Administrative United Kingdom
KOH v The Secretary Of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/50663/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Taylor House
On 19 October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE REES &
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MULREADY
Between
KOH
(anonymity direction Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Nwachuku, counsel instructed by Barnes, Harrild and Dyer
For the Respondent: Ms E. Jones, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Iraq, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 31 October 2024 (but served on the Appellant on 8 January 2025), to refuse his protection claim made on 6 October 2023. As such sections 30-39 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) apply.
Anonymity Direction
2. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation available on the Tribunal’s online case management system.
4. The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return to Iraq due to his imputed political opinion, and/or as a member of a particular social group as a man at risk of honour killing, or alternatively that he is entitled to humanitarian protection on the same grounds, and/or because of the risks posed by Shia militia, and/or because of his lack of identification documentation in the form of a Civil Status Identification Document (“CSID”) or an Iraqi National Identity Document (“INID”), and/or that he would face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Iraq.
Hearing
5. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.
Papers
6. The representatives confirmed the documentary evidence and argument they were expecting us to have was contained in a stitched bundle of 198 pages, and an amended Respondent’s bundle of 71 pages filed on the morning of the hearing. Ms Nwachuku confirmed she had sufficient time to consider that additional bundle.
Preliminary issues
Ms Nwachuku raised one preliminary issue, namely that she no longer relied on paragraph 14 of the Appellant’s skeleton argument, as it included a reference to a no longer extant Country Policy and Information Note. She confirmed she would be relying instead on the more recent Country policy and information note: opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Iraq, September 2026 (“the 2026 CPIN”).
Issues in dispute
7. The following issues were in dispute between the parties:
(a) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at risk of persecution on grounds of his imputed political opinion, on the basis he had a pre-marital relationship with XZ, the daughter of a high-ranking official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”), from which his opposition to the PUK could be inferred;
(b) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at risk of persecution as a member of a particular social group as a man at risk of honour killing;
(c) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at risk of persecution on grounds of his political opinion, because of his sur place activities;
(d) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at real risk of serious harm as a result of his relationship with XZ;
(e) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at real risk of serious harm from Shia militia;
(f) whether the Appellant would on return to Iraq be at risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the ECHR”) because of his lack of and inability to obtain a CSID or INID within a reasonable time on return to Iraq;
(g) whether there would be a sufficiency of protection for him in Iraq;
(h) whether internal relocation in Iraq would be reasonable for him; and
(i) whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Iraq.
Evidence and Submissions
8. We heard oral evidence from the Appellant, given with the assistance of a Kurdish Sorani language interpreter. The Appellant confirmed that they could understand one another and that he was comfortable communicating with the interpreter.
9. We heard oral submissions from both representatives.
10. We have considered all of the documentary evidence and argument, and oral evidence and argument, whether or not we refer to it specifically in this Decision.
Legal Framework
11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022, pursuant to section 32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, we must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 we must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a Refugee Convention reason?
(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?
12. If so, we must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) the Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(d) there would not be sufficient protection available; and
(e) the Appellant could not internally relocate.
13. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.
14. To succeed on grounds there are very significant obstacles to his integration in Iraq, the Appellant must establish this on the balance of probabilities. His position was that this issue rose and fell with the protection claim.
Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a Convention reason?
Imputed Political Opinion
15. Ms Jones confirmed the Respondent’s position that at its height there was the Convention reason of imputed political opinion.
16. We accept that at its height, the Appellant’s case establishes the existence of the Convention reason of imputed political opinion, for the reasons argued on his behalf.
Political Opinion
17. We accept also that at its height the Appellant’s case establishes the Convention reason of political opinion, because of his claim to good faith sur place activities in the UK.
Particular Social Group
18. The issue of whether a man at risk of honour killing can, for that reason, form part of a particular social group was in dispute.
19. The Country policy and information note: Iraq Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq, July 2024 includes the following:
2.2.3 Male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes (based on their involvement in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female) are not considered to form a particular social group (PSG) within the meaning of the Refugee Convention. This is because while they do share a common background that cannot be changed in that they have compromised the familial ‘honour’ of the females’ family, they do not have a distinct identity. This is due to differing notions of male and female honour, the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society and a lack of evidence to suggest that male potential victims of ‘honour’ crimes are perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
18. There were no arguments made to the contrary on the Appellant’s behalf. We are therefore not satisfied that even at its height, the Appellant’s case establishes his membership of a particular social group as a man at risk of honour killing.
Does the Appellant fear persecution on grounds of his imputed political opinion?
Parties’ Respective Positions
20. The Appellant’s position is that he had been consistent as to the core of his account: he had a pre-marital relationship with XZ, who is the daughter of a high ranking PUK official. The Appellant and XZ were seen by her cousin being physically affectionate to one another in a café. The cousin violently attacked the Appellant. The Appellant left Iraq as soon as he could, fearing he would be killed if he stayed, having violated the honour of XZ and her family. He would be at risk on return throughout the entirety of Iraq, from the family and their extended network.
21. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s account lacks credibility, because of a lack of evidence where it could reasonably have been provided, multiple inconsistencies in the core of his account including as to who the Appellant feared, his method of travel, who arranged his journey, his use of his passport, the chronology of his alleged flight from Iraq, and the circumstances surrounding his alleged relationship with XZ, along with a failure to claim asylum in either of the two safe countries he passed through on his way to the UK.
Consideration
Café
22. The Appellant’s account is that his need for asylum began with his being seen by XZ’s cousin being physically affectionate to XZ in a café.
23. In his asylum interview the Appellant stated that “she was on my lap and I was kissing her”, when the cousin saw them. The interviewer put to him that a café is a public place without private area. The Appellant replied that there was a section in the café where the boys and girls can sit, he kissed her in that section, and the cousin looked like he followed her. The interviewer said that they did not believe a girl would be sitting on the Appellant’s lap in a public place in Sulaymaniyah. The Appellant then stated that when they went inside he hugged her and kissed her and it was not crowded, they were not sitting, he meant he was just hugging her, because it was her birthday he hugged and kissed her.
24. In his witness statement the Appellant set out that “Whether she was sitting on my lap or we were standing while hugging these are minor variations in description, not contradictions.”
25. In oral evidence he was asked if it was right that she was sat on his lap. The Appellant’s answer was “no, I mean she was not sitting on my lap but we were holding hands, we were so close to each other, we were exchanging our feelings but she was not sitting on my lap, this is not a place for that.” He was then asked whether it was right they were hugging and kissing. The Appellant’s answer was “probably I have done that before we were seen by this person, but the moment we were seen by this person we were just holding hands.”
26. The Appellant’s accounts of what took place in the café that gave rise to the attack by the cousin is inconsistent.
Affection in public
27. The Respondent argued that the Appellant’s account of affection in a café was inconsistent with external evidence that young, unmarried men and women were not allowed to hug and kiss in an open public place, and were not allowed to have any physical contact.
28. The external evidence is cited in a footnote to the refusal letter. It consists of a European Country Of Origin Information Network response to a query on the social norms that regulate romantic relationships between (unmarried) men and women in Sulaymaniyah. It is based on interviews conducted in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah from 22 to 30 April 2018. It includes that “two sources noted a change among youths in terms of sexual relationships”, that young couples, especially in educated families, who have had a premarital affair, might get away with it as long as the family approves of the relationship and a marriage is arranged.” It includes also that “it is the norm in Kurdish society that men embark on illicit sexual relationships,” and that “in Kurdistan’s conservative and largely traditional society, family members of the opposite sex do not publicly display physical affection, and certainly do not kiss openly. Yet, Kurdish society is changing. Young people travel, they watch foreign movies. And in many parks young couples are often seen sitting together… many of them also kiss – mostly in secret.”
29. The Appellant’s evidence is not inconsistent with that external evidence, particularly given it is now 8 years old. His evidence was that Iraqi society is conservative, and in most public settings, it is not culturally acceptable for unmarried couples to show affection openly. However that in recent years, especially in urban areas such as Sulaymaniyah, there are cafés and restaurants with private or secluded sections designed for couples or individuals seeking privacy. These sections are intentionally separated from the main area to offer discretion and are commonly used by young couples who wish to meet out of public view.
Who the Appellant fears
30. In his screening interview the Appellant stated that he was in a relationship with someone (XZ) whose partner was powerful and held high military rank in a political party in Iraq. The partner discovered the Appellant’s relationship, and the Appellant had to leave. He stated then that he feared XZ’s family. In his asylum interview he stated that he had a fear of the cousin of XZ, and that the main threat was from her family, who want to kill him. These answers are broadly consistent.
31. In his witness statement the Appellant added that XZ’s father is a high-ranking PUK official from a powerful tribal family. This is not inconsistent with his earlier answers about fears from her family, given her father is part of her family, and he was not asked in interview for the specific member/s of the family he feared.
32. In his witness statement, the Appellant set out that he mentioned XZ’s cousin as the person who physically confronted him and issued threats after seeing them together. “However, I did not claim that he was the only person I feared. Rather, I expanded on the context both [XZ’s] partner and cousin are involved, and both are connected to the PUK. These individuals are known to be armed, powerful, and able to act with impunity. I named XY and the son of XY, both of whom are linked to the PUK and known to be capable of serious violence.”
33. In oral evidence, the Appellant said that he mentioned the partner and the cousin because they confronted him, and they saw XZ with him. He also said that the partner and the cousin were one person. It was put to him that his witness statement makes reference to two people – the partner and the cousin – and he said that the other person who saw him was the partner and the cousin, the same person, but he also fears from other cousins. These answers are inconsistent with his earlier evidence.
Mode of transport from Iraq to Turkey
34. We are not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the Appellant’s account of his journey from Iraq to Turkey undermines his credibility. The answer recorded in the screening interview in October 2023 was that he travelled by boat from Iraq to Turkey. We note he corrected that at the earliest opportunity, at the start of his second interview, in October 2024, stating that he had travelled by bus, not boat. His explanation is that there must have been an interpretation error or misunderstanding. That is a plausible explanation, particularly in light of the geography of Iraq and Turkey as regards travel between them by boat as opposed to by land.
Journey organisers
35. We are not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the Appellant stating in his screening interview that his journey was arranged by his father and his brother-in-law, and in his asylum interview that it was arranged by his brother-in-law, is an inconsistency undermining his credibility. The Appellant’s evidence was that both were involved, his father in encouraging his departure and advising the family to help, and the brother-in-law dealing with the smuggler and arranging the logistics, and that he referred to his brother-in-law more often in the detailed interview as he had the more active involvement. We accept that evidence as it is plausible and sufficiently detailed.
Passport
36. The Respondent argues the Appellant was inconsistent in his screening interview, stating that he used his passport to leave Iraq and travel to Turkey, and later in the same interview that he did not use his passport. This is incorrect. The later answer is to the question of whether the Appellant used his passport not to leave Iraq, but to enter the UK. The two answers are not inconsistent. In his witness statement and oral evidence the Appellant was consistent that he travelled through Iraq and to Turkey using his passport, and that in Turkey the smuggler took his passport and never returned it.
37. However there are other inconsistencies in the evidence before us regarding how the Appellant came to have his passport with him at the time he fled Iraq.
38. In his asylum interview the Appellant was asked what happened after the cousin beat him in the café, and his answer was that he called his father and told him what happened, feared to go back to Ranya because her cousin and her father have power and high ranking in the PUK, so he left for Hawler city. He was asked why they didn’t find him in the few hours after the incident, and he replied that “after calling my father I left straightaway.”
39. Later in the interview he was asked how he was able to escape without his CSID, and he replied that he had his passport. He was asked if he was carrying his passport when he kissed XZ and he replied, “After I called my father I went straight to the place I was living in Sulaymaniyah and picked up my passport.”
40. This is inconsistent with his earlier answer, and the explanation given in oral evidence that the place he was living was his student accommodation not his family home does not rectify that.
Checkpoints
41. The Appellant’s witness statement sets out that if the screening interview states that he did not use his passport, this may have been due to a misunderstanding, a recording error or “perhaps I was referring to not voluntarily presenting my passport at every checkpoint, given that I was travelling with the assistance of a smuggler and wanted to avoid suspicion.”
42. In cross examination it was put to the Appellant that he had said he had stopped at checkpoints, and he was asked whether it was correct he had been able to do this without a CSID card. His answer was “what do you mean the check point?” He was directed to his witness statement, where he raised the issue of checkpoints as we set out above, and asked whether he passed through checkpoints when leaving Iraq. His answer was “I don’t know what you mean. I was not asked about IDs at a checkpoint. Where in Iraq do you mean?” He was again reminded that this was in his witness statement, when he was describing his journey from Iraq to Turkey. He was asked again if he passed through checkpoints when leaving Iraq. His answer was “yes I passed through checkpoints when I left.” He was asked whether anyone asked him to show his CSID card. His reply was “which checkpoint do you mean?” Once it was clarified to him that he was being asked about the checkpoints he went through as he was leaving Iraq, he said, “yes, they asked me.” He was then asked whether he presented his CSID card, and he said “yes.” He was then asked if he had left Iraq with his CSID card, and he said, “I had my passport.”
43. This evidence is variously inconsistent, avoidant and vague.
The Appellant’s Parents
44. In the Appellant’s asylum interview, on 9 October 2024, he stated that his parents were ok, he was in contact with them every two months.
45. In the Appellant’s witness statement of 17 July 2025 he stated he had not had any contact with his parents since his departure from Iraq, which was in September 2023.
46. In oral evidence he said he was in contact with his parents. When asked to explain why his witness statement stated otherwise, he said it was because he lost contact with his parents but is now back in contact with them. This does not explain why in his interview on 9 October 2024, he said he was in contact with them, which was after he left Iraq but before he provided a witness statement claiming not to have had contact with them since he left.
Lack of Evidence
47. We remind ourselves that there is no requirement for an asylum claimant to provide corroborative evidence. However, we are persuaded by arguments made for the Respondent that the Appellant’s credibility is undermined by the lack of evidence where, if his account were true, such evidence would be straightforward to provide. There is no photograph of XZ despite the Appellant’s oral evidence that “I only have a photo or two with her” which does suggest the existence of at least one photograph of them together.
48. The Appellant claims their communication took place on Snapchat, which does not have an automatic message saving function and so we accept their messages would not be available. However her Snapchat profile should still be available and would be useful evidence to the Tribunal, but has not been provided. The Appellant has also taken and relied upon screenshots taken from Facebook on his mobile phone, albeit without metadata (discussed below), and could have done the same with Snapchat.
49. There is no witness statement from the Appellant’s father or mother, despite his current evidence that he is in contact with them and his father in particular could provide important evidence as to the immediate aftermath of the claimed café incident. There is no witness statement from the Appellant’s brother-in-law nor evidence they have lost contact, and he too could provide important evidence as to the motivation for and method of the Appellant’s departure from Iraq.
50. There is no evidence that XZ’s family are anything to do with the PUK, despite the Appellant stating that if such evidence were needed he could get it. In his screening interview he was asked whether he had any documents or other evidence relevant to his claim, and he said “no”. He was asked whether he intended to have additional documents sent to him from Iraq, and he said, “yes, maybe in the future I can provide something.” His position now is not that he could not provide evidence of XZ’s family’s involvement with the PUK, but that his solicitor did not ask him to. In circumstances in which he is an educated man, and was made aware the day after his arrival to the UK that he could provide documents or other evidence in support of his asylum claim, we do not find this a compelling reason for his failure to do so on this point.
Section 8, Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004
51. In his 2023 interview the Appellant was asked if there was any reason he did not claim asylum on his way to the UK. The answer recorded was “Turkey they hate Kurdish I couldn’t stay there and in France and Italy the language was difficult and as I speak English it was easier for me to be in the UK.” When asked if there was any reason he could not be returned to one of those countries, he gave essentially the same answer.
52. In his July 2025 witness statement the Appellant stated that he was under the complete control of the agent, was warned not to draw attention to himself in transit countries, and had no freedom to approach any asylum authority.
53. In oral evidence when it was put to him that he had given a different reason in interview for not claiming asylum in Italy or France, he accepted that he did mention English was easier for him, but maintained that he did not say that was the reason he did not claim asylum in Italy or France. This is not consistent with his two interview answers, both given in response to direct questions about why he did not claim in those countries, and why he could not be returned to those countries.
Findings
54. We have stepped back and considered the totality of the Appellant’s account, and all of the evidence in the round. We have reminded ourselves that an Appellant may lack credibility on some aspects of their account without this being fatal to their asylum claim. Having done so we find the Appellant is not credible as to the core of his account.
55. Whilst we have found parts of his evidence credible, as we set out above, and have not found all of the Respondent’s challenges persuasive, it is nonetheless the case that on material matters the Appellant’s evidence variously lacks detail, is internally and externally inconsistent, and implausible. It is notable also that his evidence changed on a number of occasions, as set out above, when he was probed on particular points and it became apparent his earlier evidence was no longer of assistance to him.
56. We are not satisfied there is sufficient evidence before us to establish that XZ exists. Even were we to give the Appellant the benefit of the doubt and find that XZ is a real person, we are not satisfied there is sufficient evidence to find he had a relationship with her as claimed, nor that they were discovered by her cousin/partner or cousin and partner, as the case may be, as claimed, nor that the Appellant was violently attacked by this person, nor that this family have the links claimed to the PUK. We consider the Appellant’s account of the relationship is a fabrication designed to bolster an unmeritorious asylum claim. We are therefore not satisfied that the Appellant fears persecution because of his imputed political opinion.
Does the Appellant fear persecution on grounds of his political opinion?
57. This part of the claim is based on the Appellant’s sur place activities.
58. The Appellant claims to have engaged in political activities in the UK demonstrating his opposition to the PUK and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (“KDP”). In his asylum interview he said he had attended two demonstrations here against the PUK. In oral evidence he said he had now attended seven or eight but could not remember exactly. He has provided photographs of himself outside the Iraqi embassy, with other people. In one batch of photos he is wearing a black t-shirt, in the other he is wearing a black t-shirt with a jacket over the top. We are going to give him the benefit of the doubt and accept that this shows he has been outside the Iraqi embassy with other people on two occasions. In cross-examination he agreed he was just a member of the crowd at these demonstrations and did not have a specific role. His evidence was that he was assisting things but was not a member.
59. The Appellant has provided also some screenshots of what he says are his Facebook activities, including certified translations of them which are consistent with his claimed political beliefs. The Appellant’s position is that members of the PUK are already looking for him, and as his Facebook account is in his own name, it is plausible that they would be able to find that, see that he is demonstrating against them in the UK, and this would place him at additional risk.
60. A difficulty for the Appellant is that these screenshots are not accompanied by the full download of metadata, which the Appellant acknowledges in his witness statement of July 2025, but argues these materials “accurately reflect my genuine political activity and involvement in anti-regime and anti-party (PUK and KDP) demonstrations. These activities were conducted publicly and have been shared on my Facebook account, which includes my name, images clearly showing my face, and anti-regime slogans. I am willing and able to submit further evidence.” The Appellant has not provided further evidence to include the metadata. When asked about this in cross examination he said he was told “the other day” he should take screenshots and send them to his solicitors, so he thought this was the way this evidence should be presented. This is inconsistent with his witness statement.
61. The Appellant argues weight can be placed on this evidence because the account is public, and in his own name.
62. As set out by the Upper Tribunal in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC):
Social media evidence is often limited to production of printed photographs, without full disclosure in electronic format. Production of a small part of a Facebook or social media account, for example, photocopied photographs, may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when such a wealth of wider information, including a person's locations of access to Facebook and full timeline of social media activities, readily available on the "Download Your Information" function of Facebook in a matter of moments, has not been disclosed.
It is easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data. For the same reason, where a decision maker does not have access to an actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value.
63. The full date is not clear on all of the screenshots provided, and without the metadata we do not have evidence before us as to whether and when the Facebook account was set up, or the details of any other Facebook activities by the Appellant, and how they fit with the chronology of the Appellant’s arrival to the UK, asylum claim, and receipt of the letter refusing that claim. This is despite it being readily available on Facebook, and no credible explanation being provided for it not being put before us. In those circumstances, noting the ease with which evidence like this can be manipulated, we consider this evidence to have very little evidential value beyond the photographs of the Appellant, which we consider above.
64. There is a marked lack of detail in the Appellant’s claims to political activism. There is nothing before us, for example, as to whether he was politically active in Iraq before his arrival to the UK, what motivates him to take part in these political activities now, what he hopes to achieve by these political activities, how he found out about the demonstrations, the dates and times on which they took place, and whether he intends to continue his political activities on return to Iraq. All of which is evidence that would be straightforward for him to provide were he telling the truth.
65. The 2026 CPIN sets out that political opposition continues to operate within the KRI. Opposition parties participate in elections, hold parliamentary seats and can publicly criticise the ruling parties. Supporters, members and individuals engaged in low-level political activities on behalf of political parties in the KRI are, in general, unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.
66. Having considered the evidence in the round we are not satisfied the Appellant’s political activities here are such that would have brought him to the adverse attention of the PUK or the KDP such that would generate risk to him on return. We are also not satisfied on the evidence before us that his activities are a good faith expression of genuinely held political beliefs, and so expecting him to delete his Facebook account and cease his activities on return to Iraq does not fall foul of the principles in HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2010] UKSC 31.
67. In light of the foregoing, we are not satisfied the Appellant fears persecution on grounds of his political opinion on return to Iraq.
68. The asylum appeals are therefore dismissed, there being no subjective fear established on the basis of either Convention reason. We now consider the humanitarian protection appeal.
Would the Appellant be at real risk of serious harm as a result of his relationship with XZ?
69. For the reasons we set out above, we are not satisfied the Appellant would be at real risk of serious harm as a result of his relationship with XZ.
Would the Appellant be at risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR because of his lack of and inability to obtain a Civil Status Identification Document (“CSID”) or an Iraqi National Identity Document (“INID”) within a reasonable time on return to Iraq?
Parties’ Respective Positions
70. The Appellant’s position is that he is unable to obtain a CSID or INID from within the UK or within a reasonable time following removal. He no longer has access to any of his original documentation, and it is reasonably likely that his local Civil Status Affairs (CSA) Office in Iraq has migrated to the INID system. As a result, he would be required to attend the CSA Office in person in order to obtain an INID. Given the real risk of arrest, torture, and serious harm upon return based on his past experiences and the accusations made against him he cannot safely travel to the relevant office to obtain replacement documentation. Furthermore, he has no family in Iraq who could assist him with this process, leaving him entirely undocumented and at severe risk of destitution and harm. The Appellant cannot be expected to travel to his local CSA office in Iraq to re-document himself, as he is currently undocumented and has no family who can assist him.
71. The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s family have his CSID card and could provide it to him, given they are still in contact. The Respondent’s position is also that Iraqi nationals in the UK have been able to apply for and obtain INIDs through the Iraqi Embassy in London since October 2024, appointments are available in London for INID applications; an Iraqi passport may not be essential in all cases; procedures exist for those who have lost documents; and individuals may contact the Embassy for clarification regarding their circumstances. The Appellant has provided no evidence that he has contacted the Iraqi Embassy, attempted to obtain documentation, investigated replacement procedures, or exhausted available avenues.
72. The Respondent submits that the Appellant has therefore failed to demonstrate that he is unable to obtain an INID, and his evidence is limited to assertions that he lacks documents and has lost contact with family members.
Consideration
73. In his asylum interview on 9 October 2024 the Appellant was asked, “you said you left the ID cards at home so would you be able to obtain the ID card as you are in touch with your parents?” His response was “yes, I can do that.”
74. In his witness statement of July 2025 the Appellant set out “While I stated that my family held some of my documents at the time I left Iraq, I have not had any contact with them since my departure. I cannot now access or rely on them to assist me with obtaining civil documentation.”
75. In oral evidence, as set out above, the Appellant stated he had now resumed contact with his parents. In cross examination the Appellant was asked whether he had asked his parents to retrieve his identity documents for him. His answer was “they said to me that they had an ID but to retrieve my passport I haven’t asked them.” He was asked to clarify the position and he said, “I might have an ID left at home, but for my passport, I might be required personally so therefore I haven’t asked them.”
Findings
76. We are satisfied the Appellant is currently in contact with his parents. We consider it unlikely he was in contact with them at the time of his asylum interview, lost contact with them by the time of his witness statement, and resumed contact with them by the time of the oral hearing, there being no evidence before us as to why or how this took place. In any event, his current evidence is that he is in contact with his parents. We accept that and we are satisfied he is currently in contact with them.
77. As to whether they have his CSID, his initial evidence was that they had it. This changed in the oral hearing to that they “might” have it. We were given no explanation for the change. We are not satisfied there has been a change. We consider it most likely the Appellant has now understood that if his family cannot provide him with his CSID, he is in a stronger position in this appeal. We are satisfied he was telling the truth when asked about this initially in interview. There is no evidence before us that the Appellant’s parents have disposed of or misplaced his CSID. In those circumstances, combined with how important the CSID is to a person’s ability to safely move throughout Iraq, we are satisfied his parents still have his CSID.
78. There is nothing before us to suggest there has been a breakdown in relations between the Appellant and his parents such that they would be indifferent to his coming to harm. There is nothing before us to suggest there is any reason they could not bring his CSID to him within a reasonable time of his arriving to Iraq. We are therefore satisfied that his parents would bring his CSID to him within a reasonable time, and that this would mitigate any risks of harm he would otherwise face due to the lack of a CSID.
Would the Appellant be at real risk of serious harm from Shia militia?
Parties’ Respective Positions
79. The Appellant’s position is that he would face serious harm as he would be undocumented and lack a support network. In Baghdad, he would belong to an ethnic minority community (as a Sunni Kurd), he does not speak Arabic, he would lack external support and would be at risk from Shia militias.
80. The Appellant’s position is that applying a fact-sensitive, sliding scale assessment, as required by paragraph 5 of the headnote in SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG)) Iraq [2022] UKUT 110, the Appellant would be at risk of serious harm in his home area, KRI and Baghdad, thus, he qualifies for humanitarian protection and his appeal should be allowed.
81. The Respondent’s position is that levels of indiscriminate violence in the IKR are low and do not present a real risk of serious harm, and as the Appellant would have his identity documentation, he would have no issues getting around Iraq.
Findings
82. As set out in SMO, the intensity of the conflict in Iraq is not such that, as a general matter, there are substantial grounds for believing that any civilian returned to Iraq, solely on account of his presence there, faces a real risk of being subjected to indiscriminate violence amounting to serious harm within the scope of Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. The exceptions to this general conclusion apply to those that would be returning to a small mountainous area north of Baiji in Salah al-Din, in which ISIL continue to exercise doctrinal control; and to the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din in which there are complex ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region meaning a fact-sensitive, sliding scale assessment is required, with reference to relevant factors identified in SMO, to establish whether the return of an individual to such an area would be contrary to Article 15(c).
83. The Appellant’s home area is Sulaymaniyah. We are satisfied he would be returning there, most likely via Baghdad. We take judicial notice that Sulaymaniyah is not in Salah al-Din, nor in Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, or Ninewah. As per SMO“Baghdad is generally safe for ordinary civilians but whether it is safe for a particular returnee is a question of fact in the individual case. There are no on-entry sponsorship requirements for Baghdad but there are sponsorship requirements for residency. A documented individual of working age is likely to be able to satisfy those requirements.” There is nothing before us to suggest the Appellant would be residing in Baghdad, but were he to, as a documented individual of working age, he would be able to satisfy those requirements, notwithstanding that he is a Sunni Kurd and does not speak Arabic.
84. We are therefore not persuaded the Appellant is at real risk of serious harm from Shia militia on return to Iraq.
Sufficiency of Protection and Internal Relocation
85. In light of our findings above, these questions do not arise. There is no need for protection from a risk that has not been established, nor to internally relocate away from an area in which a risk has not been established.
Very Significant Obstacles
86. The Appellant’s case was that this rose and fell with his protection claim. We are not satisfied to the balance of probabilities that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Iraq. He is an educated man, with no evidence of significant health problems, with timely access to his documentation, and with a family to return to.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is dismissed.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including his name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
We have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signed
M. Mulready O. Rees
First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready First-tier Tribunal Judge Rees
27 October 2026 27 October 2026
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