Administrative United Kingdom

Grill & Bar Limited v The Pensions Regulator

Official source

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01471 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/PEN/2026/0079

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Pensions

Decided without a hearing

Heard on: 16 October 2026

Decision given on: 27 October 2026

Before

JUDGE SIMON BIRD KC

Between

Grill & bar LIMITED

Appellant

and

THE PENSIONS REGULATOR

Respondent

Decision: The reference is ALLOWED and the matter is remitted to the Respondent. The fixed penalty notice is revoked and no further directions are required.

REASONS

1. This is the Appellant’s appeal by way of reference in respect of a fixed penalty notice (FPN) with reference 122768397020 issued on 6 May 2026 under section 40 of the Pensions Act 2008 (PA 2008). The Notice was issued because the Respondent was of the opinion that the Appellant had failed to comply with a Compliance Notice (CN) issued under section 35 of the PA 2008 on 11 March 2026 with a deadline date of 21 April 2026.

The Legal Framework

2. The Pensions Act 2008 and the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 impose a number of legal obligations on employers in relation to the automatic enrolment of certain employees into occupational or workplace personal pension schemes. The Respondent has statutory responsibility for securing compliance with these obligations and may exercise certain enforcement powers. Each employer is assigned a staging date from which the timetable for compliance with their obligations is set. An employer must provide certain specified information to the Regulator in a “declaration of compliance” within five months of the staging date. If there is a failure to do this, the Regulator can issue a compliance notice (section 35 of the PA 2008). If there is a failure to comply with this, the Regulator may issue a fixed penalty notice (section 40). Section 43 provides for the Regulator to review notices, including a compliance notice and a fixed penalty notice. The penalty prescribed in the present case is £400.

3. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is derived from section 44 of the PA 2008. Where a person to whom a notice has been issued under section 40 has first made an application for review of the FPN, they may then make a reference to the Tribunal. The role of the Tribunal is to make its own decision on the appropriate action for the Regulator to take, considering all the evidence before it. The Tribunal may confirm, vary or revoke a Fixed Penalty Notice and when it reaches a decision, it must remit the matter to the Regulator with such directions (if any) required to give effect to the decision.

4. The issue in this appeal is whether the FPN was issued and then received by the Appellant. Section 303 of the Pensions Act 2004, applied by section 144A of the PA 2008 to notices issued under its provisions, provides that:

“…

(2) The notification of document may be given to the person in question –

(a) by delivering it to him;

(b) by leaving it at his proper address, or

(c) by sending it by post to at that address.

….

(6) For the purposes of this section and section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (c.30)(service of documents by post) in its application to this section, the proper address of a person is –

(a) in the case of a body corporate, the address of the registered or principal office of the body,

….”

5. The Appellant is a body corporate and, therefore, section 303(6)(a) of the 2004 Act applies to the instant reference.

6. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, referred to in section 303(6), provides that:

“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) the, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.

7. Section 7 therefore provides for a rebuttable presumption that a notice which is contained in a letter which is properly addressed, pre-paid and posted is to be deemed served at the time the letter would be delivered in the ordinary post.

8. The Respondent is also able to rely on a second set of rebuttable presumptions as to the issue and service of notices under the PA 2008 contained in regulation 15 of the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance” Regulations 2010 (the 2010 Regs). Regulation 15 provides:

“(3) The presumptions in paragraph (4) apply where notices to which section 43 applies are issued…..

(4) For the purposes of this regulation, it is presumed that –

(a) where a notice is given a date by the Regulator, it was posted or otherwise sent on that day;

(b) if a notice is posted or otherwise sent to a person’s last known or notified address, it was issued on the day on which that notice was posted or otherwise sent; and

(c) a notice was received by the person to whom it was addressed.”

9. In essence, once the Respondent has discharged the evidential burden of establishing that the relevant notice was issued and properly addressed, if an Appellant claims not to have received the relevant notice, they bear the onus of rebutting the regulation 15(4)(c) presumption that it was received by them. The presumptions have been described as strong statutory presumptions (Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited v The Pensions Regulator PEN 2020 0203).

Relevant Case Law

(i) Evidence of issue of the notice as a matter of fact

10. In J M Kamau Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2025] UKFTT 00435 (GRC) the Chamber President held that in subsequent cases the Pensions Regulator was entitled to rely on the evidence given in that case as to the system it operates for the issuing of notices such as FPNs with no further requirement to produce a witness statement detailing the processes, unless a direction is made to that effect in a given reference. No such direction was given in the current reference. However, the Chamber President added the following caveats:

(a) The ruling was predicated on the evidence given in that case continuing accurately to reflect the processes in place and it continuing to be the case that there have not been any adverse issues with the system that could cause doubt as to the reliability of the information it produces

(b) Where the Pensions Regulator intends to rely upon the evidence given in the Kamau case, this must be clearly identified in the Rule 23 response to the reference;

(c) To discharge the burden of demonstrating that the relevant was issued as a matter of fact, the Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide to the Appellant and the Tribunal screenshots from the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular Appellant; and

(d) Whilst this is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, it is not inevitable and each case will need to be determined on its own facts.

(ii) Rebuttal of the statutory presumption of service

11. In London Borough of Southwark v Akhtar [2017] UKUT 150 (LC) the Tribunal explained the effect of the presumption of receipt in the following terms:

“82. A legal presumption like the one in s.7 has the effect of reversing the burden of proof. Once the landlord has proved that the notice was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted, it has nothing further to do – unless the contrary is proved. If the contrary is provide, then the landlord must, as it were, go the long way round and actually prove service without the help of the presumption and must therefore convince the tribunal on the balance of probabilities that the notice was actually received. But it is only required to do that if the contrary is proved and not if the contrary is merely asserted”.

12. In Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited the Tribunal further emphasised that a bare denial or receipt of the relevant notice was insufficient to discharge the presumption of service.

(iii) Service requires no collaboration of reciprocal act from the intended recipient

13. In Kamau, the Chamber President found at [122] that the fact that a notice had not come into the hands of the Appellant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the notices were as a matter of law received. There was nothing in section 303 of the PA 2004 or 15(4) of the 2010 Regs which supported a conclusion that service is only effected once there is some collaboration or some reciprocal action on the part of the intended recipient. He added that:

“121. As a matter of practical reality, if this were not the case it is difficult to see how the system could sensibly function. An intended recipient could deliberately choose not to pick up mail on the assumption that some of the mail would be the bearer of bad news. In doing so, they could legitimately rebut the presumption of service”.

The Appellant’s Case

14. The Appellant asks that the FPN should be revoked because it had a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance. It states that it did not receive the CN or the reminder letters and that the breach was neither intentional nor negligent. It had been genuinely unaware of its outstanding Declaration of Compliance. As soon as it became aware it took steps to remedy the breach.

The Respondent’s Response

15. The Respondent says the Appellant's automatic-enrolment duties started on 6 April 2026 requiring a declaration of compliance by 2 March 2026. It says it sent the Appellant three reminder letters in November 2025 and February 2026 all addressed to the Appellant’s registered office. When no declaration was submitted, a Compliance Notice was issued on 11 March 2026 which required compliance by the extended deadline of 21 April 2026. The Appellant did not comply by that date, resulting ultimately in the £400 FPN dated 6 May 2026. The Appellant requested a review of the FPN on 7 May 2026, but the Respondent confirmed the notice on 13 May 2026. The Appellant completed its Declaration of Compliance on 15 May 2026.

16. The Respondent relies on the presumptions of service arising under s 303(6)(a) Pensions Act 2004, s 7 Interpretation Act 1978 and regulation 15(4) of the Employers' Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 which it states set a high bar for the Appellant to overcome in terms of evidencing that the notices were not served.

17. Both the Compliance Notice and FPN were sent to 652 Lea Bridge Road, London E10 6AP. This was the company’s registered office at Companies House.

18. The Respondent further argues that the Appellant has provided no more than a bare assertion of non-receipt which is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of service, relying on Akhter and Keith Rubbish Clearance Ltd v The Pensions Regulator PEN/2020/0203.

19. The Respondent relies on the decision of the Tribunal in Kamau in which it was held that going forward, it was entitled to rely on the evidence from Ms Cathy Doherty as detailed in paragraphs 32-55 of that decision which evidences the systems and processes for the issuing of Notices. It also relies on paragraph 101 of the decision in which it was held that when evidence of non-receipt by the Appellant is evaluated against the evidence of the Respondent’s process in issuing the notices as reliable, the balance of probabilities sways in favour of the Notices being issued.

20. The Respondent further relies on the decision in Kamau for support for the proposition that evidence is important if an Appellant is to rebut the presumptions of service. In that case, the evidence given of postal difficulties was general in nature with no enquiries made by the Appellant of the Post Office in respect of mis-deliveries. The Appellant in this case does not expressly state that the Notices were not delivered by the Respondent although it has addressed this for completeness.

21. The Respondent argues that Appellant’s grounds do not disclose a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance, Whilst it claims to have been unaware of the CN, it has not explained how it came not to receive it or the three reminder letters which were all sent to the same address. Further, it was the responsibility of the Appellant as an employer to be aware of its statutory responsibilities irrespective of any reminder from the Respondent. The Appellant also did not immediately comply when it became aware of its non-compliance and provided no explanation for the seven day delay between the receipt of the FPN and the making of its Declaration of Compliance.

22. Therefore, the Respondent argues, the Notices were both issued correctly and the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for its non-compliance.

Findings and Reasons

23. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal squarely raise the issue of whether it had or is deemed to have had knowledge of the CN, the failure to comply with which is the foundation of the FPN. That raises two discrete but related factual issues; was the CN as a matter of fact issued to the Appellant and, if so, is it deemed to have been received as a matter of law. As the Upper Tribunal held in Philip Freeman Mobile Welders Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2022] UKUT 62 (AAC:

“Arguments about whether a notice was in fact issued by post affects whether the presumption about service or receipt applies in the first place, and arguments based on lack of receipt of a notice may also shade into whether it was issued”.

24. Whilst I accept that the Appellant did not in its grounds of appeal expressly raise the issue of whether or not the CN and other correspondence had in fact been issued by the Respondent, its claims not to have knowledge of their existence should have alerted the Respondent to the need to provide the Tribunal with evidence that in this case and as a matter of fact, its processes operated in the manner detailed in the evidence of Ms Doherty in the Kamau case in relation to the issue of the CN. In particular, it was incumbent on the Respondent to provide evidence that the CN was in fact issued to the Appellant as stressed by the Upper Tribunal in Freeman. As the Tribunal in Kamau stated:

“84. General evidence as to the processes operated by The Pensions Regulator cannot, of course, demonstrate of itself that a particular notice was issued and, in my view, given the evidence at the Pension Regulator’s disposal, a bare assertion to this effect is unlikely to meet the burden on it.

85. To discharge the burden of demonstrating that a OPN, FPN or EPN was issued in any given appeal, The Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide the appellant and Tribunal with screenshots of the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular appellant before the Tribunal, as it has done in this appeal. Those screenshots, assuming they confirm the issuing of the notice in question to the proper address, taken together with the general evidence as to the IT processes operated by the Pensions Regulator is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, but that is not inevitable, as each case will need to be determined on its own facts”

25. I agree with the content of those passages. In this appeal, despite the need to discharge the burden of showing that the CN had been issued as a matter of fact, the Respondent has not produced the relevant and necessary evidence in accordance which accords with the Tribunal’s decision in Kamau. Despite the guidance provided by the Tribunal in that decision of the need to provide the screenshots of relevant tables from its IT systems relating to the particular Appellant, no such screenshots have been provided to the Tribunal in response to the appeal.

26. There is no evidence before the Tribunal on which it would be proper to conclude that the CN was issued as a matter of fact. Whilst the evidence shows that the FPN was issued and served, that cannot give rise to the inference that so too was the CN. To be satisfied that the Respondent is entitled to rely on the statutory presumptions as to service and receipt it needs case specific evidence as to the issue and posting of the relevant statutory notice as is clear from the Freeman and Akhter decisions.

27. The Upper Tribunal made it clear in Akhter that presumption contained in section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 may be relied upon only where there is evidence of posting of the relevant notice and Freeman establishes that the Regulation 15 presumptions apply only where it has been shown as a matter of fact that the notice has been issued. Unless and until that initial evidential burden is discharged, the Respondent’s contention that it issued and posted the relevant notice are no more than bare assertion which stands against the Appellant’s bare assertion. In such circumstances, there is no proper evidential basis for concluding that either party’s contention is more likely than the other’s. It is not for the Appellant to explain why it has not received a CN which the Respondent has failed to show was, as a matter of fact, issued and posted by it.

28. I have given consideration as to whether I should adjourn the determination of this appeal to provide the Respondent to provide the screenshot evidence if its possesses it, but having regard to the overriding objective set out in Rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules, I have concluded that it would not be fair and just to do so. The Respondent has been provided with the clearest possible guidance in the Kamau decision of the evidence which it needs to produce in cases where an Appellant claims not to have received one or more relevant statutory notice. The need for such evidence in this appeal should have been obvious to it and, despite the Case Management Directions of 24 July 2026 providing the opportunity to send additional evidence to the Tribunal by 11 August 2026, no screenshot evidence was provided. To delay determining the appeal to allow such evidence to be provided would not be proportionate having regard to the issues involved.

29. I therefore conclude that the Respondent has failed to provide any evidence that the CN was issued and posted to the Appellant as a matter of fact. In those circumstances, the FPN which alleges a failure to comply with a CN issued to the Appellant, has no lawful basis and further, the Appellant has a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply with it. I therefore direct that the FPN be revoked.

Signed Judge Simon Bird KC Date: 16 October 2026


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.