. Friendships which did exist had faded during time spent in the UK.

64. When asked what support was available for health issues in Poland, the Appellant replied he did not know. He referred to being homeless if returned. No enquiries had been made about the extent of healthcare provision or entitlement to benefits. I am careful absent external information on the subject not to indulge in guesswork as to what support might be available. However, it is for the Appellant to establish his case. I can fairly take notice that Poland is a developed country.

65. Whilst not simply setting aside the concerns Dr.Cornwall and Ms.Dane (alongside Ms.Richards) have about the Appellant’s current health, no medical records have been supplied. Per what was said in court, he is not prescribed medication at present. It is argued by several of those who have written letters of support the Appellant’s mental health would suffer were he removed from the UK. I accept as a general point some upset may result were that to happen. The Appellant has been in this country for many years. Also correct is that Dr.Cornwall and Ms.Dane hold positions whereby they may be equipped to offer at least something of a medical opinion (though they are not presented as expert witnesses.) That, however, must in my view be balanced by a lack of diagnosed mental health condition and absence of current medication for any medical problem. It has not been suggested adequate treatment for issues with kidney stones would be unavailable in Poland. Nor is it established that would necessarily be the case in relation to mental health. A question mark remains as to what care would be needed in any event. There is no mention of risk of self-harm or suicide.

66. The Appellant lived in Poland for approaching thirty years before reaching the UK. It is clear from the hearing he retains a command of Polish. Even if as was said in court the Appellant has not been back to Poland since 2011, familiarity with the culture is likely in my view to have been retained. Without needlessly repeating things, the Appellant has a lengthy work history. He spoke in court about gaining a qualification in Poland as a baker. Employment was gained both there and here. Volunteering with Wellspring is also a positive feature in that sense. As discussed above, there is little to show the presence of health conditions which would prevent employment being obtained. The Appellant confirmed during his live evidence any issue with alcohol has been addressed. No issues around literacy have been raised. Those factors mean the Appellant would likely be in a better position than some to find work and generally re-settle in Poland.

67. None of that means there would be no obstacles to re-integration. I accept there has been a lengthy absence. In his closing, Mr.Payne suggested even if estrangement from family in Poland did occur, that does not mean they would be unwilling to offer support on return. Perhaps not but the argument involves a degree of speculation.

68. I note whilst not explicitly conceded, no direct attack was made in court on claims the Appellant cut ties with family due to conflict around inheritance. It is more likely given that and the length of time since communication happened help from family would be forthcoming. I bear in in mind when saying that the Appellant’s childhood home appears to still exist. He said in court his mother has income from a pension. Nothing shows the Appellant has asked relatives if they would assist were he removed. Then again, given there is no evidence which directly undermines what is said about estrangement it is less likely help would be available. In reaching my conclusions, I make no assumptions that would be the case.

69. Irrespective of any other elements, the Appellant cannot satisfy the first exception to deportation. He has not been in the UK for the majority of his life. I will nevertheless consider the other parts of the exception so all matters have been addressed.

70. The question of integration within UK society is mixed. There is some evidence of that. I do not propose to repeat at length that set out earlier in the determination. In brief, the Appellant has been in this country for a lengthy period. For much of that, he faced no trouble from the police or courts. There is a long work history, both paid and post-release as a volunteer with Wellspring. The supporting letters produced speak of the Appellant in very positive terms. Dr.Cornwall said in court he makes a valuable contribution ; more so than most volunteers. The evidence presented shows a long-term commitment to the group and its work. That includes corresponding efforts to address underlying problems of homelessness and alcohol abuse the Appellant faced. It is clear several people think highly of him. I accept what is said about drink no longer being an issue. The Appellant’s assertions on that subject are supported by the letters from Wellspring staff. Dr.Cornwall in particular is in a position to comment on the subject.

71. Much less weight is given to claims of close friendships in this country. Unless it is suggested those who wrote letters from Wellspring and other agencies are friends, no evidence of that has been supplied. Regardless, there is no suggestion any ties created in that sense go beyond what one would typically expect between adults.

72. The offences which led to a deportation order were plainly serious. Whilst given less weight, they are not the only convictions on the Appellant’s record. A theme of alcohol abuse runs throughout. As domestic violence. Both the DVPO and restraining order were breached ; the latter on several occasions. In both the OASys report and his live evidence, the Appellant sought to minimise that aspect of this behaviour. Other breaches occurred, albeit none led to further convictions after 2022.

73. Something of a conflict exists between expressing regret for domestic violence and at the same time struggling to grasp the gravity of breaking court orders. Coupled with that is the Appellant’s view of the bladed article conviction and claims of a social worker trying to get him into trouble. The fact those opinions persist to date is a concern. Even if one put aside the disputed recall – on which the picture is mixed – there was a further return to custody for attending the victim’s home once again. Any later adherence to immigration bail or licence conditions can only do so much to mitigate what seems to be deliberate and relatively persistent flouting of court orders.

74. No weight has been given to an apparent lack of rehabilitation via the Probation Service. I accept the Appellant’s point that the work done with Wellspring was the equivalent of anything Probation might have offered. I need not for that reason express a view about claims nothing was formally offered to the Appellant by Probation. Without over-emphasising things, it may be his having sought rehabilitation rather than waiting for help from them weighs in the Appellant’s favour when considering integration. He has made his own efforts to address problems faced.

75. Although it is finely-balanced, I cannot on the evidence presented be satisfied the Appellant is integrated within UK society. There are several fairly strong points which support his case. They are, however, overcome by a combination of what I find to be relatively serious offending coupled with at least some minimisation and failure to fully accept the importance of obeying court orders. When taken together, those elements outweigh the other aspects presented.

76. Nor am I persuaded very significant obstacles to re-integration would arise. It is clear given the length of time away from Poland there would be some barriers. They would be greater if as the Appellant believes his family are unlikely to help. I accept that as more likely than not, given what appears a long estrangement.

77. Set against that is more than half of the Appellant’s life being spent in Poland. With that comes in my view the likelihood of a continuing familiarity with culture and society. It is not an alien environment. No language barriers exist.

78. I have not simply ignored concerns expressed about the Appellant’s mental health. However, a lack of medical records and clarity as to what level of care is needed means very little weight can be given to that aspect. Dr.Cornwall spoke in court about efforts made to seek a medical referral following a recent, perceived decline in health. The difficulty is I cannot speculate about what may come from that. Nothing has been submitted showing the extent to which assistance would be available in Poland nor availability of healthcare there. It is for the Appellant to establish his case. I bear in mind the lack of representation. The burden and standard of proof nevertheless remain the same. My conclusions are the same in regard to physical health, for which it seems no treatment is currently required.

79. It is likely removal would cause upset for the Appellant. That might be considered fairly typical where someone is removed against their wishes. I am not, however, satisfied a significant medical impact would result. There is no evidence to show the Appellant is so unwell he could not work in Poland. The same can be said of any ability to deal with day-to-day life. I recognise the worry Dr.Cornwall and his two colleagues raise. That has not been ignored. The difficulty is at least for now there is no clear, diagnosed problem nor clarity as to the extent thereof. It has not been established – to the degree a medical issue exists – return to Poland would necessarily exacerbate things. Aside from recently due to worry over these proceedings, the Appellant has been able to perform voluntary work in this country.

80. To be clear, I do not find any element of the first exception to deportation has been met. Even if I am wrong about societal integration and obstacles to re-integration, the Appellant has not been in the UK for the majority of his life.

81. Turning to exception two, despite brief mention of a partner other than his wife the Appellant provides no evidence as to their existence or presence in the UK. That person is not discussed at all in either of his witness statements. They were not referred to in court. The sole mention comes in the mitigating circumstances interview document. To the extent that aspect of the appeal is relied on, I am not satisfied a genuine and subsisting relationship exists. Even if it does, nothing has been said nor evidence adduced to show removal would have an unduly harsh effect on a current partner – be it whether they remained in the UK without the Appellant or accompanied him to Poland.

82. It is not suggested a relationship remains between the Appellant and his wife. The appeal has not been pursued on that basis. The sole remaining aspect to be considered within exception two relates to the Appellant’s children.

83. Mr.Payne confirmed in his closing the Respondent does not accept any communication has taken place between the Appellant and his children since the restraining order was imposed. It is right to say the account on that subject changed significantly between what is said in the witness statements and the version given in court. As of the most recent statement – July 2026 – the Appellant suggested he was deliberately staying away from the children (paragraph 10.4.) That conflicts with claims of sending letters, raised for the first time in court. From what was said during cross-examination, such arrangement has been in place for some time ; it is permitted by the Family Court. If so, it could be reasonably expected the Appellant either would have raised the topic in his statements or produced some evidence to the Tribunal.

84. As with other elements of the appeal, I remind myself corroboration is not mandatory. The issue is one of weight. I also apply some latitude to the absence of Family Court documents. It may be an unrepresented Appellant would have less ability to obtain the necessary permission for such material to be disclosed. Then again, nothing would have prevented the Appellant from at least mentioning that contact is taking place before this appeal was heard. Things go further than that. The later witness statement suggests a deliberate choice not to communicate with the children. The refusal makes clear it is not accepted a genuine and subsisting relationship exists with either child. An opportunity existed to address that via the statements.

85. I do not for that reason accept there has been any form of contact with either child since at least the Appellant’s release from custody. It is similarly right to say claims of contact from prison were only made during the hearing. The strong impression given in both witness statements and the earlier letter from the Appellant is that ties with the children had ceased completely by then. Even if there were calls from custody, on the Appellant’s account that ended prior to the term ending.

86. The Appellant refers to providing financial support to his children. There is mention of a portion of universal credit payments being sent. Whilst the topic was not specifically addressed, Mr.Payne maintained there is no genuine and subsisting parental relationship in place. The same was said in the refusal. It is therefore odd no evidence showing the frequency or existence of payments has been produced. Producing someone such as bank statements would not have been difficult. I do, that said, recognise this aspect of the account was mentioned in the witness statements rather than only in court.

87. I note the amounts referred to are comparatively small, though equally acknowledge they may amount to a fairly significant portion of benefits received. Without delving too far into speculation the figures involved (about £30 per month) would likely represent only a small proportion of any household expenses. That suggests the Appellant’s wife has largely been able to support herself and the children without monetary help from him His ability to assist financially would likely have been little to nothing during the custodial term served (and periods of recall thereafter.) Despite that and claims the Appellant had the sole family income prior incarceration it is not said his wife and children have been unable to maintain themselves since. They are not portrayed as presently being destitute but for the Appellant’s contribution. Nothing indicates that would change in the Appellant’s absence, even if he does pay small sums each month from benefits.

88. It was said in court the Appellant has been waiting until the children turn sixteen to approach them. He suggested the Family Court had directed contact was prohibited until such age was reached, other than the letters claimed to have been sent. Whether that permits contact after a certain age is unclear beyond the Appellant’s word. As with other parts of the appeal, corroboration is not a requirement. I also bear in mind the Respondent raises no direct challenge to the suggestion an order exists in the terms described. However, even if so it does not explain why the Appellant has seemingly made no attempts to contact either child more recently. As set out earlier in the determination, given it was raised for the first time at the hearing I reject claims of letters being sent post-release.

89. During his closing submissions, Mr.Payne suggested the children are now both sixteen or older. The Appellant intervened, asserting that only applied to one of them. When I checked with the Appellant the dates his children were born they show one is sixteen and the other seventeen. Whilst it is right to say the youngest child turned sixteen only a month before the hearing (which could explain a lack of contact if one accepts what is said about the Family Court order,) the older child reached that age well over a year before. If as claimed the Family Court order permits over-sixteen contact beyond the claimed sending of letters, there has been plenty of opportunity to at least attempt that.

90. The Appellant when asked in court about child contact referred to having to approach things delicately with his wife. There was mention of not being able to attend the family home. He suggested the restraining order ended in 2023[2], though that imposed by the Family Court remains in place. If correct, I acknowledge that might pose some obstacle to seeing either child. However, it would not in my view have been beyond the Appellant’s abilities to seek assistance from social services or another agency to establish an alternate form of communication. There was reference in court to a social worker having been involved at some point. Their details are contained in the OASys report.

91. All of that means I cannot be satisfied any effort to contact the children has been made or taken place since at the latest part-way through the custodial term imposed. Nor am I persuaded the Appellant has made efforts to do so. Even if there is a Family Court order in the terms claimed, which I accept is possible, that would not have prevented communication since the children turned sixteen.

92. Even if it was suggested on release from custody the Appellant’s problems such as homelessness presented obstacles to establishing or (if one believes the account) expanding contact, such barriers are now gone. Without seeking to put a precise date on things, given the letters from Wellspring talk of working with them for over two years that suggests for at least some time the Appellant’s circumstances have been more stable. When coupled with one of the children having been sixteen for over a year, no clear reason for failing to seek contact exists.

93. There remains a fundamental conflict within the account around whether letters have been sent to the children. Even if that is the case, there is no suggestion of any response. Whilst in theory communication via letter when coupled with some financial support might constitute a genuine and subsisting parental relationship it is in my view unlikely to do so. The example of correspondence given in court was a birthday card. That is not without value but nor does it go particularly far in showing the Appellant – even if he has sent letters – plays a significant role in either child’s life. In any event, I remain of the view there has been no contact whatsoever since the Appellant was sentenced to custody.

94. That leads to the conclusion there is no genuine and subsisting relationship with either child. It may well be one existed prior to the Appellant’s convictions for domestic violence and related matters. Some time has passed since. The intervening years form a fairly substantial portion of the childrens’ lives. I acknowledge expressions of affection are made by the Appellant towards his children across the letter and two witness statements. There is no reason to doubt he cares about them and their welfare. However, that of itself is not enough to demonstrate an ongoing relationship. Nor, though I do not accept either to be true, would the modest financial support mentioned or sending of letters do so.

95. In terms of assessing whether removal would be unduly harsh for the children, the Respondent accepts such consequences arise if they were required to move to Poland. The Appellant must also show it would be similarly so were he to depart and the children remain here. That has not been established in my view.

96. It is difficult to see how the Appellant’s absence would significantly impact either child. Given my rejection of claimed contact, there has been no dialogue with the Appellant for several years. I do not overstate the point but Mr.Payne is right to note both are well into their teens. It could be said that means they are less dependent on parents than younger children. Even if contact has been maintained by letter, nothing shows correspondence of that sort could not be sustained from Poland. Though recognising there is an obvious physical difference between the Appellant being there or the UK, given the apparent lack of attempts to either establish or (even if one believes the Appellant) extend contact beyond letters from the childrens’ perspective little would change. I reject any suggestion the Appellant should be permitted to remain in this country to pursue child contact. He has had plenty of opportunity to do so ; particularly if as claimed the Family Court order permits that now the children are sixteen.

97. There is reference at paragraph 10.2 of the OASys report to one of the children being what is termed severely autistic. Whilst not simply ignored, no evidence is presented to show the extent of that. Nor has it been shown Appellant’s absence from the child’s life has had a negative impact in that sense. I am given no information about the level of treatment provided. Nothing shows the Appellant plays any part in that. He has no involvement in otherwise addressing any health problems suffered. It cannot in my view be said with any force the child’s best interests (or that of their sibling) would be harmed were the Appellant removed. From their perspective, life would be as it has for several years.

98. No evidence exists to show the children are otherwise reliant on the Appellant in any way. Whilst rejected as untrue, even if the Appellant is sending a portion of his benefits that is at such a low level it is unlikely to make any real difference. There is nothing to show the children face destitution without the £30 per month said to be sent. Their best interests are arguably met by remaining in their current environment. Per what was said in court, the children are as before with their mother. The Appellant does not suggest that places either in any peril.

99. Exception two is therefore not met.

100. That leaves the question of very compelling circumstances. The threshold there is a high one, the public interest in removal similarly so. In order to meet the ‘very compelling’ criteria, there must be factors above and beyond those considered as part of either exception to deportation. Though not an exhaustive list of the elements I can consider, from his second statement the Appellant cites length of time in the UK, work history including with Wellspring, financial contribution to his family, rehabilitation, a desire to rebuild things with his sons and the presence of close friends.

101. I have dealt with most of those aspects earlier in the determination. They were considered insufficient to meet the two exceptions to deportation. That does not mean the factors are ignored but equally even taken together it is difficult to find they constitute very compelling circumstances. Without needlessly rehearsing that already discussed, I am not persuaded the Appellant has taken advantage of available opportunity to establish a relationship with his children. There is limited evidence to show the extent of any health problems faced, nothing demonstrating a lack of available or inadequate care in Poland. No material is produced relating to close friendships.

102. While I recognise the Appellant is considered by several staff members at Wellspring to be a valuable part of the team, none suggest the group would cease to exist without him. Though his absence might be felt, it has not been established the Appellant’s removal would significantly harm the local community. Wellspring will continue to perform its work.

103. Though it matters not, I am not unsympathetic here. I recognise the Appellant has made efforts to address his problems. Though the work at Wellspring, he now contributes positively to society. I accept there has been no offending since that began. None of that, however, is enough to meet either the exceptions to deportation or the high threshold required by which very compelling circumstances arise.

104. The human rights appeal therefore stands to be dismissed on all grounds. It follows that if the deportation order remains in place, the related EUSS application could not be granted.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

The appeal has been dismissed. No fee award can be made.

Signed Date 24th October, 2026

FttJ JEPSON

First-tier Tribunal Judge Jepson

Notes

[1] https://www.gov.uk/guidance/living-in-poland

[2] Though it is not a central point, paragraph 2.1 of the OASys report suggests the restraining order ended in 2024.


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