Administrative United Kingdom
Stilprime Ltd & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2656 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2025-MAN-000274
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY
Manchester Civil Justice Centre
1 Bridge Street West
Manchester
M60 9DJ
Date: 19/10/2026
Before :
JASON BEER KC
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
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Between :
| THE KING (on the application of Stilprime Ltd on its own behalf and on behalf of: 365 Concrete Ltd Border Mix Ltd Cardinalis Development Ltd All Mix Kent Ltd Master Mix Concrete Ltd David Wood T/A Alpha Concrete Ecomix Ltd Philip Wright (Transport) Limited) L&S Waste Management Limited and Screedflo Ltd) |
Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT |
Defendant
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Peter Dixon (instructed by Dyne Solicitors Limited) for the Claimant
Emily Wilsdon (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
APPROVED JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 19th October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archive.
Jason Beer KC (Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court):
A. Introduction
1. This is a claim for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for Transport (“the Secretary of State”), dated 18th March 2025, not to extend, or to make permanent, the temporary arrangements for the weight limits of Volumetric Concrete Mixers (“VCMs”) which expire in 2028. Those temporary arrangements were brought into effect in 2018 and were then set to last for a 10-year period. That was because (in high level summary) exemptions from the regulatory regime which VCMs otherwise enjoyed were at the same time removed and it was necessary to allow the VCM industry a period of grace to respond to the removal of the exemptions and in recognition of the fact that, as matters stood in 2018, the industry had invested significantly in VCMs.
2. Before the decision of 18th March 2025 was taken, the Department for Transport (“the Department”) sought views from the public on the issues of whether the temporary arrangements should continue past 2028; whether they should expire in 2028; or whether some other action should be taken. The Department also commissioned a study from consulting engineers as to (in broad summary) the impact that VCMs were having on the road network, in particular upon bridges.
3. The claim raises issues about the adequacy and fairness of the exercise undertaken by the Department, its interrelationship with the engineering study, the rationality of the Secretary of State’s decision and the adequacy of the reasons given for her decision.
B. The Facts
Volumetric Concrete Mixers
4. VCMs are a type of specialised heavy vehicle used to transport the constituent elements of concrete to a site, and then batch mix the required amount and specification of concrete in situ. They are different from traditional barrel or drum mixer vehicles because they transport both the concrete mixing equipment and the raw materials on the vehicle and perform the mixing function on site. They are sometimes also known as Mobile Concrete Batching Plants.
5. VCMs are useful and effective machines, in particular because: (i) they enable concrete to be made up when it is needed (thereby reducing waste and costs); (ii) they allow different mixes of concrete to be made on site, as the customer requires them; (iii) they allow deliveries to be made to multiple sites as part of a single ‘milk round’ journey; and (iv) they reduce the need for a second HGV to attend a site in order to pump the concrete (such a second HGV may be needed to attend to support a barrel mixer machine).
6. However, VCMs typically operate at higher weights than standard heavy goods vehicles, especially when they are fully loaded at the start of a journey.
The Claimant
7. The Claimant, which trades as Mixamate, is a VCM operator. It is a member of Batched on Site Association (“the BSA”), a trade body which represents the interests of this industry. Mr Chris Smith is a Director of the Claimant.
The Regulatory Regime
8. Operator licensing is the regulatory regime which exists to ensure the safe and proper use of goods vehicles and to protect the environment. Generally, operators are subject to the regulatory regime if they use vehicles above 3.5 tonnes to carry goods for hire or reward or in connection with a trade or business. The Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995, together with the Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Regulations 1995 (“the 1995 Regulations”) made thereunder, regulate the licensing of goods vehicle operators.
9. There existed an exemption from operator licensing for vehicles with mounted fixed plant or machinery and which also carried goods (including materials) for use in relation to that plant or machinery. This exemption was devised before VCMs existed in their current form, but was later utilised by operators of VCMs. More traditional barrel concrete mixers did not benefit from this exemption.
The 2014-2015 Consultation
10. On 11th December 2014 the Department opened a public consultation on removing the exemption from goods vehicle operator licensing and annual vehicle testing enjoyed by VCMs. The public consultation closed on 5th March 2015. The consultation sought views on the suggestion that some exemptions to the regulatory regime, in particular the exemption for vehicles with fixed plant that also carry goods (including VCMs), were no longer justifiable and should be removed.
11. In June 2017, having been commissioned by Highways England (now National Highways), WSP Parsons Brinkerhoff (a major global engineering and professional services consulting firm) produced a report concerning VCM loading impacts.
12. In December 2017 the Department published its response to the consultation exercise. In summary, it announced that it would proceed with the removal of the exemption from operator licensing that applied to operators of VCMsto bring VCMs into scope to comply with the standard 32 tonne weight limit for four (or more) axle rigid vehicles and to remove the exemption of VCMs from annual vehicle testing. The reasons given for the removal of the exemptions included:
The current operational practice of running some MCBP at up to (and sometimes beyond) their design gross weight (of around 42 tonnes) and above normal axle limits should not continue. It has implications for the wear and tear of road surfaces, which increase dramatically with axle loadings. The Department, working with Highways England, has reviewed the effect of the loading of these vehicles on older local authority-owned bridges. This loading is outside modelled tolerances and hence has an unacceptable, unknown negative impact on structures.
13. Announcing the new approach, the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Roads, Local Transport and Devolution stated: “This is a positive step, for the industry’s reputation, for road safety and for fair competition.”
14. The Department recognised, however, that business models had been developed by the VCM industry based on longstanding operational practice and that accordingly some temporary arrangements were necessary. These were described as follows:
[40] The Government has decided to put in place a temporary arrangement, using vehicle special orders (VSO). The VSOs will limit MCBP axle weights to no more than 20% greater than the standard limits, and limit gross vehicle weights to 38.4 tonnes (20% above the maximum standard limit) for the dominant 4-axle vehicle design (with similar arrangements for the much smaller number of 2-, 3- and 5-axle vehicles). The exact weight arrangements will also be subject to a vehicle's design weights.
[42] Our intention is that this regime will last between 7 and 10 years. In the open letter published alongside this document, we are seeking further representations on this point by 1 February 2018 before finalising the position shortly thereafter.
15. There then followed a series of discussions with, and lobbying by, industry representatives (including the BSA) about the temporary arrangements which it was said ought to be introduced.
16. On 5th April 2018 the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State wrote a letter to “interested parties” in which he set out the Department’s position on the temporary arrangements that had been mentioned back in December 2017. In summary, the letter stated as follows:
a. VCMs would come under the vehicle operator licensing regime from 1st September 2018;
b. A temporary arrangement in relation to VCM weights, to permit operation above the standard legal weight limits, would be introduced and would persist for 10 years – this was “…in recognition of the fact that common practice in recent years has been for [VCMs] to be operated at higher-than-normal weights” and “…this will help reduce the different impact on [VCM] operators with different fleet management models.”
c. It was said that a permanent derogation had been considered but rejected and that the expectation was that, at the end of the temporary arrangement, VCM operating weights would “converge on the legal weight limits applicable to other heavy goods vehicles.”
The Implementation of the Government’s Decisions
17. VCMs were brought within the plating and testing regime for heavy goods vehicles by the Goods Vehicles (Plating and Testing) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2017 and made subject to operator licensing requirements by the Goods and Motor Vehicles (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2018. The effect was to make VCMs subject to the same weight limits as other heavy goods vehicles: up to 32 tonnes for four-axle rigid vehicles and up to 40 tonnes for five-axle articulated vehicles.
18. The temporary arrangements that I have set out above were implemented through the use of Vehicle Special Orders (“VSOs”) issued under s44 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 (a provision which allows certain vehicles to operate on public roads outside the regulatory regime).The VSOs limited VCM axle weights to no more than 20% greater than the standard limits and limited gross vehicle weights to 38.4t (20% above the maximum standard limit) for the dominant 4-axle vehicle design (with similar arrangements for the much smaller number of 2-, 3- and 5-axle vehicles). The exact weight arrangements were subject to the individual vehicle’s design weight. The VSOs were operative for the vehicle to which they related until the first of 31st March 2028 or the 12th anniversary of the vehicle’s first registration.
19. The temporary arrangements operated with effect from 1st September 2018. The Department expected that the 10-year period would allow the industry time to align its operations with the standard weight limits of other vehicles – i.e. to gradually transition its VCMs to standard weights.
Events Leading to the Call for Evidence
20. In 2021 the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Low Carbon Construction Vehicles was formed. This appears to have led to considerable Parliamentary activity, including ministerial correspondence; Parliamentary Questions; a Westminster Hall debate; an Early Day Motion supporting the suggestion that temporary arrangements should be made permanent; and a Transport Committee non-inquiry.
21. In the light of this Parliamentary activity, the then Minister, Richard Holden MP, met with officials on 25th April 2023 – this was followed up by a written submission to the Minister (in summary) recommending that if he wished to consider changing position from justifying the current policy (viz. that the temporary arrangements would end in 2028 or the 12th anniversary of the VCM’s first registration), then a call for evidence should be launched. The submission noted that:
The case for change is being pressed strongly. Reopening the issue would allow some of the claims being made to be tested further. There are (as with other larger vehicle types) some public benefits, for example reduced carbon emissions, and the weight concession allows VCMs to carry similar payloads to the more common barrel mixers. Most operators are small or medium-sized businesses. Industry asserts strongly that their businesses will not be economically viable once the temporary arrangement finishes.
22. The submission also noted that a permanent extension of the temporary arrangements would be unlikely to be sustainable without a very extensive programme for the assessment of bridges.
23. On 19th June 2023 the Minister agreed to the recommendation made by officials and work commenced on launching a call for evidence.
Commissioning of the VCM Study
24. On 13th July 2023 the Department commissioned National Highways (the highway authority for the Strategic Road Network – comprising, in summary, most motorways and A Roads in England) to oversee and contract out a study to reassess the impact on existing bridge structures from higher weight VCMs permitted under the temporary arrangements. On 19th July 2023 National Highways appointed WSP (as it had by now become known) to conduct the study (“the NH Study”) under an existing framework contract.
25. The brief for the study specified that an assessment should be made against the LM1 load model (which is used for design) and ALM1/ALM 2 load models (used for assessment of structures) but updating the previous investigation to use vehicle configurations permitted under the VSO for VCMs. The Department requested that NH update the bridge assessment for VCMs for the 4-axle (at 38.4t) andthe 5-axle vehicle (at 44t) as these are the heaviest vehicles that are currently
permitted under the VSOs.
The Call for Evidence
26. The Department ran a call for evidence for 8 weeks between 19th October 2023 and 15th December 2023 (“the Call for Evidence”). The introduction to the Call for Evidence stated: “We are considering whether there is evidence to justify amending the current policy approach to the weight limits applied to VCMs.”
27. The Call for Evidence presented an analysis of the issues, identified issues of particular relevance to a potential change of policy and set out three policy options under consideration (albeit it made clear that the exercise was not limited to considering these three options – the Department was open other options):
a. Option 1: To maintain the status quo (i.e. maintain the position that the temporary arrangements will end in 2028);
b. Option 2: To allow VCMs to operate at the weights of the temporary VSOs so long as advanced notifications of routes are given; or
c. Option 3: To allow higher weight VCMs beyond 2028, subject to vehicle age requirements and operators being accredited by the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency’s Earned Recognition Scheme.
28. The Call for Evidence included 80 questions to which responses were invited (one of which was an open question inviting comments generally).
29. The Call for Evidence stated that any future policy actions were subject to the results of a “feasibility study”, “structures study” or “assessment of structures” (as it was variously described) being conducted by National Highways.The document did not provide further details of the feasibility study but mentioned the findings of the study carried out in 2017 “to understand the potential effects of VCMs being used above the standard weight limits on highways structures” and also referred to a “National Highways structures study being undertaken in autumn 2023” stating that the Department’s “assumption” was that any change to the existing weight limits regime for VCMs would need to comply with its conclusions.
The NH Study
30. On 6th February 2024 the NH Study was completed. The Executive Summary referred to the 2017 Study and stated that the Department had asked for an “updated investigation” using vehicle configurations permitted under the VSO regime. It stated that the load effects had been calculated according to the same methods used in the 2017 Study but that an additional analysis had been undertaken to calculate load effects in certain “more realistic” scenarios.
31. It compared the effects of heavier VCMs against standard assessment load models used to represent HGVs operating within the standard weight limits, modelling the effects of these vehicles in different scenarios. The findings indicated that when VCMs operate at higher weights permitted under the VSOs, they can impose load effects greater than the standard assessment load models. The study calculated load effects with an increased spacing of approximately 5.2m (compared to 3.0m in the June 2017 study). Despite the increased spacing which reduces the calculated load, the study found that in some bridge configurations, these higher weight VCMs imposed load effects on structures 16-17% above those from the standard assessment load models. This would impose greater structural stresses on bridges and an increased likelihood of exceeding their design capacity, which in turn could lead to greater maintenance requirements and potential safety risks.
Analysis of the responses to the Call for Evidence
32. The Call for Evidence resulted in 36 submissions being made to the Department (this included a submission from the BSA, which sought an indefinite extension of the VSOs beyond 2028) – this was not an option, because the only vehicles permitted to operate above the standard weight limitations are those which cannot practically comply (e.g. those which transport an indivisible piece of plant – e.g. wind turbine blades, or machinery – e.g. heavy cranes).
33. In February 2024 the National Centre for Social Research prepared an analysis of the responses provided during the Call for Evidence. It stated that opinions among respondents were divided over whether to make no change (Option 1), but unanimous in opposing arrangements for VCMs based on advance route notification, albeit for conflicting reasons (Option 2). It stated that opinions were divided over whether to allow VCMs to operate at higher weights subject to vehicle age and operator accreditation (Option 3).
Submissions to Ministers
34. On 15th March 2024 a submission was sent by officials to the then Minister, Guy Opperman MP, seeking a decision. That submission was not addressed before the General Election was announced on 20th June 2024, was not addressed after that announcement, and was not addressed in the months after the formation of a new Government on 5th July 2024. Instead, on 11th November 2024 a new submission was sent to the new Minister, Lilian Greenwood MP. The submission recommended that the Minister agree to: (i) publication of the analysis from the Call for Evidence, the NH Study and a policy statement; (ii) maintain the existing weights policy, meaning that VCMs would need to comply with standard HGV weight limits from 1st April 2028.
35. On 20th November 2024 the Minister agreed to the recommendations in the submission.
The Decision
36. On 18th March 2025 the Defendant decided (in high level summary), through its communications as set out below, that VCMs should comply with the standard legal weight limits once the current temporary arrangements ended in March 2028. The Department communicated the Defendant’s decision in three ways:
a. First, by the publication of a document on the Department’s website entitled Volumetric concrete mixers: Call for evidence outcome;
b. Second, by the sending of a letter dated 18th March 2025 to “interested colleagues” (including the Claimant); and
c. Third,the publication of a one-page document entitled Volumetric Concrete Mixers (VCM) Fact Sheet – March 2025.
I explain each these three means of communication in a little more detail below. I should also say that, on the same date, the Department published (i) the February 2024 report by the National Centre for Social Research which summarised the results of the Call for Evidence and (ii) the NH Study – but neither of these documents constituted, or are said to have constituted, the Defendant’s statement to the public of her decision.
Volumetric concrete mixers: Call for Evidence outcome
37. This was a four-page document, albeit much of that was taken up with cover pages. The text that provided relevant information to those interested in the issues occupied a mere 1¼ pages. Of those 1¼ pages, as will be seen, nearly all of the text concerned the National Highways study, and only 11 words related to the Call for Evidence (despite the title of the document suggesting that its purpose was to address the outcome of the Call for Evidence). I set out below the entirety of the substantive text of the document:
Introduction
The Department for Transport (DfT) commissioned a report through National Highways (NH) on the impact on existing bridge structures from higher weight volumetric concrete mixers (VCMs) permitted under the current temporary arrangement to inform future decisions. The final report provides a summary of findings related to the viability of allowing VCMs to continue operating at higher weights.
The report compared the forces exerted by the VCMs to the standard highway vehicle load model used for assessing bridges and found the effects were up to 17% greater than for vehicles complying with the current standard weight limits. This will likely result in increased wear and tear and may impact the durability and lifespan of existing bridges. In addition to the impact on bridges, heavier vehicles also put more stress on roads.
Overload is likely to result in increased wear and tear to bridge elements and components. For example, this could lead to:
• cracking to concrete bridges
• accelerated deterioration of expansion joints
• increased wearing of surfacing
Significant resources and funding will need to be diverted to manage structures overloaded by VCMs.
In addition to the impact on bridges, heavier vehicles also put more stress on roads. Increasing the weight limit for 4 axle VCMs from 32 tonnes to 38.4 tonnes could more than double the average road wear per vehicle, which impacts maintenance costs and safety.
The implications from the NH report are that the continued operation of higher weight VCMs is not sustainable. This means that the only viable options from the call for evidence are:
• option 1: 'do nothing'
• option 2: 'advanced route notification'
Responses to the call for evidence highlighted concerns for option 2.
Next steps
The current policy position will be maintained. This allows VCMs to operate at increased weights via vehicle special orders (VSOs) until 2028 or the 12th anniversary of the vehicle's first registration, whichever comes sooner.
This arrangement, implemented in 2018, permits VCMs to operate at up to 38.4 tonnes for 4 axle rigid vehicles and up to 44 tonnes for 5 axle rigid vehicles.
The length of the arrangement was agreed to provide sufficient time for industry to transition to compliant vehicles. At the end of the temporary arrangement, VCMs must operate at the legal weight limits applicable to other heavy goods vehicles.
[emphasis added]
Letter to “Interested colleagues” dated 18th March 2025
38. On 18th March 2025 the Minister for Roads sent a letter entitled “Outcome of Volumetric Concrete Mixers Review” to “Interested colleagues” (including the Claimant). The letter relevantly stated as follows:
I am writing to confirm the Government's decision that Volumetric Concrete Mixers (VCMs) should comply with standard legal weight limits once the current temporary arrangement ends in 2028…
A call for evidence was held between October-December 2023 by the previous administration, to seek views on whether to change the policy on VCM weights. The responses did not provide any significant new evidence. The arguments made in favour of allowing these vehicles to continue to operate at a higher weight limit than other heavy vehicles were not unique to VCMs and did not provide a compelling rationale for granting a permanent exemption.
National Highways was commissioned to assess the impact on existing bridge structures from the higher weight VCMs permitted under the temporary arrangement. The report compared the forces exerted by the VCMs to the standard highway vehicle load model used for assessing bridges and found the effects were up to 17% greater than for vehicles complying with the current standard weight limits. This will likely result in increased wear and tear and may impact the durability and lifespan of existing bridges.
Bridges built to the post-2010 standards are not adversely impacted by higher weight VCMs. However, this only applies to around 1% of the existing bridge stock on the Strategic Road Network. Whilst some bridges built to the older standards may still be able to accommodate the higher weight, it is our consideration that overall, the risk of allowing the continued operation of higher weight VCMs is not sustainable.
In addition to the impact on bridges, heavier vehicles also put more stress on roads. Increasing the weight limit for 4-axle VCMs from 32 tonnes to 38.4 tonnes could more than double the average road wear per vehicle, which impacts maintenance costs and safety.
Following a thorough review of all available evidence, the current policy will remain unchanged. While this may be disappointing for some, allowing VCMs to continue operating above the legal weight limits which apply to other similar vehicles is not a sustainable option for the nation's road network.
By the end of the ten-year exemption period, VCMs will need to comply with the legal weight limits applicable to other heavy goods vehicles… Existing vehicles can continue to be operated beyond the end of the temporary arrangement provided they are not loaded beyond the legal weight limits.
Volumetric Concrete Mixers (VCM) Fact Sheet – March 2025
39. The Department published a single page fact sheet (“the Fact Sheet”). The material parts of it stated as follows:
Why are the current weight limits for VCMs changing?
• Fairness & Safety: Other heavy lorries must comply with the weight limits set out in the Road Vehicles Authorised Weight Regulations 1998, as amended. VCMs should too.
• Protecting roads and bridges: National Highways report found the load effects from heavier VCMs to be up to 17% higher than the load In addition to the impact on bridges, heavier vehicles also put more stress on roads, which impacts maintenance costs and safety.
• There’s been time to change: The 10-year transition was designed to give businesses time to switch to compliant vehicles. By 2028, there will have been plenty of time to prepare. VCMs account for just under 5% of the total fleet of concrete delivery vehicles.
What Happens Next?
From 2028, VCMs must follow the same weight rules as other lorries. There will be no further extensions.
The 10-year transition was an appropriate adjustment period, and operators have had time to plan for the change. Businesses are expected to adapt, as other industries do when regulations change.
Existing vehicles can continue to operate beyond the end of the temporary arrangement provided they are loaded to the lower weight limits (e.g. up to 32 tonnes for four-axle rigid vehicles).
40. On 20th March 2025 Mr Smith wrote to the Minister for the Future of Roads, Lillian Greenwood MP:
a. Noting that the BSA’s request, backed by 155 MPS, to make permanent the current weight regime for VCMs had been rejected;
b. Expressing the disappointment of the VCM industry at the decision which, he said, comprised of over 200 manufacturers, employing 15,000 skilled workers, and contributed over £380 million to the economy;
c. Suggesting that if he could not sell 44-tonne VCMs to the domestic market, he would have to close his factory in Sheffield;
d. Noting that the NH Report included the following sentence: “The findings in this study could be reviewed in the future if sufficient statistical data for VCM load distribution becomes available such that the adoption of reduced overload factors similar to CS 458 can be justified”, and asking for a report to be commissioned that addressed real VCM load distribution and the real running weights of VCMs; and
e. Asking for a meeting with the Minister.
41. On 6th May 2025 the Minister replied to Mr Smith’s letter. In it, she sought to refute some of the points that he had made, suggested that the decision of 18th March 2025 had not been taken lightly, and offered to meet with him.
42. On 12th May 2025 a meeting took place between the Minister, departmental officials, Mr Smith and industry representatives. The meeting involved a wide-ranging discussion (as the minutes disclose). The most significant points for present purposes are that Mr Smith and other industry representatives (i) challenged the methodology of the NH Study on a range of grounds, and (ii) stated that it was planned to commission an independent report on VCM weight limits.
The Claim
43. The Claimant, along with the wider membership of BSA, continued to remain aggrieved by the Defendant’s decision, not least because of the effect that it is likely to have on its existing business model after March 2028.
44. After exchanges of letters between the Claimant and the Defendant in accordance with the JRPAP on 28th May and 13th June 2025 respectively, the Claimant issued this claim on 17th June 2025. It is brought on behalf of the Claimant itself and (with the permission of Christopher Kennedy KC, sitting as a DHCJ, in his Order of 16th January 2026) in a representative capacity on behalf of some other members of the BSA.
45. The decision under challenge is that of the Defendant of 18th March 2025 not to extend or to make permanent the temporary arrangements for the weight limits of VCMs put in place in 2018.
46. There are four grounds of challenge set out in the Claimant’s Amended Statement of Facts and Grounds:
a. First, that the Defendant’s failure to consult on (i) the contents of the NH Study and / or (ii) the responses to the Call for Evidence before making his decision of 18th March 2025 was unlawful because it was in breach of a legal duty to do so and / or in breach of a legitimate expectation that the Defendant would do so.
b. Second, that the exercise undertaken by the Defendant was in any event an unfair consultation because either (i) the Defendant had decided before the commencement of the Call for Evidence that the conclusions of the NH Study would be determinative and / or (ii) the Call for Evidence was conducted without the outcome of the NH Study being available to respondents at the time of the Call for Evidence.
c. Third, that the Defendant’s reliance on the NH Study was irrational.
d. Fourth, that the Defendant failed to give adequate and intelligible reasons for her decision.
Order Granting Permission
47. On 3rd September 2025 HHJ Bird (sitting as a Judge of the High Court) gave permission to proceed with the claim on all grounds, noting in his reasons:
(1) If the call for evidence ("CFE") was indeed a call for evidence then it is arguable that the Defendant ought to have explained how the evidence impacted the decision-making process or ought to have consulted once the CFE had completed.
(2) It is arguable that the CFE was a consultation. If so, it is arguable the consultation was unfair.
(3) Ground 3 seems to be a catch all ground which adds little to the others.
(4) In all the circumstance permission is granted on all grounds.
C. The Law
D.
Circumstances in which a duty to consult may arise
General
48. A public body or decision maker owes no general duty in all cases to consult interested persons before deciding upon a measure (see e.g. R(Moseley) v Haringey London Borough Council [2014] 1 WLR 3947). But the decision maker may become subject to such a duty in certain circumstances. The legal principles setting out the circumstances in which such a duty arises are summarised in the well-known passage from the judgment of the Divisional Court, given by Hallett LJ, in R (Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662 (Admin) at [97]-[98](11). Having noted that the duty to consult is an incident of the common law principle of fairness, at [98(2)] she said:
There are four main circumstances where a duty to consult may arise. First, where there is a statutory duty to consult. Second, where there has been a promise to consult. Third, where there has been an established practice of consultation. Fourth, where, in exceptional circumstances, a failure to consult would lead to conspicuous unfairness. Absent these factors, there will be no obligation on a public body to consult…
49. These four categories have sometimes been collapsed into three categories (with Hallett LJ’s second and third categories being merged into one) – see e.g. Laing LJ in Eveleigh v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2023] EWCA Civ 810 at [7]. That is how I propose to approach matters.
50. The Claimant does not in this case suggest that there was any statutory duty to consult or that it was conspicuously unfair not to have consulted. It follows that I need only concentrate on legitimate expectation.
Legitimate expectation (whether because of a promise, or a sufficiently consistent past practice of consultation)
51. The bar for a claimant is a high one where the duty to consult is alleged to be based on an established practice of consultation. The practice must be sufficiently clear and well established to be tantamount to a promise or assurance that there will be consultation in the circumstances which have arisen: see Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 at 408G-H. In R v Devon County Council, ex parte Baker [1995] All ER 73 at 88-89 Simon Brown LJ said:
The final category of legitimate expectation encompasses those cases in which it is held that a particular procedure, not otherwise required by law in the protection of an interest, must be followed consequent upon some specific promise or practice. Fairness requires that the public authority be held to it. The authority is bound by its assurance, whether expressly given by way of a promise or implied by way of established practice.
[emphasis added]
52. In R(Bapio) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 1139 Sedley LJ held at [39] that "while a practice does not have to be unbroken, it has to be sufficiently consistent to be regarded as more than an occasional act". Other authorities have referred to a practice being "so unambiguous, so widespread, so well-established and so well-recognised as to carry within it a commitment": see R(Davies) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] UKSC 47.
53. Having reviewed the authorities, in R (MP) v Secretary of State for Health and Social Care [2020] EWCA Civ 1634, Newey LJ summarised the law on this issue as follows:
(i) an express promise, representation or assurance needs to be "clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification" to give rise to any legitimate expectation, whether substantive or procedural; (ii) a practice must be tantamount to such a promise if it is to found any legitimate expectation. It may be, as Sedley LJ said in BAPIO, that a practice does not have to be entirely unbroken, but it does have to be so consistent as to imply clearly, unambiguously and without relevant qualification that it will be followed in the future.
Voluntary consultation
54. In R v North and East Devon Health Authority ex parte Coughlan [2001] QB 213, before setting out the four well known requirements of a consultation (as to which, see below), Lord Woolf MR observed, at [108]:
It is common ground that, whether or not consultation of interested parties and the public is a legal requirement, if it is embarked upon it must be carried out properly.
55. That observation has given rise to considerable debate, most notably by the Divisional Court in R (Association of Personal Injury Lawyers) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWHC 1358 (Admin) ("APIL"), and by the Court of Appeal in R (Eveleigh) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2023] EWCA Civ 810, [2023] 1 WLR 3599 (“Eveleigh”) and R (National Council for Civil Liberties) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 571, [2025] 3 WLR 543 (“NCCL”).
56. APIL concerned a challenge by the Secretary of State for Justiceto reduce the fixed legal costs recoverable by solicitors representing claimants in low-value road traffic accident personal injury cases. Before announcing the policy, the Government held discussions with representatives of the insurance industry, but did not invite representatives of personal injury claimants or their solicitors to participate. The Association of Personal Injury Lawyers (APIL) and the Motor Accident Solicitors Society (MASS) argued that the reduction in recoverable costs could undermine access to justice by making it financially difficult for solicitors to represent injured claimants and that once the Government had voluntarily begun consulting insurers, fairness required it to consult other affected groups. Dismissing the challenge based on the failure to consult, Elias LJ held as follows:
[44] Contact with interest groups (or 'stakeholders', I think it is, given the modern spin) is the very warp and woof of democratic government; it is central to decision making. It means that Government is better informed of the implications of the different options, and will more likely to be made aware of potential pitfalls, political or otherwise, which the decision may create… It must be for Government to decide what information it requires, and from what source and at what time, in order to facilitate its decision making. If the Government decides to enter into a formal consultation process, that exercise must satisfy the Gunning requirements if it is to be fair and meaningful. But, in my view, a court cannot justifiably infer that a minister has entered into a consultation exercise merely because a decision is taken after a meeting with a particular interest group, even where representations from that group have, in fact, proved decisive. The purpose of the meeting may have been to clarify a particular matter, or to gauge the strength of the group's opposition to a proposed decision, or simply so that the Government will be able to trumpet that group's support for the decision when it was announced. None of this could remotely be said to amount to consultation with all the baggage inherent in that process.
[44] I agree with [counsel for the Secretary of State] that there is no principled basis for determining when the process amounts to consultation and when it involves discussions falling short of that. If a government is persuaded to a view as a result of information volunteered to it, [counsel for the claimants] accepts that that would not be consultation. But is it different if the Government solicits the same information? And if the Government seeks an exchange of views with one body, must it necessarily do so with respect to other potentially interested parties whenever it finds those views persuasive? And how do we determine whether it has found those views decisive? In my judgment, there is no safe mooring for the principle on which [counsel] relies. It is not the function of the courts to map out the way in which Government approaches its task of decision making. If the Government chooses to go down the road of formal consultation, then the courts have the obligation to make sure it is fairly carried out, but in my judgment they should go no further than that.
[45] The process of government would, in my view, grind to a halt if the nature of a government's obligations were as outlined by [counsel for the claimants]. Government must be able to take advice, obtain information, secure undertakings, and garnish support from various interest groups without being required to treat their polar opposites in precisely the same way. This is not unfair: it is simply practical governance. If Government is perceived to be deaf to some interest groups but not others, or unresponsive to interests to which it is ideologically unsympathetic, that is a matter for the ballot box; it is not a matter for the courts.
[emphasis added]
57. In Eveleigh the Government was developing a National Disability Strategy, intended to improve the lives of disabled people in the UK. Before publishing the Strategy, the DWP conducted a UK Disability Survey to gather information about disabled people's experiences, needs and opinions. The survey was described in some Government materials as a consultation, and the Government stated that responses would help shape the Strategy – but the survey did not provide participants with specific policy proposals or possible alternatives. Four disabled individuals challenged the Strategy through judicial review, arguing that the Government had failed to conduct a lawful consultation. At first instance the judge allowed the claim and quashed the Strategy, holding that the Survey had been a consultation at common law and as such had been required to satisfy the four 'Gunning criteria', but had failed to satisfy the second Gunning criterion, which was that the proposer of the proposal being consulted on had to have given sufficient reasons for the proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response.
58. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that, although the Survey had been referred to as consultative in nature, it was not the kind of consultation that attracted the Gunning criteria because it was not carried out for the purpose of a specific governmental decision. Giving the main judgment, Elizabeth Laing LJ held as follows:
[81] As [counsel for the claimants] accepted, there is no magic in the word 'consultation'. It is a word which in ordinary usage has a range of meanings. The mere use of that word cannot entail legal consequences, especially if that word is used by people who are not lawyers. For that reason, the repeated use by the Disability Unit of the word 'consultation' and the fact that the Survey was put on the Consultation Hub are legally irrelevant. As Simler J recognised in para 99 of R (FDA) v Minister for the Cabinet Office [2018] EWHC 2746 (Admin) whether, when a public authority engages with the public, that engagement attracts legal obligations is a question of substance, not form.
[82] …the Judge did not expressly explain what test he applied in deciding that the Survey was a consultation which attracted legal obligations. In my judgment, the Gunning criteria are based on self-evident assumptions about the characteristics of the exercise to which they are able, and are intended, to apply. If the exercise in question does not have those characteristics, the Gunning criteria cannot apply to it. It is therefore necessary to spell out those assumptions, as, contrary to [counsel's] submissions, they do tell us a great deal about the characteristics of the exercise to which they are intended to apply.
[83] All the cases in which the Gunning criteria have been held to apply are cases in which a public authority contemplated making a specific decision which would or might adversely affect a particular person or group of people. …
[84] Unsurprisingly, it might be thought, the Gunning criteria therefore assume that a public authority is proposing to make a specific decision which is likely to have a direct (and usually adverse) impact on a person or on a defined group of people. The Strategy is not comparable with those proposed decisions. It is a different thing altogether: a series of general policy commitments which are at such a high level of abstraction that it is not easy to see their direct negative (or positive) impact on a particular person or group of people. So the Strategy is not obviously the type of intended decision to which the Gunning criteria can, or are intended to, apply.
[85] The Gunning criteria also make two assumptions about the stage of the decision-making process at which they apply. The first is that there is a proposal to make a decision, which, while not inchoate, is at a sufficiently 'formative' stage that the views of those consulted might influence it. But the second assumption, which sheds light on what is meant by 'formative stage' in this context, is that the proposal has crystallised sufficiently that the public authority also knows what the proposed decision may be, and is able to explain why it might make that proposed decision, in enough detail to enable consultees to respond intelligently to that proposed course of action…
[emphasis added]
59. In NCCL the Court of Appeal held that the Government had acted unlawfully by introducing regulations that lowered the threshold at which police could impose restrictions on public protests. However, the Court also held that the Government's discussions with policing bodies did not amount to a formal consultation that required it to invite representations from protesters or their representatives. In relation to this latter point, Counsel for Liberty submitted that Eveleigh was authority for the proposition that it followed from the Gunning principles that a process of engagement with stakeholders would constitute a "consultation" in the formal sense and have to be conducted fairly (not only as regards the Gunning principles themselves but also as regards who was consulted) if it satisfied the following three criteria: (a) that there was a sufficiently crystallised proposal; (b) that it was likely that the proposal would impact a particular group (usually adversely); and (c) that the proposal was at a formative stage. The Court of Appeal roundly rejected that submission, holding:
[98] I do not believe that any such proposition can be extracted from Eveleigh. Elisabeth Laing LJ does indeed say in terms that where any of the characteristics implicitly assumed in Gunning were absent a putative consultation process would not be subject to the Gunning requirements: see the third sentence of para. 82. But that is not the same as saying that where they were all present the process would necessarily constitute a formal consultation attracting those requirements or, more generally, a requirement of fairness extending also to the selection of consultees. In other words, even if the "criteria" identified by [counsel for Liberty] are necessary, they are not necessarily sufficient…
[99] If [Counsel for Liberty’s] submission were right, the result would be make a huge inroad into the hitherto well-understood position that at common law the duty to consult is confined to the limited and specific classes of case identified in Plantagenet Alliance. It would mean that, in a case where there was otherwise no statutory or common law obligation to consult, a decision-maker would nevertheless come under such an obligation if they chose to engage with any third party in circumstances satisfying her three criteria. It will in practice be very common for public authorities contemplating a legislative measure which will affect a particular group or groups to wish to have some such engagement; and if they do it is most likely to occur at a time when the proposal is "sufficiently crystallised" and at a formative stage: that is just when it is most likely to be useful. Yet if they do so they will, on Liberty's case, become automatically obliged to apply the Gunning principles and, it appears, to consult a fairly chosen group representing persons potentially affected. That seems to me wholly inconsistent with the law as it has developed in this field.
[emphasis added]
The requirements of a fair consultation
60. The four essential requirements of a fair consultation were described first in R v Brent London Borough Council, Ex p. Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168 (hence their subsequent description as the Gunning requirements or Gunning criteria) and have been endorsed many time since, most notably by Lord Woolf MR in Coughlan at [108] and by Lord Wilson in R (Moseley) v LB Haringey [2014] 1 WLR 3947 at [25]-[26]). They are as follows:
a. First, that consultation must be at a time when proposals are still at a formative stage.
b. Second, that the proposer must give sufficient reasons for any proposal to permit of intelligent consideration and response.
c. Third, that adequate time must be given for consideration and response.
d. Fourth, that the product of consultation must be conscientiously taken into account in finalising any proposals.
61. It is important to recognise the purpose of public consultation. As Baker LJ noted in R(Article 39) v Secretary of State for Education [2020] EWCA Civ 1577 at [37], its purpose "has various strands": first, to improve the quality of decision making; secondly, to ensure fairness is accorded to those who may be affected by a regulatory change and to avoid the sense of injustice they may feel if they are not consulted; and thirdly, as "part of a wider democratic process".
Reasons
62. As it was accepted by the Defendant that she was under a duty to give reasons for her decision of 18th March 2025, I need not dwell on the cases relating to when such a duty arises. Instead, the focus is on what in law constitutes adequate reasons. This can be stated shortly: in the present context, reasons must be clear and intelligible; they must enable a reader to understand why the matter was decided in the way that it was and what conclusions were reached on the principal controversial issues; they must not give rise to substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law; and they may be briefly stated (the degree of particularity required depending entirely upon the nature of the issues falling for decision) (see, amongst many other cases South Bucks District Council v. Porter (No.2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at [36]).
E. Analysis, Findings and Conclusions
The Issues
63. There is a certain artificiality to the division of the issues between Grounds 1 and 2 of the claim:
a. Ground 1 suggests that the Defendant failed to consult on two matters – the contents of the NH Study and / or the responses to the Call for Evidence. It suggests that these failures were unlawful in two ways – because they were in breach of a legal duty generally to consult with the Claimant (and therefore upon these two matters) and / or in breach of a legitimate expectation that the Defendant would so consult.
b. Ground 2 alleges that, if the Call for Evidence was in substance a consultation process, then it was unfair (i) because it did not allow participants to see the outcome of the NH Study before expressing their views; and (ii) for the additional reason that the Defendant did not approach the issue with an open mind, having already decided that the outcome of the exercise would be determined by the NH Study.
64. The division is artificial because (i) this is a case where the Defendant did in fact carry out an exercise in which she sought the views of the public (and therefore the industry, and therefore the Claimant) before making her policy decision; and (ii) the first issue that therefore naturally arises is whether the exercise (on the Defendant’s case, voluntary) undertaken by the Defendant was in law a consultation exercise (with the consequential issues, if so, of whether the four essential requirements of a fair consultation were discharged).
65. It follows that the issues that arise under Grounds 1 and 2 ought in my view to be addressed as follows:
a. First, did the exercise that the Defendant in fact undertook amount in law to a consultation exercise?
b. Second, was the Defendant under a duty in law to undertake a consultation exercise?
c. Third, if the answers to either (or both) of the first two questions is “yes”, were the four requirements of a fair consultation discharged by the exercise that was in fact undertaken?
66. Ground 3 alleges that the Defendant irrationally placed reliance on the WSP Study, in particular because she found that the findings of the study meant that to allow continued use of higher weight VCMs would be “not sustainable” whereas the Study did not support that conclusion. This is the fourth issue.
67. Ground 4 alleges that the Defendant did not give adequate, intelligible reasons for her decision of 18th March 2025. This is the fifth issue.
Issue 1: Did the exercise that the Defendant undertook amount in law to a consultation exercise?
68. The only exercise identified by the Claimant that might, on its case, constitute a voluntary consultation by the Defendant was the Call for Evidence.
69. The Call for Evidence uses the word “consultation” in a number of places in relation to the exercise that was being undertaken:
a. In explaining the Call for Evidence, this sentence appears: “Pending the outcome of the call for evidence, there may befurther consultation if there is a decision to make legal changes or a change in policy” (emphasis added).
b. Under the hearing “Freedom of Information” this sentence appears: “Information provided in response to this consultation, including personal information, may be subject to publication or disclosure in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) or the Environmental Information Regulations 2004” (emphasis added).
c. Under the heading “Consultation principles”, this appears: “This consultation is being conducted in line with the government's consultation principles guidance. If you have any comments about the consultation process, contact: Consultation Co-ordinator, Department for Transport, Zone 1/29 Great Minster House, London SW1P 4DR” (emphasis added). A link to a webpage dealing with the Government’s Consultation Principles was also given, alongside an email address beginning with consultation@…
70. As I have explained above, the characterisation of an exercise as a “consultation” in the relevant documents is not determinative of whether it constituted consultation as a matter of public law: Eveleigh at [81]. Thus, there is no magic in the word ‘consultation’ and that the repeated use of that expression, including in the Call for Evidence, was legally irrelevant to whether the exercise undertaken attracted legal consultation obligations. The question is one of substance, not form.
71. Before I move on to look at the substance of the exercise that was undertaken by the Call for Evidence, I should address in a little more detail the rather odd line in it which reads: “Pending the outcome of the call for evidence, there may be further consultation if there is a decision to make legal changes or a change in policy.” No-one at the hearing could adequately explain what this sentence means, worthy as it is of the Pythia speaking at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. It could mean (among many other things): (i) whilst the call for evidence is underway, and before it is concluded, the Department may in fact decide to change the law or introduce a change in policy – if it does so, it may consult before doing so; or (ii) after the end of the Call for Evidence, but before the results of it have been published, the Department may in fact decide to change the law or introduce a change in policy – if it does so, it may consult before doing so. Notably, on either construction the rather curious suggestion is made that the Department would consult after a decision is made – this is, of course, the wrong way around. In the event, because of the inane nature of this sentence (which ought never to have appeared in the Call for Evidence: it is disagreeable by reason of vague and uncertain meaning), by the end of the hearing neither party founded an argument based on it.
72. Turning to the substance of the Call for Evidence, the proper inquiry is into the nature, purpose, content and stage of the exercise actually undertaken, applying the analysis in Eveleigh at [82]–[87], rather than the terminology adopted to describe it.
73. In my judgement the engagement that the Defendant undertook with the public, and with the VCM industry in particular, through the Call for Evidence, was not in law a consultation. Instead, it was part of the warp and weft (or woof, as Elias LJ described it in APIL at [44]) of democratic government. The Call for Evidence was a voluntary exercise undertaken by the Defendant. It sought to obtain some information about some issues. In the assessment of this issue, it must be borne in mind that the policy introduced in 2018 was designed to allow time for businesses to switch to compliant vehicles and that, in the event, that policy remained unchanged – this was not one of those cases in which a putative decision may deprive a person of some benefit or advantage which he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do so – here, the opposite is the case: the temporary arrangements were scheduled to come to an end. It was patent on the face of the Call for Evidence that that exercise was to run in parallel with the NH Study – no reasonable person could properly understand that the Call for Evidence was itself a consultation exercise when it was being conducted concurrently with another process the product of which would inevitably contribute to decision-making (and respondents to the Call for Evidence were not being shown the product of that other exercise, nor was there a promise that they would be shown that product).
74. For all of these reasons, the exercise undertaken by the Defendant was not in law a consultation.
Issue 2: was the Defendant under a duty in law to undertake a consultation exercise?
75. Although in some of the documents prepared for the purposes of this claim the Claimant asserted that the Defendant was under a legal duty to undertake a consultation exercise other than by reason of a legitimate expectation that the Defendant would so consult, in fact the only basis on which the Claimant alleges that such a duty arose is by reason of a legitimate expectation (accordingly no suggestion arises that there was a statutory duty to consult, or that it was would have been conspicuously unfair for the Defendant not to have consulted).
76. As I have explained above, a legitimate expectation as to consultation may arise from (i) an express promise, representation or assurance that there will be such a consultation – in each case, the relevant words need to be clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification; or (ii) a consistent practice (even if it is not entirely unbroken) which is tantamount to such a promise because it implies clearly, unambiguously and without relevant qualification that it will be followed in the future. It can immediately be seen why the bar for a claim has been described as a high one.
77. The Claimant does not allege that there existed any express promise, representation or assurance that there would be such a consultation, and so that can be put to one side.
78. Turning to the second limb on which a legitimate expectation may arise, on analysis, the Claimant does not really allege that the Defendant has adopted consistent practice of consulting which is tantamount to a promise to consult. Instead, the essence of its case is that: the Claimant had a particular and direct interest in the outcome; the Claimant was involved in discussions between the industry and the Defendant in connection with the 2018 decision; the Claimant was involved in discussions between the industry and the Defendant that preceded the decisions to commission the Call for Evidence and the NH Study; and the letter of 18th March 2025 was sent to the Claimant (and accompanied by a courtesy call from the Minister). But none of this is nearly sufficient to give rise to a legitimate expectation that the Defendant would undertake a formal consultation exercise – it amounts to different ways of saying that the Claimant was particularly and directly interested in the outcome of the decision-making process. The authorities establish that this alone is not enough.
79. The case was sometimes put slightly differently in argument – namely that the Claimant had a legitimate expectation that the Defendant would consult after, or in the light of, the publication of the outcome of the Call for Evidence and / or the publication of the NH Study (so that the Claimant and others were given an opportunity to comment on the methodology of the NH Study, its conclusions and the weight that the defendant should place upon them). But that case fails too – nothing that the Department said or did could give rise to any legitimate expectation that the Department would publish the results of either exercise and then consult upon them, or that the Defendant had in the past adopted a consistent practice that amounted to a promise that it would do so. Indeed, all of the evidence is to the opposite effect. In this regard, I note in particular that:
a. The process which the Defendant adopted in 2023 – 2025, leading to the 18th March 2025 decision, largely replicated the process that it took in 2014 – 2018 and which lead to the decision of 5th April 2018. Most notably the exercise which sought the views of the public, including the industry, between 11th December 2014 and 5th March 2015: (i) preceded the June 2017 WSP Parsons Brinkerhoff study, (ii) the Defendant did not publish the WSP Parsons Brinkerhoff study and then revert to a further exercise of engagement with the public before making the decision of 5th April 2018, and (iii) the Defendant did not publish the outcome of the exercise that had ended on 5th March 2015 before making the decision of 5th April 2018.I should note in this regard that the 11th December 2014 – 5th March 2015 exercise was described in its launch material (and in some later material) as a consultation. Although there was no debate before me whether what happened was in law a consultation, I have proceeded on the basis that it was, not least because the Defendant describes the 2014-2015 exercise in her Detailed Grounds and in her Skeleton Argument as a public consultation. Notwithstanding this fact, the Claimant has not submitted that, because the 2014-2015 exercise was in law a consultation a legitimate expectation accordingly arose that the Defendant would do the same in 2023 – 2025.
b. The Call for Evidence made it clear that any future policy actions were subject to the results of a “feasibility study”, “structures study” or “assessment of structures” (as it was variously described) being conducted by National Highways. These were explicit statements made by the Department that (i) there was to be a study conducted by or on behalf of National Highways, and (ii) that decision-making by the Defendant was subject to the results of that study. The Call for Evidence made no reference whatsoever to inviting comment, feedback, suggestions or any input from respondents regarding the NH Study, its methodology, or its conclusions. Not only was there no promise or indication that the results of the study would be made public before any decision was taken (whether to allow interested parties to make further representations or otherwise), but the Call for Evidence read as a whole suggested that each of the exercises – the study and the Call for Evidence – were to take place concurrently.
80. It is right, as the Claimant submits, that there was certainly plenty of time for the Defendant to undertake a consultation exercise that included (i) disclosure of the results of the Call for Evidence and / or (ii) disclosure of the results of the NH Study – the Call for Evidence closed on 15th December 2023 (with the results being analysed in February 2024) and the results of the NH Study were available on 6th February 2024 – it was not until 18th March 2025, some 13 months later, that the decision under challenge was announced. But that is nothing to the point – the mere temporal opportunity to undertake a consultation exercise does not create a duty in law to do so.
81. For these reasons, the Defendant was not in law required to undertake a consultation.
Issue 3: Were the four requirements of a fair consultation discharged by the exercise in fact undertaken by the Defendant?
82. It follows from the conclusions which I have set out above that this issue does not arise.
83. I should add, however, that in some of the arguments made in writing (but developed only meekly in oral argument) it was suggested that the Defendant failed to approach the decision of 18th March 2025 with an open mind, having already decided that NH Study would determine the outcome.
84. Insofar as it was suggested that the Defendant undertook, or was required in law to undertake, a consultation exercise and that exercise involved predetermination (the requirement to avoid predetermination being inherent in the Gunning principles governing fair consultation – the first criterion requires consultation to occur while proposals remain at a formative stage, and the fourth requires conscientious consideration of consultation responses), then it fails for the reasons already given: the Call for Evidence was not a consultation exercise, and the Defendant was not otherwise in law required to undertake such an exercise.
85. Insofar as this argument was pursued as one of pre-determination in reaching the decision of 18th March 2025 (even though it was made under the rubric of arguments concerning consultation), then this is a different head of challenge that is not dependent upon the undertaking of a consultation exercise. Predetermination arises where a decision-maker has approached a decision with a closed mind, rather than remaining genuinely willing to consider relevant arguments and evidence.
86. Although it is right to say that in the final analysis the Defendant regarded the results of the NH Study as highly significant to the decision that she took, in my judgement there is no evidence that such a conclusion was predetermined. There is no such evidence in the material that has been disclosed in these proceedings relating to the decision to commission the Call for Evidence which establishes or even hints at the possibility that the Defendant had already decided that her decision would be determined by the NH Study. Indeed, at that time, the results of the NH Study were not known to the Defendant – she could hardly have decided to have been bound by the contents of a report that had yet to be written. Similarly, as matters progressed to the stage when the results from the Call for Evidence were known and the NH Study had been completed, there is no evidence that the Defendant was even predisposed to treat the results of the NH Study as determinative without having regard to the content of each of the Call for Evidence and the NH Study. In truth, the position is that the NH Study was indeed an important document to the Defendant’s decision-making, but she had not pre-determined that it would be important (i.e. without having regards to its contents, conclusions and the impact of them upon her decision).
Issue 4: Irrational reliance by the Defendant on the NH Study
87. Although they have been expressed differently across time, I identify the main complaints by the Claimant as follows: the Defendant irrationally placed reliance on the NH Study, in particular because (i) the study was based on a desk-based modelling approach, and (ii) the study used a design standard which would likely result in higher estimated overload factors.
88. In relation to the first complaint, the evidence from the Defendant as to why she took the approach that she did is relatively limited. The position is explained in the witness statement of Hannah Tooze, the Department’s Deputy Director for Road Freight, as follows:
A desk-based modelling approach by expert engineers was viewed as the most appropriate approach for carrying out this study. Obtaining data on the real life VCM load distribution would have required a significant and disproportionate level of resources to be invested by the Department. This would have involved a field study of the routes taken by VCMs across the country and the level of loading at different times of the day.
89. Within the body of the report, under the heading ‘Consequences of Overload’ it was noted that “at present it is unknown how many structures would be overloaded by VCMs in real life” and under the heading ‘Recommendations’ it was stated that “the findings in this study could be reviewed in future if sufficient data for VCM load distribution becomes available …”
90. The Claimant says that – in the light of (i) the relatively modest size of the VCM industry (there are no more than 1,000 VCMs in operation), (ii) the fact that the VCM industry is well organised (including through the BSA), and (iii) the existing engagement of the VCM industry with Government – it was irrational for the Defendant to have made her decision on the basis of a desk-based study and that she ought instead to have engaged with the VCM industry in order to obtain real life data.
91. The starting point is the explanation given by Ms Tooze: on its face, this is a reasonable and rational one. The authors of the NH Study themselves contemplated the possibility of securing real-life data, but did not suggest that it was necessary to do so before conclusions could reasonably or rationally be based on their desk-top study. I note, additionally, that at the pre-action stage the Claimant suggested that it was to commission an expert report on VCM weight limits that would, inter alia, comment on the methodology adopted in the NH Study. That has not materialised – and so I have no expert evidence before me (other than, of course the NH Study itself) which might suggest that the approach taken by the authors of the NH Study was manifestly wrong (such that no rational reliance could be placed upon it by a decision-maker). Nor has real-life data as to VCM weight limits, patterns or loading, or patterns of movements been adduced by the Claimant in these proceedings (data which, according to the Claimant’s submissions is easy to come by in this small and well organised industry (indeed, the Claimant filed no witness evidence on the substantive issues)). I am therefore left with the bare assertions of counsel as to what such data might have shown (and, therefore, what a different picture would have been created for the Defendant when making her decision). The NH Study included an additional analysis to calculate the load effects with an increased inter-vehicle axle spacing of approximately 5.2m (whereas 3.0m had previously been considered), representing a more realistic scenario which better reflected the front and rear overhangs of vehicles. Thus, the approach taken in the NH Study resulted in greater distances between VCMs being assumed than in the previous analysis. For all of these reasons, this second limb of complaint is not established,
92. In relation to the second complaint, the Study relied upon a highways design standard contained in National Highway’s “Design Manual for Roads and Bridges” (“the DMRB”) to assess the load effects of HGVs on highway structures – the design standard is known as “CS 454”. It is used for the design of new highways structures and is intended to be used in the assessment of the effects of “standards” HGVs on such structures. The DMRB contains a further standard – known as “CS 458” – which is concerned specifically with the assessment of highways bridges and structures for the effects of special type general order (“STGO”) and special order (“SO”) vehicles. The Claimant suggests that, by reason of the arrangements introduced by the Defendant in 2018, VCMs are SO vehicles.
93. The Claimant suggests that, in these circumstances, CS 458 rather than CS 454 was the applicable standard that ought to have been employed.
94. The authors of the Study elected to use CS 454, stating that “at present, there is not sufficient statistical data on the overall weight and individual axle weights of VCMs in use to justify the application of the CS 458 overload factors, which are typically lower [than the method used]…”
95. In my judgement, the Defendant was fully entitled to rely on the approach taken by the authors of the NH Study in this regard because: (i) the subject matter was a highly technical one; (ii) the authors were manifestly experts in that subject matter; (iii) the authors had used the same method as the previous study (about which there had been no challenge); and (iv) the authors gave what was on the face of it a rationale explanation for utilising CS 454 instead of CS 458.
96. For the reasons set out above, the irrationality challenge to the Defendant’s decision is dismissed.
Issue 5: The reasons challenge
97. If the Defendant’s reasons for her decision of 18th March 2025 were contained only in the document published on the Department’s website entitled Volumetric concrete mixers: Call for evidence outcome then I would have upheld this challenge. That was, by itself, manifestly an inadequate explanation of the Defendant’s decision.
98. But that document does not stand alone. It must be read alongside the Defendant’s letter of 18th March 2025 to “interested colleagues” (including the Claimant). That document gives, in my judgement, clear reasons which do not leave room for genuine doubt as to what the Defendant has decided and why. In particular, it explains that:
a. The responses to the Call for Evidence did not provide significant new evidence;
b. The arguments made in favour of allowing VCMs to continue to operate at higher weights than other heavy vehicles were not unique to VCMs and did not provide a compelling rationale for granting a permanent exemption;
c. The NH Study found that the forces exerted on existing bridge structures by the higher weight VCMs had effects up to 17% greater than vehicles complying with current weight limits – this would likely increase wear and tear and may have impacts upon the durability and lifespan of existing bridges;
d. Only 1% of the existing bridge stock within the Strategic Road Network was built to post-2010 standards, and thus not adversely affected by the higher weight VCMs – although some bridges built before this time might be able to accommodate higher weights, it was judged that the risk of allowing the continued operation of higher weight VCMs was not sustainable; and
e. Higher weight vehicles also put more stress on roads – increasing the weight limit could more than double the average road wear per vehicle, impacting on maintenance costs and safety.
99. Overall, these documents explained with sufficient clarity why Option 1 was chosen. The reasons challenge is accordingly dismissed.
F. Outcome
100. The claim for judicial review is dismissed. I shall set a timetable for the making of written submissions in relation to consequential matters, including costs, if such matters cannot be agreed. I will then determine such matters on the papers.
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