Administrative United Kingdom
Auto Total Care Limited v The Pensions Regulator
NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01468 (GRC)
Case Reference: FT/PEN/2026/0079
First-tier Tribunal
(General Regulatory Chamber)
Pensions
Decided without a hearing
Heard on: 16 October 2026
Decision given on: 27 October 2026
Before
JUDGE SIMON BIRD KC
Between
AUTO TOTAL CARE LIMITED
Appellant
and
THE PENSIONS REGULATOR
Respondent
Decision: The reference is ALLOWED and the matter is remitted to the Respondent. The fixed penalty notice is revoked and no further directions are required.
REASONS
1. This is the Appellant’s appeal by way of reference in respect of a fixed penalty notice (FPN) with reference 110355878627 issued on 26 February 2026 under section 40 of the Pensions Act 2008 (PA 2008). The Notice was issued because the Respondent was of the opinion that the Appellant had failed to comply with a Compliance Notice (CN) issued under section 35 of the PA 2008 on 10 December 2025 with a deadline date of 20 January 2026.
The Legal Framework
2. The Pensions Act 2008 and the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 impose a number of legal obligations on employers in relation to the automatic enrolment of certain employees into occupational or workplace personal pension schemes. The Respondent has statutory responsibility for securing compliance with these obligations and may exercise certain enforcement powers. Each employer is assigned a staging date from which the timetable for compliance with their obligations is set. An employer must provide certain specified information to the Regulator in a “declaration of compliance” within five months of the staging date. If there is a failure to do this, the Regulator can issue a compliance notice (section 35 of the PA 2008). If there is a failure to comply with this, the Regulator may issue a fixed penalty notice (section 40). Section 43 provides for the Regulator to review notices, including a compliance notice and a fixed penalty notice. The penalty prescribed in the present case is £400.
3. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is derived from section 44 of the PA 2008. Where a person to whom a notice has been issued under section 40 has first made an application for review of the FPN, they may then make a reference to the Tribunal. The role of the Tribunal is to make its own decision on the appropriate action for the Regulator to take, considering all the evidence before it. The Tribunal may confirm, vary or revoke a Fixed Penalty Notice and when it reaches a decision, it must remit the matter to the Regulator with such directions (if any) required to give effect to the decision.
4. The issue in this appeal is whether the FPN was issued and then received by the Appellant. Section 303 of the Pensions Act 2004, applied by section 144A of the PA 2008 to notices issued under its provisions, provides that:
“…
(2) The notification of document may be given to the person in question –
(a) by delivering it to him;
(b) by leaving it at his proper address, or
(c) by sending it by post to at that address.
….
(6) For the purposes of this section and section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (c.30)(service of documents by post) in its application to this section, the proper address of a person is –
(a) in the case of a body corporate, the address of the registered or principal office of the body,
….”
5. The Appellant is a body corporate and, therefore, section 303(6)(a) of the 2004 Act applies to the instant reference.
6. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, referred to in section 303(6), provides that:
“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) the, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.
7. Section 7 therefore provides for a rebuttable presumption that a notice which is contained in a letter which is properly addressed, pre-paid and posted is to be deemed served at the time the letter would be delivered in the ordinary post.
8. The Respondent is also able to rely on a second set of rebuttable presumptions as to the issue and service of notices under the PA 2008 contained in regulation 15 of the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance” Regulations 2010 (the 2010 Regs). Regulation 15 provides:
“(3) The presumptions in paragraph (4) apply where notices to which section 43 applies are issued…..
(4) For the purposes of this regulation, it is presumed that –
(a) where a notice is given a date by the Regulator, it was posted or otherwise sent on that day;
(b) if a notice is posted or otherwise sent to a person’s last known or notified address, it was issued on the day on which that notice was posted or otherwise sent; and
(c) a notice was received by the person to whom it was addressed.”
9. In essence, once the Respondent has discharged the evidential burden of establishing that the relevant notice was issued and properly addressed, if an Appellant claims not to have received the relevant notice, they bear the onus of rebutting the regulation 15(4)(c) presumption that it was received by them. The presumptions have been described as strong statutory presumptions (Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited v The Pensions Regulator PEN/2020/0203).
Relevant Case Law
(i) Evidence of issue of the notice as a matter of fact
10. In J M Kamau Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2025] UKFTT 00435 (GRC) the Chamber President held that in subsequent cases the Pensions Regulator was entitled to rely on the evidence given in that case as to the system it operates for the issuing of notices such as FPNs with no further requirement to produce a witness statement detailing the processes, unless a direction is made to that effect in a given reference. No such direction was given in the current reference. However, the Chamber President added the following caveats:
(a) The ruling was predicated on the evidence given in that case continuing accurately to reflect the processes in place and it continuing to be the case that there have not been any adverse issues with the system that could cause doubt as to the reliability of the information it produces
(b) Where the Pensions Regulator intends to rely upon the evidence given in the Kamau case, this must be clearly identified in the Rule 23 response to the reference;
(c) To discharge the burden of demonstrating that the relevant was issued as a matter of fact, the Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide to the Appellant and the Tribunal screenshots from the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular Appellant; and
(d) Whilst this is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, it is not inevitable and each case will need to be determined on its own facts.
(ii) Rebuttal of the statutory presumption of service
11. In London Borough of Southwark v Akhtar [2017] UKUT 150 (LC) the Tribunal explained the effect of the presumption of receipt in the following terms:
“82. A legal presumption like the one in s.7 has the effect of reversing the burden of proof. Once the landlord has proved that the notice was properly addressed, pre-[aid and posted, it has nothing further to do – unless the contrary is proved. If the contrary is provide, then the landlord must, as it were, go the long way round and actually prove service without the help of the presumption and must therefore convince the tribunal on the balance of probabilities that the notice was actually received. But it is only required to do that if the contrary is proved and not if the contrary is merely asserted”.
12. In Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited the Tribunal further emphasised that a bare denial or receipt of the relevant notice was insufficient to discharge the presumption of service.
(iii) Service requires no collaboration of reciprocal act from the intended recipient
13. In Kamau, the Chamber President found at [122] that the fact that a notice had not come into the hands of the Appellant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the notices were as a matter of law received. There was nothing in section 303 of the PA 2004 or 15(4) of the 2010 Regs which supported a conclusion that service is only effected once there is some collaboration or some reciprocal action on the part of the intended recipient. He added that:
“121. As a matter of practical reality, if this were not the case it is difficult to see how the system could sensibly function. An intended recipient could deliberately choose not to pick up mail on the assumption that some of the mail would be the bearer of bad news. In doing so, they could legitimately rebut the presumption of service”.
The Appellant’s Case
14. In summary, the Appellant argues that it did not receive any of the letters or a copy of the Compliance Notice from the Respondent and that, had it done so, it would have taken immediate steps to comply.
15. The Appellant states that there are six separate businesses operating under the same premises and address as it and due to this arrangement, postal deliveries can be misdirected, delayed or incorrectly handled between businesses. It is highly likely that any correspondence sent was either not delivered to the correct entity or was inadvertently received by another business within the premises.
16. The Appellant states that it takes its legal and regulatory obligations seriously and has always acted in good faith. There was no intention on its part to ignore or avoid its relevant duties. The issue had arisen solely due to its lack of awareness caused by the non-receipt of official communication. It further states that it took prompt steps to ensure full compliance with the auto enrolment requirements.
17. The Appellant asks the Tribunal to revoke the notice on the ground that it had a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance.
The Respondent’s Response
18. The Respondent says the Appellant's automatic-enrolment duties started on 10 June 2025, requiring a declaration of compliance by 10 November 2025. Three reminder letters were sent between September and November 2025. When no declaration was submitted, a Compliance Notice dated 10 December 2025 required compliance by the extended deadline of 20 January 2026. The Appellant did not comply by that date, resulting ultimately in the £400 FPN dated 26 February 2026. The declaration was eventually submitted on 3 April 2026.
19. The Respondent relies on the presumptions of service arising under s 303(6)(a) Pensions Act 2004, s 7 Interpretation Act 1978 and regulation 15(4) of the Employers' Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010.
20. Both the Compliance Notice and FPN were sent to 25a Chorley Road, Swinton, Manchester, M27 4AF. This was the company’s registered office at Companies House, the registered address appearing in its incorporation documentation and the address which the Appellant itself subsequently supplied in its Notice of Appeal.
21. The Respondent relies on the decision of the Tribunal in Kamau in which it was held that going forward, it was entitled to rely on the evidence from Ms Cathy Doherty as detailed in paragraphs 32-55 of that decision which evidences the systems and processes for the issuing of Notices.
22. As to the Appellant’s contention that six businesses operate from the same premises and that post can therefore be misdirected, delayed or handled by another business, the Respondent argues that this is no more than a bare assertion of non-receipt, insufficient to rebut the statutory presumptions. It relies on London Borough of Southwark v Akhter [2017] UKUT 150 and Keith's Rubbish Clearance Ltd v The Pensions Regulator PEN/2020/0203 for the proposition that a mere assertion of non-delivery falls short of what is necessary.
23. The Respondent also relies on decision in Kamau for there being a distinction between correspondence not being received at the address and correspondence which reaches the correct address but is subsequently overlooked or mishandled.
24. As the statutory notices had been issued to the Appellant’s registered office address, the Respondent contends that the fact that they were not actioned cannot amount to a reasonable excuse for the Appellant’s failure. A failure to appreciate and/or act on a Statutory Notice or it simply being wrongly handled, ignored and/or discarded by the Appellant cannot amount to a reasonable excuse for the Appellant’s failure.
25. No evidence of rebuttal had been provided by the Appellant in this appeal and therefore it was the Respondent’s case that the Notices in this matter were correctly served and received by the Appellant.
26. As to the other matters raised in the grounds of appeal, the Respondent argues that the fact that the Appellant’s may have unintentionally breached its duties does not amount to a reasonable excuse for a failure to comply with them. The Appellant had been provided with sufficient notice of its obligations in the form of three reminder letters and the Compliance Notice and as a responsible employer it should have been aware of its legal duties.
27. The Respondent acknowledges that the Appellant has now completed its declaration of compliance however this was completed after the FPN deadline had been extended following the Appellant’s request for a review of that Notice. Late or eventual compliance does not excuse a failure to comply with all directions in the Compliance Notice or comprise exceptional grounds for revoking a FPN served following a failure to comply with a Compliance Notice.
28. The Respondent maintains that no reasonable excuse had been advanced in fact or law for the failure to complete the declaration on time. The decision to issue a £400 FPN was fair, reasonable and proportionate for all the reasons the Respondent had set out.
Findings and Reasons
29. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal squarely raise the issue of whether it had or is deemed to have had knowledge of the Compliance Notice, the failure to comply with which is the foundation of the FPN. That raises two discrete but related factual issues; was the Compliance Notice as a matter of fact issued to the Appellant and, if so, is it deemed to have been received as a matter of law. As the Upper Tribunal held in Philip Freeman Mobile Welders Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2022] UKUT 62 (AAC:
“Arguments about whether a notice was in fact issues by post affects whether the presumption about service or receipt applies in the first place, and arguments based on lack of receipt of a notice may also shade into whether it was issued”.
30. Whilst I accept that the Appellant did not in its grounds of appeal expressly raise the issue of whether or not the Compliance Notice and other correspondence had in fact been issued by the Respondent, its claim not to have knowledge of their existence should have alerted the Respondent to the need to provide the Tribunal with evidence that in this case and as a matter of fact, its processes operated in the manner detailed in the evidence of Ms Doherty in the Kamau case. In particular, it was incumbent on the Respondent to provide evidence that the Compliance Notice was in fact issued. As the Tribunal in Kamau stressed:
“84. General evidence as to the processes operated by The Pensions Regulator cannot, of course, demonstrate of itself that a particular notice was issued and, in my view, given the evidence at the Pension Regulator’s disposal, a bare assertion to this effect is unlikely to meet the burden on it.
84. To discharge the burden of demonstrating that an OPV, FPN or EPN was issued in any given appeal, The Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide the appellant and Tribunal with screenshots of the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular appellant before the Tribunal, as it has done in this appeal. Those screenshots, assuming they confirm the issuing of the notice in question to the proper address, taken together with the general evidence as to the IT processes operated by the Pensions Regulator is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, but that is not inevitable, as each case will need to be determined on its own facts”
31. I agree with the content of those passages. In this appeal, despite the need to discharge the burden of showing that the Compliance Notice had been issued as a matter of fact, the Respondent has relied simply on the evidence as to its general processes set out in the evidence of Ms Doherty in Kamau. That is no more than the general evidence which the Tribunal held in Kamau would be unlikely to meet the burden on it of showing that a given notice was issued and, in my view, it does not and cannot show that the Compliance Notice in this case was issued to the Appellant as a matter of fact. Despite the guidance provided by the Tribunal in Kamau of the need to provide the screenshots of relevant tables from its IT systems relating to the particular Appellant, no such screenshots have been provided to the Tribunal in response to the appeal. There is no evidence before the Tribunal on which it could conclude that the Compliance Notice was issued as a matter of fact. Whilst the evidence shows that the FPN was issued and served, there is no proper basis upon which to imply that this was also the case in relation to the Compliance Notice.
32. I have given consideration as to whether I should adjourn the determination of this appeal to provide the Respondent to provide the screenshot evidence if its possesses it, but having regard to the overriding objective set out in Rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules, I have concluded that it would not be fair and just to do so. The Respondent has been provided with the clearest possible guidance in the Kamau decision of the evidence which it needs to produce in cases where an Appellant claims not to have received one or more relevant statutory notice. The need for such evidence in this appeal should have been obvious to it and, despite the Case Management Directions of 24 July 2026 providing the opportunity to send additional evidence to the Tribunal by 4 August 2026, no screenshot evidence was provided. To delay determining the appeal to allow such evidence to be provided would not be proportionate having regard to the issues involved.
33. I therefore conclude that the Respondent has failed to provide any evidence that the Compliance Notice was issued to the Appellant as a matter of fact. In those circumstances, the FPN which alleges a failure to comply with a Compliance Notice issued to the Appellant, has no lawful basis and further, the Appellant has a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply with it. I therefore direct that the FPN be revoked.
Signed Judge Simon Bird KC Date: 14 October 2026
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