Civil United Kingdom
MSV Estates Limited v Michael Leeds & Anor (As Personal Representatives of the estate of John Graham Rhoden)
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2750 (KB)
Case No: KB-2026-000344
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 27/10/2026
Before :
MASTER SULLIVAN
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Between :
| MSV ESTATES LIMITED | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| (1) MICHAEL LEEDS (2) KRISTINA KICKS (As Personal Representatives of the estate of John Graham Rhoden) |
Defendants |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Adam Tolley KC (instructed by HCR Legal LLP) for the Claimant
Richard Wilson KC and Harry Martin (instructed by Clarion Solicitors) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 22 July 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 27 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
MASTER SULLIVAN
Master Sullivan :
1. The claim arises out of a loan agreement for the sum of around £11 million. The loan was made by Maltby Services Limited to Mr Rhoden in April 2019. Mr Rhoden died in March 2023. The Defendants are the personal representatives of Mr Rhoden’s estate. The loan was assigned by Maltby Services Limited (“Maltby”) to TD Capital Limited (“TDC”) in November 2024 and then by TDC to the Claimant, MSV Estates Limited (“MSV”) in December 2025.
2. The Defendants dispute the validity of the assignment to MSV (“the assignment”). The Defendants made an application on 29 May 2026 for the strike out of or summary judgment on the claim in their favour on the ground that the assignment is void as it breached the rule that a solicitor who has conduct of litigation may not take an assignment of their client’s cause of action (“the solicitor rule”).
3. The Claimant in response has made an application to join TDC, who assigned the loan agreement to MSV.
4. Whilst I had intended to hear the applications sequentially, I heard the Defendants’ application first and there was insufficient time for the Claimant’s application to be heard. This is my decision on the Defendants’ application.
The facts
5. The following is not in dispute for the purposes of the applications. Prior to his death, Mr Rhoden entered into a loan agreement with Maltby on 3 April 2019. Its terms provided that the loan was repayable on 3 April 2039. The transaction was recorded in a Deed of Loan.
6. Maltby then assigned its rights under the Deed of Loan to TDC on 8 November 2024. Notice of that assignment was given to Mr Rhoden’s personal representatives in November 2024. In December 2024 and January 2025, TDC corresponded with the administrator of Mr Rhoden’s estate over whether the debts were valid and binding on the estate, including notification of an intent to start Part 8 proceedings.
7. A firm of solicitors called Hickman Construction Law (“HCL”) then began to write on behalf of TDC from January 2024. In a letter dated 16th January 2025 they state “We have been instructed to act for TDC in relation this matter”. The reference on that letter indicated it was sent by Mr Andrew Hickman.
8. The shareholders of HCL were Andew Hickman Limited and Anthony Page Consultants Limited. Mr Hickman and Mr Page, who are the directors, shareholders and persons with significant control of Andrew Hickman Limited and Anthony Page Consultants Limited, were also the directors of HCL. They are both SRA regulated solicitors.
9. Correspondence continued culminating in an agreement to engage in ADR on a without prejudice save as to costs basis.
10. On 11 December 2025 TDC assigned its rights under the Deed of Loan to the Claimant (“MSV”). At that time the directors of MSV were Mr Hickman and Mr Page. There was a dispute before me as to the extent of their shareholding in MSV. The documentation from Companies House suggested they each had at least 25% shares but less than 50%. MSV’s position is that they are minority shareholders. Their evidence does not set out what the shareholding is, but the documents they rely on indicate shareholding of about 11% each. For the purposes of this judgment, I assume MSV’s position as shown by their documents is correct. I accept on the same basis that other individuals not involved in HCL are the majority shareholders in MSV.
11. On 9 January 2026, HCL wrote to the solicitors for the Estate that they were no longer instructed and on 22 January 2026, HCR Legal LLP, who still act for the Claimant, were appointed to act for the Claimant. HCR Legal were instructed on behalf of MSV on 13 January 2026. HCR Legal are not otherwise related to HCL or Mr Hickman or Mr Page.
12. Proceedings were issued on 6 February 2026. The Defendants made their application for strike out or summary judgment on 29 May 2026.
The law on summary judgment
13. The law on summary judgment and strike out is not controversial and is well known. The test for summary judgment is whether there is a real prospect of success. Real means realistic as opposed to fanciful. The application to strike out in this case is on the same basis, that there are no reasonable grounds for bringing the claim. I bear in mind the summaries of the matters to take into account in Easyair v Opal Telecos Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 and Daniels v Lloyds Bank [2018] EWHC 660 (Comm).
14. The Claimant argues that the application for summary judgment should be dismissed on procedural grounds, that the application notice and witness evidence in support did not meet the formal requirements of CPR 24. In particular:
i) The application notice must identify concisely any point of law or document relied upon (CPR 24.5(1)(b))
ii) It musts state that the applicant believes that the respondent has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue to be determined (CPR 24.5(1)(d))
iii) It must state that the applicant knows of no reason why the disposal of the claim or issue should await trial (CPR 24.5(1)(c))
iv) It must draw the respondent’s attention to their right to rely on evidence opposing the application (CPR 24.5(1)(f)).
15. The Claimant’s position is that none of those requirements are met, they are mandatory and therefore the application must fail. The Claimant relies on Price v Flitcraft Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 850 at 86 and commentary in the White Book at 24.5.1 which states that these requirements are not formalities. They are safeguards against a party making an application and claiming a case to be straightforward when they believe otherwise.
16. The Defendants’ position is that the application notice does state that they rely on the solicitor rule, though it is right that the witness statement in support did not expressly set out the matters at items (ii) and (iii) above, a supplemental witness statement did. In respect of (iv), the Claimant has in fact been able to rely on evidence.
17. In my judgment, the application notice did concisely identify the point that was relied upon. It was clear that the solicitor rule was relied upon in respect of the assignment in December 2025. The fact that there is a dispute about when that rule applies did not need to be identified in the way suggested by the Claimant.
18. Whilst it is correct that the matters in (ii) to (iv) should have been in the witness statement in support, it seems to me that (ii) was implicit in what was set out in paragraph 32 of Ms Wharton’s witness statement where she states no purpose would be served by the claim continuing because the Claimant has no standing to seek a remedy. In any event, I accept these errors have now been corrected. In respect of (iv) the Claimant has had sufficient time to, and has, relied on evidence opposing the application. In those circumstances it would not be in accordance with the overriding objective for me to dismiss the application on this basis. Whilst it is correct that these are not mere formalities, in this case the procedure has been such that the relevant information has been given in time so that there is no unfairness.
19. In respect of strike out, the Claimant also submits that the factual dispute over the extent of shareholding in MSV is a relevant factual dispute which goes beyond the pleaded facts and therefore strike out is inappropriate. It is correct that this is a matter which is not pleaded and therefore the court has to look beyond the pleadings. The argument in summary judgment and strike out is the same on this point, and I take the Claimant’s factual position as the starting point, as I would have to do for a strike out, so this argument takes matters no further and I will continue to consider the substantive issues.
The Solicitor rule
20. There is no dispute that there is a longstanding rule that a solicitor who has the conduct of litigation may not take an assignment of their client’s cause of action prior to judgment. The scope of that rule is however in dispute; does it apply before issue of proceedings? Does it apply when there is a lack of commonality between ownership of solicitor and assignee?
21. Both parties refer to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Farrar (Deceased) v Miller [2022] EWCA Civ 295. That case distinguishes three separate but related common law rules, noting that they are closely related and not always distinguished from one another. First, a bare cause of action can only be assigned where the assignee has a genuine commercial interest in enforcing the claim. Second, the rule with which I am concerned, that a solicitor who has the conduct of litigation may not take an assignment of their client’s cause of action prior to judgment and third, the rule against champerty. I am only concerned with the second, the solicitor rule.
22. The solicitor rule is said to have been established by a consistent line of authority going back (from 2022) nearly 240 years to Hall v Hallet (1784) 1 Cox 134, 29 ER 1096. I set out below the paragraphs dealing with the history of this rule set out by the Court of Appeal from paragraph 23:
“23. In Hall v Hallet (1784) 1 Cox 134, 29 ER 1096 an attorney called Scrase took an assignment from his client Hall of two debts of £620 and £50 in consideration of payment of the sum of £300. Lord Thurlow LC held that the assignment was void, saying at 140, 1099:
“… no attorney can be permitted to buy in things in a course of litigation, of which litigation he has the management. This the policy of justice will not endure.”
24.In Wood v Downes (1811) 18 Ves Jun 120, 34 ER 263 Downes was a solicitor who had the conduct of litigation on behalf of Wood concerning an estate. They entered into an agreement for the sale of Wood’s share of the estate in consideration of the payment of £100 and a promise to pay £1000. Lord Eldon LC held that the agreement was void, saying at 127, 265-266:
“… it is laid down as clear Law, that no attorney can take any thing for his own benefit from his client pending the suit, save his demand; and I add that, as a guardian cannot take any thing from his ward pending the guardianship, or at the close of it, or at any period until his influence has ceased to exist, the obligation upon an attorney to refrain from taking an extraordinary benefit is at least as strong.
The case of Wells v Middleton … is an extremely strong case of this kind. It was admitted, that the transaction was liable to no objection as between man and man; but it was overturned upon this great principle the danger from the influence of Attorneys or Counsel over clients, whilst having the care of their property; and, whatever mischief may arise in particular cases, the Law, with the view of preventing public mischief, says, they shall take no benefit, derived under such circumstances. It is not denied in any case that, if the relation has completely ceased, if the influence can be rationally supposed also to cease, a client may be generous to his Attorney or Counsel, as to any other person; but it must go so far.”
25.In Simpson v Lamb (1857) 7 EL & BL 84, 119 ER 179 an attorney called Scott was on the record for the plaintiffs, but an attorney called Shaen took over the conduct of the case shortly before trial. After the plaintiffs had obtained a verdict for £50 damages, but before judgment, Shaen purchased the plaintiffs’ interest in the verdict for the sum of £50. The Court of Queen’s Bench held that the transaction was void. Lord Campbell CJ delivering the judgment of the Court consisting of himself, Coleridge, Wightman and Erle JJ said at 93, 1182-1183:
“ … it has been held in several cases, that no attorney can be permitted to purchase any thing in litigation, of which litigation he has the management (Hall v Hallet (1 Cox 134), Wood v Downes (18 Ves 120) and the authorities therein cited), and considering the relation in which the attorney and client stand to each other, it would seem, as was said in Hall v Hallet (1 Cox 134), to be against the policy of the law to permit such a dealing by an attorney, whilst the case is still undetermined by judgment, … whatever might have been the case had the purchase been by a stranger.”
26.In Pittman v Prudential Deposit Bank Ltd (1896) 13 TLR 110 the plaintiff was a solicitor who had acted for a client called Law in an action against a hotel. Law owed the plaintiff money for the costs incurred. While the proceedings were pending Law and the plaintiff agreed that Law would assign the judgment to the plaintiff. Law obtained judgment for £250, and immediately afterwards assigned it to the plaintiff. Willes J held that the assignment was invalid, and this Court dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. Lord Esher MR, with whom Lopes and Rigby LJJ agreed, said at 111 that the law upon the point was clear:
“In order to preserve the honour and honesty of the profession it was a rule of law which the court had laid down and would always insist upon that a solicitor could not make an arrangement of any kind with his client during the litigation he was conducting so as to give him any advantage in respect of the result of that litigation. That might be said to be on account of the fiduciary relation between the solicitor and the client. But the doctrine was founded upon a higher rule. The responsibility of persons engaged in the profession of the law was very great, and their conduct must be regulated by the most precise rules of honour. The Court thought that, unless the rule was carried out to its fullest extent, there would be a temptation to solicitors which they should not be subjected to. It was useless to say that in the particular case the solicitor was not tempted and that he acted from the most honourable motives. The law was universal that, without considering the motives of the particular solicitor, a solicitor must not persuade his client, or indeed accept from his client a voluntary offer, so as to obtain any advantage dependent upon the result of the litigation which he was then conducting.”
”
23. In paragraph 28 the rationale for the rule was accepted as follows:
“Counsel for Mr Miller submitted that it was clear from the authorities that the rationale for the rule was the conflict of interest which would arise between the client and the solicitor if the solicitor could negotiate for an assignment of the client’s claim, bearing in mind that the solicitor owed the client fiduciary duties. This analysis was not disputed by counsel for CANDEY, and I accept it.”
The parties’ submissions
24. The Defendants’ submission is that the solicitor rule applies in this case. The directors and shareholders of MSV are Mr Hickman and Mr Page who were the solicitors acting (through HCL) at the time of the assignment. The rule is not limited to the period following issue of a claim form, and therefore the assignment is invalid. The Claimant therefore has no cause of action and the claim should be struck out or summary judgment given. If TDC wish to bring a claim, they will have to issue a new claim (although the Defendants previously openly offered that if their costs were paid, they would agree to the substitution of TDC as Claimant).
25. The Claimant’s position is that the solicitor rule does not apply to the facts here as HCL has not, and has never had, the conduct of the litigation. There are two aspects to this argument. The first is that the solicitor rule only applies once a claim has been issued, and HCR Legal has had conduct of the litigation since then, not HCL. Secondly, a vehicle in which the claimant’s solicitors have a minority interest is not the same as the solicitor acting, there is a lack of commonality of ownership and therefore the rule does not apply.
26. They also submit that this is not an area which is suitable for summary judgment. This is an area of law which is not settled and there are conflicting decisions of coordinate jurisdiction and therefore I should not determine this on a summary basis. It is also an area where the direction of travel is to confine not expand the law (Sibthorpe v Southwark LBC [2011] EWCA Civ 25); this would be to expand it.
27. I will first set out the analysis of the law, then consider whether there are conflicting authorities of coordinate jurisdiction which means I should not decide the point.
28. In Farrar, as set out above the rule is said to be that a “solicitor could not make an arrangement of any kind with his client during the litigation he was conducting so as to give him any advantage in respect of the result of that litigation”. That, says the Claimant, makes it clear that the rule applies during the conduct of an issued claim, not before.
29. I have been referred to a number of cases discussing this rule. It is right to say the majority of them appear to be in relation to assignments or other arrangements once a claim had been issued (using modern terminology). It is the Defendants’ submission that the cases do not say that the rule only applies post-issue.
30. In Hall v Hallet (1784) 29 ER 1096, the context was the administration of an estate of J Hall, deceased. Scrase was a lawyer instructed “in the management Hall’s affairs” who was assigned some debts due to the estate. The Defendants submit, and I accept, that it is not clear from the report whether there was issued litigation in respect of those debts or the timing of the assignments. It was held that:
“But if it stood on the simple fact of the assignment, he never should be entitled to any advantage from it; for no attorney can be permitted to buy in things in a course of litigation, of which litigation he has the management. This the policy of justice will not endure”.
31. In Wood v Downes (1811) 34 ER 263, the Claimant relies on the dicta of Lord Eldon LC that “no attorney can take any thing for his own benefit from his client pending the suit, save his demand…”. Pending the suit means once issued and pending judgment.
32. The Defendants submit that the case refers to matters obtained “by an attorney from this client during their relation, as such, and connected with the subject of the suit”. Further at page 265 the following is said:
“The transaction is liable to objections of two kinds,: first as bringing forward the consideration of the effect of a bargain between an attorney and his client, for the benefit of the attorney, before, pending and after, a suit : and not only for his benefit, but connected with the very article and subject in contest in a suit, in which he was about to be engaged”.
33. The Defendants’ position is that it is not clear that the litigation had been started at the time of the assignment in Wood and the judgment expressly includes consideration of the pre-issue period; “before, pending and after, a suit”.
34. In Pittman v Prudential Deposit Bank Ltd (1896) 13 TLR 110, as cited in Farrar, the Defendants point out that he assignment was in fact executed after judgment and the rule still applies. The report makes it clear that the assignment was immediately post judgment, and there had been some form of agreement pre-judgment between the solicitor and client and therefore it seems to have been an attempt to get around the solicitor rule. The judgment makes it clear that the rule should be applied to the fullest extent. The Defendants submit that the same should apply here.
35. The Defendants rely on Commercial Law Practice Ltd v Atkinson Wheller Ltd [2024] (“CLP”) as direct authority that the solicitor rule applies pre issue. In CLP, Master McQuail determined a summary judgment application which included the question of whether an assignment of a claim where no proceedings were in existence breached the solicitor rule. There were other arguments as to champerty and the relevance of the timing of a termination of a retainer. She decided this was a case where there was a legal point to be decided and she should grasp the nettle and determine it, as explained in Easyair, and did so.
36. In paragraph 44 she states:
“The validity of the first assignment must be considered in the context of the law of champerty as explained in Farrar v Miller. It is undoubtedly an agreement by which the solicitor first claimant has endeavoured to acquire the cause of action of its client the second claimant. That it was entered into before proceedings were issued or a letter before action was sent cannot be material to whether it falls foul of the laws of champerty. It falls on the lawyer side of the hard distinction referred to by Marcus Smith J in Farrar v Miller and the genuine commercial interest test has no relevance. ”
37. The Claimant’s position is that CLP is really also a case about the conduct of litigation, in the sense of an issued claim, and the mischief which the solicitor rule is there to address was engaged. CLP acted for M in patent litigation compromised on the basis that he would not claim an interest in the patents. Later he was advised by a patent agent to register the patent. He did. CLP acted for him in the resulting patent litigation which M lost. M was made bankrupt following judgment on his own petition. Prior to that, M assigned to CLP any cause of action he had against the patent agent. So the Claimant says in CLP, the claimant was the solicitor conducting the underlying litigation. The mischief was that the solicitor was acting on their own behalf, trying to bypass the bankruptcy to recover their own fees.
38. In DLA Piper UK Ltd LLP v Henshaws Farming LLP [2025] EWHC 542 (Ch), Master Clark also determined a claim for strike out or summary judgment. One of the issues in the claim was whether an assignment before a claim was commenced breached the solicitor rule. Master Clark did not determine that point, but determined that DLA had a real prospect of showing that it did not. Master McQuail’s decision was referred to in the judgment.
39. The claim was a dispute over ownership of land. The Claimants, DLA, had acted pro bono for the trustees in the sale of the land from 2008. In April 2023, DLA terminated their retainer. New solicitors were instructed, and in October 2023 the trustees assigned to DLA their cause of action.
40. Master Clark noted that there is a general rule that it is not normally appropriate in a summary procedure to decide a controversial question of law particularly because it is desirable that the facts should be found so that any further development of the law should be on the basis of actual not hypothetical facts. The first issue she dealt with was an issue of limitation under s32 of the Limitation Act 1980. That aspect of the application was dismissed as requiring disclosure and oral evidence and therefore not suitable for summary judgment. In respect of the validity of the assignment there were a number of arguments, including whether DLA had a legitimate commercial interest in the claimant’s claims which were said not to be suitable for summary judgment. In respect of the solicitor rule, there were two factual matters relied upon by DLA as taking the assignment out of the solicitor rule. First, as at the date of the assignment, the trustees were not the claimant’s clients, and had not been for 6 months and secondly, no claim had been commenced at that date. There seemed to be a dispute over whether correspondence showed that the solicitor-client relationship had in fact terminated and the Master was not satisfied DLA had no real prospect of proving the termination of the retainer means that the solicitor rule does not apply.
41. In respect of the fact that proceedings had not been issued at the date of the assignment, the Master was referred to the decision of Master McQuail and the reference in Wood to the duty being there before suit. She noted that the case law consistently refers to the rule applying where the claim is pending. She was not satisfied, given the conflicting wording in the authorities that DLA has no real prospect of showing an assignment before a claim is commenced does not fall within the solicitor rule. She also stated:
“In any event, since I have concluded that the issue as to whether the rule applies after termination of the solicitor/client relationship should be determined at trial, I consider that this second issue should also be determined at trial when the judge has the benefit of having made full findings of fact.”
Decisions of coordinate jurisdiction
42. In respect of the issue of decisions of coordinate jurisdiction, Colchester Estates v Carlton plc [1986] Ch 80, states the general rule as follows:
“where there are conflicting decisions of courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, the later decision is to be preferred, if it is reached after full consideration of the earlier decision.”
43. With the following qualification:
“I would make an exception only in the case, which must be rare, where the third judge is convinced that the second was wrong in not following the first.An obvious example is where some binding or persuasive authority has not been cited in either of the first two cases.”
44. The reason for that is, as Mr Justice Nourse explained:
“… it is desirable that the law, at whatever level it is declared, should generally be certain. If a decision of this court, reached after full consideration of an earlier one which went the other way, is normally to be open to review on a third occasion when the same point arises for decision at the same level, there will be no end of it. Why not in a fourth, fifth or sixth case as well?”
45. I am slightly troubled by the fact that what is being argued here is not whether there is inconsistency in the decision as to the scope of the solicitor rule, but that there is inconsistency as to whether the scope of the solicitor rule is a matter suitable for summary determination. That, it seems to me, is an exercise of discretion.
46. Master Clark did not in fact determine the solicitor rule issue one way or another. Although she does deal with the issue as a pure matter of law, given the factual matrix within which she was working, the decision not to determine the point was entirely right – the solicitor who took the benefit of the assignment was not formally retained at the time of the assignment which gave rise to a dispute about the nature of the relationship at the time of the assignment. That, as Master Clark found, may have relevance to the issue to be determined.
47. I am not in such a situation. It is clear on the facts that HCL was acting for TDC at the time of the assignment, and when steps were being undertaken with a view to commencing proceedings against the Defendants, namely corresponding following a letter before action.
48. Insofar as there are inconsistent decisions of judges of coordinate jurisdiction, it seems to me they can be distinguished based on the different facts which were relevant to whether the issue was suitable for summary judgment. They were different exercises of discretion.
49. There are no conflicting decisions of co-ordinate jurisdiction on the legal point as to whether the solicitor rule applies to an assignment of a cause of action from client to solicitor before the claim is issued.
50. In my judgment this is a case in which I should grasp the nettle and determine the point consistent with the approach set out in paragraph 15(vii) of Easyair.
51. I agree with Master McQuail that the fact that the assignment is pre-issue cannot be material to whether it falls foul of the solicitor rule.
52. The assignment was executed at a time when pre-action correspondence was taking place, such correspondence being regulated by pre-action protocols. The historical cases, insofar as they are clear that a claim has been issued, do not say the conflict rule only arises once the claim has been issued. Wood expressly considers that it can arise earlier. The policy behind the rule as expressed in Farrar is the conflict of interest which could arise between the client and solicitor if the solicitor could negotiate for an assignment of the Claimant’s claim, bearing in mind the solicitor owed the client fiduciary duties.
53. If a solicitor has been acting for a client in pre-issue litigation, in contemplation of issuing a claim, how can that conflict be said not to arise just because a claim has not been issued? Why would there be different rules for the validity of an assignment executed at 10am and for an assignment executed at 2pm on a day when a claim form is issued at noon on that same day?
54. I also do not accept that CLP can be distinguished. There was no litigation when the assignment was executed. Previous litigation had ended, judgment had been given and the solicitor rule expressly ends once judgment has been entered. There is no conflict with the fiduciary duty at that point. The fact that a solicitor has acted in one completed action cannot be relevant to whether there is a conflict with their fiduciary duty to the client in respect of another cause of action, even if there is a link between the cases.
Is MSV caught by the solicitor rule?
55. The Defendants’ position is that it does not make any difference that Mr Hickman and Mr Page, having acted for TDC through HCL, received the assignment through a company rather than personally. They themselves executed the Deed on behalf of the Claimant.
56. The Defendants rely on Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers (1854) 1 Macq 461 by analogy for the proposition that the involvement of a company is irrelevant. Companies can only act through agents, and those agents have a fiduciary duty and should not be allowed to enter into arrangements where they have a conflicting personal interest. That is not to rely on the self dealing rule as a route to say the assignment was invalid, but applying the reasoning in it to show by analogy that the company has to be looked at by the acts of its agents. The issues of conflict should not be assessed by looking at the company and not the individuals who act on its behalf. The director’s personal interest is relevant to the analysis of conflict of interest.
57. Their position is that the fact that Mr Hickman and Mr Page only held a minority shareholding is also irrelevant. It is a material interest sufficient to give rise to a conflict of interest. There is also a conflict in that they are the directors of the Claimant.
58. The Claimant’s position is that assigning to a corporate vehicle involving solicitors who were acting is not the same as assigning to the solicitors who are acting. There is a lack of commonality of ownership. Further, the amount of shareholding is uncertain and it is a matter for trial on the facts as to whether the solicitor rule applies in these circumstances.
59. In my judgment, the fact that the assignment was to a corporate vehicle rather than Mr Hickman and Mr Page directly does not avoid the effect of the solicitor rule, just as the fact that they acted as solicitor through HCL rather than as an individual solicitor or solicitors does not affect it, and the analogy with BlaikieBrothers is apt for the reasons the Defendants submit.
60. In my judgment there is no need for this matter to be determined at trial, they have at least around 11% shareholding each on their own documents and they are directors of MSV, and they signed the Deed on behalf of MSV. At the same time they were the solicitors advising TDC. The exact amount of shareholding is irrelevant. I cannot see that there would be any other further relevant evidence which can reasonably be expected to emerge.
61. There is a clear conflict of interest which the solicitor rule is in place to avoid. There is, in my judgment, no real prospect of arguing otherwise. As Mr Wilson KC pointed out in his skeleton argument, the solicitor rule would be hollow if it could be so easily circumvented merely by the solicitors acting through a company. That is no less a forceful argument even if they are minority shareholders.
62. In summary, I find that the solicitor rule does apply to the December 2025 assignment, and that assignment is invalid. I cannot see, save for the Claimant’s undetermined application to add TDC as a party, that there is any other compelling reason why the issue should be disposed of at trial.
63. I am conscious that the Claimant’s application to amend to add TDC as a claimant has not been heard immediately following this application as I had intended and I will list a hearing at which the consequences of this judgment and that application are determined. I invite the parties to seek to agree on the way forward in the meantime.
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