Tax United Kingdom

Gordon Berry v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01451 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10056

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

George House, Edinburgh

Appeal reference: TC/2026/00630

INCOME TAX–self assessment–late filing penalties under Schedule 55 Finance Act 2009– whether in default–yes–whether penalties timeously and competently issued–yes–whether there was a reasonable excuse–no–whether the default was remedied without unreasonable delay–no–were there special circumstances –no–appeal dismissed

Heard on: 16 September 2026

Judgment date: 20 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANNE SCOTT

IAN SHEARER

Between

GORDON BERRY

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Graham Aitken

For the Respondents: Ms Hannah Ritchie, litigator of HM Revenue and Customs’ Solicitor’s Office

DECISION

Introduction

1. The appellant is appealing against penalties that HMRC have imposed under Schedule 55 of the Finance Act 2009 (“Schedule 55”) for a failure to submit an annual self assessment return for the tax year ending 5 April 2024 on time. The tax return was ultimately filed on 16 April 2026.

2. The penalties that have been charged can be summarised as follows:

(1) a £100 late filing penalty under paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 imposed on 18 February 2025,

(2) a £300 “six month” late filing penalty under paragraph 5 of Schedule 55 imposed on 5 August 2025,

(3) a £300 “twelve month” penalty under paragraph 6 of Schedule 55 imposed on 17 February 2026.

(4) “Daily” late filing penalties totalling £900 under paragraph 4 of Schedule 55 imposed on 5 August 2025.

3. We had a Hearing Bundle extending to 141 pages, an Authorities Bundle extending to 117 pages and numerous items of correspondence from the appellant to both HMRC and the Tribunal.

Preliminary Issues

4. Firstly, the Statement of Reasons for HMRC narrated that the appeal of the late filing penalties was allegedly late and pursuant to section 49(2)(a) Taxes Management Act 1970, as amended (“TMA”), HMRC had consented to the late appeal.

5. However, we put it to Ms Ritchie that on our pre-reading of the Bundle, the appeals were not late and she conceded that that was the case.

6. Secondly, the appellant argued that all of the penalties had been appealed whereas HMRC argued that the twelve month penalty had not been appealed. For the reasons narrated at paragraphs 75 and 76 below, we find that the twelve month penalty was not a matter in relation to which the Tribunal had jurisdiction.

The Issues

7. The issues under appeal are:

(1) Whether the penalties charged were correctly issued;

(2) If so, whether the appellant has established a reasonable excuse.

8. Two further questions arise in determining this appeal. They are: if the appellant is in default of an obligation imposed by statute: (a) what was the period of default; and (b) did the appellant have a reasonable excuse throughout the period?

9. The above matters are to be considered in light of all the circumstances of the case.

Burden and Standard of Proof

10. HMRC bear the initial burden of demonstrating that the penalties were properly notified and are due. Once this is discharged, the burden of proof is upon the appellant to demonstrate that there is a reasonable excuse.

11. The standard of proof is the civil standard; that of a balance of probabilities.

Background Facts

12. Until 2024, the appellant had been a builder and joiner after he left school with no O-levels when he was 16. He has been in the self assessment tax regime since 8 July 2016. Prior to that he had been in employment and he paid tax through PAYE. Latterly a friend had filed his tax returns for him and the 2022/23 self assessment tax return (“SATR”) was filed online by that friend on 28 December 2023. The appellant is not computer literate and does not have access to a computer.

13. On 16 March 2024, the appellant wrote to HMRC enclosing a self assessment statement requesting information since he did not understand the statement. He said that he had worked for R&W Joinery since 26 September 2022 and they deducted tax at 30% from payments to him.

14. On 10 April 2024, HMRC responded to that letter from the appellant and pointed out that:

(a) The appellant’s self assessment statement showed late payment penalties for 2015/16 which had been cleared.

(b) The appellant had a payment plan in place and the remaining penalties should be cleared by 5 May 2024.

(c) The appellant was not registered with the Construction Industry Scheme (“CIS”) and he was advised how to register and thereby reduce his tax deductions to 20%.

(d) He was reminded that the deadline for filing a paper SATR for 2023/24 was 31 October 2024 but if he chose to file online then the deadline was 31 January 2025.

15. HMRC’s digital record shows that the Notice to File a SATR for 2023/24, although dated 6 April 2024, was despatched to the appellant on 2 May 2024. HMRC estimate that it would have been delivered by Royal Mail on or about 6 May 2024.

16. The Notice to File letter included the following paragraphs:

“You need to send your tax return for the tax year 6 April 2023 to 5 April 2024

Our records show that you need to send a self assessment tax return for April 2023 to April 2024. By law, you must send a return. That applies even if you’ve already paid all the tax you owe, or you don’t think you owe any tax.

…

When you need to send your tax return

If you submit your return online, you must submit your return by 31 January 2025 (or three months after the date of this notice, whichever is the later).

If you send a paper return you have less time, and must send your return by 31 October 2024 (or three months after the date of this notice whichever is the later).

…

If you don’t think you need to send a return

You must tell us if you think you no longer need to send a tax return. We need to agree this with you before 31 January 2025 or you may have to pay a penalty.”

17. On 22 October 2024, the appellant telephoned HMRC’s PAYE Unit because all of his colleagues had received forms P60 and he wanted to know why he had not received one. He was transferred to the self assessment helpline who told him to take the matter up with his employer and if he still had problems to call back. He did speak to his employer and was told by the accountant that he was not eligible for a P60 as he was not taxed under PAYE.

18. In January 2026, the appellant, who was by then unemployed due to problems with his knees, turned to his friend, Mr Aitken, for help with his tax affairs. The friend who had previously helped him had unfortunately become ill in July 2024 and died in October 2024. Mr Aitken was the author of all of the subsequent correspondence with HMRC albeit that that did not become clear until much later. In a letter to the Tribunal, copied to HMRC and dated 6 June 2026, Mr Berry explained that Mr Aitken is a friend and not a tax specialist but having worked in “IT Management…he has seasoned capability in applying a sound business perspective to all matters of disagreement between parties – whatever the subject matter”.

19. In a letter dated 16 January 2025, albeit the date next to the signature is 17 January and HMRC received it on 24 January 2025, the appellant wrote to HMRC stating that:

(a) He was inexperienced in relation to SATRs and had “only recently” become aware of the need to file a return.

(b) He knew that the deadline for submission of a paper return had expired but he was treating this letter as a paper return. He did not have online access so if he was required to file a SATR, he would file a paper version.

(c) His “extenuating circumstances” were that he had “assumed” that a SATR was not required since his total income was £8,381.32 with a CIS deduction of 30% (£2,514.40) so the net amount paid to him had been £5,866.92.

(d) He presumed that he would be entitled to repayment of the £2,514.40 since his total income was less than the personal allowance of £12,750.

(e) He asked for “explicit clarification” at the earliest opportunity and confirmation that if a SATR was required then whether a paper version would be acceptable. He recognised that a SATR “may be required” despite his income being less than the personal allowance and if so he was “appealing that Late Filing Penalty charges should not apply”.

(f) He enclosed a copy of a CIS Payment and Deduction Statement for the year ended 5 April 2024 from Ritchie Joinery Ltd.

20. On 6 March 2025, the appellant sent a reminder to HMRC, stating that:

“I appreciate that HMRC Self Assessment workload burdens may mean that a response may still not be imminent, but I am currently experiencing some stressful personal financial circumstances in line with the nationwide cost of living crisis…”.

21. On 12 March 2025, marked “URGENT!!” and again drawing attention to his personal circumstances, the appellant wrote to HMRC pointing out that he had had no response to his earlier two letters but he had received the £100 initial late filing penalty dated 18 February 2025 but received by him only on 10 March 2025. He appealed the penalty.

22. He enclosed a copy of the penalty notice which stated amongst other things that:

“What you need to do

1. Send us your tax return now

….

You must send us a tax return, even if you don’t think you owe any tax

…

If you don’t file your tax return…

If you still haven’t filed your return 3 months after the deadline, we’ll start charging you £10 a day until we receive it. We can charge daily penalties for up to 90 days, starting from 01 February 2025 for paper returns or 01 May 2025 for online returns.

….

If you don’t think you should have to pay this penalty

…

If you believe you have a good reason for not sending your tax return on time, you can appeal against this penalty. You need to appeal within 30 days of this letter – please read the enclosed leaflet first”

23. There was included in the Bundle a copy of HMRC’s form SA370 “Self Assessment – Penalties for late filing and late payment” which stated amongst other things:

“What will not count as a reasonable excuse

The following will not be accepted as a reasonable excuse:

• you relied on someone else to send your return and they did not

…

• you found the HMRC online service too difficult to use

….

Appeal outcomes

If you contact us online or in writing and we agree your appeal:

• we’ll write to you to say that your appeal is successful

…

If you contact us online or in writing and we do not agree your appeal:

• we’ll write to you to say why and tell you what you need to do if you do not agree with our decision…”.

24. On 14 April 2025, the appellant sent a reminder to HMRC stating that no SATR was required for the reasons previously articulated and that he was due a refund of the CIS deductions. He asked for an urgent reply.

25. On 21 May 2025, the appellant wrote a further reminder to HMRC complaining about the lack of response and arguing that HMRC should offer him compensation for the stress and inconvenience that he had suffered. He made it clear that he considered the matter to be “Highly Urgent”.

26. On 19 June 2025, having received an initial daily penalty reminder from HMRC dated 3 June 2025, he sent a further reminder to HMRC, this time marked “Highly Urgent Emergency”, requesting the refund and confirmation that no SATR was required. The HMRC reminder stated that the return should be filed as soon as possible.

27. However, on 17 June 2025, an Assistant Officer in HMRC had written to the appellant and that letter was received by him on 24 June 2025. That letter appeared to be a reply to the appellant’s letter of 16 January 2025. Insofar as relevant that letter read:

“I’m sorry for the delay in replying.

Request for a form or document

Thank you for contacting us on 24 January 2025.

You asked us to send you forms SA100 Self Assessment Paper tax return and SA105s Self Employed Short page for the year 2023 t0 2024.

We have enclosed them with this letter” .

28. HMRC’s internal Self Assessment Notes dated 16 June 2025 record that

(a) The author of that letter was replying to the appellant’s letter of 16 January 2025 which had been received on 24 January 2025.

(b) HMRC had received five other letters and one of those had indicated that the appellant should be removed from self assessment for the tax year 2024/25 as his income from self-employment was less than £1,000 per annum.

(c) However, a return was still required for 2023/24 because the appellant’s income in that year was greater than the £1,000 threshold for a SATR.

(d) The appellant was “asking” for a paper return.

(e) All five of the letters were “follow up” letters after the 16 January 2025 letter and they would be closed.

(f) Nothing could be done with the penalty until the return was filed.

(g) The actions were to send the paper return to the appellant and to send an automated letter withdrawing the Notice to File for 2024/25.

29. The automated letter was issued to the appellant on 19 June 2025, stating that “You or your adviser told us that for the tax year 2024-2025 you no longer meet the SA criteria for filing a Self Assessment tax return” and HMRC agreed that no SATR was required for 2024/25.

30. What HMRC did not do was acknowledge receipt of the appeal of the penalty.

31. The appellant wrote to HMRC on 25 June 2025 referring to his letter of 19 June 2025 pointing out that it had been written before he received HMRC’s letter of 17 June 2025. He also pointed out that the only letter that he had written to HMRC in January 2025 had been the letter of 16 January 2025. He referred to all of his previous letters and complained that HMRC’s letter of 17 June 2025 had not addressed any of the arguments that he had advanced and had not explained why a SATR for 2023/24 was required. Furthermore, the argument for the lack of a need for a SATR for 2024/25 (which had been accepted by HMRC) was precisely the same as the argument that he had been advancing in relation to 2023/24 since 16 January 2025.

32. He asked for confirmation that no SATR was required and that he was due a refund. This letter was Marked “Highly Urgent Emergency!!”.

33. On 20 July 2025, having received a further daily penalty reminder dated 1 July 2025 but received by him on 19 July 2025, the appellant wrote to HMRC complaining about the lack of response from HMRC and reiterating his previous arguments.

34. On 5 August 2025, HMRC wrote to the appellant pointing out that the SATR had still not been received but they had received his appeal of the late filing penalty. They stated that he still had to file the return. They stated that:

“You have told us that you have a reasonable excuse for not sending your tax return on or before the due date. The reason you have given is unclear as return (sic) not received to date.

….

We cannot agree you had a reasonable excuse whilst the return is still outstanding.

This is because the law says:

• your excuse for not filing your return on time must have lasted for the whole period your return was overdue.

• you must have filed the return without unreasonable delay after that excuse had ended

What you need to do

Send us your tax return for this year now. Then send your appeal to us again in writing if you still wish to do so.

…

Daily Penalties

If your return is more than 3 months late, we’ll charge you a penalty of £10 a day for up to 90 days. To reduce these penalties, you can file your tax return online.

…

We are issued (sic) the 2023 – 2024 tax return and await its completion before any further matters can be considered therefore, please submit the tax return online or by paper by downloading a copy via the www.gov.uk. If however you no longer require a Self Assessment (sic) record you will require to complete a criteria check to close either online where you can use our webchat again on www.gov.uk. and speak with an advisor to close the Self Assessment of (sic) speak with an advisor on 0300 200 3600”

35. The six month and daily penalties totalling £1,200 were dated on the same day but only received by the appellant on 19 August 2025 having been posted on 11 August 2025. Under the heading “What to do next” it stated “Send us your tax return now to avoid further penalties for filing late”. Under the heading “Do you need our help?” it referred again to form SA370 (see paragraph 23 above), saying that it was relevant especially if it was thought that “your tax return is late for a good reason” and also said that if the appellant needed more help then HMRC should be telephoned.

36. On 18 August 2025, the appellant responded to HMRC complaining that they had begun their letter of 5 August 2025 by saying that they had received his appeal, but had not identified which of his many letters they were referring to. He reiterated his previous arguments and stated that, in the circumstances, he did have a reasonable excuse for not filing the SATR.

37. Having received the two further penalties the day previously, on 20 August 2025, the appellant appealed in the same terms as previously and referenced, in particular, his letter of 18 August 2025. He asked for an urgent response.

38. On 15 September 2025, HMRC responded to the appellant with two letters. One referred to the appeal against the three penalties that had been issued for 2023/24 and opened with the sentence: “You have not told us why you did not send your tax return in on time.”. It stated that because the SATR was still outstanding, HMRC did not accept that there was a reasonable excuse. He was told that he could ask for a review or appeal to the Tribunal. It also said that if he wished to file a SATR for 2024/25 it would have to be filed by 31 October 2025. That letter appeared to come from “George” from “PT OPS”.

39. The second letter from the same address at HMRC also referred to the three penalties but this time said that “we received your appeal” after the 30 day deadline for appealing had expired.

40. It went on to say:

“…we do not agree that you have a reasonable excuse because you received a payment and deduction statement from your CIS employer and believing that you were under the tax free amount.

…

Please send your 2023 to 2024 tax return as soon as possible if you have not already done so. The longer your tax return is overdue, the more penalties you’ll have to pay.

The penalties cannot be more than the amount of tax, Student Loan deductions and National insurance contributions (NICs) owed on the date the payment is due. If you owe less than £100 when you send your tax return, we’ll cut your penalties to equal the amount that you owe.

…

If you do not agree that your appeal is late

If you do not agree that your appeal was too late you can:

• ask us to look at your case again – giving us further information that you want us to consider

• continue your appeal by asking a tribunal to decide the matter

…

The threshold for Self-Employment income is £1000, this requires you to complete a full tax return, your original letter is not sufficient. As you stated you don’t have personal online access, a paper return will be required as it is still outstanding. Regarding a tax refund for 2023 to 2024, this is not possible until the relevant tax return has been filed and captured.” (Emphasis added)

41. It was signed by C Burns, Revenue and Customs Officer.

42. On 30 September 2025, the appellant replied in similar terms as previously enclosing copies of his letters of 18 August and 16 January 2025. He again complained about HMRC’s failure to answer his correspondence. In particular he stated that he found the statement by HMRC that “You have not told us why you did not send your tax return on time” to be “piercingly frustrating” and “utterly ridiculous”.

43. The appellant’s letter simply restated his position that he had furnished a reasonable excuse but it did not address the paragraph that we have underlined. In fact, he restated the argument that he was due a refund and did not need to file a return.

44. On 23 October 2025, HMRC replied. The letter was again headed as being a response to his appeal of the penalties. It opened with:

“You told us that you did not send your tax return in on time. You told us this was because You (sic) do not meet Self Assessment criteria.”.

It asked him to file the return and rejected the argument on reasonable excuse with a third formulation of their explanation (two different formulations had been given in the letters of 15 September 2025) stating:

“I do not agree that you have a reasonable excuse because it is not clear you have no self assessment criteria”.

Under a bold heading “What you need to do by 22 November 2025”, he was told that if he disagreed, and thought that he had a good reason for filing his return late, he could provide any further information that he wished to be considered. He was also offered a review and told that he could appeal to the Tribunal.

45. The appellant replied on 3 November 2025, arguing that:

“…since my Total Taxable Income for Tax Year 2023/2024 had been less that the Tax Free Allowance amount of £12570, I therefore had not required to submit a Self Assessment Tax Return for Tax Year 2023/2024 – and accordingly Late Filing Penalties were a total irrelevance forTax Year 2023/2024!!”

46. He argued that that was supported by the fact that HMRC did not require a SATR for 2024/25. He pointed out that HMRC’s letter had said that “a reasonable excuse… is something that stopped you meeting a tax obligation” and he had had no tax obligation to file a return for 2023/2024. He also argued that a friend had had his late filing penalties cancelled in similar circumstances and enclosed copies of his friend’s correspondence with HMRC. That correspondence was not in the Bundle.

47. He wrote a further letter to HMRC on 5 November 2025 referring to all of the previous correspondence and his claim for a refund of the CIS deductions and asked for a “Highly Urgent!!” reply.,

48. On 18 December 2025, he sent a reminder to HMRC referring to his two letters of 3 and 5 November 2025, asking for confirmation that (a) he had no obligation to file a SATR for 2023/24 as he had no taxable income, (b) therefore there should be no late filing penalties, and (c) his repayment claim should be processed. He again said that it was a “Highly Urgent Emergency”.

49. On 20 January 2026, HMRC wrote to the appellant thanking him for contacting them on 29 December 2025 about his appeal.

50. HMRC stated that he had appealed against the four penalties that had been charged for that year. They included a twelve month penalty. They referred to their letter of 15 September 2025 (wrongly stated to be 2024) pointing out that the late appeal was not accepted and that the appellant should appeal to the Tribunal. They stated that if he did not appeal to the Tribunal by 19 February 2026 then HMRC would treat the appeal as settled and he would have to pay all of the penalties including the twelve month penalty.

51. Before he received that letter, the appellant had again written a reminder to HMRC on 24 January 2026. He reiterated the same arguments and again asked for financial compensation complaining about HMRC’s “consistent abysmal level of service”.

52. On 28 January 2026, the appellant wrote to HMRC referring to two identical letters dated 20 January 2026 (presumably two copies had been sent erroneously since the quotation he used was from the letter of that date in the Bundle). He pointed out that he had not contacted HMRC on 29 December 2025 and that presumably they were referring to his letter of 18 December 2025. He advanced the same arguments as previously and pointed out that HMRC had not addressed the arguments that he had been making since 16 January 2025.

53. The appellant appealed to the Tribunal by letter dated 3 February 2026 but received by the Tribunal on 9 February 2026. He copied that appeal to HMRC on 4 February 2026.

54. On 3 March 2026, Mr Harrison, the HMRC litigator, wrote to the appellant pointing out that:

(a) HMRC’s Extra Support Team had attempted to contact the appellant on 24 February 2026 to assist him in filing the SATR and to explain that once a Notice to File has been issued in terms of section 8 TMA a taxpayer is legally obliged to file the return.

(b) Once such a Notice has been issued it is not a reasonable excuse to object to filing a SATR.

(c) Unless the appellant registered for CIS and filed the 2023/24 SATR there could be no reclaim of CIS; the requirement to complete a SATR to report CIS income was long established.

(d) He was asked to complete the paper SATR which had been sent to him on 24 February 2026 and lodge it by 13 March 2026; it was explained that that was not a new filing date and the SATR was now more than 12 months late.

55. In that regard, we noted from the Bundle that there had been an unsuccessful attempt at telephone contact with appellant on 24 February 2026. On 25 February 2026, Officer Bailey wrote to the appellant on 25 February 2026 stating:

“Please see attached black (sic) 2023/24 Self Assessment Tax Return for you to complete.

…

If you require any assistance, please telephone the number at the top of this letter and ask for the Extra Support Team.”.

56. On 2 March 2026, the appellant replied to Officer Bailey stating that he found the letter “nothing short of ridiculous” as it had not addressed his concerns adding that:

“…accordingly, I shall certainly not be completing and returning the Tax Year 2023/24 Tax Return Form as included with your correspondence…”.

57. On 10 March 2026, having received the twelve month penalty he wrote to HMRC, copied to the Tribunal, complaining about the “additional stressful upset” as he had expected that all of the late filing penalties would be paused until after the Tribunal had decided the appeal and concluded that the penalties “should be cancelled in full”.

58. The appellant wrote again to HMRC on 13 March 2026 but did not file the SATR. HMRC responded to him on 26 March 2026 pointing out that:

(a) The issue of the tax refund had been addressed in the Statement of Reasons filed with him and the Tribunal.

(b) The appellant had been issued with a Notice to File under section 8 TMA which required him by law to complete and deliver a tax return or face penalties.

(c) HMRC had advised him six times that he still required to file the SATR but he had refused to do so; the fact that his income was below the personal allowance was irrelevant since it was over £1,000.

(d) He had been advised to register for CIS and had been told how to do so.

(e) There is a right of appeal against late filing penalties but no right of appeal against HMRC not having issued a repayment; the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in relation to repayments.

59. The SATR dated 16 April 2026 was received by HMRC on 21 April 2026.

60. On 22 May 2026, HMRC, having processed the return, confirmed that a tax refund of the CIS deductions amounting to £2,514.14 would be made.

61. On 23 May 2026, the appellant made what he described as an Offer of Settlement arguing that the “effective date” for submission of the SATR should be treated as being 1 April 2025 since the appellant would have filed the tax return by that date if HMRC had replied to the letter of 16 January 2025 and the reminders. He would be prepared to accept a late filing penalty on that basis. However, he still sought financial recompense/compensation for his “very substantial inconvenience and stressful upset” and interest on the refund since, in his view it had been paid more than 12 months too late. Therefore, the late filing penalties should be reduced to “Zero”.

62. On 16 June 2026, HMRC responded declining the Offer of Settlement. The appellant then wrote to HMRC on 28 June 2026 repeating his Offering of Settlement and on 9 July 2026 HMRC again declined.

63. The appellant wrote again to HMRC on 16 July 2026 urging settlement and HMRC replied on 17 August 2026 and declined the Offer of Settlement.

64. On 15 August 2026, the appellant wrote to HMRC, copied to the Tribunal, a letter which he described as “Summary Opening Position Statement by the Appellant”. In the covering letter he stated that he was also preparing what he described as a “Fully-Stated Opening Position Statement” with attachments. (Mr Aitken confirmed that that was never filed.)

65. The former document narrated the history of the correspondence with HMRC and concluded by stating that he assumed that the appeal hearing would address both the late filing penalties and the claim for a tax refund. He asked that the Tribunal should cancel the late filing penalties in full and order that the tax refund be paid in full and quickly.

66. On 17 August 2026, HMRC wrote to the appellant stating that:

“The only issue which will be considered at the Hearing on 16 September 2026 is your appeal against the late filing penalties.”

67. On 24 August 2026, the appellant wrote to the Tribunal enclosing copies of correspondence between the appellant and HMRC. In summary, the appellant stated that he believed that the appeal before the Tribunal encompassed a claim for a tax refund in the sum of £2,514.40 for the tax year 2023/24 ie for the same tax year as the penalties with which we are concerned.

68. On 3 September 2026, the appellant wrote to the Tribunal nominating Mr Aitken as a representative and stressing the need for the Tribunal to have copies of all relevant documents and in particular the Summary Opening Position Statement.

69. On 8 September 2026, the appellant wrote to the Tribunal enclosing what he described as a “Hearing Opening Statement” prepared by Mr Aitken which stated that he had drafted all of the letters and again summarised the history of the correspondence. In essence, he complained that

(a) HMRC had not recognised the significance of the personal allowance.

(b) No tax was due.

(c) Late filing penalties should not have been issued since no SATR was required.

(d) The repayment should have been made a long time previously.

(e) The whole process had been very stressful particularly since HMRC had failed to respond to what he described as the “Tax Free Allowance factor”.

(f) It was only when the letter from litigation dated 26 March 2026 (see paragraph 58 above) was received that it had been understood that it was because the income in 2023/24 was in excess of £1,000; the SATR had then been promptly filed.

(g) The Offer of Settlement should have been accepted.

The legislation

70. The relevant statutory provisions are included as an Appendix to this decision.

Jurisdiction

71. At the outset of the hearing, we explained to the appellant that the Tribunal is a creature of statute and has only the powers given to it by statute. Not all decisions made by HMRC are appealable to the Tribunal and the only appeal presently with the Tribunal is the appeal against the late filing penalties.

72. The Tribunal can only find the facts relating to the matters under appeal and then apply the relevant law.

73. We explained that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to order HMRC to make the repayment of tax sought and nor could the Tribunal direct HMRC to pay interest or make an offer of compensation. Complaints about HMRC are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and must be directed to HMRC’s complaints process.

74. However, in that regard, we observe that we are surprised that none of the many letters of complaint, which were very clearly expressed as such, were not passed to the complaints division. Ms Ritchie, appropriately, conceded that HMRC’s responses, and in many cases the lack thereof, to the appellant’s correspondence had not been good. She very properly apologised for the distress that had been caused to the appellant, and to Mr Aitken, by what we would describe as HMRC’s consistently very poor handling of those complaints.

75. As far as the twelve month penalty is concerned, we certainly understand why the appellant thought that it was being appealed given the terms of HMRC’s letter of 20 January 2026 (see paragraph 50 above) which clearly identified the twelve month penalty. However, that is quite simply impossible because that penalty had not even been issued. It is clear from HMRC’s own records that the penalty was only issued on 17 February 2026 and that was after the appeal was filed with the Tribunal.

76. Accordingly, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction in relation to the 12 month penalty and in terms of Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 (as amended) (“the Rules”) we must, and do, strike out that part of the appellant’s appeal.

77. Ms Ritchie confirmed that, in the circumstances, HMRC would accept that the appellant had a reasonable excuse for believing that he had appealed that penalty (to them) and HMRC would process that appeal after this decision is issued.

Discussion

78. In this appeal, we found that the appellant had appealed the other three penalties timeously (see paragraphs 21 and 37 above).We also found that, since the SATR had not been filed and the Notice to File had been served, the penalties had been competently and timeously issued. The penalties imposed are due and have been calculated correctly so HMRC have discharged their burden of proof.

79. Because the appellant no longer had the assistance of a friend to file online, he had a statutory obligation to file the paper SATR by no later than 31 October 2024. He did not and it was only received by HMRC on 21 April 2026. The period of default was therefore 537 days.

Was there a reasonable excuse throughout the period?

80. The issue for the Tribunal therefore was whether or not the appellant had established a reasonable excuse for the late filing and whether that subsisted throughout the period of default.

81. There is no statutory definition of reasonable excuse but HMRC rightly referred to the test articulated by Judge Medd in The Clean Car Company Limited v CEE [1991] BVC 568 where he said:-

“…the test of whether there is a reasonable excuse is an objective one. In my judgment it is an objective test in this sense. One must ask oneself: was what the taxpayer did a reasonable thing for a responsible trader conscious of and intending to comply with his obligations regarding tax, but having the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and placed in the situation that the taxpayer found himself in at the relevant time, a reasonable thing to do?”

82. Although Clean Car was a VAT case, it is generally accepted that the same principles apply to a claim of reasonable excuse in direct tax cases.

83. In a similar vein, in Barrett v HMRC [2015] UKFTT 329 (TC) at paragraphs 154 and 161 Judge Berner said:

“154. The test of reasonable excuse involves the application of an impersonal, objective, legal standard to a particular set of facts and circumstances. The test is to determine what a reasonable taxpayer in the position of the taxpayer would have done in those circumstances, and by reference to that test to determine whether the conduct of the taxpayer can be regarded as conforming to that standard.

…

161. The test is one of reasonableness. No higher (or lower) standard should be applied. The mere fact that something that could have been done has not been done does not of itself necessarily mean that an individual’s conduct in failing to act in a particular way is to be regarded as unreasonable. It is a question of degree having regard to all the circumstances, including the particular circumstances of the individual taxpayer. There can be no universal rule; what might be considered an unreasonable failure on the part of one taxpayer in one set of circumstances might be regarded as not unreasonable in the case of another whose circumstances are different.”

84. HMRC also rightly relied on Christine Perrin v HMRC [2018] UKUT 0156 (TCC) (“Perrin”)where the Upper Tribunal suggested that a four-step process be adopted by the Tribunal when considering whether a taxpayer has a reasonable excuse. Paragraph 81 reads:

“81. When considering a “reasonable excuse” defence, therefore, in our view the FTT can usefully approach matters in the following way:

(1) First, establish what facts the taxpayer asserts give rise to a reasonable excuse (this may include the belief, acts or omissions of the taxpayer or any other person, the taxpayer’s own experience or relevant attributes, the situation of the taxpayer at any relevant time and any other relevant external facts).

(2) Second, decide which of those facts are proven.

(3) Third, decide whether, viewed objectively, those proven facts do indeed amount to an objectively reasonable excuse for the default and the time when that objectively reasonable excuse ceased. In doing so, it should take into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and the situation in which the taxpayer found himself at the relevant time or times. It might assist the FTT, in this context, to ask itself the question “was what the taxpayer did (or omitted to do or believed) objectively reasonable for this taxpayer in those circumstances?”

(4) Fourth, having decided when any reasonable excuse ceased, decide whether the taxpayer remedied the failure without unreasonable delay after that time (unless, exceptionally, the failure was remedied before the reasonable excuse ceased). In doing so, the FTT should again decide the matter objectively, but taking into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer”.

85. The Upper Tribunal explained that the experience and knowledge of the particular taxpayer should be taken into account in considering whether a reasonable excuse has been established. The Upper Tribunal concluded that for an honestly held belief to constitute a reasonable excuse, it must also be objectively reasonable for that belief to be held. The word “reasonable” imports the concept of objectivity, whilst the words “the taxpayer” recognise that the objective test should be applied to the circumstances of the actual (rather than the hypothetical) taxpayer.

86. We observe that, although we were not referred to the case, at paragraph 29 in MatthewHarrison v HMRC [2022] UKUT 216 (TCC) (“Harrison”), the Upper Tribunal stated that the four-stage approach in Perrin:

“…is good practice but not intended to be a strait jacket. Rather, it is a helpful way for the FTT to address the statutory questions”.

87. The following two paragraphs in Harrison are of particular relevance in this appeal and read:

“30. Stages three and four of Perrin reflect the fact that paragraph 23 of Schedule 55 deals with two different questions: 1) whether there was a reasonable excuse and whether it ceased before the end of the period before the failure was remedied, and 2) whether, if there was a reasonable excuse and it had ceased, the failure to file was then remedied “without unreasonable delay”. Perrin confirms these questions are to be approached on an objective basis but taking into account the experience and other relevant attributes of the taxpayer and the situation in which the taxpayer found themselves at the relevant time or times.

31. Before us, the parties were agreed that a reasonable excuse must be made out by reference to one or more circumstances which existed as at the relevant filing date. We agree and consider this is clear from the legislation (where the penalty in respect of the “failure” is a reference to the failure to file by the deadline set out in the Schedule). Events which take place after that deadline would not therefore be relevant (except so far as, as a matter of evidence, they threw light on relevant circumstances existing at and before the filing date). Circumstances that existed after the filing date could of course be relevant to the second part of paragraph 23, namely whether the failure to file the return had been remedied without unreasonable delay.” (Emphasis added)

88. We have described the appellant’s personal circumstances and those of Mr Aitken at paragraphs 12 and 18 respectively above.

89. It is obvious from the terms of the letter of 16 January 2025 that the appellant knew that the deadline for filing a paper return had passed; hence the attempt to appeal any Late Filing Penalties that might be imposed (see paragraph 19 above).

90. Whilst we accept that the appellant has limited education and little understanding of the tax system, both the letter of 10 April 2024 and the Notice to File were expressed in plain English and made the deadlines for filing the SATR explicit. As Ms Ritchie pointed out it is not a complex matter.

91. The appellant was aware that he was being taxed under self assessment. He had known of the existence of the self assessment helpline and had spoken to them, albeit about another matter, before either deadline for filing passed. He had previously been in the Schedule 55 penalty regime albeit in relation to the late payment of tax.

92. When the deadline of 31 October 2024 for filing the paper return passed (ie the default date) Mr Aitken had not been consulted and all that the appellant knew, or should have known, was that unless he filed online by 31 January 2025, he would be out of time and might face penalties. The appellant’s only explanation was that he found tax confusing. That does not suffice. He knew how to contact HMRC for help. He did not.

93. In all of those circumstances, we find that, objectively considered, a prudent taxpayer should have taken steps to file the SATR before the October 2024 deadline if it was to be completed on paper. On that basis we find that no reasonable excuse has been offered in relation to the initial failure to file. However, he still had the option to file online.

94. We asked about filing online, as the appellant had done so with the help of a friend the previous year, and he said that Mr Aitken had offered to help him in January 2025 but neither he nor Mr Aitken could file online.

95. It was Mr Aitken who adopted the argument that because the appellant’s earnings were less than the personal allowance then no SATR was required.

96. As can be seen from the quotation from the Notice to File letter (see paragraph 16 above) it made it explicit that, even if a taxpayer did not think that a SATR was necessary, unless HMRC agreed that a SATR was not necessary before 31 January 2025, the SATR still had to be filed or penalties might be imposed.

97. Given the terms of the Notice to File letter, it was a mistake to think that there was no requirement to file the SATR in January 2025 as there was no agreement reached with HMRC before 31 January 2025.

98. HMRC have cited Judge Hellier at paragraph 12 in Garnmoss Limited t/a Parham Builders v HMRC [2012] UKFTT 315 (TC) (“Garnmoss”) where he said:

“What is clear is that there was a muddle and a bona fide mistake was made. We all make mistakes. This was not a blameworthy one. But the Act does not provide shelter for mistakes, only for reasonable excuses. We cannot say that this confusion was a reasonable excuse. …”.

99. That is correct. The Act does not provide shelter for mistakes.

100. Whilst we accept that the default in failing to file the SATR in January 2025 may not have been intentional in the sense that the appellant, through Mr Aitken, believed that because his income was less than the personal allowance and no tax was due, that was a mistake and we cannot say that the appellant’s assumption that he need not file a SATR amounts to a reasonable excuse.

101. The core problem for the appellant is that, as the Upper Tribunal in Harrison made clear in the quotation to which we have added emphasis in paragraph 87 above, circumstances that existed after the filing date are only relevant in relation to whether the failure to file had been remedied without delay. Since this was a paper SATR, then the period of default runs from 31 October 2024.

102. Furthermore, and significantly, as can be seen, in the letter of 16 January 2025 the appellant recognised that a SATR “may be required” and we find that, in the absence of a response from HMRC before 31 January 2025, a prudent taxpayer would have filed the SATR albeit on paper.

103. That would have minimised the subsequent penalties. In addition, the refund of the CIS deductions would have been approved much earlier than it was.

104. Even if there had been a reasonable excuse in the first instance, which we have found that there was not, the issue to the appellant of the first late filing penalty notice on 10 March 2025 should have alerted him to his, by then very real, problem. As we record at paragraph 22 above, the penalty notice is explicit in its terms and states that even if the taxpayer thinks that no tax was due nevertheless the SATR must be filed.

105. In addition, the letters from HMRC dated 5 August, 15 September and 23 October 2025 and 20 January 2026 all told him that he was required to file the SATR. In particular, Officer Burn’s letter of 15 September 2025 explained precisely why the SATR had to be filed.

106. The appellant was also told very clearly, for example on 5 August 2025 (see paragraph 34 above), that HMRC could not agree that there was a reasonable excuse whilst the SATR was outstanding because any reasonable excuse must have lasted until the SATR was filed and that must have been without unreasonable delay.

107. Whilst we certainly accept that the Appellant became very frustrated, nevertheless after it was pointed out to him on more than one occasion, not just that he had to file to file the SATR and why, even if he did not think that it was necessary, he did not do so.

108. As can be seen, when the then HMRC litigator wrote to the appellant in very clear terms on 3 March 2026, the appellant still did not file the SATR and continued to advance the same arguments. The 29 page Statement of Reasons in this appeal dated 20 March 2026 still triggered no response and the (very short) SATR dated 16 April 2026 was only received by HMRC on 21 April 2026.

109. We find that the appellant did not remedy the default without delay.

110. HMRC concede in their Statement of Reasons that “there have been unfortunate delays in responding to the Appellant” and “the Appellant is entitled to complain about the service he has received from HMRC in response to his letters…as there were instances where the service could have been better”.

111. As we have indicated, and Ms Ritchie and the Statement of Reasons confirmed, the appellant’s right of redress in regard to those complaints is through HMRC’s complaints process and, in HMRC’s words, “including the option to ultimately escalate this to the Adjudicator's Office”.

112. We agree with HMRC that that is separate to the legal obligation to file the SATR.

113. HMRC are correct in arguing that a complaint about their failures “does not provide shelter for the Appellant’s continued failure to file…”.

114. We say that because we have considered all of circumstances in this appeal including the correspondence up until the eve of the appeal. We have identified in the quotation from Harrison the only situation in which the circumstances after the filing date can be relevant and that is whether there is a reasonable excuse for failing to file the SATR without delay.

115. For the reasons given, we have found that the appellant did not have a reasonable excuse for the failure to file the SATR and, even if we are wrong in that, he did not have a reasonable excuse after he heard from Officer Burns and the HMRC litigator in September 2025 and March 2026 respectively.

116. In that context, it was disappointing to note from the Self Assessment Notes (see paragraph 28 above) that the author of the letter of 17 June 2025, being the first to reply to the appellant, did not respond to his questions although it is evident that all six of the letters had been read.

117. We make that point in the interests of transparency only because the appellant is effectively unrepresented and, although we are not concerned with the twelve month penalty, we observe that it is possible that the twelve month penalty might have been avoided had a “proper” explanation been given along the lines of what was recorded in those Notes.

118. We say “might” because Officer Burns (see paragraph 40 above). in the letter dated 15 September 2025, in the paragraph that we have underlined, made it clear that the £1,000 threshold was important, and the letter of 16 January 2025 did not suffice. Therefore a SATR was required but the appellant appears not to have taken note of that until April 2026.

119. Lastly, it was argued by the appellant that the Tribunal should treat the deadline for filing the SATR as being 1 April 2025 (see paragraph 61 above). In short, the deadlines of 31 October and 31 January in any year are fixed by law and the Tribunal has no power whatsoever to amend that.

Do any special circumstances apply?

120. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 55 allows HMRC to reduce the penalty below the statutory minimum if they think it right to do so because of special circumstances.

121. As can be seen from paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 55, the appellant’s ability to pay the penalties cannot be a special circumstance.

122. In terms of paragraphs 22(3)(b) and (4) of Schedule 55, the Tribunal may rely on paragraph 16 but only if HMRC's decision was 'flawed' when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review. That is a high test.

123. In this appeal HMRC set out their reasoning for stating that there were no “special circumstances” under the heading “Special Reduction” at paragraphs 135 to 147 of their Statement of Reasons.

124. In particular, HMRC relied upon paragraphs 68 to 74 and paragraph 86 in Barry Edwards v HMRC [2019] UKUT 137 (TCC) (“Edwards”).

125. In paragraphs 68 to 74 the Upper Tribunal analysed the applicable authorities coming to the conclusion at paragraphs 72 to 74 that “special circumstances” should not be given a narrow meaning and that:

“What matters is whether HMRC (or where appropriate, the Tribunal) consider that the circumstances are sufficiently special that it is right to reduce the amount of the penalty”, and

“special circumstances may or may not operate on the person involved but what is key is whether the circumstance is relevant to the issue under consideration”.

126. In paragraph 86 of Edwards, the Upper Tribunal concluded that the penalty regime set out in Schedule 55 establishes a fair balance between the public interest in ensuring that taxpayers file their returns on time and the financial burden that a taxpayer who does not comply with the statutory requirement will have to bear.

127. The Upper Tribunal considered whether the fact that significant penalties had been levied for the late filing of returns where no tax was due was a relevant circumstance that HMRC should have taken into account when considering whether there were 'special circumstances' which justified a reduction in the penalties and decided that the answer was “no”.

128. Therefore, that cannot be a special circumstance for the appellant.

129. As we have explained, the “extenuating circumstances” advanced by the appellant (see paragraph 19 above) did not exist as at 31 October 2024 and, in any event are by no means unusual.

130. HMRC rightly pointed out that the penalty regime was established by Parliament to ensure that SATRs, and tax, are respectively filed and paid on time.

131. In this instance, we find that HMRC did take into account all of the arguments put forward by the appellant and that included acknowledging the delays on their part. We find that they did not take into account any irrelevant factors and that having regard to all of the available evidence the decision that there were no special circumstances was not irrational.

132. We find that HMRC’s decision in this regard is not flawed in a judicial review sense.

133. Lastly, in part the appellant has argued that to uphold the penalties would be unfair. As we explained during the hearing, the Upper Tribunal in HMRC v Hok [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC) held that this Tribunal does not have the power to discharge penalties on the ground that their imposition was unfair. The Tribunal can only consider the application of the statutory provisions.

Decision

134. For all these reasons, the penalties are upheld and the appeal is dismissed.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

135. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

20 October 2026

APPENDIX – RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1. The penalties at issue in this appeal are imposed by Schedule 55. The starting point is paragraph 3 of Schedule 55 which imposes a fixed £100 penalty if a self assessment return is submitted late.

2. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 55 provides for daily penalties to accrue where a return is more than three months late as follows:

4—

(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if)—

(a) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the penalty date,

(b) HMRC decide that such a penalty should be payable, and

(c) HMRC give notice to P specifying the date from which the penalty is payable.

(2) The penalty under this paragraph is £10 for each day that the failure continues during the period of 90 days beginning with the date specified in the notice given under sub-paragraph (1)(c).

(3) The date specified in the notice under sub-paragraph (1)(c)—

(a) may be earlier than the date on which the notice is given, but

(b) may not be earlier than the end of the period mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(a).

3. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 6 months late as follows:

5—

(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the penalty date.

(2) The penalty under this paragraph is the greater of—

(a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and

(b) £300.

4. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 55 provides for further penalties to accrue when a return is more than 12 months late as follows:

6—

(1) P is liable to a penalty under this paragraph if (and only if) P's failure continues after the end of the period of 12 months beginning with the penalty date.

(2) Where, by failing to make the return, P deliberately withholds information which would enable or assist HMRC to assess P's liability to tax, the penalty under this paragraph is determined in accordance with sub-paragraphs (3) and (4).

(3) If the withholding of the information is deliberate and concealed, the penalty is the greater of—

(a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and

(b) £300.

(3A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (3)(a), the relevant percentage is—

(a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 100%,

(b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 150%, and

(c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 200%.

(4) If the withholding of the information is deliberate but not concealed, the penalty is the greater of—

(a) the relevant percentage of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and

(b) £300.

(4A) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)(a), the relevant percentage is—

(a) for the withholding of category 1 information, 70%,

(b) for the withholding of category 2 information, 105%, and

(c) for the withholding of category 3 information, 140%.

(5) In any case not falling within sub-paragraph (2), the penalty under this paragraph is the greater of—

(a) 5% of any liability to tax which would have been shown in the return in question, and

(b) £300.

(6) Paragraph 6A explains the 3 categories of information.

5. Paragraph 23 of Schedule 55 contains a defence of “reasonable excuse” as follows:

23—

(1) Liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to a failure to make a return if P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure.

(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)—

(a) an insufficiency of funds is not a reasonable excuse, unless attributable to events outside P's control,

(b) where P relies on any other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took reasonable care to avoid the failure, and

(c) where P had a reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.

6. Paragraph 16 of Schedule 55 gives HMRC power to reduce penalties owing to the presence of “special circumstances” as follows:

16—

(1) If HMRC think it right because of special circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule.

(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does not include—

(a) ability to pay, or

(b) the fact that a potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential over-payment by another.

(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a penalty includes a reference to—

(a) staying a penalty, and

(b) agreeing a compromise in relation to proceedings for a penalty.

7. Paragraph 20 of Schedule 55 gives a taxpayer a right of appeal to the Tribunal and paragraph 22 of Schedule 55 sets out the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on such an appeal. In particular, the Tribunal has only a limited jurisdiction on the question of “special circumstances” as set out below:

22—

(1) On an appeal under paragraph 20(1) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may affirm or cancel HMRC's decision.

(2) On an appeal under paragraph 20(2) that is notified to the tribunal, the tribunal may—

(a) affirm HMRC's decision, or

(b) substitute for HMRC's decision another decision that HMRC had power to make.

(3) If the tribunal substitutes its decision for HMRC's, the tribunal may rely on paragraph 16—

(a) to the same extent as HMRC (which may mean applying the same percentage reduction as HMRC to a different starting point), or

(b) to a different extent, but only if the tribunal thinks that HMRC's decision in respect of the application of paragraph 16 was flawed.

(4) In sub-paragraph (3)(b) “flawed” means flawed when considered in the light of the principles applicable in proceedings for judicial review.

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our tax lawyer in Paris.


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