Administrative United Kingdom

Alicja Balcerak, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Wandsworth

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2727 (Admin)

AC-2026-LON-004271

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

SITTING IN LONDON

Issued: 23rd October 2026

Handed down: 28th October 2026

Before:

FORDHAM J

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Between:

THE KING (on the application of
ALICJA BALCERAK)
Claimant
– and –
LONDON BOROUGH OF WANDSWORTH (CHILDREN’S SERVICES DIRECTORATE) Defendant

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The Claimant appeared in person

South London Legal Partnership for the Defendant

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Approved Judgment

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FORDHAM J

FORDHAM J:

Introduction

1. In this case a question arose as to whether the Defendant had discharged its duty of candour. It is necessary and appropriate, but in the circumstances it is also sufficient, to address that question in a judgment in the public domain. The Defendant’s duty of candour and cooperation is addressed in the Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2026 at §15.3, whose contents I will not set out here. I record that the Claimant has made a belated request for anonymisation, based on protecting the safety, privacy and welfare of her children, by reference to circumstances which she identified. I declined that request, concluding that the test of necessity to derogate from open justice is not satisfied.

Thornton J’s Order of 16 September 2026

2. This case was first considered by the Immediates Judge (Thornton J) on Wednesday 16 September 2026. The Claimant had filed a Form N463 the previous day. Her claim was that the Defendant had acted unlawfully by abruptly ending, on Thursday 3 September 2026, emergency accommodation under section 17 of the Children Act 1989. The Claimant characterised that as an abrupt unlawful eviction. Her request to the Court, in the Form N463, was to order an interim injunction requiring the Defendant to provide new section 17 accommodation. The Immediates Judge wanted to ensure that the Defendant had an opportunity speedily to respond. She directed: (1) that the Defendant was to file and serve a written response by 10am on Friday 18 September 2026; and (2) that the papers were to be referred to another Judge for further consideration before the weekend.

My Order of 18 September 2026

3. The case was duly referred to me as the Immediates Judge on Friday 18 September 2026. The Defendant had filed its response, at 09:45 that day, ahead of the 10am deadline in Thornton J’s Order. I received the papers at 10:21. I considered them and made an Order at 11:36. I refused the application for interim relief. I will set out below the reasons which I gave. They were contained within my Order. I am underlining a sentence within the reasons, because it is relevant to this judgment.

(1) Thornton J rightly allowed the Defendant a brief window to reply, and rightly required a Judge to deal with the application urgently today, ahead of the weekend. I do not consider that there is a viable legal challenge (serious issue to be tried). My decision does not turn on the height of the threshold. Emergency short-term accommodation (26.8.26 to 1.9.26) as a safety net to allow the Claimant to engage with the system which addresses homelessness cases, following her non-engagement and non-attendance on 14.8.26 and 19.8.26. The evidence is that non-engagement, and her non-attendance continues (9.9.26). The Defendant is aware of the children’s circumstances and they have been seen (2.9.26).

(2) It was plainly lawful to deal with the Claimant under the homelessness system, and to expect her to engage with that. The evidence is that she has not done so. A signed witness statement (18.9.26) tells me that latest emails (16.9.26 and 17.9.26) were unanswered. It is entirely inappropriate for this Court to require the Defendant to provide ongoing housing. That jumps the queue, takes valuable resources, and sidesteps the homelessness system. The Defendant’s solicitors’ cogent submissions (paras 19-25) are a complete answer. And, as they explain (§26), the Claimant should engage with Housing Services immediately. Engagement will allow decision-makers to make informed decisions based on need and applicable criteria, while safeguarding the children as appropriate.

The Defendant’s response

4. That underlined sentence within my reasons was a point which I had derived from relying on a passage within a three-page witness statement signed and dated 18 September 2026 from a social worker (Ms Khan). That witness statement formed part of the Defendant’s written response, alongside the submissions written by the Defendant’s solicitors. Again, because of its relevance, I will underline a sentence from the witness statement:

On 16/09/2026, an email was sent to Ms Balcerak requesting information regarding the family's current accommodation, any further contact with Housing, whether a new homelessness application had been made, whether Housing’s requested documents had been obtained and how the children’s educational needs were being met. This communication was followed by a further email on 17/09/2026 requesting confirmation of where the family were residing. At the time of preparing this statement I have not received a substantive response to those enquiries.

The candour question

5. The question which has arisen is whether the sentence in the witness statement discharged the Defendant’s duty of candour.

How the question came to light

6. What happened next was this. The Claimant emailed the Court at 10:59 on 18 September 2026, in reply to the Defendant’s response, which the Defendant had sent to her. She identified the sentence in the witness statement and complained that it was incorrect and misleading. She referred to a response which she had sent to the Defendant on 17 September 2026 at 16:08. I was not made aware of the Claimant’s 10:59 email until 12:13, by which time my Order had been sealed and sent out.

Impact on my substantive decision

7. The first and most pressing step for me to take was this. I needed to consider whether the Claimant’s reply, including her point about her email of 16:08 on 17 September 2026, materially undermined the substantive decision which I had made refusing interim relief, and the reasons which I had given for that decision. Having reconsidered the papers in the case, I decided that there was nothing which undermined my substantive decision. I made a second Order dated 18 September 2026, explaining that the refusal of interim relief stood, and that the substance of my reasons for having refused interim relief continued to apply.

Process

8. Although my substantive decision was unaffected and my refusal of interim relief stood, there remained the question whether the Defendant had breached its duty of candour, as the Claimant contended. I gave directions for evidence and submissions from the Defendant, and a reply from the Claimant. I decided that resolution of the question did not require an oral hearing.

Assessment

9. I have come to the conclusion that the Defendant did breach its duty of candour:

i) The breach occurred because of the combination of: (a) the Defendant stating in the witness statement that it had not received any “substantive response”; and (b) the Defendant failing to exhibit, and draw attention to the existence of, those communications which had been received from the Claimant.

ii) It was open to the Defendant to make the point that it did not consider the Claimant’s communications to constitute a “substantive” response, because they did not provide the information which it had requested. It was not, however, open to the Defendant to make no reference to the response which it had received. Nor was it open to the Defendant to fail to exhibit such response as it had received, so the Court could consider for itself whether it was satisfied that the response was not “substantive”.

iii) The risks arising from these failures are illustrated by the fact that I picked up on what was said in the witness statement, when I made my observations about “unanswered” emails, in the context of non-engagement by the Claimant.

iv) The failures were aggravated in seriousness because: (i) the papers needed to be considered urgently and at speed by an Immediates Judge; and (ii) the urgent timetable in Thornton J’s order did not permit a right of reply for the Claimant and effectively gave the Defendant the last word. There was a special responsibility on the Defendant to present the picture with complete transparency and fairness.

10. Having said that, there are other relevant considerations which warrant acknowledgment by the Court. It is right to see the breach of the duty of candour in the light of these features.

i) I am satisfied that there was no intention by the Defendant or Ms Khan to mislead the Court, nor to score a unilateral advantage behind the back of the Claimant. The word “substantive” was chosen deliberately, although it was not explained. The Defendant and Ms Khan understood that the Claimant’s communications had been sent or cc’d to the Court, and thought a Judge could join the dots. The documents which the Defendant filed with the Court were promptly sent to the Claimant.

ii) The Defendant and Ms Khan were putting together materials at speed, against a tight deadline.

iii) The Defendant has acknowledged, in response to directions, that there was – in the contents of the witness statements and exhibits – a serious shortcoming, for which an unreserved apology has been extended. It is appropriate for the Court to accept that acknowledgment and apology.

Statement of truth

11. Ms Khan’s witness statement of 18 September 2026 did not have, at the end of the document, the conventional verificatory statement of truth (see CPR 22.1(1)(b)). However, it was signed, and its contents did record Ms Khan’s belief that the facts stated were true, and her understanding that it could be a contempt to make a false statement, in a document verified by a statement of truth, without an honest belief in its truth. I am satisfied that no separate concern arises, in the circumstances, from this feature.

Costs or compensation

12. The Claimant has invited the Court to order her costs at litigant in person rates (CPR 46.5) and/or to entertain the pursuit by her of a claim for damages, or a “summary restitution order”. I decline both of these invitations. There is no trigger or traction for any monetary order of any nature. The Claimant is seeking, by reference to the candour question, to recover the expenses from what she maintains was an abrupt lawful eviction. But I have rejected her claim, that there was an unlawful abrupt eviction on its substantive merits.She had no viable such claim, for the reasons I explained in my Order. The candour breach does not supply viability of such a claim. Nor can it be said that the breach of the duty of candour caused the Claimant any loss or damage, nor the incidence of any legal costs. The duty of candour is not, in any event, an actionable duty which sounds in damages. There is no potential cause of action. There is no application, and I am making no Order. Even if I had a discretion to award a monetary remedy, or costs or expenses, that course could not be appropriate as a judicial response, in all the circumstances which I have described. What is appropriate is for me to release this judgment, which speaks for itself.

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our administrative lawyer in Paris.


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